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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyses the influence of Francoist agrarian policy on agricultural output in 
Spain in the 1939-55 period. The focus is on the wheat, olive and wine sectors, and 
special attention is given to small-scale farmers. Agrarian policy included price-fixing, 
production quotas and rationing of consumption. In the historical literature, this policy 
is often blamed for the post-Civil War decline in output. Yet, the present analysis 
states that this interpretation is erroneous.
Producers and consumers circumvented intervention by creating a black market. 
When earnings from this source are included, value of output per unit of land remained 
close to pre-war levels. This also holds for small-scale farmers, although they 
benefited less from the black market than large-scale farmers did. It is then concluded 
that the decrease in wheat output was caused by lack of work animals and fertilisers 
rather than official prices. Intervention in the wheat sector was therefore desirable from 
a social viewpoint, but the system could have been improved.
Average olive oil output was only below the pre-war level immediately after the 
war. Consequently, state intervention was unnecessary after 1942-43 and could have 
been abolished long before it was finally done in 1952. Thus, the intervention in the 
olive sector is an example of state failure.
In the wine sector, policy aimed at increasing farm prices rather than decreasing 
consumer prices. Table wine consumption declined after the war, but this was 
counteracted by higher demand for high-alcohol white wine for the production of 
brandy and industrial alcohol. The winegrowers in Toledo successfully reacted by 
increasing output of high-alcohol white wine. Yet, the strategy led to overproduction, 
and state protection was increased in 1952-53.
Consequently, state intervention had different effects on different sub-sectors. 
However, in none of the cases did output decline significantly because of the price 
policy.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis explores the relationship between political intervention in the economy and 
agrarian output in Spain between 1939 and 1955. In the 1940s and early 1950s, the 
Spanish economy was subject to widespread state intervention. This policy was driven 
by the aim of the Franco regime of achieving a high degree of economic self- 
sufficiency. In the historical literature, this economic policy has been identified as the 
main reason for Spain’s poor economic performance in the post-Civil War period.1
In the 1940s, the agrarian sector in Spain employed approximately half of the 
active population and produced more than 30 percent of GDP. An understanding of 
the economic conditions in the agrarian sector in the 1940s is, therefore, crucial for the 
interpretation of the effects of state intervention on the economic development of 
Spain. The thesis focuses on the wheat, olive and wine sectors, emphasising the 
economic impact of the intervention in geographic areas where small-scale farming 
was prevalent.
From the end of the Civil War, it was compulsory for farmers to sell almost all 
of their production to a state monopoly at fixed prices. In real terms, these were below 
the pre-war level. Furthermore, producers were to some degree obliged to cultivate 
specific crops, with minimum target levels of output for key crops. The state’s 
regulation of agriculture coincided with a significantly lower level of output than 
before the war, although the decline in output recorded in the contemporary statistics 
was partially offset by a thriving black market.2 Finally, the removal of most of these 
controls in the early 1950s coincided with an increase in output.
Since the early 1970s, it has been common in the historical literature to 
understand the relation between the economic policy and the level of agrarian 
production as one of “cause and effect”. Several influential works by Carlos Barciela 
in the early 1980s supported this interpretation.4 Mainly based on an analysis of the 
wheat sector, he argued that state intervention impeded output growth. According to 
this interpretation, the post-war decline in output was principally the result of a
1 See Sections 1.1. and 1.2.
2 Yet, the pre-war peak agrarian output was not surpassed until 1956.
3 This viewpoint was forwarded in Clavera et al (1973), which was one of the first comprehensive 
treatments of the political economy of early Francoism.
4 Barciela (1981a) was the first analysis of the Servicio Nacional de Trigo (the National Wheat Board) 
which was the state monopoly responsible for the day to day intervention vis-a-vis the farmers. The 
argument on the relation between the economic politicy and the working of the agrarian sector was 
further elaborated in subsequent works: Barciela (1981b), Barciela (1983a), Barciela (1986b), and 
Barciela and Garcia Gonzalez (1983).
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movement along the supply curve caused by the development of real prices paid to the 
farmers.
However, two important factors favoured the farmers and this calls into question 
any theory based solely on the development of official prices. First, a large black 
market existed where prices were much higher than official prices. Second, agrarian 
wages in the 1940s grew less than official prices paid to the farmers. Consequently, 
studies of the economies of individual large-scale farms tend to show that these 
experienced favourable conditions throughout the period.5 This would suggest that 
official prices were not the dominant factor in determining the rentability of farms. 
Hence, the cause-effect relation between official prices and the level of production is, 
at least, debatable.
Small-scale farmers appear to have been those who benefited the least from the 
system of intervention. Hence, one of the main goals of this thesis is to analyse the 
economic consequences of the agrarian policy for this segment.6 Focusing on the 
wheat, olive and wine sectors, the analysis is carried out at the national level and for 
the provinces of Cuenca, Jaen, and Toledo. These three crops covered a very large 
part of the post-war Spanish agrarian sector. Wheat was by far the most extensive crop 
in the period, while olives and grapes were the two most widespread perennial crops. 
While the cultivation, elaboration, commercialisation and consumption of almost all 
crops, including wheat and olives, were subject to intensive state control, this was not 
the case for the wine sector for most of the years. The analysis of the wine sector, 
therefore, makes it possible to some extent to carry out a comparative assessment of 
the impact of state intervention on the agrarian sector.
The selection of Cuenca, Jaen, and Toledo out of Spain’s 50 provinces is based 
on the importance of the three crops in each of these areas. Cuenca is situated in the 
La Mancha region between Madrid and Valencia, and in the 1940s and 1950s, the 
province was predominantly an agrarian area. Traditional southern Spanish dry-land 
crops such as cereals, grapes, and olives dominated agriculture in Cuenca, like the rest 
of La Mancha. The largest amount of land was dedicated to wheat, and in the 5 years 
preceding the Civil War Cuenca was the province with the largest average output.
5 Works forwarding this interpretation are Naredo (1981), Naredo (1983) and Naredo, Ruiz-Maya and 
Sumpsi (1977), and the viewpoint was also accepted in Simpson (1995).
6 In the historical literature, it is normally accepted that small-scale farmers fared worse in the 1940s 
than large-scale farmers. The reasons are that small-scale farmmers gained less from the development 
of agrarian wages, and had a smaller relative marketable surplus that could be sold in the black market. 
Furthermore, small-scale farmers often lacked political connections that could facilitate the selling of a 
part of the production outside the control system.
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Consequently, pre-war production was much greater than the provincial consumption. 
The social structure was characterised by very few large-scale farms and a relatively 
small proportion of landless farm labours in comparison with the south of Spain.
The second province is Jaen in Andalucia, which was Spain’s most important 
producer of olive oil in the period. The importance of the cultivation of olives makes 
the province very useful for this study. Furthermore, the social structure of the 
province can be divided in two relatively well-defined areas which both had olives as 
the main crop. This means that within a limited geographical area it is possible to 
assess differences in the economic consequences of the agrarian policy for small and 
large-scale farmers cultivating the same crop.
Toledo is the last province and is located in the La Mancha region, which in the 
1940s was the largest wine-producing area in Spain. Before the war, approximately 
six percent of the national production of wine came from Toledo, and grape 
cultivation was widespread among the small-scale farmers.
This thesis could have been restricted to a single province where all three crops 
were grown, but the use of several provinces compensates for the paucity of available 
sources. The Franco regime did not allow the existence of non-official organisations. 
Consequently, it was the central administration or other official organisations that 
produced almost all sources on the agrarian sector. Since all published material was 
censored before publication, printed reports are often poor in factual information 
and official publications dealing with agriculture are mainly concerned with 
technical aspects. A further obstacle for the investigator is that much unpublished 
material has never made it to the relevant archives, making what is available on the 
three provinces somewhat uneven. Spreading the scope to three provinces has 
therefore two main advantages: that the analysis covers a wider geographic area, and 
that there are increased possibilities of finding material for the different sub-sectors.
Since it is the aim of this thesis to explore the relationship between the political 
intervention in the economy and agrarian production, the conditions for the small- 
scale farmers cannot be seen as an isolated phenomenon. Several chapters are 
therefore devoted to the treatment of questions dealing with the agrarian sector at the 
national level. These chapters are important in their own right, as their findings make 
a significant contribution to the debate on the relation between state intervention and 
agrarian output. Yet, their conclusions also serve as an essential background to the 
analyses at the local level.
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This thesis is organised in nine chapters. The first offers a review o f the existing 
literature on the subject. As an introduction, the chapter starts with a short outline o f 
the general economic development in the 1940s. This is followed by a detailed 
discussion o f the literature on the agrarian sector.
The second chapter starts with a theoretical framework for the analysis o f state 
intervention in the production and distribution o f  foodstuffs. The discussion deals with 
the case for and against state intervention in relation to the question o f economic 
efficiency versus social welfare. The theory is then applied to the policies o f a number 
o f states during World War II, illuminating the range o f possibilities that were open to 
the Franco ^ouer^r^e^-V-
The next two chapters establish the broader national context for the provincial 
case studies that follow. Chapter 3 examines the conditions governing the official, the 
parallel and the black market for wheat. This includes a discussion o f  whether it could 
have been possible to increase significantly the output o f  both wheat and agrarian 
production as a whole. Chapter 4 looks at the market for olives and olive oil, much in 
the same way as the chapter on wheat. The reason for having separate chapters on the 
two crops is that in spite o f  state regulation being relatively similar in the two cases 
the consequences in many ways turn out to be rather different.
Chapter 5 marks the change from the national to the provincial level. It gives a 
background description o f the environmental conditions as well as the composition o f 
the agrarian sectors in Cuenca, Jaen and Toledo. These are then treated separately in 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8. In each o f these, the relevant sub-sectors are the core o f  the study, 
but within the context o f the whole o f  the agrarian sector.
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis with a general evaluation o f the results o f the 
preceding chapters. It is argued that the post-war level o f  agrarian output was not 
simply the product o f  a movement along the supply curve caused by falling official 
prices. In the case o f  wheat, the post-war decline in output was the outcome o f a 
shift o f  the supply curve to the left caused by a lack o f  work animals and fertilisers. 
These factors led to a significantly smaller cultivated area and a simultaneous decline 
in yields. Consequently, the average farm income declined while the economic 
outcome for the individual farmer depended on his ability and/or luck to maintain a 
stable cultivated area and selling a part o f his production in the black market. 
However, when black market earnings are included, the value o f  production in real 
terms per unit o f cultivated land does not appear to have been significantly smaller in
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the 1940s than before the Civil War. This result makes it relevant to analyse how the 
problem of supply was solved in the beginning of the 1950s.
Barciela maintains that this was due to the introduction of higher official prices 
and the relaxation of the controls from 1952-53. The implication is that these steps 
could have been taken earlier.7 However, our conclusion that the post-war decline in 
output was the outcome of a shift of the supply curve to the left questions both of 
these interpretations. First, the factors that were in short supply -  i.e. work animals 
and chemical fertilisers -  were very difficult to replace before the early 1950s. 
Second, even small-scale farmers appear to have been able to maintain the level of 
income per unit of land. Finally, when fertilisers became available on a larger scale in 
1949-50 production increased. This happened although the official prices paid to the 
farmers remained below the pre-war level in real terms.
Nevertheless, the agrarian policy of the Franco regime was far from optimal for 
increasing wheat production and its distribution. A parallel market was introduced 
around 1950 and this greatly increased the part of the output that was sold through 
legal channels. This initiative could have been taken much earlier if it was not for a 
politically-motivated opposition to a deregulation of prices. Yet, the gains in terms of 
increased production probably would have been limited. Nevertheless, the earlier 
introduction of the parallel market would greatly have increased the transparency of 
the market, to the benefit of producers, consumers and the state alike. The policy used 
in the case of wheat was therefore not the best possible, but its main effect was on the 
distribution of the produce rather than on the level of output. This is clearly at odds 
with the dominant interpretation found in the historical literature of the last twenty 
years.
In the case of olives, the situation was characterised by the fact that the main 
capital asset of this sub-sector -  i.e. the olive trees -  survived the Civil War practically 
unhurt. In this respect, olive farmers did not suffer from the same problems as the 
wheat farmers, i.e. that it was difficult to maintain the pre-war level of cultivated land. 
However, small-scale olive farmers were in a less favourable position to sell in the 
black market than the wheat growers were. On the other hand, the higher proportion of 
work done by wage labour in the olive sector improved the economic situation of 
olive farmers due to the decline in real wages after 1939. The net result of these 
developments appears to have been that both the value of production per unit of land
7 See above in Footnote 4.
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and the net income for the small-scale farmers remained at least at the pre-war level 
during the 1940s.
The official contemporary statistics show a decline in the yields of olives in the 
post-war years. However, the findings of this thesis indicate that this is likely to be 
mainly the result of underreporting to conceal the farmers’ black market activities. 
There seems, therefore, not to have been a fall in production due to a movement along 
the supply curve caused by the level of official prices. The supply of olive oil per 
capita in the Spanish market in the 1940s was on average similar to the pre-war level. 
Nevertheless, it seems likely that in the first two or three years after the Civil War 
there was an inadequate supply, due to lower than average yields. In these 
circumstances, a regulation of the market could be justified from a social point of 
view.
State intervention seems to have had a limited economic effect on the small- 
scale olive farmers as well as on the level of production. Yet, it did introduce market 
distortions in the form of a relatively important black market. These results confirm 
the conclusion from a somewhat overlooked article by Naredo. He shows that 
production of olives and olive oil could be very profitable in the late 1940s and early
Q
1950. This was especially the case if the farmers also controlled the production of the 
oil, which, however, was seldom the case for the small-scale farmers.
Until now, the main study of the olive sector has been that of Tio.9 This dealt 
mainly with the political aspects of the regulation of the sector rather than levels of 
output. Apparently, Tio is somewhat doubtful about the effect of the state’s regulation 
on output. When compared to the results from this thesis, the doubt seem to be the 
consequence of an insufficient division of the analysis in two sub-periods -  i.e. the 
early post-war years and the second half of the 1940s.
In the case of the wine sector, nothing so far has been done on either the period 
in the context of the agrarian policy or as a point of comparison with other crops. 
Hence, the results from this thesis are new when compared to the existing literature on 
the effects of the agrarian policy. As happened in the olive sector, the main capital 
asset of the agrarian part of the wine sector -  the vines -  survived the Civil War 
relatively unhurt at the national level. However, this was not the case in Toledo10 
where a combination of warfare and phylloxera led to an important decline in the 
productive area. After the Civil War, there was a decline in domestic consumption of
8 Naredo (1983).
9 Tio (1982).
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wine as well as in exports. However, this was counteracted by a growth in demand for 
low-quality, high-alcohol wine used for distillation into brandy and industrial alcohol. 
The winegrowers in Toledo reacted to this change in demand by increasing the output 
o f grapes, which produced high-alcohol white wine. The result was that the farmers 
received better prices in real terms than before the war. In spite o f this, it took more 
than 20 years before vines occupied the same amount o f  land as in 1935. Although the 
wine sector was not subject to the same control as the wheat and olive sector, the 
situation was still not so attractive that a massive shift from yearly crops to grapes was 
carried out. According to the historical literature,11 that would have been expected in a 
place like Toledo where the trend since the beginning o f  the 20th century had been 
exactly this process o f substitution. The economic conditions in the wine sector 
changed in the early 1950s when two bumper harvests resulted in declining prices. 
This led to a shift in the Government’s policy with the introduction o f floor prices 
being the most important feature. The new policy ensured the continuos expansion o f 
output.12
Seen as a whole, it becomes clear that the agrarian policy o f the Franco regime 
was not the best possible in the 1940s. However, contrary to what has been stated in 
the economics literature, the main effect appears to have been on the distribution o f 
the produce. The post-war decline in wheat production was not the result o f a 
movement along the supply curve, but o f  a shift o f the supply curve to the left due to 
lack o f work animals and fertilisers. The production recovered only when the supply 
curve shifted back to the right with the better access to these two factors in the early 
1950s. In this light, some sort o f intervention in the wheat market was desirable from
bC.
a social point o f view. The alternative c o u ld ^  serious deterioration o f the living 
standard o f the poorer part o f the population, especially since bread was a crucial 
ingredient in the diet. The necessity o f  securing an equal distribution o f  basic 
foodstuffs to the whole o f the population was furthermore the common policy 
throughout Europe during and after World W ar II. On this point, the Spanish 
experience o f state intervention was not an exception from contemporary political 
practices.
10 Nor was it the case in Cuenca, for that matter.
11 Most notably the earlier mentioned works by Barciela.
12 The process lasted until the early 1980s, when the sector was forced to reduce output when Spain 
became a member of the EEC.
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CHAPTER 1: ECONOMIC CRISIS, STATE INTERVENTION, AND 
THE ROLE OF THE AGRARIAN SECTOR IN SPAIN, 1939-55
1.1: THE CRISIS IN THE SPANISH ECONOMY BETWEEN 1939 AND 1953
In 1939, the Franco regime inherited an economy where the agrarian sector was still 
very significant. More than half of the active population was employed in agriculture, 
and it produced almost a third of GDP output (Table 1.1).
Table 1.1: GDP and employment composition in Spain, 1929-75.
GDP 1929 1940 1950 1960 1975
Agriculture 29 33 31 24 10
Industry 25 19 24 31 30
Construction 8 4 3 4 8
Services 38 44 42 42 52
Employment 1929 1940 1950 1960 1975
Agriculture 48 53 50 42 24
Industry 28 20 20 22 27
Construction 3 4 6 7 10
Services 21 23 24 29 50
(All figures in percent)
Source: Prados de la Escosura and Sanz (1996), p. 368.
Some changes in the structure of employment and output took place between 1950 
and 1960. Yet, it was only in the 1960s that the process really accelerated, resulting in 
a notable decrease in the importance of the agrarian sector within the economy.
In Table 1.2 we see that in the composition and in the development of its GDP, 
the Spanish economy followed a pattern also seen in other southern European 
countries like Italy and Portugal. In all three countries agriculture continued to play a 
prominent role for a longer period than was the case in a more developed economy 
like the French. Both the agrarian and industrial sectors had been sheltered by
• 13protectionist policies since the latter part of the 19th century. Consequently, the 
Spanish economy was relatively closed before the Civil War compared to other 
countries,14 and, as we observe in Table 1.3, this characteristic was reinforced during 
the first half of the Franco regime.15
13 The ongoing debate in the 19th century between free traders and protectionists was definitely settled 
in favour of the protectionists with the tariff of 1891; M.-J. Gonzalez (1980), p. 82.
14 Whether the relatively closed nature of the Spanish economy turned out to be an advantage in relation 
to the international economic crisis in the early 1930s has been the object of some debate in the 
economics literature. For a short outline of the discussion, see Prados de la Escosura and Sanz (1996), 
p. 361, and Hernandez Andreu and Garcia Ruiz (1996), pp. 249-253.
15 As will be explained later, the process of closing the economy even further than was the case before 
1935 was a deliberate ideological choice of the regime.
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Table 1. 2: Origin of GDP at market prices in France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, 1925-64.
France Italy
Years Agriculture Industry1* Services Agriculture Industry1' Services
1925-29 37 30 33
1935-39 22"’ 36"* 42"' 29 31 40
1950-54 13 48 39 30/22J* 37/36j) 33/42a*
1960-64 8 48 44 13 41 46
Portugal Spain
Years Agriculture Industry1* Services Agriculture Industry1* Services
1925-29 29a* 33°' 38D*
1935-39 CO CO a 23°* 44°'
1950-54 314’ 324' 374' 3T ' 27" 42"
1960-64 21 35 44 24°' 35°* ro a
(All figures in percent)
1) Includes mining and construction.
2) 1938 - calculation based on N.D.P.
3) The first figure is for 1950/51, the second is for 1951/54. Meanwhile there was a change in concepts.
4) 1953/54.
5)1929.
6) 1940.
7) 1950.
8) 1960.
Sources: Mitchell (ed.) (1992), and Table 1.1.
Table 1 .3: Degree of openness - ((Imports + exports) / GDP) - of the Spanish, Italian, French, 
and British economy, 1830-1961.
Years Spain1* Italy France United Kingdom
1830 6 8 22
1860 11 15 18 24
1870 16 24 44
1890 26 17 28 44
1913 24 24 33 48
1929 20 22 25 39
1938 13"’ 13 18 24
1950 4 18 21 36
1961 16 22 21 29
(All figures in percent)
1) Peninsular Spain and Balearic Islands.
2) Data for 1935.
Source: Carrereas (ed.) (1986), p. 331.
When analysing the Spanish economy after 1939, it is important to remember that 
these characteristics were not only the outcome of a long process, but were also the 
result of the peculiar type of regime emerging after the Civil War. The Franco regime 
was the product of the military coup of July 18, 1936. Failing to overthrow the 
Republican regime, the coup turned into a Civil War that lasted nearly three years. 
During the war, parts of the Republican zone went through a revolutionary process 
including collectivisation in the agrarian sector. In spite of the war and the
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collectivisation movement, destruction in agriculture and industry does not seem to 
have been very widespread.
This Civil War was a comparatively “low technology war”, and did not result in 
the massive destruction of larger cities, with the exception of Oviedo.16 In the major 
industrial centre of Bilbao, the city’s defenders did not destroy the factories before the 
rebels conquered it.17 Nor did Barcelona and the other cities with some industrial 
production suffer from widespread destruction.18 At the same time output from the 
agrarian sector did not diminish significantly in the part of the country controlled by 
the rebels. This was also more or less the case in the zone still governed by the 
Republic until 1938.19
In spite of the relatively limited damages caused by the war, it was a lengthy 
process to recover pre-war peaks in economic activities. It took until 1954 to recover 
the 1929 level of real GDP per head, until 1952 to reach again the 1930 peak in 
industrial output, and until 1957 to pass for good the level of agricultural output in 
1934 (Diagram 1.1), and until 1954 to reach the 1929 level of real income per head.20 
Therefore, it appears necessary to explore other explanations for the extremely slow 
recovery of pre-war levels for these macroeconomic indicators.
One factor was that the end of the Civil War coincided closely with the outbreak 
of World War II, which meant a partial interruption of international trade. However, 
during World War I Spain had made relative gains from being a neutral country. 
Rising prices for its exports, more than made up for the decline in volume, leading to a 
substantial surplus in the balance of trade between 1915 and 1919.21 This situation 
was not repeated between 1940 and 1945, although the balance of trade as well as the 
balance of payment showed a modest surplus. Even so, Spain fared worse than other 
non-belligerent countries in foreign trade earnings.22 After 1945 there was a chronic 
deficit on the current account, which however, until the mid 1950s was
counteracted by an influx of short term and long term capital (Diagram 1.2).
16 Andres-Gallego et al. (1989), p. 472.
17 Fusi (1986), p. 318.
18 Catalan (1995), p. 46-50; Vidal (1996), p. 441-442.
19 Barciela (1983b), p. 657. Although this viewpoint is generally accepted in the historiography, 
dissident opinions still exist. In a book as recent as Vidal (1996), p. 443, the author maintains that the 
destruction in the agrarian sector was important. However, he does so without references to any 
literature on the subject, on a very weak statistical background, and without distinguishing between 
long lasting effects and short-term interruptions of production. However, he is far from the first author 
to do so, given that the low level of agrarian production in the 1940s was often blamed on wartime 
destruction by the propaganda of the Franco regime.
20 Prados de la Escosura and Sanz (1996), p. 356.
21 Carreras (ed.) (1986), p. 343.
22 Catalan (1995), pp. 91-95, M.-J. Gonzalez (1980), pp. 87-89.
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Diagram 1.1: Indices of agricultural output, industrial output and GDP per capita in Spain, 1925-58
(1958=100).
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Diagram 1.2: Balance of payments, trade balance and current account balance for Spain, 1940-58
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Furthermore, to finance the war effort the Republican government had depleted the 
Spanish gold reserves, which were the third largest in the world before the Civil War. 
Hence, the Franco regime faced the problem of limited international reserves when it 
came to power in 1939, and although the situation had improved somewhat by 1945, it 
was far from satisfactory.23 The result was that when export earnings decreased again 
after 1945, much-needed inputs and raw materials could not be obtained.24
Between 1946 and 1950, Spain passed through a period of international isolation 
which further exacerbated the situation. In February 1946, France closed its borders 
with Spain, and in December 1946 the United Nations approved a declaration urging 
its members to withdraw its ambassadors. The international attitude towards the 
Franco regime shifted again from the beginning of the 1950s, and the country was 
slowly readmitted into the international community. The international isolation had its 
background in the close links the regime had maintained with Italy and Germany from 
the outbreak of the Civil War until a relatively late date during World War II. Later, 
the reopening of international contacts coincided with the emergence of the Cold War 
when the western powers’ strategic interests in Spain were raised.
Within this general picture, the domestic economy was characterised by 
persistently high levels of inflation between 1939 and 1951, with a yearly average of 
around 14 percent.25 This is remarkable given that the government intended to 
maintain strict price and wage controls throughout the 1940s. In spite of the economic 
crisis, official figures for unemployment remained low throughout the period. The 
highest figure for unemployment is 475,000 in 1940 and the lowest was 107,000 in 
1952 and 1953. Out of an active population of some 10 million, this gives an
9ftunemployment rate between 1.5 and 5 percent. However, the statistics do not reflect 
the notorious underemployment in agriculture, which contained nearly 50 percent of 
the workforce.
This brief description has given a quite depressing picture of the Spanish 
economy in the 1940s. Starting from a very low level of foreign reserves in 1939, the
23 In 1939 the reserves were 27 mill $ in gold, which by 1945 had increased to 110 mill $ in gold; 
Catalan (1995), p. 93.
24 This problem of the balance of trade was further aggravated by the overvaluation of the peseta, 
caused by the government’s setting of the exchange rate at an unrealistic level - see Catalan (1995), pp. 
158-160 and 169-174; M.-J. Gonzalez (1980), p. 112-114.
25 Based on retail prices, M.-J. Gonzalez reached the figure of an annual rate of inflation of 14 percent, 
while Prados de la Escosura and Sanz, using the GDP deflator reached the figure of 13 percent. M.-J. 
Gonzalez (1980), pp. 36-38; Prados de la Escosura and Sanz (1996), p. 368. The highest rates of 
inflation were found in 1941-43, 1945-47 and 1950-51.
26 In 1940, the active population was 9,220,000 while it was 10,793,000 in 1950; Mitchell (ed.)(1992), 
pp. 153 and 164.
24
opportunity of World War II to increase export earnings was not enough to solve 
Spain’s economic problems. The crisis in agriculture caused a low level of export 
earnings and, at the same time, made it necessary to increase imports of foodstuffs in 
several years. Meanwhile, with the possibilities of imports constrained, the industrial 
sector suffered from a lack of raw material and capital goods. This double crisis in 
agriculture and industry went together with persistent inflation regardless of the 
government’s intent to control prices and wages. This situation only improved from 
1951 when aid from the United States helped to overcome bottlenecks in production. 
Industry and agriculture recovered pre-war levels, and the same occurred with real 
GDP and real income per head.
The historiography on the post-war economy has to a large degree dealt with the 
reasons for the poor economic performance asking questions like: Was the Civil War 
the main reason for Spain’s economic problems in the 1940s? How did World War II 
affect the Spanish economy? What were the economic effects of the international 
isolation in the late 1940s? Was the economic policy of the Franco regime adequate 
for the circumstances?28 Although these questions are difficult to answer completely, 
there is a broad agreement in the literature in blaming most of the post-war problems 
on the economic policies of the Franco government.
1.2: THE POST-WAR QUEST FOR INDUSTRIALISATION
The 1939-59 period is known as the “autarky years” of the Franco regime, but the 
literature generally distinguishes two sub-periods in the political economy of this era. 
The first running from 1939 to 1951 and the second from 1951 to 1959, with the 
change being that a gradual liberalisation of the economy took place after 1951 
accompanied by economic growth.29 The following description mainly focuses on the 
1940s and early 1950s, which are at the core of the thesis. In this period the Spanish 
economy was subject to extensive political control. This can be seen as a response to 
the special economic problems that faced a country which had only recently emerged 
from a Civil War and in a situation where the rest of Europe was also at war.
But a second factor was also important in enacting widespread control over the 
economy: The Franco regime’s strong nationalistic ideology. In the sphere of 
economic policy, this meant that a strong emphasis was placed on what was
27 See Table 1.1.
28 See Catalan (1995), pp. 41-SH, for a short outline of these discussions.
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considered economic independence from foreign powers. This was supposed to be 
gained through import substitution of basic industrial products, foodstuffs and raw 
materials, strict control of foreign trade, and a clear priority of which sectors were to 
be subsidised by the state.
In the historiography there has been a long discussion about whether this state
intervention in the economy should be interpreted primarily as the result of the
necessities imposed by the international conditions in the 1940s or as an intentional
act of the regime.30 However, in recent years there seems to be a relatively broad
1
consensus among researchers favouring the latter interpretation. As a result of this, 
the discussion has focused on the overall rationality of the economic policy, on the 
appropriateness and extent of the selected measures, on the duration of the 
intervention, and - not least - on the economic, social and structural consequences of 
the policy.
Concerning the economic priorities of the regime, we saw in Table 1.2 that the 
industrial sector of the Spanish economy in 1939 was relatively small when compared 
to countries such as France and even Italy. To the new government, this fact was at 
odds with the political desires for Spain being an economically, politically and
i t .
militarily independent nation. According to Francoist ideology, the 19 Century 
liberal political system and a supposed absence of entrepreneurial skills in the Spanish 
population was to blame for this lack of industrialisation. The consequence of this line 
of thought was that the new authoritarian state should promote industrial development. 
The aim was to secure the supply of manufactured goods, raw materials and energy, 
improve the balance of payments, and obtain external military independence.
The creation in 1941 of the state holding Instituto Nacional de Industria (INI) 
- i.e. the National Institute for Industrialisation - was an important move in the pursuit 
of the regime’s economic goals. The rationality of national self-sufficiency was 
clearly stated in the preface and the first paragraph of the law that created the
29 Prados de la Escosura and Sanz (1986), pp. 362-368.
30 See Gamir (ed.) (1980), pp. 46-54, and Catalan (1995), p. 72, Footnote 60, for aspects of this 
discussion in the 1960s and 1970s.
31 See for example Barciela (1986b), pp. 388-389, Catalan (1992), pp. 374-375, Catalan (1995), pp. 70- 
74, Clavera et al (1973), pp. 46-54 and pp. 83-90, Gamir (ed.) (1980), p. 50, M.-J. Gonzalez (1980), p. 
83, Preston (1995), pp. 297-98, 344-45, 665, 682, 785-786, Tusell (1993), pp. 52-57, Velasco 
Murviedro (1981), pp. 391-406, Vinas (1984), pp. 210-234. A variation of this viewpoint is found in 
Martin Acena and Cormn (1992), p. 425. These authors maintain that although the ideology of the 
regime favoured a policy of economic self-sufficiency, it was also partly induced by the international 
circumstances.
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holding.32 Through the years, the INI became involved in a large range of productions 
and services, and especially in the early years, there was an emphasis on industries 
related to national defence and energy.33
Although this strategy was disputed within the regime, the quest for an import- 
substitution industrialisation was to have widespread consequences for the economic 
policy adopted towards other sectors of the economy, including agriculture. The 
period where the policy of the regime in general was most directed by the ideology of 
autarky that was behind the creation of the state holding was undoubtedly in the 
1940s, and especially between 1945 and 1951. In this last period, Suanzes, who was 
the founder/director of INI, was also Minister of Industry and Commerce.
However, in terms of output only relative meagre results were obtained. 
Furthermore, it was a common feature of the activities of the INI that little attention 
was given to opportunity costs of the investments in war related industry, resulting in 
a massive misallocation of resources.34 Contrary to earlier beliefs, recent research has 
furthermore shown that INI in some cases behaved as a competitor to private 
enterprise, rather than acting as a subsidiary. This was especially the case in what 
were considered essential areas, such as the motorcar and fertiliser industry and in the 
production of energy.35
The strategy of industrialisation followed in the 1940s had serious consequences 
for the economic development of the country. First, the misallocation of resources led 
scarce capital away from more productive sectors in a period of slow economic 
growth. Furthermore, the emphasis on military needs was probably not the most 
effective way of obtaining economic growth. Secondly, the concentration on industrial 
development led to the neglect of the modernisation of the agrarian sector. Imports of 
inputs and capital goods used in agriculture were restricted, regardless that these could 
have improved the nutritional standards of the population, boosted productivity, 
increased exports and reduced imports. Thirdly, the Francoist analysis of the situation 
implied the necessity of a strict control of allocation of inputs. This lead to a
32 The text is re-printed in Martin Aceiia and Comm (1992), p. 429. The inspiration for the INI was a 
mix of various origins. The Italian lstituto per la Recostruzione Industriale in its post 1937 version, 
where it was supposed to play an active role in the further development of Italian industrialisation, 
undoubtedly served as inspiration. Nevertheless, the idea of developing a strong defence related 
industry had grown independently in Spanish military circles in several decades before the outbreak of 
the Civil War, and was further developed during this conflict. San Roman (1999), pp. 59-162.
33 Catalan (1995), p. 223.
34 Martin Acena and Comin (1992), pp. 440-441.
35 Gomez Mendoza and San Roman (1997). See San Roman (1999), pp. 189-298 for case studies of the 
actuation of the INI with regards to energy, motorcars and the aeronautic industry, in connection with, 
respectively, the ENCASO plant, the SEAT factory and the CASA factory.
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35 Gomez Mendoza and San Roman (1997). See San Roman (1999), pp. 189-298 for case studies of the 
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respectively, the ENCASO plant, the SEAT factory and the CASA factory.
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complicated system o f import controls, licensing and so on, which fostered rent 
seeking and further undermined the productivity o f the industrial sector.36
A problem for economic development in general, and industrialisation in 
particular, was that the quest for rapid industrialisation arose as part o f  a nationalistic 
approach to economic policy. Intending to keep state control over the economic 
activity o f  the larger companies, foreign investment was hindered, and foreign 
ownership o f shares in Spanish companies was restricted to a maximum of 25 
percent.37 As part o f the same strategy, foreign companies established in Spain were 
harassed if  their production was considered o f  vital interest to Spanish economic 
independence.38
Furthermore, there was a strong corporate element in much social and economic 
l e g i s l a t i o n , t h e  labour market to fierce regulation. The suppression of 
independent trade unions was followed by the creation o f “vertical trade unions”, 
representing both employers and employees, which were then integrated into the state 
administration. The Ministry o f Labour determined wages, and the leadership o f the 
“vertical trade unions” was appointed from above right up to the end o f  the 1950s. The 
consequence for wage earners was a constant fall in real wages throughout the 1940s. 
In the agrarian sector a low point was reached in 1951, when real wages were close to 
50 percent o f  the 1936 level (Table 1.4) .39
36 Prados de la Escosura and Sanz (1996), pp. 362-369 .The conditions for the private sector was further 
complicated between 1948 and 1953, and then again from 1956 to 1959 by the introduction of a 
complex system of multiple exchange rates; M.-J. Gonzalez (1979), pp. 149-152
37 Prados de la Escosura and Sanz (1996), p. 364.
38 An interesting example where political considerations overruled general economic interests is the 
Government campaign from 1940 to 1954 that led to the British Rio Tinto Company selling its mining 
operations in the province o f Huelva to a Spanish conglomerate. In the official propaganda, the British 
company was called “The economic Gibraltar”, and through a range o f measures like the control of 
prices and wages, heavy loses were imposed on the company. As a result o f this the company reduced 
output of copper from the mine, a consequence that was in palpable contrast to the official policy in the 
1940s of producing at every cost; Gomez Mendoza (1994).
39 Note that the nominal wages used for calculating real wages were the official minimum wages. 
However, Perez Rubio found that in the latifundio areas, it was not uncommon that the employers paid 
even less; Perez Rubio (1995a), pp. 106-107. Unfortunately, it is not possible to analyse the 
development o f wage differentials between agriculture and industry in the 1940s, because no 
comprehensive statistics exist on the development of wages in industry at the national level in the 
period.
28
Table 1.4: Index of real wages in the agrarian sector, 1940-59 (1936 = 100)
Years Index of real wages Years Index of real wages
1940 82 1950 56
1941 73 1951 51
1942 72 1952 52
1943 74 1953 52
1944 73 1954 54
1945 72 1955 57
1946 63 1956 58
1947 60 1957 68
1948 56 1958 71
1949 53 1959 77
Source: Martinez Alier (1968), p. 27.
The rationality behind the low level of real wages was to minimise costs both in 
industry and in agriculture. In the first sector, the purpose was to facilitate the 
industrialisation process, and in the second sector, it was to obtain cheaper foodstuffs 
for the urban population to avoid social unrest. All in all, the demand side was seen as 
secondary to the quest for industrialisation, which focused on the production of capital 
goods.40
The composition of the state budget during the early years of Francoism was a 
reflection of the priority given to national defence. Yet, it was hardly consistent with 
the wider goal of increasing economic growth through industrialisation. The 
importance given by the regime to defence and internal security is obvious in the 
1940s, where the expenditure on these two posts, with the exception of 1941, 
accounted for between 40 percent and 60 percent of the state budget.41 Given that the 
INI was financed outside the state budget, and that a substantial part of investments of 
the INI was in defence related industries, a remarkably large part of state funds was 
channelled in to this sector.
When the data on defence expenditure are broken down, it can be seen that the 
percentage spent on salaries was between 49 percent and 70 percent in 1940-44, and 
still between 45 percent and 54 percent in 1945-56. Given the low labour productivity 
of people employed in defence, relatively more expenditure on services and 
investments in capital goods would have been a better promoter of economic growth 
in the economy.42 This, however, would have required a down-scaling of the army,
40 Within the industrial sector, this policy principally favoured industry in the Basque Country. This 
produced more capital goods than the manufacturing sector in Cataluna, which mainly made consumer 
goods. Gonzalez Portilla and Garmendia (1988), pp. 13-22.
41 Olmeda Gomez (1988), p. 208.
42 The figures include the army, the Civil Guard and the National Police; Olmeda Gomez (1988), pp. 
217-218.
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which in the light of continued social division of the country and the heavy army 
presence in the governments of the 1940s, was not a very likely outcome.43
When debt repayments and salaries for other state employees were added to the 
expenses on defence and security, little was left in the state budget for goods and 
services that could be instrumental in developing the economy. According to Comm, 
the size of the state budget was small compared to contemporary European standards. 
Hence, the problem with the budget was not so much a question of excessive taxation 
as a misallocation of the relatively few resources that the state handled.44
1.3: THE POST-WAR CRISIS IN THE AGRARIAN SECTOR
As mentioned before, agrarian policy of the Franco regime should be understood 
within the context of the overall goals of its economic policy. Given that the policy of 
rapid industrialisation had the highest priority, the fact that output of the agrarian 
sector did not recover its pre-war peak before 1956 might not be such a big surprise. 
Therefore, the evaluation of the “effectiveness” or “desirability” of the controls over 
the production, marketing and consumption of agrarian output cannot be based only 
on the immediate effects of this policy on the agrarian sector. The consequences for 
the rest of the economy have to be taken into account as well. However, before going 
into a discussion of the relation between economic policy and the level of output in 
agriculture, we will first look at the influence of the Civil War on the agrarian sector.
1.3.1: The Impact of the Civil War on Post-war Agrarian Output
The post-war years were characterised by a combination of lower levels of output and 
a relative increase in the demand for inferior goods due to the fall in real wages.45 In 
response to this, rationing of basic foodstuffs started at the national level in 1939 and 
lasted until 1953. The Franco regime used to blame the low level of production on a
43 Preston has characterised the post-war Spanish army as “an army of occupation”, given that major 
parts were located next to population centres rather than at the frontiers. In this context, numbers rather 
than modem military equipment was important for the maintainance of public order. Salary costs were 
furthermore large due to the presence of a relative large officer corps that had been established during 
and after the Civil War. This provided Franco a strong base within the armed forces against possible 
political dissent from other high-ranking officers. Preston (1990), pp. 85-86, 131-162.
44 Comm (1994), pp. 296-301.
45 The official post-war statistics on the agrarian sector suffer from a problem of reliability. This is due 
to the existence of a large black market, which had the consequence that not all output was registered. 
The implications of this problem for the present thesis are discussed in Appendix 1.
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mixture of Civil War damages and adverse weather conditions, but this type of 
explanation is not accepted nowadays.
Barciela has given the question the most comprehensive treatment and he has 
argued that the Civil War only had a short-lived negative impact on post-war 
production, because physical destruction of the means of production was relatively 
modest. Although the war negatively affected the stock of work and rent animals, this 
was not an insoluble problem. Moreover, he notes that the decrease in the cultivated 
area between 1936 and 1939 was mainly occurring within yearly crops and that it 
would not be difficult to bring such land back into cultivation. Barciela moreover 
argues that large parts of the country were controlled by the rebels for the whole of the 
war, and were therefore not directly affected by military operations. Moreover, 
production in the Republican zone was relatively “normal” at least until 1938.46 
Barciela therefore agrees with M.-J. Gonzalez that the largest impact of the Civil War 
on post-war agrarian production was probably the loss of labour due to deaths, exiles, 
and the politically motivated repression by the Francoist regime in the 1940s.47
To summarise: since the Civil War appears to have had a limited direct 
influence on post-war agrarian output, it was largely the economic policy of the 1940s 
that differentiated the post-war period from the pre-war years, and that caused the 
decline in agrarian production. Nevertheless, some disagreement on the subject can be 
found in the historiography. In a recent work, Simpson suggested shortly the 
possibility, that agrarian output in the 1940s was restricted by lack of fertilisers and
ARwork animals. In relation to this discussion, one of the main purposes of the present 
thesis is to challenge the view that official prices were the main reason for the post­
war decline in output. This will be done on the basis of an analysis of prices received 
by farmers when black market earnings are included, and an investigation into 
external constraints on agrarian output in the 1940s.
1.3.2: The Pillars o f the System of Intervention: Price Controls, Production Quotas 
and Rationing
As we have seen, the Government tried to foster rapid industrialisation through import 
substitution and a strict control of the labour market. The agrarian sector was an
46 Barciela (1986b), pp. 384-385.
47 Barciela (1986b), p. 385, M.-J. Gonzalez (1980), p. 90. A similar interpretation can be found in 
Clavera et al (1973), pp. 48-49.
48 Simpson (1995), p. 247.
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important component of this system. The low level of real wages in the 1940s and 
early 1950s demanded that the urban population was provided with cheap provisions 
to secure their physical survival and avoid social unrest.
An attempt to keep retail prices at the pre-war level was already made during the 
Civil War through granting local authorities power to determine prices locally. 
Nevertheless, it was not until March 1939 that the Comisaria General de 
Abastecimiento y  Transporte (CGAT) -  (“General Commissary of Transport and 
Trade”) -  was created. The CGAT was to conduct much of the state intervention in 
the domestic economy in the 40s and 50s.49 A short look at the powers of this 
organisation reveals a lot about the nature of state intervention in the production and 
consumption of foodstuffs.
According to the regulations of the CGAT, it should control the demand for and 
supply of provisions through a temporary system of rationing and retail price controls. 
To fulfil this objective, it was gradually given a monopoly in organising the 
commercialisation of a large number of products.50 After 1940 the CGAT counted on 
the Fiscalia de Tasas, a special court headed in each province by the Civil Governor, 
to punish infractions.51 The main objective of the price controls was to constrain 
inflation. At first this was supposed to be possible through a decree ordering the 
maintenance of the prices at the same level as before the Civil War, totally ignoring 
the rise of prices during the conflict.52 When this measure was insufficient to reach the 
desired goals, a widespread system of controls with production and consumption of 
foodstuffs was introduced in the following years.
Concerning the foodstuffs that were subject to intervention by the CGAT, a 
large part of the daily work was carried out by another state organisation, the Servicio 
Nacional de Trigo (SNT) -  (“The National Wheat Board”).53 The rebel government 
had created the SNT in 1937. The then dominant perception about the wheat market 
was one of overproduction leading to falling prices.54 Consequently, the policy
49 Clavera et al (1973), pp. 65-66. Until 1951, the CGAT was part of the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade. It thus became part of the Ministry of Trade, the latter constituting a separate entity from that 
date.
50 In 1945 the products controlled by the CGAT was categorised below 54 different heads.
51 Clavera et al. (1973), pp. 116-122. Although the political head of the Civil Governors was the 
Minister of Interior, the Fiscalia de Tasas was integrated in the Presidency of the Government.
52 Clavera et al. (1973), pp. 123-126.
53 SNT was part of the Ministry of Agriculture, although it worked on behalf of the CGAT from 1941.
54 This interpretation had its origin in circumstances before as well as during the Civil War. In 1932, 
wheat prices fell dramatically, due to unnecessary imports o f wheat by the government, and this led to 
massive protest by the wheat-growing farmers. Other factors at play were a general lack of statistical 
information, and that the area controlled by the insurrectionists contained a higher proportion of wheat
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promoted by the SNT in 1937-38 was to reduce prices as an incentive to diminish 
production. The outcome of this policy was a serious underproduction in 1939 in 
relation to the needs o f the newly reunited Spanish population .55 Given that rapid 
industrialisation was the main goal o f  post-war economic policy, the official prices 
paid to agrarian producers in the 1940s were set, in real terms, at a lower level than 
before the Civil War. This happened in spite o f a decline in the production.
The intervention had started with the control o f  the production o f wheat, but 
later the SNT, on behalf o f the CGAT, came to control the production, marketing and 
consumption o f an ever-increasing number o f agrarian products. A system o f 
compulsory production quotas was enforced for bread grains. The quotas were 
minimum requirements that the farmers had to fulfil, and they were normally fined if  
they did not comply with the demands. However, the fulfilment o f  the production 
quotas did mean that farmers could sell the restAheir output in an uncontrolled 
market, since with few exceptions SNT was the only legal buyer o f  grains until 1950.
The bureaucracy involved in the regulation^foodstuff production did not stop 
with the CGAT and the SNT. At the local level, mayors played an important role in 
much o f  the day to day administrative tasks. The “representation” o f  the interests o f 
the agrarian sector was entrusted to the official vertical trade unions. However, these 
had no legal rights to influence political decisions, which were made exclusively by 
the government.56 The decision making process was therefore extremely centralised, 
with no direct means for either the consumers or the producers to influence it.
According to Barciela and Garcia Gonzalez the consequences o f  this system o f 
intervention on the production o f wheat can be summarised as follows:
a) There was an overall decrease in the total cultivated area.
b) The decrease in the cultivated area further depressed real wages in the 
agrarian sector.
c) There was an increase in the cultivated area o f other crops than wheat, 
including the area dedicated to animal grazing.
d) The cultivation o f wheat was de-intensified.
e) The supply o f  wheat decreased.
land than of population. All this resulted in a too optimistic view of the situation at the national level; 
Barciela (1983b), pp. 666-667.
55 Barciela (1983b), pp. 663-670.
56 Aparicio (1980), pp. 34-36, 79, 92-93, 96-97, 104, 189-190, 193 and 196.
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f) The small farms withdrew from the market.
In response to the inadequacies of the rationing system, a large black market emerged 
to meet the demand for wheat and lasted throughout the 1940s.
1.3.3: The Working o f the Black Market for Foodstuffs
According to Barciela’s argument that economic policy was the reason for that 
agrarian output took so long to recover pre-war levels, the food market in the 1940s 
was characterised by disequilibrium between supply and demand.58 This was an 
outcome of the prices being paid by the state to the farmers, which were fixed below 
their equilibrium levels, in a situation where the price elasticity of demand was very 
low. The result of this combination was a supply shortage and the emergence of a 
black market for basic foodstuffs where prices were significantly higher than in the 
rationing system. In some years, this process was reinforced by producer prices being 
set before any knowledge was available about the size of the harvest. This meant that 
a bad harvest led to a fall in the income of the producers, forcing them to work outside 
the official system to an even greater degree than in a normal year. Therefore, in years 
of bad harvests the supply through the rationing system fell relatively more than the 
decline in production and, consequently, the demand of black market products rose 
even further. In this way, the price system increased scarcity in the official market in 
years when production was lowest as well as augmenting the difference between 
official and black market prices.59
Until now, most historical work has focused on the black market for wheat.60 
Using information published by the SNT in the early 1960s, Barciela calculated that 
on average 55.7 percent of the marketable production61 of the harvests between 1939 
and 1949 was sold on the black market. The second most popular item in the black
fTKmarket was probably olive oil. There have been two attempts to estimate the total 
amount of olive oil sold in the black market: Tio made a rough “guestimate” saying
57 Barciela and Garcia Gonzalez (1983), pp. 84-86.
58 Barciela (1983a), pp. 285-302.
59 Barciela (1983a), pp. 288-291.
60 This is so because it was the crop cultivated on the largest amounts of land, the most sold item in the 
black market, and the centre of attention of the intervention by the SNT. Furthermore, bread was a 
primary commodity with a very low elasticity of demand.
61 I.e. total output minus self-consumption and seed com.
62 Barciela (1981b), p. 27.
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that on average 10-15 percent were sold in the black market.64 The other attempt was 
made by Gutierrez del Castillo but covers only the period 1940-44. She concluded that 
c oUvjC. o , \  cwjeo&S* 7>«?ko y  V. c y i e f v ly  w*a*Uci<rd
between 1940 and 1944.66 Another study covering the province o f 
Alicante between 1941 and 1950, reached a similar conclusion .67 While the estimates 
by Barciela for the black market o f wheat seem to be as good as possible considering 
the available information, the methodology used by Gutierrez del Castillo contains 
some errors. These will be resolved in Chapter 4.
The general consequence for consumers was, as would be expected, an 
extraordinary difference between official retail prices and black market prices. Table 
1.5 shows the black market prices for bread and olive oil in the city o f Bilbao, when 
calculated as a percentage o f the official prices for the same products. It can be seen 
that there was a decrease in the difference between the two at the end o f the 1940s. 
The reason for this development could be various factors such as a better supply 
and/or higher prices in the official market, improved control o f  the black market by 
the police, a change in the demand patterns, or any combination o f  these. This will be 
discussed in the Chapters 3 and 4 for bread and olive oil respectively.
Table 1. 5: Black market prices in Bilbao for bread and olive oil as percent of official prices, 
1941-51.
Years Bread Olive oil
1941 917 1294
1942 1286 509
1943 800 509
1944 686 336
1945 600 536
1946 545 893
1947 643 344
1948 457 337
1949 492 305
1950 492 287
1951 328 180
Source: Gonzalez Portilla and Garmendia (1988), pp. 33-34.
63 The conditions here were slightly different from those governing the wheat production given that the 
price of the base product - the olives - was not fixed, which was the case of wheat grain. However, the 
price o f olive oil was regulated in the same manner as the price of flour; Tio (1982), p. 88.
64 This figure was reached in a rather curious way. The author started from a low estimate o f the black 
market share of wheat - 25 percent of production - and divided this by 2, without explaining the reason 
for this procedure; Tio (1982), pp. 76-77. Note that this was done before Barciela calculated the relative 
size of the black market for wheat.
65 I.e. icisyal vua<rVi.cf pG'S * \ p o r f i -
66 Gutierrez del Castillo (1983), p. 161.
67 Moreno Fonseret (1994), pp. 168-176.
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Turning to the supply side of the black market, Naredo analysed this phenomenon and 
the amount of fraud involved in an article in 1981. His access to both the “official” 
and the “real” accounts of one latifundio in Southern Spain give a revealing portrait of 
the working of the black market. Legally, all farmers were obliged to report to the 
SNT the area in use every year. Falsifying these data was one way of reserving a part 
of production for the black market. In the case studied, the under-reporting of the 
cultivated area amounted to 17 percent of the land dedicated to wheat, and 41 percent 
of that dedicated to barley, oats, maize and different kinds of leguminous. At the 
same time, cheating was also done in the reporting of the yields, with the result that 
40.1 percent of the wheat harvest, and between 24.5 percent and 67 percent of the 
other products were not declared.69
The result was that the real value of harvests was around 330 percent of the 
official value, and Naredo suggests that this difference was not exceptional among the 
southern latifundios.70 This clearly indicates that in spite of the low official prices paid 
by the SNT to the farmers, it was possible to have substantial earnings in the sector. 
However, this possibility seems to have varied substantially between different social 
groups and regions.
It can be supposed that the development of wages, prices received by the 
farmers and black market earnings had different repercussions to different social 
groups. If we ignore regional variations and concentrate on social stratification, it was 
the bottom of rural society, the landless farm labourers, who were likely to be the 
worst off given the decrease in real wages. Whether paid in cash or kind, the situation 
was probably quite desperate, and with very few, if any, possibilities of an extra 
income from the black market. This effectively left the families of the landless 
labourers close to starvation in years with a bad harvest when demand for labour was 
even lower than normal. Labourers who supplemented their wages with a small 
landholding producing for self-consumption or the black market were better off. 
Although still suffering from low real wages, they were as producers permitted to 
keep a quantity of the production for themselves, which eventually could be sold in 
the black market.
However, this group often seems to have relied on middlemen for black market 
transactions. First, they needed middlemen due to a lack of their own means of 
transportation to bring their produce to the urban population. Second, because they
68 Naredo (1981), pp. 98-101.
69 Naredo (1981), p. 102.
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seldom were able to transform their crops on by themselves - for example, from grain 
and olives to flour and olive oil.
The dependence on middlemen also apply to the next level up, which was the 
family-size farms, including both those who did and did not employ occasional wage 
labour. In the cases where they were using outside labour, this group benefited from 
the decline in real wages. Those with a diversified crop structure would furthermore 
have the advantage of some insurance against a bad harvest in one crop.
The last group, the capitalist farmers employing large amounts of wage labour, 
were the ones who benefited most from the black market for a number of reasons. 
Given that they often controlled the local labour market through a quasi-monopoly of 
employment, they could sometimes pay lower wages than the official minimum to 
their labourers. Furthermore, if they had the means to transform the crops, they would 
then have no need of intermediates. Finally, due to their often-dominant local social 
position, they could either have the necessary connections to avoid the state’s 
regulation and/or the money to pay the required bribes. On this point Leal et al. 
observed that the profitability of the agrarian sector suffered less from the low level of 
the official prices received by the farmers than it might appear at first. The reason for 
this was that, although prices were lower in real terms in the 1940s than before the 
Civil War, wages declined even further.71
Perez Rubio highlighted this differential impact of agrarian policy among the 
social classes. Using oral sources from Extremadura, he found that among the poorer 
part of the agrarian population small-scale black marketing was seen as a necessary 
way of survival in difficult times. The poorer part of the population therefore 
considered their black market dealings qualitatively different from large-scale black 
marketing done by the large landowners.72
Regional differences should also be taken into account in any general 
description of the black market. It seems plausible that the higher the ratio of urban to 
rural population in a given area, the higher the gains to be made on the black market 
due to relatively higher demand and lower transportation costs.73 Other factors to take
70 Naredo (1981), pp. 104-106.
71 Leal et al (1985), pp. 44-46 and 64.
72 Perez Rubio (1995b), pp. 102-112.
73 A feature of the official price system reinforced this tendency further. Grain sold through the SNT 
system was sold at the stock door to the millers and at the same price throughout the country. This 
meant that the millers had to pay for the transportation costs between stocks and markets. The result 
was that the millers preferred to buy “legal” grain close to urban areas whenever it was possible. But 
the same rules applied to the grain bought in the black market, raising the competition for grain close to 
urban centres, where cultivating normally was not very extensive; Barciela (1981a).
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into consideration are the geographical and climatic characteristics of a given region. 
One such important aspect is the quality of the soil for specific crops, which leads to 
differences in yields and the possibility of growing a certain crop in a given area.
However, the conditions for black market activity also included that controls 
seem to have been enforced more consistently to the “stars” of the black market - i.e. 
wheat and olive oil. Consequently, it was probably relatively easier to sell other types 
of crops outside the official channels.74 This implies that the gains per quantity in this 
second group of crops were not as high as those for wheat and olive oil. Nevertheless, 
the possibility of selling a larger quantity in the black market could make up for some 
of the difference. However, the analysis of the black market for other crops than wheat 
and olive oil is complicated by lack of comprehensive source material on prices and 
quantities sold in the black market.75
1.3.4: Capital Accumulation in the Agrarian Sector
What then was the effect on the agrarian sector of the opposing tendencies of low 
official prices and potentially high gains in the black market? First, it seems that it led 
to a widening of the income distribution within the sector, with the determining factor 
being whether one was employed, self-employed or employer. This feature appears to 
hold true despite any regional differences. Leal et al. have argued that the widening of 
the income distribution led to an overall increase of the financial capacity of the
n(\sector. For the 1941-59 period, the authors reached the conclusion that the average 
financial capacity of the agrarian sector was approximately 12 percent of the value of 
total production, with the highest values found around 1950.77
However, the accumulation of capital mainly took place in the hands of the 
larger landowners who benefited from an increase in output prices relative to agrarian
78wages. Yet, since there were huge regional differences in the social structure of the 
Spanish agrarian sector, it seems likely that there were large regional differences in 
the financial capacity, but until now, this has hardly been investigated.
74 Naredo (1981), pp. 98-101.
75 In the analysis of the situation in the province of Cuenca in Chapter 6, various scenarios are 
constructed concerning the impact on value of production of black market sales of other crops than 
wheat and olive oil.
76 The authors define financial capacity as the difference between saving and investment within the 
sector. A persistent positive financial capacity then leads to the accumulation of capital; Leal et al. 
(1986), p. 29.
77 Leal et al. (1986), pp. 98-99.
78 Leal et al. (1986), pp. 41-45.
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At present, there exist only “one and a half’ estimations of capital accumulation 
at a regional level. The first is for the province of Valladolid, but it is based on a proxy 
in the form of the development of the nominal value of shares deposited in the major 
banks of the city of Valladolid. Between 1939 and 1952 the nominal value more than 
trebled,79 and the author interprets this result as confirming that there was a process of 
capital accumulation in the agrarian sector in the 1940s.80
The “half’ example comes from the province of Valencia. In this case the author 
identifies a process of capital accumulation in the citrus fruit sector in the 1940s, but 
he does not offer a quantitative estimation of the magnitude of the process, nor a
• ft 1 •comparison with the pre-war experience. Furthermore, Valencia was not very 
representative for the agrarian sector as a whole. Citrus fruits made up a large part of 
the agrarian production in Valencia, and, contrary to traditional crops like wheat and 
olive oil, these were mainly exported. As a currency earner and a crop with high 
demand elasticity outside Spain, it was not in the interest of the government to 
suppress prices for citrus fruits. Therefore, production was significantly less regulated 
than that of most other crops in the 1940s and early 1950s. This made it easier to earn 
an “honest” profit on citrus fruits production, and, consequently, lead to an increase in 
the productive area.82
As mentioned above, Leal et al. stated that the relative level of wages and prices 
was important for the process of capital accumulation in the agrarian sector in the 
1940s. This factor can also be traced in the development of the situation for the 
sharecroppers. Perez Rubio analysed this for the relatively large population of 
sharecroppers in Extremadura, and concluded that large landowners after 1940 were 
engaged in a continuos struggle to expel sharecroppers from their estates in favour of 
direct cultivating. Naredo, Ruiz-Maya and Sumpsi, although drawing on much more 
limited empirical evidence from the province of Sevilla, also found that in the 1940s 
and 1950s direct cultivating turned out to be relatively more advantageous for the
79 This equals an annual growth rate of almost exactly ten percent.
80 Gutierrez Hurtado (1987), p. 73. This book is explicitly influenced by Leal et al. (1986). However, 
the chosen proxy is problematic for at least the following reasons. First, because there is no comparison 
with pre-war figures. Second because the development of the market value of the shares is not 
considered. Third, because in an environment of relatively high inflation, as was the case in Spain in the 
1940s, investment in shares might be more attractive than, for example, cash deposits. The inclusion of 
this factor in the analysis would therefore be desirable. Finally, although it might be argued that people 
from the agrarian sector were the owners of some of the shares, it was probably not the case that they 
were the only owners of shares in Valladolid. It is even possible that they did not constitute the main 
group of shareholders.
81 Somi Manes (1980).
82 Somi Manes (1980), pp. 149-152.
83 Perez Rubio (1995b), pp. 113-167.
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landowner than sharecropping.84 The overall result seems to be a continued process of 
eviction of sharecroppers in the latifundio areas after 1940. This led to a fall in the 
living standards of the sharecroppers, once they were turned into wage earners in the 
countryside.85 Summarising, the picture that emerges is one where the conditions in 
the agrarian sector in the 1940s led to that at least large-scale farmers where able to 
increase income and savings, in spite of state intervention. It is therefore not clear that 
the economic conditions for the farmers in the 1940s should lead to a decrease in 
output.
Finally, Leal et al. argued that the accumulation of capital in the agrarian sector 
worked in favour of the industrialisation of Spain, through investments in industry via 
the banking system. This interpretation builds on the assumption that what Spanish 
industry lacked in the 1940s was investments rather than an internal market for its 
production. The authors maintain that the need for further investments was due to a 
low price elasticity of supply in the Spanish economy in the 1940s, In this situation an 
active demand-side policy based on the rural population was irrelevant and would 
only cause further inflation. However, as early as 1956, de Torres forwarded a 
Keynesian interpretation of the problem. He contended that the predominance in 
1940s Spain of small-scale enterprises principally producing for the home market 
made the purchasing power of the agrarian population vital to the industrialisation and 
economic development of the country.87 A further examination of this question is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, which mainly deals with the conditions within the 
agrarian sector.
84 Naredo, Ruiz-Maya and Sumpsi (1977), pp. 34-41.
85 Naredo, Ruiz-Maya and Sumpsi (1977), pp. 21-26.
86 Leal et al (1986), pp. 15-16. If these considerations were in the minds of the members of the 
government, then the reason for the low price elasticity of supply side in the industrial sector is a 
crucial point in determining the economic logic of the policy. The answer to this question is related to 
the judgement of why crucial inputs in the industrial sector, such as energy and raw materials, were 
lacking, and which sectors of the industry were favoured by incentives and direct governmental help. 
As mentioned above, the focus of government industrial policy was especially on sectors related to 
defence and energy. The former was probably not the optimum way of boosting general economic 
growth. The second could have played an important role, had it not been for the very heavy investment 
required to obtain an absolutely insufficient amount of national produced energy. A related problem is 
the state regulation of the financial markets. In the 1940s and 1950s, regulation favoured a small group 
of large banks that obtained a large influence on the industrial sector, and lead to a weak market for 
bonds and shares. The overall influence of this policy in the financing of the industrial sector is hard to 
determine, given that it covers two opposite consequences. Firstly, a lack of a diversified financial 
market, and, secondly, a concentration of savings - i.e. potential investments - in a few banks, 
potentially making large amounts available for investments depending on the banks risk willingness; 
Lukauskas (1994), pp. 75-78.
87 de Torres (1956), pp. XIV-XVI.
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1.4: SUMMARY
Between 1939 and 1951 Spain passed through a prolonged economic crisis, which 
was reflected in most macroeconomic indicators. In spite of being neutral during 
World War II, Spain did not manage to rebuild a large stock of international reserves. 
With the agrarian sector in a prolonged crisis, export earnings decreased, making the 
imports of raw materials and much-needed capital goods very difficult. The situation 
was aggravated by a constant over-valuation of the peseta.
In these years, the government pursued a policy of rapid industrialisation with a 
special emphasis on defence-related sectors. A fundamental instrument in this process 
was the creation of the state-holding INI in 1941, which operated at very high costs in 
comparison to the results obtained. Behind the economic policy was a nationalistic 
ideology, which stressed state regulation of the economy. This led to complicated 
systems of licensing, control over pricing, the labour market, imports and exports, and 
disincentives for foreign investment. The resulting administrative system was utterly 
bureaucratic and opened the way for rent seeking activities.
The state budget did not have the capacity to foster single-handedly the 
development of the economy. Its ability was hampered by the dedication of a large 
amount of available resources to areas with low labour and investment productivity 
like national defence and internal security. In this situation, the government, in spite of 
attempting to keep prices down, was not able to avoid high levels of inflation.
The agrarian sector was clearly subordinate to the drive for industrialisation. 
The need to provide cheap foodstuffs so as to keep wages low was considered crucial 
by the government. This position lead to detailed controls of prices, production and 
consumption of foodstuffs. The farmers reacted by withdrawing a part of the 
production from the official market, channelling it into a growing black market. This 
opened up opportunities for illicit capital accumulation among the larger landowners.
From the beginning of the 1950s the situation gradually improved. External 
imbalances were reduced with the help of economic co-operation with the United 
States and a gradual integration into the international economy. This made much- 
needed imports of capital goods possible, resulting in increased industrial and agrarian 
output. At the same time, official agrarian prices paid to producers were increased, 
and output finally reached pre-war levels. This at last made it possible to abandon the 
system of rationing, which had existed since the end of the Civil War. Improvements
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in supplies helped to moderate inflation, which although still being relatively high, 
was lower than it had been in the 1940s.
The prevailing interpretation of this development has centred on two aspects of 
agrarian policy in the 1940s: price-fixing and rationing. The introduction of a
tfirationing system has been frequently resorted to in the 20 century by governments 
facing a shortage of commodities they consider vital.88 In this situation, an attempt to 
increase output through an increase in the price paid to the producers would appear 
logical. On the other hand, the combination in Spain in the 1940s of a shortage of 
supply of basic foodstuffs, and the introduction of a ceiling on the prices paid to the 
producers appears to have an inherent lack of logic. As we have seen, it is exactly this 
apparent lack of logic which is often highlighted in the historiography, and used as a 
criticism against the agrarian policy in the 1940s. The present thesis will analyse to 
what degree this criticism is adequate. The point of departure for this is an 
examination of economic theory related to state intervention in agriculture. This will 
be followed by a short look at how this type of intervention was carried out in various 
countries in the 1930s and 1940s.
88 This will be discussed in relation to World War II in Section 2.2.
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CHAPTER 2: THE FOOD PRICE DILEMMA, AND STRATEGIES TO 
SOLVE IT IN RELATION TO WORLD WAR II
2.1: THE ECONOMICS OF THE FOOD PRICE DILEMMA
89While the Franco regime was in many ways unique, it did not exist in a vacuum. 
Widespread state control of the economy was prominent in the industrialised world in 
the 1930s and 1940s, either out of a perceived exceptional necessity in peculiar 
situations, or as a goal in itself. One reason behind increasing state intervention was 
the desire to secure a supply of basic foodstuffs in a war situation. This became clear 
during the course of the First World War. On several occasions, the absence of 
adequate supply due to declining national output and loss of imports had demoralising 
effects on troops and civilians, with subsequent risks of military inefficiency and/or 
social upheavals on the home front.90 This lesson was learnt, although to varying 
degrees, by democracies and dictatorships alike in the 1930s and the 1940s, and 
control measures were widely used in belligerent and neutral countries before, during 
and after World War II.91
The interruption of international trade that accompanied the two World Wars of 
the 20th century often made a greater reliance on domestic food production and/or a 
shift in output composition necessary. In this situation, governments often faced what 
has been called “The food price dilemma” -  i.e. how to keep farm prices high and 
food prices low.92 On one side, it would be deemed necessary to protect the consumers 
from rising food prices due to a decline in supply. On the other side, it would be 
desirable to increase prices received by the farmers, to expand domestic production in 
order to compensate for the decrease in imports of foodstuffs and/or inputs.
The analysis of the economic and social effects of different approaches to the 
food price dilemma can best be understood when seen as a deviation from a situation 
with a competitive market with perfect information and no state intervention. In such 
circumstances, and seen from the point of view of economic efficiency, the correct 
level of prices in a given country should adjust to the border price criterion. That is:
89 This special nature of the regime includes its origin in a Civil War in the context of the pre-World 
War II struggle between fascism and democracy, as well as its longevity. The last point led it to adopt 
different attitudes to, for example, economic policy.
90 See Offer (1989) for this aspect of World War I.
91 Some examples of this are treated in Section 2.2.
92 The formulation is from Timmer, Falcon and Pearson (1983), pp. 224-225.
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In such a world, any deviation of the domestic price from the international 
border price of a commodity, as either an import or export, reduces total 
economic welfare in the country because of dead-weight efficiency93 losses in 
production and consumption.94
However, a government might dislike the consequences of following the border price 
criterion. Contemporary examples are the agrarian policies of the European Union and 
the United States, where the desire to secure food supplies, as well as political 
pressures to maintain income of farmers have led to a system of guaranteed minimum 
prices. The effect of such a policy is an income transfer from consumers to producers, 
a dead-weight efficiency loss in the economy, and an over-production that has to be 
stocked.95
The border price criterion can also be irrelevant if  there is no international 
market for a given commodity. In such a situation, the domestic price will be 
determined by supply and demand in the internal market. Wartime restrictions of 
international trade can further decrease output of a commodity if these also affect 
inputs for the production.96
The combination of insufficient domestic production and a limit on imports due 
to external circumstances can lead to a sharp increase in prices if no substitute 
products are available. If the commodity furthermore is a basic staple, the result can 
be a social market failure, i.e. unacceptable social consequences for a part of the 
population.97 Whether a social market failure occurs or not, will depend on several 
factors, such as the price elasticity of supply and the time gap between the
QO
introduction of higher prices and the subsequent increase in production. Except in 
cases of a high price elasticity of supply and sufficient buffer stocks, the government 
might find itself in the food price dilemma. If this is the case, the outcome in the 20
93 Dead-weight efficiency loss occurs when a reallocation of resources in an economy leads to a 
situation where ”... somebody’s welfare is reduced because of the misallocation of resources (...), but no 
one else benefits from this particular loss”; Timmer (1986), p. 45. Consequently, a dead-weight 
efficiency loss reduces the aggregate welfare of society.
94 Timmer (1986), p. 13. Still, if the government want to encourage production by promising farmers 
that they will receive the expected border price, there can be substantial methodological problems of 
establishing how to calculate this; Timmer (1986), pp 73-100. However, the examination of how to set 
farm prices according to border price is omitted from the following analysis, because the international 
market for basic staples was very limited in the 1940s.
95 For overall details of the US system, see Gardner (1992), pp. 85-88.
96 Specifically in relation to agrarian production, major wars in the 20th century have led to a decrease in 
international trade with artificial fertilisers, due to the use of nitrogen in explosives.
97 Middleton (1996), p. 54.
98 Note that in the agrarian sector, the desired increase in production will require at least one growth 
season, even with a high price elasticity of supply.
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century has often been price intervention including some sort of protection for the 
consumers.
In analytical terms the effects of a restriction on imports due to war conditions 
equal the imposition of a quantity quota on imports. To analyse how this works, it is 
first necessary to discuss briefly the price elasticity of supply in the agrarian sector, 
and both the size of this elasticity as well as the question of whether the elasticity is 
positive or negative are widely debated in the historiography." However, the 
following four conclusions appear to be generally agreed upon. First, a positive price 
elasticity of supply appears to be the norm, although it can be negative in specific 
circumstances.100 Second, the short-run price elasticity of aggregate supply is smaller 
than the long-run elasticity. Third, the price elasticity of supply of single crops is 
higher than the aggregate supply elasticity and, finally, non-price factors have to be 
taken into consideration especially in less developed countries.101 For the moment 
being, we will therefore assume that the price elasticity of supply in Spain in the 
1940s was positive and symmetrical.102
Standard economics then state that for a commodity with a positive price 
elasticity of supply and a negative price elasticity of demand, equilibrium in the
i mmarket will occur at the point E where quantity Qd obtain price Pd. With 
international trade and world market prices Pw below the domestic equilibrium price 
Pd, imports will take place at Pw in the quantity Q2 -  Qi.104 If government action or 
war restrict imports to the amount Q4 -  Q3, the supply curve will shift to the right to S’ 
by this magnitude and a new equilibrium will occur at Pq. The quantity consumed will 
be Q4 , which is less than the amount that was consumed before import restriction Q2 , 
and the price will be Pq, which is more than the world market price before import
99 An outline of the development of the main points of the discussion can be found in Askari and 
Cummings (1976), Chhibber (1989), Griliches (I960), Peterson (1979), and Schiff and Montenegro 
(1997).
100 It has been argued that close to subsistence small-scale farmers in sub-Saharan Africa would react to 
increasing farm gate prices by selling less in the market but consuming more in the household. This will 
improve the living standard in the household and uphold monetary income. Platteau (1990), pp. 300- 
303.
101 See Footnote 99.
102 The calculation of the price elasticity of supply in Spain in the 1940s is difficult due to deficient 
statistics. However, Astorquiza and Albiso analysed the 1959-85 period, and they found that the price 
elasticity of supply for wheat with regards to its own price and calculated over the cultivated dry land 
area was 0.36. Furthermore, they found that the cross price elasticity of supply for wheat with regards 
to the price of barley was -0.07. Astorquiza and Albiso (1993), pp. 76-78. The price elasticity o f supply 
for wheat in Spain will be further analysed in Chapter 3.
103 Note that in Spain in the years immediately before the Civil War, the market for a basic staple like 
wheat was characterised by equilibrium between domestic demand and supply. This was the outcome 
of a protective trade policy, while exports were not possible because the Spanish producers were not 
competitive in the international market.
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restriction Pw. This means that after the introduction o f trade restrictions, consumers 
will consume less at a higher unit price, and domestic producers will produce more at 
a higher unit price.
Diagram 2. 1: The effects on supply and demand of an import quota or a reduction in imports 
caused by international restrictions.
P r i c e
Pw
Q 3  Q d  Q 4  Q 2
Q u a n t i t y
S o u r c e :  T h e  f i g u r e  a n d  t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  a r e  s t a n d a r d  t e x t b o o k  m a t e r i a l  o n  t h e  
c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  i m p o r t  q u o t a s ,  n o r m a l l y  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  p r o t e c t i v e  t r a d e  p o l i c i e s .  S e e  
f o r  e x a m p l e  B o y e s  a n d  M e l w i n ,  ( 1 9 9 6 ) ,  p p .  9 8 4 - 9 8 6 . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
This new equilibrium can lead to socially unacceptable consequences for a 
government, if, for example, the new equilibrium price makes it impossible or 
difficult for a part o f  the population to buy the commodity. This can be a problem if  it 
is an important ingredient in the diet with no obvious substitute. This problem can be 
aggravated further in the short term, given that it might take some time before the 
producers can supply the amount required for the new equilibrium to be established, 
due to the growth cycle o f the crop. In these circumstances, a government might 
intervene in the price setting and/or the distribution o f  the commodity, but before 
analysing the available possibilities, we will first have a look at another context where 
state intervention is likely.
Price intervention, which regulates consumer prices, might also happen if  a 
regime decides upon a course o f forced industrialisation. Here it might find it 
appropriate to squeeze agrarian output prices, to make it possible to lower costs in the
104 World prices are defined as border prices c.i.f.
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industrial sector. This took place in Spain in the 1940s, but is also a phenomenon 
found in less developed countries in later years.105 This type of policy has often been 
based on the following four assumptions:
1) that aggregate agricultural production is not very responsive to price 
changes;
2) that the chief beneficiaries of higher prices would be the larger-size farmers;
3) that higher food and other agricultural-related prices such as clothing would 
most adversely affect low-income consumers; and
4) that manufacturing provides a more rapid means of growth, and that 
achieving that growth depends upon large transfers of income (profits) and 
foreign exchange from agriculture to manufacturing.106
Price discrimination against agriculture can take a number of forms, ranging from 
indirect measures such as exchange rate manipulation, selective tariffs, tax levels, and 
so forth, to direct measures, in the form of price fixing by the state.
It has been argued in the historiography that the main reason for the low level of 
agrarian output in Spain in 1940s was state discrimination against the agrarian sector. 
This was done by setting compulsory farm gate prices below the equilibrium price.107 
Leaving aside for the moment the question whether this interpretation is correct, the 
argument is as follows. In Spain before the Civil War, the market for basic staples was 
characterised by equilibrium between domestic supply and domestic demand with the 
price Pd being set by the market (Diagram 2.2). However, after the war the 
government fixed the price Pf at a level that was below the equilibrium, with the 
consequence that consumers increased demand to Q2 and producers restricted output 
to Qi. In the absence of imports this led to unsatisfied demand and it was required to 
introduce a quantitative rationing of consumption.
105 In Spain, the strategy was designed with the purpose o f increasing defence-related industry, but this 
is not necessarily the case. Whatever the reason behind the policy of industrialisation, it does not 
change the part of the argument that is relevant for this study. See Krueger (1992) for a summary of 
discriminatory policies against the agrarian sector in the less developed countries.
106 Brown (1978), p. 84.
107 See Section 1.3.
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Diagram  2. 2: The effects of state fixed prices below the equilibrium  price.
Price
Pd
Pf
Qi
Quantity 
S o u r c e :  D e l l  ( 1 9 9 4 ) ,  p . 1 8 - 1 9 .
Returning to the analysis o f import restriction, a government that wants to protect 
consumers against the price increase connected with the decline in imports by fixing 
prices for example at the level Pw, will face the situation described in Diagram 2.2. If 
this happens, producers will react by maintaining output at the same level as before 
the reduction in imports. Consequently, aggregate supply will be even further 
restricted, while at the same time demand will be maintained at the level 
corresponding to the price Pw. In Diagram 2.1, this will lead to a supply shortage o f  Q2 
-  Q3, equalling the decline in imports. The result will be excess demand.
In this situation, the distribution o f the available produce can take place in two 
different ways. One possibility is that the state establishes a rationing scheme, which 
limits the amount that can be purchased by each consumer, but entitles all consumers 
to a minimum amount o f the commodity at state fixed prices. The alternative to 
administrative rationing is a “First come, first served” scheme where consumers 
receive the produce according to, for example, time spent queuing or privileged access 
to information about where and when the goods can be purchased.
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In a situation with excess demand, it is possible that some consumers will be 
willing to pay more than the official price and that some producers will break the law 
and sell at this price. Whether this will take place depends on a number of factors. 
These includes the efficiency of the control system, the nature of the goods, the degree 
to which both consumers and producers are willing to take risks, the moral assessment 
in society of breaking the law, and so on. The markets where illegal transactions take 
place at higher than official prices are normally referred to as “black markets”.
The economic consequences of price-fixing and a black market can vary widely 
according to the concrete government action, the market conditions, and the type of 
produce that is considered. The following description is therefore restricted to 
conditions often found in markets for basic foodstuffs. First, that consumers and 
producers are counted in large numbers, which means that total state control over the 
market is unlikely. Consequently, at least some consumers and producers can engage 
in black market trade if they decide to do so. In spite of the fact that the state cannot 
control all trade, it will still find it necessary to have a system of punishment, to 
maintain supply in the legal market. Without a threat of punishment, it is possible that 
there will be no supply in the legal market.
The large number of producers and consumers furthermore has the consequence 
that each of them only produces/consumes a small fraction of the total output, which 
leads to them being defined as price takers. A third factor to take into account is that 
the demand for basic foodstuffs is often price inelastic, since daily intake of the 
produce is required for survival.
Price-fixing by the state is then often found in one of the two following forms. It 
can either be decided that all transactions taking place at prices higher than the official 
price are illegal. Alternatively, trading at higher than official prices can be declared 
legal if  the producer has beforehand sold a certain amount of output at the official 
price. The free market in the last system is normally referred to as a ’’parallel market”, 
in contrast to a black market, which is illegal trade at non-fixed prices.
In practice it is possible to combine various sorts of price-fixing with different 
types of penalty systems, and the economic effects of state intervention vary to some 
degree according to the chosen combination. Dell has also shown that different price 
control systems lead to distinctly different output levels. Returning to there
is a situation where the state has fixed the price at Pf below the free market 
equilibrium price Pd, but the state is not able to control the market completely. This 
leads to that a part of output is sold at a higher price than Pf, and in analytical terms
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this can take two forms, which, though, are not mutually exclusive. The first 
possibility is that black market supply is the result of an increase in output beyond Qi, 
while the second is that only the quantity Qi is produced, but a part of this is sold in 
the black market. The last phenomenon is often described as “diversion” or “leakage”. 
With diversion, a black market will lead to a decrease in the supply in the legal 
market, but that does not happen in the first example.108 The effects on total output of 
a black market are different according to whether diversion takes place or not.
The simplest case is if there is no diversion. In this condition, all black market 
supply is the result of an increase in output above the level of Qi. If diversion is 
possible, Dell has shown that a parallel market will increase output compared to a 
situation where no trade outside the regulated market is allowed.109 This conclusion 
has a paradoxical consequence: if the goal is to raise output, it will be in the interests 
of the state to tolerate trade outside the regulated market if a part of the supply is not 
the result of diversion. However, it is not likely that a government would be able to 
declare this in public, since it would undermine the authority of the state to encourage 
violation of its own price control system.
A further problem for the political acceptance of a system which includes a 
parallel market, is that although aggregate output might increase in comparison with a 
system without a parallel market, this is not necessarily visible. Given the illegal 
nature of the black market, it can be difficult to estimate changes in aggregate output, 
and this estimation is further complicated in agriculture because climatic conditions 
cause yearly variations in output, thus obscuring the picture. For the administrator of 
the control system, the visible point of comparison will be aggregate output before and 
after the introduction/removal of a parallel market. However, the correct point of 
comparison is between output after the introduction/removal of a parallel market and 
thevsituation without this change in policy. This however is a non-observable 
counterfactual.
Under price-fixing the changes in total welfare in society also vary according to 
the type of regulation and supply response, and once again the existence of a parallel 
market turns out to be an advantage for society. On one side, it can be shown that a 
price-fixing system, which prohibits all trade at non-official prices leads to a decrease 
in total welfare, when compared with a market without price-fixing, irrespective of the
108 Dell (1994), p. 18.
109 Dell (1994), pp. 63-64 and 68-70.
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nature of the penalty system.110 Nevertheless, the welfare loss is smaller in a situation 
with a black market, as opposed to one where price-fixing is perfectly enforced.111 On 
the other side a price-fixing system, which allows trade at non-official prices in a 
parallel market, does not necessarily lead to a welfare loss when compared with a non­
regulated market.112
However, the absence of welfare loss in the last model requires a design of the 
price-fixing system that might be difficult in the agrarian sector. The first condition is 
that the state is able to calculate a compulsory quota that the producers have to sell at 
the official price, where the official price equals the marginal cost of the last produced 
unit in the quota. This condition is difficult to fulfil when there are many producers 
with different production functions. The second condition is that the costs for the 
farmers resulting from breaking the law have to be money transfers, but may not 
include the use of real resources, which can lead to the production of other goods 
being prevented.113
An alternative way of dealing with the food price dilemma is to try to keep 
producer prices high and food prices low at the same time. However, this requires an 
intermediary -  often in the form of a parastatal monopoly -  which buys the produce 
from the farmers and sells it to the consumers at a loss, with the deficit being covered 
by the treasury. Such a system has the advantage of increasing output and supporting 
the poor consumers at the same time. However, such a system also involves income 
transfers that are not easily observable since these will normally by hidden in the state 
budget.
If the consequences for the consumers and producers are disaggregated between 
social groups, it furthermore becomes clear that across-the-board subsidies lead to a 
socially regressive re-distribution of income from the poor to the rich in society. Since 
large-scale farmers often sell a larger proportion of their produce in the market, they 
will benefit more from the high farm gate prices than smaller producers. Furthermore, 
if  the goods under consideration have a positive income elasticity of demand, and if 
there is no rationing of consumption, it will be the consumers who are better off who 
will benefit most from the consumer subsidy.
A general consumer subsidy also carries the possibility of fraud and/or changes 
in consumption patterns. Fraud can take the form of producers selling to the state not
110 Dell (1994), pp. 68-69.
111 Dell (1994), p. 30.
112 Dell (1994), pp. 64-66.
1,3 Dell (1994), pp, 64-66.
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only what they have produced on the farm, but also an amount bought at subsidised 
prices from the state agency. The produce can thereby enter a trade circle between the 
farmer and the state where the state loses money every time it buys back something 
which it had previously sold to the farmer at a lower price. The change in 
consumption pattern can arise if the commodity can be used both for human 
consumption and as fodder. Here the risk is that livestock farmers will buy the 
produce from the state and feed it to their animals, because the subsidy has made it 
cheaper than normal fodder.114 In the worst case, the result will be a decline in the 
supply for human consumption.
An alternative to a general consumer subsidy is a targeted subsidy to the poorest 
part of the population. This involves establishing a dual price system, i.e. that the 
same commodity is sold at different prices to different social groups. This is a 
measure that is socially more progressive and, at the same time, cheaper for the 
treasury. The other side of the coin is that targeted subsidies are more difficult to 
administer. Means tests can be complicated to design. Moreover, they require a well- 
developed administrative system with a profound knowledge of the economic 
conditions of the population, to avoid the risk of some poor people being left without 
access to lower priced goods, if the administration is deficient. The easiest solution is 
to subsidise a commodity, which has a negative income elasticity of demand, or is 
only consumed by poor consumers, but this may not always be possible.115
Finally, the ultimate way of solving the problem of supply, so rationing and/or 
unsatisfied demand can be avoided, is to obtain a shift of the supply curve to the right, 
on a temporary or permanent basis.116 This can take various forms, such as for 
example a subsidy on inputs or capital goods in the agrarian sector, the promotion of 
technical changes which increases the productivity of land, capital or labour, or a 
change in conditions in related markets, such as husbandry. The increase in calorific 
output can, in some cases, take place at the cost of the variety of the diet, if it includes 
shift in production patterns to fewer but high-calorific products.
To sum up, it can be said that the food price dilemma forces governments to 
choose between economic efficiency and social equity. Even the most efficient ways 
of price-fixing are likely to reduce total output when dealing with agriculture, or, in
114 Timmer (1986), pp. 108-111.
115 Timmer, Falcon and Pearson (1983), pp. 202-206. A variation of this strategy was carried out in 
Spain after 1949, as will be described in Chapter
110 Note that this can be done with or without the across-the-board consumer subsidy being 
implemented at the same time.
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the case o f  across-the-board subsidies, require substantial financial outlays on behalf 
o f the state. The existence o f  a black market might furthermore undermine social 
coherence and/or the authority o f  the government. However, leaving a part o f the 
population without access to daily foodstuffs or other basic commodities might be 
considered politically unacceptable, and the economic losses and administrative 
problems can then be seen as necessary costs. The choice between economic 
efficiency and social equity can also be formulated as a selection between social 
market failure, as formulated by Stiglitz:
For some type o f public intervention, the full costs o f government intervention, 
taking into account the inevitable public failures, may be less than the benefits 
arising from correcting (or improving upon) market failure.117
and government failure, as formulated by North:
Economists (such as Professor Stiglitz) ordinarily take for granted a state that 
has created a set o f rules o f the game that are broadly conducive to economic 
growth. But not only are such rules still the exception (...) there is no guarantee
1 1 o
that they will be perpetual even in the developed world (...).
Given that governments might face financial, technical or political constraints to the 
scope o f action that is open to them it is usually possible to criticise the strategy o f a 
given government fofless than perfect. Consequently, the analysis should also include 
the question o f what the viable alternatives would have been. This discussion will be a 
crucial in the analysis o f the situation in Spain in the 1940s and early 1950s. However, 
before returning to Spain in the following chapters, we will first have a brief look at 
how other governments tried to solve the food price dilemma before, during, and after 
World War II.
2.2: THE REGULATION OF PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION AND
CONSUMPTION OF BASIC FOODSTUFFS DURING WORLD WAR II
During World War II there was widespread state intervention in the economy 
with the purpose o f securing national food supply and ensuring that all members o f the 
population were receiving a minimum ration. The present section shows that the
117 Stiglitz (1989), p. 56.
118 North (1989), p. 109.
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systems of intervention were not the same in all countries, given differences in 
political regimes, the relation between natural endowments and population size, trade 
possibilities, and so forth. Consequently, the intended - and non-intended -  results 
regarding output, supply, distribution and costs also varied from country to country. 
The next four sub-sections describe state intervention in the agrarian sector and its 
consequences in the United Kingdom, Germany, and the USA before and during 
World War II, as well as in “Bizonia” after the end of the war.119 The purpose is to 
show that state intervention in agriculture during and after World War II was often 
carried out on an ad hoc basis. Furthermore, it appears that success depended not only 
on the policy itself, but also positively correlated with the degree of modernisation 
of the agrarian sector and the economy as such. First, a modernised agrarian sector 
appears to be better prepared than a traditional one to shift output patterns and 
increase calorific output. Second, a diversified and large industrial sector will have an 
advantage in substituting imports that are not available in a war period. It is significant 
that when compared to the countries described in the following sub-sections, these 
conditions were not fulfilled in the case of Spain.
2.2.1: From external dependency to improved nutritional standards: The case of the 
United Kingdom
In the context of securing food supply during World War II, the case of the United 
Kingdom is often regarded as relatively successful, particularly in the light of the 
external circumstances. In spite of the fact that the country was highly dependent on 
imports of food,120 few measures were taken to secure provisions before the outbreak
191of the war. The supply situation was further complicated after the capitulation of 
France in 1940, which left the country dependent on a limited agricultural base and 
the hazards of transatlantic maritime transport of foodstuffs.
This led the government to adopt a policy that had three main objectives: a) to 
increase agrarian production, b) to avoid unacceptable inequality of consumption, and
c) to control inflationary pressures. To fulfil these goals, the policy included
119 “Bizonia” is an often-used name for the Anglo-American occupation zones in Germany after 1945.
120 In the 1930s, some two thirds of the consumed calories were imported, and for a basic staple like 
wheat, almost 90 percent of consumption was accounted for in this way. Olson (1963): p. 117.
121 Olson (1963): pp. 43-44. A contemporary author went as far as to say that it was not until 1941 that 
agrarian policy worked well. Murphy (1943), pp. 266-267.
122 Nash (1951): p. 200.
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incentives to increase calorific output, a rationing system, and price controls for both 
producers and consumers.
The expansion of calorific output was stimulated through disincentives for most 
animal production as well as incentives for increasing vegetal production. These 
measures were relatively successful and led to a substantial increase in the amount of 
land under cultivation and total output of calories. The outcome was an improvement 
in the nutritional standards of large parts of the British working class during the 
war.123 As far as the distribution of production was concerned, rationing was gradually 
introduced. Here it is notable that consumption of some basic staples, including bread, 
remained non-rationed during the war.124 Finally, an across-the-board consumer 
subsidy for basic foodstuffs was introduced step by step. The procedure was that the 
state borrowed the money to pay for the difference between what the farmers received 
and what the consumer paid. This was done to maintain social stability, as well as to 
stimulate domestic production of foodstuffs without risking inflationary pressures due 
to wage demands. However, the control of inflation was not as successful as intended,
i ^ r
and the consumer subsidy turned out to be quite expensive for the state. 
Furthermore, the fixing of prices turned out to be problematic according to one of the 
participants in the planning of price controls:
From what has already been said as to the circumstances in which the successive 
price decisions were made during the war, it will be clear that the individual 
price changes cannot be expected to fall into a completely logical pattern. Each 
set of decisions was to some extent a compromise, a result of conflicting 
influences. Thus we cannot take the individual price changes as conforming in 
any consistent fashion to official estimates of change in costs of production, or 
to cost changes modified by appropriate ’’incentives” for different producers.126
Although parts of the price policy were introduced on an ad hoc basis, the general 
results went in the desired direction. On the supply side, calorific output increased by 
91 percent, the production of proteins grew by 106 percent, and the inflationary 
pressures were eased.127 However the success had been obtained at the cost of a
123 Olson (1963): pp. 120-130.
124 Murphy (1943): pp. 270-273. Note, however, that bread was rationed in the UK after 1946. 
Farquharson (1985b), p. 120.
125 See Nash (1951), pp. 206-236 for details of the price control system and the gradual introduction of 
its different elements.
126 Nash (1951), pp. 214-215.
127 Olson (1963), p. 125.
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significant increase in state expenditure, and imports from the US continued to be 
128necessary.
2.2.2: State control and exploitation through conquest: The case o f Nazi Germany
The lesson from World War I of the importance of food supply was maybe most 
acutely learnt by the Nazi regime in Germany. The result was that during a good part 
of the war there appears to have been a reasonable supply of food to the German 
population, but this was partly obtained at the cost of the population in occupied 
countries.
Already from the 1930s, the agrarian policy and part of the trade policy were
directed with the aim of securing wartime supplies, and on a technical level this
strategy to some degree resembled that of the British government. The policy included
compulsory organisation of the farmers in the Reichnahrstand, the preparation of total
state control over agrarian output, trade agreements with countries in Eastern 
1Europe, rationing, price controls, and increase of calorific output through changes
1 ™in the output composition. However, on top of that, the plan for securing food 
supplies included that occupied Eastern Europe should be the granary for a German 
controlled continent. This last point, including the atrocities committed against the 
population of the occupied countries as well as the occupation by German citizens of 
the homes and land of those killed or deported, was a singular strategy amongst the 
belligerent countries in Europe.131
The outcome of this policy is difficult to evaluate exactly, due to lack of 
statistics, but it appears that with its perverted logic, it managed to secure reasonable 
provisions for the German population until approximately 1943. However, from this 
date, output declined at an accelerating rate, due to a lack of fertilisers, farm
• 1Umachinery, and labour. The policy appears to have been more successful in 
Germany than in occupied Eastern Europe. First, because the war was fought outside 
Germany during most of the period. Second, because the shifting war fortunes left few 
years to “normalise” the situation in the occupied countries. Furthermore, the singular 
Nazi conception of “normalising” the situation in Eastern Europe included plundering,
128 Hirsch (1943), pp. 230-231 andPuhle (1985), p. 165.
129 Lehmann (1985), pp. 29-31, and Overy (1994), pp. 21-22.
130 Puhle (1985), pp. 40,46.
131 For the situation in Czechoslovakia and Poland, see Prucha (1985) and Luczak (1985).
132 Lehmann (1985), pp. 36, 40-42.
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as well as deportation and killing of the local population, which would not promote 
agrarian output.
2.2.3: From peacetime depression to wartime boom in the US
The negative effects of the depression in the 1930s led to state intervention in the 
agrarian sector as a part of the New Deal programme. The main goal was to secure 
farmers’ income through state guaranteed minimum prices, and upper limits on the 
cultivated areas. This policy led to surplus output, and important buffer-stock existed 
at the outbreak of World War II.133 The outbreak of World War II led to an increase in 
domestic demand and demand from the United Kingdom, as well as a decline in 
imports. In these circumstances, the government tried to increase output but also to 
keep consumer prices low to avoid inflationary pressures. To obtain this double goal, 
price subsidies were introduced for consumers, in the same way as in the United 
Kingdom. Farm prices were then calculated on the basis of the relative prices of 
agrarian and industrial goods.134
Price controls were not confined to the agrarian sector but covered large parts of 
the economy. In total there were more than 600 rent and price regulations during 
World War II, covering more than 8,000,000 articles. After the end of the war, 
Galbraith maintained that widespread price control had only been introduced when no 
other alternatives appeared viable. But the regulation “made no pretence to deal with 
particular disequilibria; it undertook, quite unequivocally, to fix prices qua prices.”135 
However, the official prices were not always respected. The violations of the 
regulation included upgrading, falsification of records, cash at the side payment, 
payments for non-delivered goods, tie-in sales, quantity/quality deterioration, 
falsification of coupons, selling of rationed commodities without coupon-payment, 
and so on.136
The ability of the agrarian sector to satisfy not only an increase in domestic 
demand but also to deliver exports to allied countries indicates that the outcome of the 
policy was output growth. This was mainly obtained through an increase in the 
cultivated areas, a more intensive use of fertilisers, an improvement in seed quality,
133 Hirsch (1943), pp. 229-230.
134 Hirsch (1943), pp. 232 -242.
135 Galbraith (1980), p. 4.
136 Clinard (1952), pp. 10, 16-21.
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and an acceleration of the mechanisation process.137 However, this happened against a 
background of substantial buffer stocks at the outbreak of the war, and the under 
utilisation of land and capital that was the norm in the sector in the 1930s. Both these 
factors were an advantage in the process of responding to the increase in demand after 
1939.
2.2.4: The industry versus agriculture dilemma: The case o f Bizonia 1945-49
After the end of World War II, Bizonia, i.e. the Anglo-American occupation zones in
Germany, was not able to produce sufficient foodstuffs to maintain an acceptable level
of nutrition for the population. Consequently, rationing, which was introduced during
the war, continued after 1945 and the area was heavily dependent on imports from the 
1-10
United States. The British and American administrators in Bizonia adopted the 
strategy of shifting from husbandry to vegetal production, but with less success than in 
the UK during the war. The move was resisted by the farmers, who refused to 
slaughter more animals, after the Nazi regime had already pursued a policy of limiting 
animal production.139
During the last years of the war, a shortage of fertilisers was a major problem 
for the agrarian sector and this problem persisted after 1945. The simultaneous lack of 
agrarian and industrial output gave rise to a vicious circle of food-coal-food shortage. 
Lack of food meant that the labour force in the German mines produced less coal, due 
to low calorific intake and the time spent searching for food rather than working. With 
energy being a very important input in the production of farm machinery and artificial 
fertilisers, output of these commodities was below the desired level, and so it was 
difficult to raise the agrarian output.140
This vicious circle gives a clear example of the food-price dilemma, which was 
difficult to break in the specific circumstances of post-war Germany. It was politically 
unacceptable to increase rations for the German population beyond the level found in 
the allied countries, and paying higher prices to the farmers would jeopardise the 
situation for the population until agrarian output increased. At the same time, low
137 Puhle (1985), pp. 165, 172-173.
138 Farquharson (1985b), pp. 161-175.
139 Farquharson (1985a), p. 57.
140 Farquharson (1985b), pp. 120-133.
58
official prices paid to the farmers would lead to a decline in output, or a larger share of 
produce being sold on the black market.141
The vicious circle was only broken with the aid of the Marshall plan, which 
allowed food imports from the United States to enter Bizonia in the winter of 1948/49. 
The increase in rations led to a decline in black market prices, and more German 
produced food being sold through legal channels. Finally the improvement in the 
nutritional status of the workers in the mines led to an increase in coal output, and 
subsequently, industrial output, including inputs and capital goods for the agrarian 
sector.142
2.3: SUMMARY AND PERSPECTIVES FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE 
SITUATION IN SPAIN IN THE 1940S AND EARLY 1950S
Economic theory suggests that price-fixing and rationing in the agrarian sector will 
reduce total welfare in a society when compared to a situation without these measures. 
In spite of this, price-fixing in agriculture has been widely used in the 20th century, for 
example to counter a perceived risk of social market failure, or with the purpose of 
fostering industrial growth. These two approaches reflect different attitudes towards 
price-fixing. It can either be seen as a temporary exception from the normal course of 
economic policy or as a desired procedure.
The experiences from World War II show that the contrast between the two 
approaches can be partly obscured in times of large-scale war. In such a case, 
increased levels of state intervention have often been seen as inevitable. Thus, the 
divergent opinions concerning price-fixing mainly show up as different degrees of 
interference in the economy. The second part of the chapter showed this as the 
opposition between, on one side, the German organisation of the economy, and on the 
other side, the approach taken by the United Kingdom and the United States. When 
the experiences from these three countries are compared to the Spanish economic 
policy in the 1940s and early 1950s, it is clear that politically, the course taken in 
Spain had more in common with German economic policy than with that of the United 
Kingdom and the United States.143 Both Spain and Germany favoured widespread 
state control with the economy with the purpose of obtaining national self-sufficiency
141 Farquharson (1985b), pp. 216-217.
142 Farquharson (1985b), pp. 218-219.
143 See Section 1.2 for a brief overview of the general economic policy o f the Franco regime in the 
1940s and early 1950s.
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in key war-related sectors including agriculture. Even under the assumption that 
World War II had not broken out in 1939, it is likely that the Franco regime would 
have pursued a policy of extended state intervention in the economy in the 1940s. On 
the other hand, the experience from other European countries suggests that most types 
of regime governing Spain in the 1940s would have resorted to state intervention in 
the economy to alleviate problems of supply.
We have found that the situation faced by the governments in the 1940s can be 
seen as an example of the “food price dilemma”, i.e. how to keep producer prices high 
to encourage production and at the same time keep consumer prices low to secure 
supply for all. The first part of this chapter suggested that there was no cost-free 
solution to the dilemma, while the second part demonstrated some of the conditions 
that eased the way out of the dilemma. The favourable conditions included a surplus 
capacity in agriculture, as well as a domestic industrial sector that could compensate 
for declining imports of inputs for the agrarian sector. Furthermore, it appears that 
high-productivity agriculture tends to adapt more easily than low-productivity 
agriculture to requirements of change in production patterns.144
All in all, the theory presented in this chapter will make it possible to evaluate 
the agrarian policy of the Franco regime within the context of the food price dilemma. 
This will be possible both as an assessment of the policy that was carried out, and as a 
discussion of which alternatives were open to the government. This analysis will 
cover both the questions of how to raise output, and of how to make an adequate 
distribution of the supply that was at hand. At the same time, the description of the 
various solutions to the food price dilemma tried in other countries will serve as a 
point of comparison for the advantages and disadvantages of Spanish agriculture to 
respond to agrarian policy. The two first points that will be dealt with is the questions 
of whether wheat output could have been increased significantly in the 1940s if the 
regime had opted for another policy, and whether the rationing system for wheat and 
bread could have been optimised.
144 Milward (1985), pp. 13-14.
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CHAPTER 3: PRICE INCENTIVES, CHEMICAL FERTILISERS, 
WORK ANIMALS AND THE POST-WAR DECLINE IN WHEAT 
OUTPUT
3.1: INTRODUCTION
In the historiography, much focus has been on wheat when analysing the 
consequences of the agrarian policy of the Franco regime.145 This is not surprising 
since wheat was the most extensive crop, bread was an important part of the diet of 
the Spanish population, and because the black market for wheat was the largest in the 
sector in terms of value. Furthermore, due to a combined decline in cultivated area and 
average yields, output in the 1940s and the first half of the 1950s was significantly 
smaller than before the Civil War, as can be seen in Diagram 3.1.
Traditionally, wheat output levels in the 1940s have been interpreted in two 
different ways: as a movement along the supply curve due to declining prices, or as a 
shift of the supply curve to the left caused by a lack of inputs and capital. The widely 
accepted works of Barciela are representative of the first argument.146 According to 
this line of reasoning, the prices set by the state led to a substitution of other crops for 
wheat, as well as a de-intensification of wheat cultivation.147 Finally, this 
interpretation states that the supply problem was only solved in the early 1950s when 
prices paid to farmers by the state were increased and the market for agrarian products 
was liberalised.148 As an alternative explanation, Simpson has suggested that the 
decline in output was the result of a shift of the supply curve to the left. He pointed to 
the possibility that it was the lack of fertilisers and work animals that was behind the 
decrease rather than the level of official prices.149 A related observation was made by 
Leal et al. They observed that although the official prices paid to farmers in real terms 
were lower in the 1940s than in the 1930s, this coincided with an increase in the 
relative price of output to labour.150
145 See Section 1.3.
146 See Barciela (1981a), Barciela (1981b), Barciela (1986b), and Barciela and Garcia Gonzalez (1983). 
References to the works of Barciela can be found in for example Harrison (1985), Prados de la 
Escosura and Sanz (1996), Richards (1999) and Simpson (1995).
147 Barciela (1986b), p. 391-393.
148 Barciela (1986b), p. 416.
149 Simpson (1995), p. 247.
150 Leal, et al. (1985), pp. 44-46 and 64.
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Diagram 3.1: Index of the development of output, yields, and cultivated area with wheat in Spain,
1939-59 (1931-35 average = 100)
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The main problem to be addressed in this chapter is which of these two theories is 
more accurate. This issue is important because it is fundamental for the understanding 
of the agrarian policy of the Franco regime in the 1940s, and, thereby, for the 
evaluation of the general political economy of the period. Furthermore, it will serve as 
a background for Chapter 6, which deals with wheat growing farmers in the province 
of Cuenca. The joint conclusions from these two chapters will make it possible to 
discuss if  the economic policy of the Franco regime had special consequences for 
small-scale farmers in comparison with the rest of the agrarian sector.
The present chapter concludes that the main reason for the decline in output was 
a shift of the supply curve to the left due to a shortage of fertilisers and work 
animals.151 Given the national and international conditions in the 1940s, these 
shortages were difficult to overcome. The absence of an intervention in the wheat 
sector would therefore have resulted in a social market failure, running the risk of 
large parts of the population experiencing a further deterioration of their living 
conditions.
Moreover, black market earnings counteracted the fall in official prices, and at 
the same time changes in relative prices received by the farmers appear to have 
favoured wheat cultivation at the cost of other yearly crops. Consequently, the 
decrease in wheat output cannot be ascribed to the substitution of wheat for other 
crops. A similar result is found in the issue of possible changes in land use in favour 
of animal husbandry. Although sheep breeding became more widespread, this factor 
does not appear to have been decisive for the decrease in wheat production.
Since work animals and fertilisers were scarce resources, a raising of the official 
wheat prices paid to farmers would not have been a sufficient condition for a higher 
wheat output unless it took place at the expense of other crops. Moreover, the study 
will demonstrate that between 1950 and 1952 higher official prices were not a 
necessary condition for obtaining a larger production. Thus, while there was a limited 
scope for increasing output, the analysis will show that it would have been possible to 
design the system of intervention in such a way that it would have encouraged less 
black market trading. It is therefore important to make a distinction between the effect
of the agrarian policy on the level of production and on the distribution of production.
1
The overall argument is broadly in line with what has been suggested by Simpson,
151 This result is in accordance with the interpretation suggested by Simpson. See Footnote 149.
152 Simpson (1995).
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and Leal et al. .153 On the other hand, the conclusions are at odds with the 
interpretation forwarded by Barciela, who argued that the level o f  official prices paid 
to the farmers in the 1940s was the main reason for the post-war decline in output. 154
3.2: ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE WHEAT PRICES RECEIVED BY FARMERS 
AND THEIR EFFECT ON OUTPUT LEVELS BETW EEN 1939 AND 1953
3.2.1: The increase in wheat prices in absolute terms in the 1940s when black market 
earnings are included
From Section 2.1 we know that in a situation with state fixed prices, the existence o f a 
black market could in certain circumstances increase output. The principal condition 
that had to be fulfilled was that at least a part the produce sold in the black market was 
not the result o f “diversion”.155 It is therefore significant that the SNT estimated in the 
early 1960s, that for the 1939-49 harvests 55.7 percent o f  the marketable production 
o f  wheat was sold in the black market. 156 It might have been the case that black 
market sales immediately after the end o f the Civil W ar were mainly the result o f 
diversion. However, the relative size o f  the black market makes it likely that from the 
early 1940s it was clear to farmers that earnings from this source could be included in 
the planning o f  production. Consequently, official prices paid to farmers might not 
have been that important for the level o f output. This is supported by the fact that 
when rationing was abolished in 1952, official prices in real terms were some o f the 
lowest since the end o f the war.
If  black market earnings were to work as an incentive to increase production, the 
gains from this source had to be worth the risk o f being caught. The fact that such a 
high proportion o f  the harvest found its way to the black market indicates that the 
deterrent effect o f  the control system was limited. As mentioned in Chapter 1, a 
special court called the Fiscalia de Tasas was created in 1941 to deal with cases o f
black market activity. Unfortunately, no sources are available that give the total
number o f  cases that were brought for trial at the institution. At the provincial level, 
the archive o f  the Fiscalia Provincial de Tasas in Teruel has survived, and this 
indicates that the risk o f  being caught was not very large. Close to 10,000 cases were
153 Leal et al. (1985). ,^ /c .e L  awJ
154 Barciela (1981a), Barciela (1981b), Barciela (1986b) and'fjarcia Gonzalez (1983).
155 See p. 50.
156 Servicio Nacional de Trigo (1963), Table C.-9-1.
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brought before the Fiscalia Provincial de Tasas in the 1941-53 period, which only 
amounts to some 800 cases a year. However, among those caught were not only 
farmers selling in the black market, but also middlemen and consumers, as well as 
people trading in other rationed goods such as clothes and shoes.157 With the 
provincial population being around 230,000 in the 1940s, this meant that 
approximately one third o f a percent o f the population was punished each year. In the 
light o f  the quantity and range o f products that were sold on the black market, this 
figure is hardly impressing.
Although the non-fulfilment o f the compulsory production quota is no proof of 
black market activity in itself, the sources suggest that there probably was a high 
coincidence between the two phenomena. Normally all farmers were fined if  they 
owed more than 1000 kilos o f their quota. However, the deterrent effect appears to 
have been small since examples can be found o f people selling nothing to the SNT 
despite the fact that their production quotas sometimes reached 50,000 to 60,000 
kilos.158
For those owing less than 1000 kilos, fines were imposed in a discretionary way. 
These would be based on a joint evaluation by the local SNT office and the Ministry 
o f  Agriculture in Madrid. Judging from the correspondence between the local SNT 
offices and Madrid, it is clear that the purpose o f  fining some o f  the farmers owing 
less than 1000 kilos was to inflict exemplary punishment where they saw fit.159 The 
inefficient control o f production had the consequence that the official price did not 
equal the average price received by the farmers. It is therefore crucial to determine 
what prices farmers received for their produce to accurately gauge the importance o f 
the price policy on output. Unfortunately, almost all information on black market 
prices deals with consumer prices and not those received by farmers. However, based 
on oral and personal evidence, Barciela and Garcia Gonzalez judged that setting the 
black market price o f wheat received by farmers at 250 percent o f  the official price 
was a conservative estimate for the 1939-53 period as a w hole.160 Applying this factor
157 Fiscalia Provincial de Tasas de Teruel: Fichas de los sancionados por la Fiscalia Provincial de Tasas 
y multas que se les han impuesto (1941-55).
I CO
Servicio Nacional de Trigo: Resumen de deudores de cupos forzosos de trigo para la Gxw, 
1950/51.
159 This is for example explicitly stated in a letters from the Provincial Delegates o f SNT in Palencia 
and Malaga to the SNT office in Madrid, both from May 30th 1951: Servicio Nacional de Trigo: 
Resumen de deudores de cupos forzosos de trigo para la 1950/51. However, even this did not 
always take place, given that at least in one year in Cuenca, the Civil Governor of the province 
cancelled the fines imposed on the farmers for not fulfilling their production quota: Christiansen 
(1999), pp. 234-235.
160 Garcia Gonzalez worked for the SNT in the 1940s.
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to the share of output that the SNT estimated was sold in the black market, Barciela 
and Garcia Gonzalez calculated average nominal prices received by farmers (Column 
3 in Table 3.1).161 Note that the constant increase in nominal prices that can be seen in 
the table is not that telling for the economic situation of the farmers, given that Spain 
in the 1940s was characterised by high levels of inflation.162 Since a farmer would 
spend at least a part of his income buying other goods whose prices also increased, it 
is necessary to take into consideration the development of the relative price of wheat 
to other goods in the economy.
Barciela and Garcia Gonzalez used a GDP deflator, with 1915 as its base year, 
for the conversion of nominal prices into real prices. However, it has been preferred to 
use Prados de la Escosura’s price deflator for “agriculture, forestry and fishing” for 
the calculation of Columns 4 and 5 in Table 3.1.163 This deflator is preferable to the 
1915 GDP deflator because the base year is 1958, which is closer than 1915 to the 
period that is dealt with in the analysis. It can be supposed that farmers mainly spent 
their income on products from within the primary sector, rather than industrial 
products or service goods.164 Hence, it is an advantage to use a deflator, which mainly 
covers the development of food prices.165 Although this deflator might be too narrow 
to capture the development of all prices paid by farmers, it still appears to be more 
accurate than a GDP deflator.166
It is now possible to evaluate the development of average wheat prices received 
by the farmers. The average wheat price received by farmers in most post-war years 
was higher than the pre-war average when black market earnings are included and 
when prices are calculated in real terms (Column 7 in Table 3.1). Nevertheless, this 
average wheat price is not a precise measure of the exact level of prices received by 
the farmers.
161 In Barciela and Garcia Gonzalez (1983) the total price received by the farmers does not include 
earnings from black market sales in 1939 and 1940. Since the authors do not argue that the situation 
was different in these two years, the figures for these two years have been recalculated according to the 
method for the rest of the years.
162 See Section 1.1.
163 Prados de la Escosura (1995), vol. 2, pp. 131-134.
164 The first inquiry into household expenditure patterns in Spain was made between March 1964 and 
March 1965. At this time farm households spent on average 55 percent o f their income on foodstuffs, 
15 percent on clothes and shoes, 6 percent on rent, 8 percent on household equipment and 5 percent on 
holidays and miscellaneous. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de Espana, (1966). 
It can be assumed that an even higher proportion of income was spent on foodstuffs in the 1940s, where 
the average economic situation was far worse than in the 1960s.
165 The deflator is also used to convert nominal prices to real prices in Chapters 4, 6, 7 and 8.
166 Moreover, using the GDP-deflator from Prados de la Escosura has the consequence that official 
prices in real terms were higher than the pre-war average in most of the 1939-53 period, which is a 
highly unlikely interpretation.
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Table 3.1: Official wheat price, estimated average price, index of official price and index of estimated average received bv farmers per 100 kilo 
wheat.
O no
Years
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Official price Amount of output Estimated average Official price Estimated average Index of official Index of average
paid to sold in the black prices received by paid to farmers prices received by price received by price received by
farmersl) market farmers when farmers when farmers in farmers in
black market sales black market sales constant 1958 pts. constant 1958 pts.
are included are included
(Current pts) (percent) (Current pts) (Constant 1958 pts)^ (Constant 1958 ptsy° (1931-35 av. = 100) (1931-35 av. = 100)
1931 47 - 47 513 513 94 94
1932 47 - 47 517 517 95 95
1933 47 - 47 574 574 105 105
1934 49 - 49 556 556 102 102
1935 47 - 47 563 563 103 103
1937 51 - 51 515 515 94 94
1938 63 - 63 549 549 101 101
1939 67 28 94 495 702 91 129
1940 85 31 124 490 717 90 132
1941 87 28 123 406 577 75 106
1942 96 38 151 375 589 69 108
1943 127 34 192 480 724 88 133
1944 163 34 246 529 799 97 147
1945 181 29 259 556 797 102 146
1946 177 31 260 444 650 81 119
1947 192 36 295 458 703 84 129
1948 252 37 392 574 892 105 164
1949 252 33 367 514 749 94 137
1950 252 21 331 453 596 83 109
1951 290 18 369 497 631 91 116
1952 376 24 511 662 900 121 165
1953 401 9 456 685 778 126 143
1) Official prices are national averages, except 1937 and 1938 where they are average prices in the part of Spain controlled by the rebels.
2) Constant prices were obtained by deflating current prices by "price index in agriculture, forestry and fishing" from Prados de la Escosura (1995).
Sources: Barciela and Garcia Gonzalez (1983): p. 94, Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario Estadistico de las producciones agrarias (1931-35).
This is the result of the uniform black market premium in its calculation and partly 
due to the inherent problems involved in determining the relative size of the black 
market. The correct interpretation of Table 3.1 would therefore be that it indicates the 
likely level of discrepancy between the official prices and the average prices received 
by farmers.
In any case, three factors demonstrate that this discrepancy might have been 
even larger than Table 3.1 shows. The first is that Barciela and Garcia Gonzalez 
maintain that the applied black market price is only a conservative estimate. 
Moreover, the calculation in Table 3.1 does not take into account that a part of what is 
registered in the statistics as farmers self-consumption could also have been traded in 
the black market. On top of that, Barciela and Garcia Gonzalez ignored the existence 
of a more diversified official market in 1950 and 1951 where a part of production 
fetched a higher price than what is indicated in the table.167 It is therefore questionable 
that the level of output of wheat was principally determined by official prices.
Finally, it is important that the solution of the supply problem of bread did not 
happen alongside an increase in the official price of wheat. The abolition of the 
rationing of bread took place in the spring of 1952, it being a product of the 1951 
harvest. Diagram 3.2 shows that in real terms the official price known to the farmers
1 AQat the time of sowing was the second smallest since 1939. In addition, Table 3.1 
demonstrated that in real terms, the official price received for the 1951 harvest was 
just 3 percent above the average official price between 1939 and 1950. These two 
findings mean that the incentive from official prices to increase planned output in 
1951 was smaller than in almost every year in the 1940s. At the same time, the 
encouragement from the official prices to sell in the official market rather than in the 
black market was similar to the average situation in the 1940s. The findings of this 
section seriously question the interpretation that the level of official prices paid to the 
farmers determined the level of wheat output. The two main points in the critique are: 
that the average prices received by the farmers in absolute terms were higher after the 
war than in the 1930s when black market earnings are included, and that the abolition 
of the rationing system happened at a time with low official prices.
167 The conditions in the official market in 1950-51 are described in Section 3.6.
168 At the time of sowing for the 1951 harvest, the last received price was 453 constant 1958 pesetas, 
while the average known price at the time of sowing between 1939 and 1950 was 528 constant 1958 
pesetas.
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Diagram  3.2: Area cultivated with wheat and official price known at tim e of sowing.
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Sources Barciela and Garcia Gonzalez (1983), p.94. Ministerio de Agricultural Anuario Estadistico de las producciones agricolas (1939-40, 1943-53). Ministerio de Agricultura: Resumen 
estadlstico de las producciones agricolas (1950, 1950-1951, 1954-1955). Real prices were obtained using the deflator for “agriculture, forestry and fishing” from Prados de la Escosura 
(1995). See the discussion on p. 66 for the use of constant prices instead of nominal prices, as well for the choice of deflator. Note that between 1939 and 1942, and again from 1949 
onwards, the official prices were announced at the beginning of the harvest, but between 1943 and 1948, prices were announced at the time of the sowing. The prices are the most recent 
information available to the fanner at the time of sowing
At the beginning of the section, it was assumed that at least a part of produce sold in 
the black market was not the result of diversion. It has only been possible to ground 
this hypothesis on indirect evidence on the conditions in the market for wheat. A more 
certain proof would require an investigation into the economies of individual farms, 
which is beyond the scope of this thesis.
3.2.2: The limited substitution of other crops and other types of agrarian land use for 
wheat in the post-war years
Diagram 3.1 demonstrated that the post-war decline in wheat output was the combined 
result of a smaller cultivated area and lower yields than in the 1930s. In theory, this 
trend in cultivation could be the outcome of changing relative prices, which made it 
more attractive to plant other crops than wheat or use the land for animal husbandry. 
Yet, the evidence does not support this interpretation. There exist some difficulties in 
accurately measuring changes in relative prices between wheat and other crops as 
there are insufficient data on black market prices and the relative size of the black 
market for crops other than wheat. Thus, we can only observe the changes in the 
allocation of land to different crops without knowing the accompanying shifts in 
relative prices.
Since wheat was by far the most widespread crop, only the following crops 
could act as substitutes on any significant scale: barley, rye, oats, maize, chickpeas, 
broad beans, green beans, carob beans, vetch and potatoes. Table 3.2 shows that 
before the war the total area cultivated with those 10 crops was slightly larger than the 
wheat area. For a period after the war, it appears that the cultivation of wheat lost its 
attractiveness for the farmers. Until 1946 the relative size of the area cultivated with 
wheat with regards to the other 10 crops was smaller than the pre-war average. 
Nevertheless, this temporary decline in the share of land used for wheat was not the 
principal factor behind the absolute decrease in the area cultivated. In fact, that the 
total post-war cultivated area was significantly below the pre-war average was almost 
doubly important.169
169 The relative importance of the two factors can be calculated by constructing the following two 
counterfactuals. The first is to apply the share of land used for wheat between 1939 and 1946 to the pre­
war total cultivated area. This would have resulted in a 306,000 hectares decrease in the average area 
cultivated with wheat between 1939 and 1946. The other counterfactual is to apply the pre-war share of 
land used for wheat to the total cultivated area between 1939 and 1946. This would have resulted in
571,000 hectares decrease in the average area cultivated with wheat between 1939 and 1946.
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Table 3.2 shows furthermore that after 1941, the post-war cultivated area 
remained stable at around 90 percent of the pre-war average. This implies that the 
shift in land use for yearly crops did not lead to a change in the total area cultivated 
with the crops between the early 1940s and the late 1950s. An expansion of wheat 
output through an increase in the cultivated area would only have been possible at the 
expense of other yearly crops. The stability of the total cultivated area for the whole of 
the 1941-59 period is also interesting in relation to Barciela’s interpretation of 
agrarian policy. He stated that the recovery in agrarian output that occurred in the 
early 1950s was the result of higher official prices and a liberalisation of the market. 
These measures then led to an increase in the area cultivated with wheat and a more
170intensive use of fertilisers.
Table 3. 2: The development of the area cultivated with most the widespread yearly crops in 
Spain, 1931-59.
Years Area cultivated Area cultivated Area cultivated Index of area Area cultivated with
with wheat With other with 11 main cultivated with 11 Wheat as % of
10 yearly crops1* yearly crops. main yearly crops 11 crop total
(1000s of Hectares) (1000s of Hectares) (1000s of Hectares) (1931-35 average = 100) (Percent)
1931-35 4557 5073 9630 100 47,3
1939 3496 4229 7725 80 45,3
1940 3535 4652 8187 85 43,2
1941 3762 4882 8644 90 43,5
1942 3776 5039 8815 92 42,8
1943 3736 4978 8714 90 42,9
1944 3711 4800 8511 88 43,6
1945 3766 4618 8384 87 44,9
1946 3950 4465 8415 87 46,9
1947 4017 4395 8412 87 47,8
1948 4041 4405 8446 88 47,8
1949 4086 4451 8537 89 47,9
1950 4080 4451 8531 89 47,8
1951 4214 4447 8661 90 48,7
1952 4262 4368 8630 90 49,4
1953 4256 4356 8612 89 49,4
1954 4260 4417 8677 90 49,1
1955 4288 4282 8570 89 50,0
1956 4305 4351 8656 90 49,7
1957 4378 4258 8636 90 50,7
1958 4365 4250 8615 89 50,7
1959 4368 4158 8526 89 51,2
1) Barley, rye, oats, maize, chickpeas, broad beans, green beans, carob beans, vetch and potatoes.
Sources: Institute Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario estadlstica de Espafia (1943); Ministerio de Agricultural Anuario
Estadlstico de las producciones agricolas (1931-60).
170 See Section 3.1 for an outline of Barciela’s argument. It is especially noteworthy that he maintains 
that the liberalisation of the market for foodstuffs led to a general increase in the cultivated area. Yet 
this is done only on the basis of the development for wheat, barley, rye, oats and maize. (Barciela 
1986b), pp. 420-421.
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However, Table 3.2 at least questions this hypothesis, as the supposed incentive to 
increase output did not manifest itself in a larger cultivated area with the main yearly
The stability o f the area cultivated with the main yearly crops after 1941 at 
about 90 percent o f the pre-war average could be the result o f a relative expansion o f 
animal husbandry. Nevertheless, such a process o f  substitution does not appear to 
have been common in the 1940s and early 1950s. Cattle and sheep were the two 
species that could compete with yearly crops for the same land. Table 3.3 shows that 
there were some 10-15 percent fewer animals older than one year in the 1940s than 
before the war for cattle, while the number o f sheep increased by some 20  percent in 
the same period . 172 When calculated on the basis o f  the combined living weight o f  the 
two species, the two opposing tendencies cancel each other out (Table 3.3).
The difference in the development o f  the number o f  animals in the two cases 
reflects different market conditions for some o f the products obtained from these 
species. The combination o f the post-war decline in the production o f  fodder crops , 173 
with the lower level o f living standards for both urban and rural population, was
171 As explained in Appendix 1, the statistics for the production and cultivated area of wheat, barley, rye 
and oats between 1939 and 1949 were adjusted upwards by the Ministry o f Agriculture in the early 
1950s. The lack o f corrections for the other yearly crops opens the possibility that there was also an 
underestimation o f the cultivated area. This means that if the data for the total cultivated area in Table 
3.2 are inaccurate, the bias is against our hypothesis that the level o f official prices was not the main 
cause for the post-war decline in production.
172 Some confusion is possible about the number o f animals in 1933 when compared to the 1940s. In the 
1933 data, the total number of animals is divided in “adult animals” and “young animals” 
(terneros/terneras), while in 1940 the division is between ’’adult animals”, “young animals” and 
“animals younger than 1 year” (crias). In subsequent overviews o f the development of the number of 
animals, the 1933 data has then been understood to include “animals younger than 1 year”, but this 
appears to be a mistake. In 1940 883,943 animals younger than 1 year plus 1,030,453 “young animals” 
were registered, while in 1933 only 964,931 “young animals” were registered. Furthermore, there were 
2,171,459 cows in 1933 but only 1,722,945 in 1940. It does not seem likely that a smaller number of 
cows in 1940 had produced twice the number of animals younger than three years "'in 1933. An 
alternative source gives the number of some 4,215,000 cattle for 1935, in comparison with the 1933 
data of 3,568,325. The difference is close to the number of animals that were registered in 1940 as 
“Animals younger than 1 year”. We have therefore interpreted the 1933 data as being without “animals 
younger than 1 year”. For the post-1940 data, the “Animals younger than 1 year” are not included in the 
original statistics. See Ministerio de Agricultural “Tres estudios economicos”: pp. 52-53, 75-80, and 
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de Espana (1943), pp. 480-483, for the original 
statistics. See the 1958 edition o f the Anuario Estadistico de Espana, p. 185 for the 1935 data, as well 
as for an example o f the interpretation that the 1933 data includes the “animals younger than 1 year”.
Note that 69 percent of the decline in the number o f cattle between 1948 and 1955 recorded in 
Table 3.3 was found in only five provinces in the north-east o f Spain: La Coruna, Lugo, Orense, 
Oviedo and Pontevedra. This might either be due to special circumstances at the local level and/or 
changes in the methodology or the quality of the statistics. We will not pursue the matter further since 
wheat was not very widespread in these provinces, and because 1955 is after the period with the most 
intensive state control o f wheat production.
173 Typical fodder crops were barley, oats and various leguminous plants.
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probably detrimental to most animal production in the 1940s.174 This is supported by 
the data in Diagram 3.3. Meat output from slaughterhouses in provincial capitals was 
55 percent lower in the 1940s than between 1929 and 1935, and total meat production 
between 1950 and 1956 was 42 percent higher than in the 1941-49 period.175
Table 3 .3 : Number of cattle and sheep, and accumulated living if the two species in Spain, 1933- 
55.
Years Cattle older Index of number Adult sheep Index of number Living weightv Index of
than 1 year of animals of animals living weight
(1933 = 100) (1933 = 100) (kilos) (1933 = 100)
1933 3568625 100 13618645 100 2108382250 100
1940 3013428 84 16715567 123 2041149550 97
1942 3294000 92 16539110 121 2144555500 102
1948 3300180 92 15921303 117 2116137150 100
1950 3092491 87 16341821 120 2054087450 97
1955 2742037 77 15933140 117 1893471800 90
1) Calculation based on cattle weighing 400 kilos and sheep weighing 50 kilos.
Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de Espafla (1943,1944-45,1950,1953, 1958):
Ministerio de Agricultura: "Tres estudios econdmicos".
Nevertheless, the economic conditions for sheep breeding appear to have improved
1 7  A •after the war, in spite of intervention by CGAT. The improvements of the economic 
situation was due to declining imports of raw cotton and wool for the Spanish
1 77industry, and increased exports of woollen cloths during World War II. Although 
the number of sheep increased, this did not have a negative effect on the output of 
annual crops. 19 provinces accounted for close to 70 percent of the total number of 
animals. In these areas, the correlation coefficient between the increase in sheep and 
the increase in area cultivated with yearly crops between 1933 and 1950 is only -  
0. 10.178
Engel’s Law states that in general there is a positive correlation between income and the demand for 
superior foodstuffs such as meat.
17 Unfortunately, the data for the 1929-56 period are contained in two discontinued series, but the 
picture still remains clear. Note that the retail price for meat was controlled by the CGAT in the 1940s, 
but a black market also existed: Camera Oficial de Comercio, Industria y Navegacion de Bilbao: 
Memoria Comercial (1944-49).
176 Barona (1948), pp. 372-373. The official trade union repeatedly demanded a liberalisation of the 
market: Monter Garcia (1949), p. 689 and p. 714.
177 Catalan (1995), pp. 175-179; Instituto Nacional de Estadistica; Comercio exterior de Espana. 
Numeros indices (1901-1956), pp: 56-57.
178 The 19 provinces are those with more than 2 percent of national total of sheep in 1933, i.e. Avila, 
Badajoz, Burgos, Caceres, Ciudad Real, Cordoba, Cuenca, Guadalajara, Huesca, Leon, Navarra, 
Palencia, Salamanca, Soria, Teruel, Toledo, Valladolid, Zamora, and Zaragoza. The picture is the same 
when using data for 1948 instead of 1950. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de 
Espana” (1950, 1952); Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario Estadistico de las producciones agricolas 
(1931-35, 1948, 1950); Ministerio de Agricultura: Resumen estadistico de las producciones agricolas 
(1950, 1950-1951).
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Diagram 3.3: Meat output in Spain, 1929-56.
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In sum, the stable level o f aggregate living weight o f  sheep and cattle and the limited 
inverse correlation between the increase in the number o f  sheep and the development 
o f  the area cultivated with yearly crops, suggest that the post-war decline in wheat 
output was not the result o f a competition for land from animal husbandry.
3.3: THE LACK OF WORK ANIMALS IN SPAIN AFTER THE CIVIL WAR
It has been argued in the historiography that crop substitution and official prices were 
the two main reasons behind the post-war level o f  wheat output. 179 However, the 
present chapter has demonstrated that this interpretation is doubtful. The next step will 
be to analyse alternative factors that could restrict wheat output in the 1940s. In Table 
3.2 we saw that the total area cultivated with yearly crops was virtually stable from 
1941 to 1959, so that the aggregate expansion or retraction o f  the crops was close to 
zero. At the same time, the total cultivated area in the 1940s was below the pre-war 
level and could not be explained by the use o f  land for animal husbandry. It turns out 
that the reason behind the decrease in the cultivated area was a reduction in the 
number o f work animals as a product o f the Civil War. As the agrarian sector in Spain 
was not yet mechanised, this was an important constraint on agrarian output.
The two main species used as work animals were mules and cattle, but rather 
than being substitutes, the two animals were to a certain degree complementary. In 
1933, the M inistry o f Agriculture ascribed this to the variances in natural conditions 
and social organisation that characterised the agrarian sector:
The logic consequence is that cattle are widespread in places where natural 
conditions favour animal husbandry and where urban concentration is small. On 
the other hand, mules dominate in locations where the climate is harsh and 
where the urban concentration is high, which are factors that imply that 
cultivated land is far from the homes o f  the farmers and that land plots are 
disseminated. Only changes in the last factors would lead to a bigger number o f 
cattle as a work animal, which many agronomists and zoologists think would be 
an advantage.180
The result was large regional variations in the relative share o f  cattle and mules, with 
cattle being less suited to the natural conditions and the social organisation in large
See Section 3.1. .
180 Ministerio de Agricultura: “Tres estudios economicos”, p. 57.(Owv% A (toy*s'6--*1 0 )
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parts of central and southern Spain.181 Since this was the main area for cereal 
cultivation, production of these crops depended to a large degree on the available 
number of mules.
The Civil War led to a 10 percent decline in the number of animals, and it was 
very difficult to recover the pre-war figures in the 1940s.182 The importance of the 
decline is indicated by the fact that the relative reduction in the cultivated area with 
the 11 main yearly crops was also 10 percent (Table 3.2). Consequently, the ratio of 
mules per cultivated area with yearly crops remained constant from the early 1930s to 
1950.
Yet, in 1939 it did not appear to be a major problem to recover the pre-war 
number of animals. With an increase in demand for mules, prices for fodder crops 
controlled and with less competition for land use, the breeders of mules should have 
been able to increase prices and reduce costs at the same time. In normal 
circumstances, this should increase mule output, but three problems worked against 
this. The first problem was structural, the second was the result of international events, 
and only the last one originated in decisions taken by the Franco government.
The structural problem was related to the stock of animals in Spain. Production 
of mules requires an adequate stock of horses and donkeys, and there was a shortage 
of horses since they were seldom used as work animals in Spain. Consequently, the 
animals on hand did not have the required characteristics for being good breeding 
animals for mules, and pre-war practice was to import young mules, mainly from 
France and the United States.183 A recovery of the pre-war number of work animals 
based on the existing stock of breeding animals in Spain was therefore not feasible.
The problem originating in the international environment was the eruption of 
World War II. Transatlantic trade was interrupted, while at the same time the war led 
to a sharp increase in the demand for draft animals for military use, especially for the 
German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Hence, the continued import of work 
animals to Spain, let alone a larger volume than before the Civil War, was not
181 Since horses and donkeys were mainly used for riding and as freight animals, the Ministry of 
Agriculture did not consider them when they in 1933 estimated the relative amount of work animals 
that were cattle and mules. The largest amount of cattle was found along or close to the Atlantic coast, 
with 99 percent in Santander, 89 percent in the Basque Country, 87 percent in Galicia, 81 percent in 
Leon and 77 percent in Asturias. Mules dominated in the central and southern parts of the county, with 
94 percent in Levante, 90 percent in Castilla la Nueva and Albacete, 89 percent in Aragon, 69 percent 
in Extremadura and 66 percent in Eastern Andalucia. See Ministerio de Agricultura: “Tres estudios 
economicos”, pp. 56 and 95.
182 In 1933 there were 1,019,756 mules older than three years, while the average for 1940, 1942, 1948 
and 1950 was approximately 924,000: Ministerio de Agricultura: “Tres estudios Economicos”; Instituto 
Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de Espana” (1943, 1944-45, 1952).
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possible. This is reflected in import data, which also reveals that imports had already 
declined in the early 1930s, when compared to the late 1920s (Diagram 3.4).
The third factor was the introduction of a price ceiling for mules in 1942, which 
complicated the situation for the breeders.184 Given that the number of mules on a 
farm was relatively easy to control, price controls probably worked as a damper on 
production, even though there was also a black market for this commodity. It is hard 
to argue that the Franco regime could have done much to correct the two first 
problems between 1939 and the end of the 1940s. This left the regime with the option 
to increase the national production through a liberalisation of prices and/or a technical 
program of improvement in the stock of animals. Even so, as late as in 1947 there was 
apparently still no initiative on the last point, in spite that this apparently could 
increase the number of surviving foals by 50 percent over a number of years.185
It is clear that the price policy did not favour an increase in the stock of mules. 
However, given the other problems just described, it appears that the recovery of the 
pre-war level of animals in all cases would have been a lengthy process. Moreover, we 
have seen that the possibility of substituting mules for cattle was limited in the cereal 
sector. In this way, lack of mules became an important restriction on wheat output 
throughout the 1940s, and the government had only limited possibilities to solve this 
problem.
183 Serrano (1943): p. 43.
184 In October 1942 the official maximum price for a mule was set at 10,000 pesetas. This ceiling 
remained unchanged until May 1947, when it was raised to 15,000 pesetas: Consejo Economico 
Sindical de Cuenca: Informe, dated 22nd of May 1946, s.p.; Consejo Economico Sindical de Cuenca: 
Situation actual de la agricultura, dated 23rd of September 1947, s.p. It was the Junta Superior de 
Precios that decided to increase the price ceiling, and the procedure gives an impression of the erratic 
way official prices were set. It appears that the decision was the result of conflicting interests from 
various actors. In the file from the meeting where it was decided to raise the price there is a note from 
the Civil Governor of Toledo saying that the 1942 prices were not respected, a suggestion from the 
Ministry of Defence that trade and prices should be liberalised and a petition from the Sindicato 
Ganadero asking for prices to be increased by at least 90 percent. Furthermore there is a counter­
suggestion from the Ministry of Agriculture stating that if prices of mules were increased, the same 
should apply to the prices paid to the farmers, along with a declaration that a 50 percent increase in the 
prices for mules would be the maximum that was acceptable. Apparently without further discussion, the 
maximum price was then increased by 50 percent. Junta Superior de Precios: Acta de la reunion 
celebrada el dia 7-5-47.
185 Seculi Brillas (1947): pp. 158-162.
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Diagram 3.4: Imports of mules to Spain, 1925-56.
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3.4: CHANGES IN THE INTENSITY OF CULTIVATION
The development of the number of work animals was not the only factor that affected 
wheat output in the post-war period. Two other elements have to be considered as 
well: the availability of fertilisers and the development of the relative price of wheat to 
labour. In the case of fertilisers, this section will demonstrate that external constraints, 
in the form of limits on imports of nitrogenous products had a strong negative effect 
on wheat output in Spain until 1949. On the other hand, it will also be revealed that 
the development of prices and agrarian wages clearly favoured wheat farmers at the 
cost of workers. Everything else equal, this would increase production.
3.4.1: The lack o f chemical fertilisers in the 1940s
Table 3.4 shows that after the end of the Civil War there was a sharp decrease in the 
fertiliser usage per unit of cultivated land. The decrease in the usage of fertilisers 
along with their later revival around 1950 had an important influence on wheat output. 
This is reflected in that the correlation coefficient for the 1940-57 period between the 
five years moving average of the yields of wheat and the usage of nitrogen and 
phosphates is 0.85 and 0.77 respectively. However, the official price of wheat in the 
1940s does not seem to have influenced the usage of fertilisers, as it increased before 
the official prices did.
The development of the post-war fertiliser output was to a large degree beyond 
the control of the Franco regime. Before the war, the domestic industry was able to 
satisfy the demand for phosphate fertilisers. Nonetheless, according to Robles 
Teigeiro production fell after the war due to a combination of difficulties with the 
replacement of capital in the industry and a 50 percent decline in the import of 
phosphate rock.186 The result was that it took until 1952 to re-establish the 1935 level 
of output.
186 Robles Teigeiro (1992), pp. 195-196. Between 1931 and 1935, the average imports of phosphate 
rock was 534,255 tons per year. Yet, from 1940 to 1947, imports oscillated around 200,000 tons per 
year, until they sharply increased in 1948 to more than 400,000 tons, and finally reached approximately
850,000 tons in 1956. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Comercio exterior de Espana. Numeros indices 
(1901-1956), p. 33.
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Table 3.4: Index of the use of fertiliser in Spain, 1940-57 (1931-35 average = 100).
Years Kilos of Nitrogen per Kilos of Phosphate per
hectare of wheat, barley, Hectare of wheat, barley,
rye and oats. Rye and oats.
1940 40 77
1941 36 71
1942 32 65
1943 34 30
1944 28 32
1945 20 62
1946 35 32
1947 40 41
1948 40 80
1949 54 93
1950 127 105
1951 105 114
1952 176 127
1953 160 137
1954 195 147
1955 269 166
1956 268 175
1957 239 195
Sources: Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario Estadistico de las
producciones agricolas (1931-57); Robles Teigeiro (1992),
pp. 193 and 197.
The pre-war demand for nitrogenous fertilisers was almost entirely satisfied by 
imports. For military reasons, these were drastically reduced with the outbreak of 
World War II.187 In the 1940s, establishing a state-controlled industry capable of 
producing nitrogenous fertilisers and explosives for military use was highly placed on 
the agenda of the INI. Even so, the jealousy of the INI towards private enterprise 
worked as a constraint on output.188 The availability of imports did not improve 
immediately with the end of World War II given that a world-wide shortage prompted 
the International Emergency Food Council to regulate international trade of fertilisers
• 1RQuntil 1949. In the meantime, Spain was allocated 25 percent of her necessities,
while other countries with import needs were given 80 percent of their 
requirements.190 Consequently, it seems unlikely that the majority of farmers in the 
1940s even faced the possibility of considering whether the relative prices of artificial 
fertilisers and wheat made it attractive to increase their usage of the former.
187 Between 1931 and 1935 the Spanish production of nitrogenous fertilisers was less than 5 percent of 
domestic usage: Gallego Martinez (1986), p. 222.
188 See Gomez Mendoza (1997) for the plans of the INI to create an industry capable of producing 
nitrogenous fertilisers and explosives.
189 See International Emergency Food Council (1947), pp. 52-61 for a short description of the reasons 
for the shortage of nitrogenous fertilisers.
190 Gomez Mendoza (1997), p. 25. The treatment of Spain was probably the result of its international 
isolation. The Spanish government asked for an import quota of 93,000 metric tons in 1946-47 and
126,000 metric tons in 1947-48, but received only 27,800 metric tons and 31,600 metric tons: 
International Emergency Food Council (1947), pp. 62-63.
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While it might be argued that government action for increasing fertiliser output 
was sub-optimal from a technical point of view, there was hardly anything they could 
do about the international situation.191 It is significant in relation to the timing of 
renewed growth in wheat output that usage of fertilisers already surpassed the pre-war 
level per hectare in 1949-50. This was before the market was liberalised and at a time 
when official prices for wheat in real terms were still below the pre-war average. 
Hence, official wheat prices do not appear to have determined the use of fertilisers for 
wheat cultivation in the 1940s.
The smaller yields in the post-war years equalled a shift of the supply curve to 
the left, but less fertiliser would also result in a steeper supply curve. In the short run, 
the easiest way for a farmer to react to changing prices would be to regulate the 
amount of fertilisers that is used on the land rather than to alter the amount of land 
under cultivation. The difference is that a change in the use of fertilisers can be made 
at infinitely small steps while it is more complicated to increase or decrease the 
cultivated area. When the work capacity of the existing stock of animals is exhausted 
an increase would require a larger number of work animals. At least for small- and 
medium-scale farmers this would require an important investment. Similarly, a 
decrease in the cultivated area would either equal to using less than the full potential 
of the stock of work animals or a reduction in their number. Consequently, the 
farmers’ overall possibilities of response to changes in prices would be more rigid 
after the decline in the availability of artificial fertilisers.
3.4.2: The increase in the relative price o f wheat to labour
Another factor that could be detrimental to wheat output was a decline in the 
employment of labour for post-sowing caretaking of the crops. Yet, this does not 
appear to have been economically attractive for small-scale farmers nor for large-scale 
farmers. For small-scale farmers tilling their own land, a reduction in the working of 
the land would only be desirable if alternative employment generated a growth in 
income. This was difficult \o obtain because in most rural areas in Spain in the 1940s 
alternative employment was scarce outside the harvest season. Small-scale farmers 
therefore had few ways of increasing total earnings other than the non-monetary 
expenditure of improving the yields on his own land through post-sowing work.
191 An increase of nitrogenous fertilisers would have been economically sound in the short run in the 
1940s. Yet, the Spanish industry had not been competitive in the international market in the 1920s and
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For the large-scale farmers, post-sowing care taking of crops involved the 
employment of wage labour. This makes it necessary to analyse the development of 
the relative price of wheat to labour (Table 3.5). Even when using official prices it is 
clear that the relative price of wheat to labour increased significantly after the war.192
Table 3. 5: The development of the relative price of wheat to labour, 1936-53.
Years Index of real official Index of real wages Index of relative price
wheat price paid in the agrarian sector of wheat to labour
to the farmers
(1935 price = 100) (1936 salary = 100) (1935-36 = 100)
1940 87 82 106
1941 72 73 99
1942 67 72 92
1943 85 74 115
1944 94 73 129
1945 99 72 137
1946 79 63 125
1947 81 60 136
1948 102 56 182
1949 91 53 172
1950 81 56 144
1951 88 51 173
1952 118 52 226
1953 122 52 234
Sources: Martinez Alier (1968): p. 27; Tables 1.5 and 3.1.
The favourable post-war evolution of the relative price of wheat to labour is reflected 
by that relatively more land was cultivated directly by the owners, while a large 
number of sharecroppers were evicted in the period.193 It is therefore not likely that 
wheat output declined in the 1940s because of a general reduction of labour inputs.
3.5: SOCIAL MARKET FAILURE IN THE MARKET FOR WHEAT AND BREAD, 
1939-49.
So far the analysis has shown that the post-war decline in wheat output was due to the 
lack of fertilisers and work animals, which shifted the supply curve to the left as well 
as making it steeper. By examining some characteristics of the market for wheat and 
bread, it will be argued that the absence of regulation of the market for bread would 
have led to an example of social market failure. The ramifications of this conclusion
1930s, which was the main reason for the limited production in this period.
192 Unfortunately, the base year for the two series is not the same, but this does not change the fact that 
the relative price of wheat to labour increased after the war. First, we expect that the wages in 1936 
were at least as high as in 1935, due to the result of the general elections in February 1936 where the 
Popular Front coalition won on a left wing program. Second, as the wheat prices used in Table 3.5 are 
official prices, they underestimate the wheat price received by the farmers. Both these factors will 
further increase the relative price of wheat to labour in the 1940s.
193 See Section 1.3.4.
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make it necessary to reconsider the agrarian policy of the Franco regime in the 1940s 
in light of what in Section 2.1 was defined as the “food price dilemma”.
The post-war decline in wheat output obviously affected consumption, but this 
was probably not felt equally for different parts of the population. It is likely that 
farmers were better able to maintain the pre-war level of consumption than the urban 
population, who experienced a rather grim situation according to the analysis of 
calories supplied through the rationing system.194 In the city of Bilbao, adult males in 
the poorest part of the population received in the 1944-49 period between 800 and 
1250 calories in the daily rations. The figures were slightly higher in the mining 
districts, where rations contained between 1000 and 1300 calories per day. In all cases 
it was only approximately half of the daily recommendations.195
It is hardly surprising that between 1941 and 1949 black market prices for bread 
varied from 457 percent to 1286 percent of the official price.196 Within these levels of 
consumption, demand for bread in the black market is likely to be inversely correlated 
with the amount of bread provided through the rationing system. This appears to have 
been the case since the correlation coefficient between the amount of wheat per capita 
sold through the rationing system and the marketable part of the production of wheat 
sold in the black market is -0.80.197 From the point of view of the farmers, this meant 
that black market demand was a function of calories supplied through the rations.
This left the state in a position where a decline in the share of wheat sold in the 
black market would require increased supplies through official channels. This could 
be obtained through either an increase in imports or an increase in the share bought 
from the farmers. Concerning the last point, the analysis has shown that lack of 
fertilisers and work animals made it difficult to increase production between 1939 and 
1949. The possibilities for the state to increase the relative share of wheat that went 
through the official channels were therefore limited. The two main tools at hand were 
increasing the prices paid to the farmers and/or applying more coercive power. These 
two parts together constitute the food price dilemma described in Section 2.1.
194 Leal, et al. stated that the variation of the harvest mainly affected the size of the marketable surplus 
rather than the farmers’ self-consumption: Leal, et al. (1986), p. 35.
195 Camera Oficial de Comercio, Industria y Navegacion de Bilbao: Memoria Comercial (1944-49). The 
number of calories in the rations is an estimate, given that the calorific values are difficult to fix for 
some of the less important categories of food.
196 Gonzalez Portilla and Garmendia (1988), pp. 33-34.
197 See Servicio Nacional de Trigo (1962), Tables C.-8-1 and C.-10-1 for the data on the size of the 
rations per capita and the relative size of the black market for wheat. Note that the amount of bread sold 
through the legal market was not only a function of the harvest, but also of net imports and changes in 
stocks.
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An increase o f the prices paid to the farmers would increase the supply through 
the rationing system, but also the prices paid by the consumers. Furthermore, it is to 
be expected that the high relative price in the black market would lead to that the 
increase in official supply'frelatively smaller than the increase in prices. Total wheat 
output would also grow since the relative price o f wheat to other crops would increase 
but the growth would take place at the expense o f  other crops competing for the same 
land. This equals a shift o f the supply curve to the left for the other crops, and would 
result in an increase in prices before a new equilibrium between demand and supply 
was reached. Since a price increase was not possible in the official market, it would 
take place in the black market.198
The net result would be a change in the distribution o f  income between 
consumers. Wheat consumers would experience an increase in official price, a growth 
in supply through the rationing system and a decrease in black market prices. The net 
result for the individual consumer depends on the share o f  consumption that comes 
from the rations. The larger the share coming from the rations, i.e. the poorer the 
consumer, the more the increase in official prices would have been felt. As explained 
in Section 2.1, an increase in the prices paid to the farmers included the serious risk o f 
a deterioration o f  the living standards o f the poorest part o f  the population. The 
establishment o f an equilibrium between supply and demand for wheat in the 1940s 
would therefore include the risk o f unacceptable social consequences in the short run. 
At the same time, consumers o f substitutional products, such as livestock farmers 
buying barley, would also be worse o ff if  they bought a part o f their produce in the 
black market.
The other possible strategy for the state to obtain more supply through the 
rationing system would have been to strengthen the enforcement o f its regulations. 
With the total number o f producers and consumers in the millions, complete control o f 
all commercial activity was not realistic. Even leaving this point aside, the application 
o f more coercive power in a situation without a parallel market will leave total output 
unchanged as was described in Section 2.1. It can therefore be argued that neither 
increased control with the black market nor an increase in the official price o f  wheat 
would have solved the overall supply problem.
198 The lack of fodder crops was a recurrent subject in the contemporary discussion, but the subject 
attracted less attention than the lack of crops for human consumption: Moreno Luque (1944).
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3.6: THE CREATION OF A PARALLEL MARKET AS A SOLUTION OF THE 
FOOD PRICE DILEMMA
Although there was a limited scope for increasing wheat output in the 1940s, it is clear 
that the distribution system could have been improved. In Section 2.1 it was argued 
that in a situation with social market failure it could be desirable from a social point of 
view to introduce a dual price policy. The purpose would have been to give the 
poorest consumers access to cheap foodstuffs without jeopardising total output 
through low producer prices. In Section 2.1 we moreover saw that if  a parallel market 
existed along the black market, the result would be an increase in total output. A 
variety of such a dual price system was in fact introduced in Spain in the form of a 
parallel market for wheat. Probably because of the political climate in the 1940s, the 
parallel market opened as late as 1950, although economic theory and contemporary 
evidence show that this was long overdue.
A closer look at the data for the relative size of the black market reveals the 
positive influence of the parallel market. The black market was significantly smaller 
in 1950 than between 1939 and 1949, in spite of the fact that the official price paid to 
farmers in real terms was 12 percent lower in 1950 than in 1949. Furthermore, the 
absolute size of the two harvests was not that different.199 The difference between the 
two years was the extension of an already existing minor parallel market for wheat. 
From 1948, wheat grown on land categorised as “improved land” could be sold legally 
at free prices to certain industries, as well as to some public and private institutions. In 
October 1949 it was decided to extended this parallel market from the 1950 harvest 
onwards:
Once the farmer has sold the compulsory quota (to the SNT), he can then sell 
the rest for bread making to consumers or collectives who so wish through the 
SNT. In this case, the consumers are converted to reservistas in the following 
way: The price of the sales will be for free contraction among the participants, 
but the farmer has to hand in the corresponding part of wheat to the SNT, which 
then, through the manufacturers, delivers the corresponding flour to the 
consumer, after he has handed in his bread coupons from his ration book(.. .).200
199 See Table 3.1 for the official price in the two years. In nominal terms, the official price was 252 
pesetas per 100 kilos in both years. In 1949, SNT controlled 725,110 tons o f wheat out of a harvest of
3,035,000 tons, while in 1950 it controlled 1,289,015 tons out o f a harvest of 3,374,000 tons: Barciela 
(1981b), p. 32.
200 Alimentation Nacional, vol. 154, 25th of October 1949, p. 2
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It was this extension which was behind the large increase in 1950 in the share of 
wheat that went through legal channels. This can be deduced from information 
provided by the SNT (Table 3.6).
Column 3 shows that the farmers as a whole still did not fulfil their production 
quotas. Nevertheless, Column 6 demonstrates that those of them who had fulfilled 
their quota, and therefore had the right to sell wheat in the parallel market as well,
^A 1
delivered a significantly larger “surplus production” than anticipated. It took some 
months after the 1950 harvest before the market adjusted to the new conditions, with 
the result that the price in the parallel market of wheat remained higher than expected 
by the CGAT. In this space of time the farmers often declined to sell in the parallel 
market at the price they were offered, but from December 1950 the farmers started to
A A A
sell bigger quantities in the parallel market causing prices to fall.
The establishment of a parallel market was an advantage to producers, 
consumers and administrators. For the producers the possibility of selling a part of the 
production at freely negotiated prices had the benefit of obtaining higher than official 
prices without the risks involved in dealing in the black market. For the consumers it 
was an improvement that the price of bread could be set relative to the individual 
opportunity cost of queuing in the rationing system. This was so because not all 
members of a family had to shift from receiving rations to being reservists. Within a 
family it was therefore possible to set the average price paid for bread by letting some 
members buy their bread through the rationing system and others doing it in the 
parallel market. Furthermore, the consumers would no longer pay the specific 
transaction costs inherent in the black market. Moreover, less people would have to be 
fed through the rationing system, so that the rations for those remaining could be 
increased. Finally, the control mechanism became easier for the administrators to 
handle since a significant part of the former black market was legalised.
In sum, the parallel market worked as a consumer subsidy for the part of the 
population for whom the opportunity cost of queuing was the lowest. The producers 
paid for the subsidy since they were forced to sell a part of their production to the 
SNT below market price.
201 See Section 1.3.2 for details on the intervention system.
202 Alimentation National, vol. 180-181, December 10th 1950, pp. 5 and 34.
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Table 3.6: Expected and obtained amount of wheat bought as, respectively, production quota and surplus production in 1950. The data describe the 
situation by 15 January 1951
oo
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Provinces Production Fulfilled quota Fulfilled quota Expected Realised Realised surplus Amount of wheat Amount of wheat ("87 "7")* 100
quotas as percent surplus surplus output as percent expected to be actually controlled
production quota output output of expected controlled by by the SNT
surplus output the SNT
(Metric tons) (Metric tons) (Metric tons) (Metric tons) (Metric tons) (Metric tons)
Alava 10000 9790 98 4250 4010 94 14250 13800 97
Albacete 5750 8160 142 2500 4400 176 8250 12560 152
Alicante 1580 1820 115 670 470 70 2250 2290 102
Almeria 1470 1690 115 630 310 49 2100 2000 95
Avila - - - - - - - - -
Badajoz 62830 58820 94 26920 45400 169 89750 104220 116
Baleares 1750 2280 130 750 4670 623 2500 6950 278
Barcelona - - - - - - - - -
Burgos 63850 64810 102 27350 28460 104 91200 93270 102
C£ceres 21550 18820 87 9200 17500 190 30750 36320 118
Cadiz 28350 25920 91 12150 14820 122 40500 40740 101
Castelldn 3430 3670 107 1470 2290 156 4900 5960 122
Ciudad Real 12450 10860 87 5300 9700 183 17750 20560 116
Cordoba 26000 24700 95 11400 37110 326 37400 61810 165
Corufia - - - - - - - - -
Cuenca - - - - - - - - -
Gerona 6650 6840 103 2850 3050 107 9500 9890 104
Granada 16280 17070 105 6970 19700 283 23250 36770 158
Guadalajara 19250 17650 92 8650 18600 215 27900 36250 130
Guipuzcoa 880 1010 115 370 210 57 1250 1220 98
Huelva 7000 4960 71 3000 1300 43 10000 6260 63
Huesca 6650 8420 127 2850 13060 458 9500 21480 226
Ja6n 5600 5270 94 ‘ 2400 5980 249 8000 11250 141
Las Palmas - - - - - - - - -
Le6n - - - - - - - - -
Lleida 25250 14910 59 10800 400 4 36050 15310 42
Logrofio 12150 11190 92 5120 3920 77 17270 15110 87
Table 3.6: (Continued) Expected and obtained amount of wheat bought as, respectively, production quota and surplus production in 1950. The data describe the
situation by 15 January 1951.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Provinces Production Fulfilled quota Fulfilled quota Expected Realised Realised surplus Amount of wheat Amount of wheat ("87 "7")* 100
quotas as percent surplus surplus output as percent expected to be actually controlled
production quota output output of expected controlled by by the SNT
surplus output the SNT
(Metric tons) (Metric tons) (Metric tons) (Metric tons) (Metric tons) (Metric tons)
Lugo 1400 1400 100 600 600 100 2000 2000 100
Madrid 3500 6170 176 1500 5970 398 5000 12140 243
Malaga 13480 10790 80 5770 1260 22 19250 12050 63
Murcia 4200 4490 107 1800 1880 104 6000 6370 106
Navarra - - - - - - - - -
Orense - - - - - - - - -
Oviedo - - - - - - - - -
Palencia 49700 47010 95 21250 34900 164 70950 81910 115
Pontevedra 140 140 100 60 60 100 200 200 100
Salamanca 38250 33460 87 16350 18960 116 54600 52420 96
St. Cruz de T. - - - - - - - - -
Santander - - - - - - - - -
Segovia 14900 16530 111 6400 15790 247 21300 32320 152
Sevilla 54250 48950 90 23250 29430 127 77500 78380 101
Soria 14000 15130 108 6000 23490 392 20000 38620 193
Tarragona 3430 570 17 1470 230 16 4900 800 16
Teruel 7150 6970 97 3050 8150 267 10200 15120 148
Toledo - - - - - - - - -
Valencia 5670 5800 102 3420 2520 74 9090 8320 92
Valladolid - - - - - - - - -
Vizcaya 1400 1510 108 600 730 122 2000 2240 112
Zamora 20300 12220 60 8700 8860 102 29000 21080 73
Zaragoza 42000 33740 80 18000 21160 118 60000 54900 92
Total 612490 563540 92 263820 409350 155 876310 972890 111
Source: Servicio Nadonal de Trigo: Resumen de deudores de cupos forzosos de trigo para la camparia 1950-51.
Given the advantages of the parallel market, the question arises why this was not 
introduced earlier. The answer has to be found in the culture of intervention which 
dominated the political system.
In 1946 the economic policy was dominated by a plan for a “campaign for the 
reduction of the costs of living”. Consequently, the director of the CGAT, Rufino 
Baltran, launched the idea at a meeting in the Junta Superior de Precios in September 
1946 that it would be possible to solve the inflationary pressures by restoring relative 
prices to the situation in the 1931-35 period. The suggested procedure to reach this 
goal consisted in finding the product among the basic necessities which had 
experienced the lowest increase in price since 1935. The 1946 prices of the other 
commodities should ideally be their 1935 prices multiplied by the same factor. The 
next step was to compare this “harmonious” price scale with the actual prices in 1946. 
A given price should then remain unchanged if it was lower than the calculated 
“harmonious price”. On the other hand, in the cases where the prices were actually 
higher than on the list, the state should reduce the price to the desired level.203
However, when the Junta Superior de Precios discussed the plan in the autumn 
of 1946, the idea of setting an equal relative price level for all products was partially 
abandoned. Instead it was agreed to temporarily admit higher levels for products in 
short supply.204 A meeting held on October 31st produced an explanatory note about 
the plan, which said:
The Junta Superior de Precios, considers that it is possible to gradually reach a 
harmonious level of prices for food products at a minimum level that is 
technically acceptable. However, the authorities should know that it is difficult 
to maintain this in practice without severe discipline.205
At least it can be said that this affirmation was more realistic than the general design 
of the plan.
Even in the Junta Superior de Precios there were voices that doubted the 
viability of the plan. Carlos Rein Segura, the Minister of Agriculture, presented a note
tViat a meeting on October 4 where serious doubts were cast about the viability of the 
proposed procedure. The main objection was that the transferring of pre-war relative 
prices to a period of state-determined prices would ignore the changes in a number of
203 Junta Superior de Precios: Acta de la reunion celebrada el dia 9-9-46, and Acta de la reunion 
celebrada el dia 16-9-46.
204 Junta Superior de Precios: Acta de la reunion celebrada el dia 4-10-46.
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factors that were important for production. As a result, the proposed reduction in 
prices would be very difficult to enforce in practice, and only an initial minor
9 0 6reduction in prices could be the first step in a long-term project.
While the political agenda in 1946 excluded the introduction of a parallel 
market, its inauguration in 1950 met with some resistance. The new measure was 
commented upon with considerable interest, and the diversity of opinions even found 
its way to the strictly controlled press. They went from demands for further 
liberalisation to calls for the reinstatement of the former system. From the discussion, 
it appears that the partial liberalisation of the wheat market was disputed even in 
government circles.207
On one side, Rein Segura - still the Minister of Agriculture - said in an interview 
in Arriba in March 1951 that the new measure had been a success in 1950, with even 
better results expected for the 1951 harvest. Nevertheless, one month later 
Alimentacion Nacional published a leading article defending the return to a higher 
degree of state intervention. It cited from a recent speech by Franco where he said 
“intervention is the only defence for the poor”.209 An article with the heading “The 
poor luck of the free markets” appeared in the same volume of the journal. At any 
rate, within a broader context of a gradual liberalisation of the economy in the first 
half of the 1950s, the partial liberalisation of the production, distribution and 
consumption of foodstuffs eventually got the upper hand.
3.7: THE PRICE RESPONSE TO OFFICIAL PRICES
It has been argued in this chapter that the black market for wheat was not supplied 
exclusively by diversion, and that farmers planned production based on black market 
earnings. Unfortunately, it was only possible to build this assumption on indirect 
evidence. This makes it relevant to analyse the likelihood and implications of the 
counterfactual, i.e. that farmers planned production exclusively based on official 
prices between 1939 and 1953. If farmers behaved in this way, it should be possible to 
establish a relation between the two variables.
205 Junta Superior de Precios: Acta de la reunion celebrada el dia 31-10-46: “Proyecto de nota 
aclaratoria la propuesta de orden de la presidencia, sobre reduction y armonia de precios”, pp. 1,4-5.
206 Junta Superior de Precios: Acta de la reunion celebrada el dia 4-10-46; Secretaria Tecnica del 
Ministerio de Agricultura: Informe.
207 See for example Alimentacion Nacional vols. 157, 166, 169, 176, 177, 179, 182 - all from 
autumn/winter 1950 - for comments and references to opinions voiced in other newspapers.
208 Reproduced in Alimentacion Nacional, Vol. 188 (25 March 1951).
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The normal practice is to estimate the price elasticity of supply, but the 
calculation is complicated by the fact that there was a large black market in the 
period.210 The Ministry of Agriculture corrected the official statistics for the 1939-49 
period, but the yearly figures cannot be expected to be totally accurate.211 Yet, it 
appears that the errors mainly affects output data, and the estimation of farmers supply 
response has therefore to be based on the data for the cultivated area. However, this 
procedure is not only convenient in these specific conditions. It also has the advantage 
that it makes it possible to avoid “noise” in the results due to random climatic 
variations that affect output. This advantage is generally recognised in the economics 
literature. Hence, a well-established research trend uses cultivated area as a proxy for 
planned output.212
The standard textbook definition of price elasticity of supply is that it measures 
the relative effect on output of a one-percent change in prices paid to producers. Yet, 
in agricultural economics, other variables than the own price of the crop are normally 
included in the estimation. Such variables often includes the price of substitutional 
crops, the price of inputs if they differ between the crops or changes significantly over
91^time, technological trends and so forth.
It is therefore necessary to consider what the most likely substitutional crop 
was for wheat in Spain in the 1940s, and barley appears to be the most obvious 
candidate for three reasons. First, it was the second most extended crop in the period. 
Second, wheat and barley could be cultivated on the same land using the same tools. 
Finally, the same inputs were used for the cultivation of the crops. Farmers would 
therefore be able to make year-to-year shifts between wheat and barley.214 It is now 
possible to make the first test of whether farmers planned output exclusively based on 
official prices between 1939 and 1953. This will be done estimating the own price
209 Alimentacion Nacional, Vol. 190 (25 April 1951).
210 As noted by Colman, the following estimates are strictly speaking not an analysis of the price 
elasticity of supply, but of the price elasticity of output. Farmers will usually consume and/or stock a 
part of output. This is therefore not the same as “supply”, which is conventionally defined as the 
amount offered for sale in a market. Nevertheless, estimations of the price elasticity of “supply” in 
agriculture is mostly based on output data, as will also be the case here. Colman (1983), pp. 201-202.
211 See Appendix 1 for details.
212 Over the years, a large number of researchers have dealt with price elasticity of supply in 
agriculture, and the result has been a number of different estimation techniques. Apparently, the 
selection of procedure has often been pragmatically based on the availability of data! Descriptions of 
different methodologies, as well as a large number of results can be found in Askari and Cummings 
(1976), pp. 52-218.
2,3 See Askari and Cummings (1976), pp. 52-218.
214 Astorquiza and Albiso (1993), p. 26.
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elasticity of supply for wheat and the cross price elasticity for wheat with respect to 
the price for barley.
Yet, at the time of sowing farmers do normally not know the price they will 
receive after the harvest. In the economics literature, a great deal of attention has been 
paid to the issue of how to solve this problem. Various models have been proposed 
based upon the assumption that farmers plan output on rational expectation about the 
price they will receive. Moreover, it is normally assumed that the expectations are the 
result of prices in earlier years, with the most recently received prices carrying the 
heaviest weight in the formation of the expectation.215
However, for the 1943-48 harvests in Spain, official cereal prices were 
announced at the time of sowing, and the expectation about the official price would 
therefore automatically be fulfilled. Yet, for the remaining years farmers had only a 
limited possibility to draw on earlier experiences about the level of official prices. In 
these years, official prices were set by the state at the time of the harvest. On the other 
hand, in the pre-war period prices were determined in the market. The experience with 
prices announced at the time of the harvest was therefore limited to the years between 
1939 and 1942 and between 1949 and 1953. Consequently, it has been assumed that 
farmers planned output based on the official price paid in the preceding harvest, in the 
years where prices were not pre-announced.
Thus, in the first test of farmers supply response to official prices, it will simply 
be assumed that the cultivated area with wheat in the year “t” is a function of the 
expected official price of wheat and barley, i.e. that:
CAw>t = f(Pw, t*» Pb, t*)
with
CAw,t = the area cultivated with wheat in year “t”
Pw, t* = the expected/pre-announced official wheat price in year “f  ’
Pb, t* = the expected/pre-announced official barley price in year “f  ’
To calculate the price elasticity of supply, an OLS-regression has therefore been 
computed, with CAw,t as the dependent variable and Pw, t* and Pb, t* as the independent 
variables. All nominal prices were transformed into real prices, using the price 
deflator for “agriculture, forestry and fishing” by Prados de la Escosura.216 All data on 
cultivated area and prices have furthermore been converted into natural logarithms to
215 Askari and Cummings (1976), pp. 25-51.
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avoid the problem of units. This has the advantage that the price elasticity of supply is 
directly given by the coefficients of the variables.217 Yet, Table 3.7 demonstrates that 
the explanatory power of the model is very limited. The coefficients of the variables 
have the expected sign, but non of the variables are statistically significant.
This might not be so surprising since changes in land use for widespread crops 
normally do not take place at a very fast rate. Said in another manner, it is highly 
plausible that land use in the previous harvest period had an important influence on 
land use the following year. The second test of farmers supply response to official 
prices will account for this factor. It will be assumed that the cultivated area with
wheat in the year “t” is a function of the official price of wheat and barley, and the
area cultivated with wheat and barley in the previous year:
CAw>t = f(Pw, t*> Pb, t*, CAW) t-i, CAb, t-i)218
with
CAW, t-i = Area cultivated with wheat in the year “t-1”
CAb, t-i = Area cultivated with wheat in the year “t-1”
The Durbin-Watson statistic for this equation is inconclusive as to whether there is
3 1 Q
auto-correlation at the 5 percent level. The regression was therefore re-estimated 
using the Prais-Winsten method.220 The result in Table 3.7 show that the second 
model has a large explanatory power, but this is almost exclusively driven by the 
variable CAW, t-i. Moreover, the estimation produces counter intuitive results, such as a 
negative price elasticity of supply for wheat and a positive cross price elasticity. Yet 
again, none of these two variables are statistical significant.
Finally, Astorquiza and Albiso have made an estimate of the price elasticity of 
supply for wheat for the 1959-85 period. These authors also used the cultivated area as 
a proxy for planned output. They stipulated that the cultivated area could be expressed 
in the following terms:
C A „ = fp v .- ,. Pm -i. CAw,t.„ CAb.w, DV73)221
with
2,6 See page 66 for the use of constant prices instead of nominal prices, as well for the choice of 
deflator.
217 Lim Lin Shu (1975), pp. 12-13.
218 Strictly speaking we are then not estimating a “price elasticity” since other variables than the price 
enters the equation. The following shall therefore be interpreted as the likely output response to a 
change in prices under specific conditions concerning the cultivated area in the year “t-1”.
219 The Durbin-Watson statistic is 2.25, and there are 15 observations and four variables excluding the 
constant.
220 This was carried out using SPSS-software.
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CAWjt = the area cultivated with wheat in year “t”
PW) t_! = the wheat price in real terms received by the farmers in year “t-1”
Pb, t-i = the barley price in real terms received by the farmers in year “t-1”
CAW, t-i = the area cultivated with wheat in year “t-1”
CAb, t-i = the area cultivated with barley in year “t-1”
DV73 = a dummy variable to account for special conditions in the year 1973. 
The variable takes the value one in 1973, and zero in the rest of the years.
Based on this Astorquiza and Albiso constructed an OLS-regression with CAWi, as the
* 9 9 9  ■dependent variable and the rest of the factors as independent variables. Nominal 
prices were converted to real prices, while absolute figures were used for the data on 
the cultivated area. The model appears to have a high explanatory power, and the 
coefficients of the variables Pw, t-i and Pb, t-i have the expected sign. Moreover, the 
variable Pw, t-i turns out to be significant at the 5 percent level (Table 3.7).
When the results from the 1939-53 period are compared with the 1959-85 years, 
there are both similarities and differences. The main similarity is that land use in a 
given year exerts a strong influence on land use in the following year. Obviously, the 
main difference concerns the estimated price elasticity of supply. While the own price 
was important for the planning of output in the later period, this was not the case in 
the earlier period. Furthermore, in the second estimation for the 1939-53 the 
coefficients of the own price elasticity and the cross price elasticity had the “wrong” 
sign.
The are to obvious interpretation of the results for the 1939-53 years. The first is 
that farmers did not plan output based on official prices, which is the viewpoint we 
have forwarded in this chapter. The second interpretation is that statistics on the 
cultivated area are inadequate for the analysis, due to the existence of black market. 
The size and the sign of the price elasticity of supply has been widely debated in the 
economics literature, but two arguments appear to be dominant.
221 Astorquiza and Albiso (1993), Table 5, p. 78.
222 The cultivated area with wheat and barley in the year “t-1” was expressed thorugh the ratio CAWi t.
i/CAb,t-i.
223 The topic has attracted considerable interest over the years, which probably has to do with its 
implications for economic policy choice. An outline of the main points of discussion can be found in 
Askari and Cummings (1976), Chhibber (1989), Griliches (1960), Peterson (1979), and Schiff and 
Montenegro (1997).
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Table 3.7: Estimates of the price elasticity of supply for wheat, 1939-85.
Periods R2 ®D,W ®D.b rho
1939-53
0 )
(OLS)
ln(CAw,t) = 14.428 + 0.124*ln(Pw,t.) - 0.003 *ln(Pbjt.) 
(19.96)*** (1.03) (-0.74)
0.08 0.124 -0.003
1939-53
(2)
(Prais-Winsten)
ln(CAWjt) = 2.975 - 0.040*ln(Pw>t.,) +  0.015*ln(P„,t.,) + 0.930*ln(CAWi,.,) - 0.122*ln(CAb,,.,) 
(1.70)* (-0.99) (1.15) (12.04)*** (-1.27)
0.95 -0.040 0.015 -0.302
1959-85
(OLS)
CAw, t =  -173,584 + 29,350*Pw,n  -  7,777*Pb.M + 4,733,700*(CAw,t.1/CAb,l.1) -  267,488*DV73 
(-0.59) (2.67)** (-0.43) (7.43)*** (-2.13)**
0.97 0.36 -0.07
Numbers in parenthesis are t-student coefficients 
* = Significant at 10 percent level.
** = Significant at 5 percent level.
*** = Significant at 1 percent level.
Sources: Astorquiza and Albiso (1993), Table 5, p. 78, Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de Espana, (1943), Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario Estadistico de 
las producciones agricolas (1939-53), Ministerio de Agricultura: Resumen estadistico de las producciones agricolas (1950, 1950-1951).
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First, the price elasticity of supply for single crops is higher than the aggregate supply 
elasticity. Second, the price elasticity of supply is in most cases positively correlated 
with technological and economic development.224 The first point is in line with the 
analysis earlier in this chapter, which said that an eventual increase in wheat output in 
the 1940s could only happen at the expense of the output of other crops.
The implication of the second point is that the price elasticity of supply in the
1939-53 period is not likely to be higher than in the 1959-85 period, i.e. 0.36. This is 
quite important since a price elasticity of supply of 0.36 is far too small to explain the 
post-war decline of the area cultivated with wheat. From Table 3.1, it can be 
calculated that the average official price in real terms between 1939 and 1952 was less 
than 10 percent lower than the pre-war average. Even applying a price elasticity of 
supply of 0.36, the subsequent reduction in the area cultivated with wheat would be 
approximately 3 percent. This is less than one third of the actual reduction in the area 
cultivated with wheat, which on average was close to 13 percent between 1940 and 
1953.225
Unfortunately, the quality of the data for the 1939-53 period limits the 
conclusion that can be drawn from this section. Nevertheless, the main impression is 
that official prices were not the main factor reason for the post-war decline in planned 
output.
3.8: CONCLUSIONS
The main purpose of this chapter was to discuss whether there existed a cause-and- 
effect relationship or a coincidence between, on one side, the level of the official 
prices paid to farmers, and, on the other, the level of wheat output. The main 
conclusion is that the level of official prices cannot be said to have been the main 
reason for the low level of output in the 1940s. The inefficiency of the control system 
vis-a-vis the farmers allowed the existence of a large black market. Consequently, the 
average price received by farmers was significantly higher than the official price. 
From the point of view of the desire to expand production the inefficiency of the 
control system can therefore be seen as a positive feature. The result is that the non­
enforcement of the state’s coercive powers increased output and market distortions at
224 See Footnote 223. The introduction of highly specialised utilities for a specific crop would lead to a 
lower price elasticity of supply. Yet, in a largely non-mechanised sector as we find in Spain in the 
1940s, there is not a relevant objection.
225 See Diagram 3.1 for the development of the area cultivated with wheat between 1939 and 1959.
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the same time, while a more effective control would have led to a smaller black 
market and less output.
The analysis also demonstrated that the lack o f work animals and chemical 
fertilisers were the main reasons for the post-war decline in output. Since these 
problems were virtually insoluble in the 1940s, neither higher official prices nor a 
liberalisation o f  the market would have solved the supply shortage. With constraints 
on production, higher official prices would have increased returns to land and capital 
without producing more output. Obviously, the large-scale farmers would benefit most 
from this process, while the richest consumers would pay the largest part o f  the price 
increase. However, the poorest consumers would run the risk o f  ending up in a very 
precarious situation in the short run unless a subsidy to consumer prices was 
introduced. A total liberalisation o f  the market would have left the poor consumers 
even worse off, given that they would not even have been assured a minimum amount 
o f foodstuff through the rationing system. In both cases, the result would be a socially 
regressive redistribution o f income in a situation where the living standards for the 
poorest part o f the population were already problematic.
As pointed out in Section 2.2, the potential problems o f  a free market for basic 
foodstuffs in wartime were generally recognised by the participants in World War II, 
and the situation in Spain cannot be seen as an exception. However, the analysis in the 
present chapter also indicated that the system o f intervention in Spain in the 1940s left 
much to be desired. The extension o f the parallel market in 1950 was a belated way of
otr & v">
easing the problemvo f supply. Another possibility would have been to introduce an 
across-the-board consumer subsidy following the British model during World War
99
II. However, such a measure would have required a substantial outlay on behalf o f 
the government. Both models had their problems, but could have increased the legally 
consumed part o f  the production without a negative effect on its size. This places a 
large portion o f  the blame on the regime. The “culture o f intervention” in the 1940s 
was responsible for the late introduction o f the indubitable advantages connected with 
the extension o f  the parallel market. In this light, the criticism found in much o f the 
historiography stating that the agrarian policy was problematic turns out to be right, 
but for the wrong reasons. While little could have been done to increase the size o f the 
cake, the distribution o f it was clearly deficient.
226 See Section 2.2.1 for the British experience with an across-the-board consumer subsidy.
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CHAPTER 4: STATE INTERVENTION IN THE OLIVE SECTOR AS 
AN EXAMPLE OF “STATE FAILURE”
4.1: INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines some of the characteristics of state intervention in the olive oil 
sector between 1939 and 1952. To do this, it is first necessary to revise the official 
statistics on post-war olive oil output, as these appears to misrepresent the actual 
development. The modified data make it possible to calculate the size of the black 
market for olive oil in the 1940s, and to discuss whether state intervention was 
necessary to secure a normal supply situation.
The production, commercialisation and consumption of olive oil were subject to 
state intervention throughout the 1940s. Similar to what occurred in the wheat sector, 
this intervention included the compulsory selling of output to the CGAT at 
government fixed prices. Table 4.1 shows that these prices were in real terms below 
the pre-war level for most of the 1940s.227
Table 4.1: Index of official prices for olive oil in real terms paid to producers.
Years Index of olive oil price
(1931-35 average price = 100).
1939 93
1940 101
1941 84
1942 81
1943 71
1944 72
1945 69
1946 67
1947 96
1948 87
1949 85
1950 96
1951 119
1952 115
1953 118
1) Nominal prices changed to real prices by the
use of deflator for "agriculture, forestry and fishing"
from Prados de la Escosura (1995).
Sources: Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario
Estadistico de las Producciones Agricolas
(1931-35,1939-40, 1943-53); Instituto Nacional
de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de Esparia (1943).
According to the official statistics, the post-war decline in official prices coincided 
with a level of output that was below the pre-war average, as demonstrated in
227 See Section 3.2.1 for the discussion of the use of nominal versus r& d prices in the analysis as 
well as the choice of deflator.
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Diagram 4.1. Although the productive area continued to grow after 1940, this was 
more than offset by a reduction in average yields. At the outset, conditions in the olive 
sector in the 1940s therefore resembled those in the wheat sector. In both cases, we 
find state intervention - including the state’s determining of prices below the pre-war 
level - a black market and a decline in output.
Nevertheless, the following analysis will show important differences between 
the two sectors regarding output, the size of the black market, consumption per capita, 
and the need for state intervention. First, the post-war decline in output that emerges 
from Diagram 4.1 was probably more apparent than real. This is related to the 
existence of a black market for olive oil in the 1940s and early 1950s, which was not 
completely reflected in the official statistics. Contrary to the case of wheat, post-war 
output of olive oil is not characterised by a shift of the supply curve to the left by 
external restrictions. Furthermore, although a black market existed for both olive oil 
and wheat, it was significantly smaller for the former than for the latter. While the 
black market for wheat on average amounted to approximately 55 percent of legal 
consumption between 1939 and 1949, the figure was only 2 percent for olive oil.228 
Finally, the combination of a limited decrease in output, black market trade and a 
simultaneous decline in exports had the effect of average post-war consumption of 
olive oil per capita being very close to the pre-war level. For the olive oil sector state 
intervention does not appear to have been necessary to secure adequate supplies for 
the general population.
While it was concluded in Chapter 3 that the post-war situation in the wheat 
sector required state intervention, since the alternative would have been a social 
market failure, intervention in the olive oil sector was an example of state failure. This 
difference is important for the understanding of the consequences of the Franco 
regime’s agrarian policy in the 1940s, since it points to the need to distinguish 
between the different effects of its policy in different sectors.
228 Barciela (1981b), p. 27.
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Agriculture: Anuario Estadistico de las Producciones Agricolas (1939-40, 1943-53).
4.2: A REVISION OF THE OFFICIAL FIGURES FOR OLIVE OIL OUTPUT 
BETWEEN 1939 AND 1950
The available statistics on olive oil output in the 1940s are probably incorrect, due to 
the existence of a black market. The 60 observation in Table 4.2 on relative black 
market consumer prices from 19 provincial capitals demonstrates that this market was 
persistent throughout the 1940-52 period. Prices were as high as up to 12 times the 
official price, and the simple average of the relative black market prices in Table 4.2 is 
almost four times the official price.
The SNT revised the original statistics on output for the four main cereals, but 
despite a general acceptance of the desirability of doing the same in the case of olive 
oil, such correction has never been made.229 An evaluation of the likely margin of 
error in the original statistics will not only increase our comprehension of the outcome 
of the system of intervention. It will also lead to more accurate information about the 
relative size of the black market, and improve the knowledge about the economic 
situation of the olive-growing farmers. The following analysis will show a rough 
estimate of the magnitude of the underreporting of post-war output, stating that a 12 
percent increase can be considered the upper limit for the 1940-52 period.
4.2.1: The stability of the cultivated area and the industrial yields, 1939-52
Diagram 4.1 shows that average olive oil output in the 1940s and early 1950s 
oscillated around 95 percent of the 1932-36 average.230 As noted above, this was the 
result of a combination of a slight increase in the cultivated area and a decrease in 
average yields. When reworking the figures for the post-war output of olive oil, three 
factors have to be considered:
1) The productive area cultivated with olives
2) The industrial yields -  i.e. the amount of olive oil obtained per unit of olives
3) The agrarian yields -  i.e. the amount of olives obtained per unit of land
229 See Barciela (1986a) for a short overview of the problems related to the official agrarian statistics of 
the 1940s.
230 It was further below the five years moving average from the late 1920 due to the two exceptionally 
good harvests in 1928 and 1930. The yields for these two years turned out to be atypical in the 20th 
century, and the situation in the 1940s is best analysed using the 1932-36 average as a benchmark.
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Table 4.2: Maximum black market retail price for olive oil as percent of official price en 
provincial capitals, 1939-51
Years Alicante Badajoz Barcelona Bilbao Cbceres La
Corufia
Gerona Huelva Huesca
1940 240 276 660 - 286 - - - -
1941 - 405 - 1294 - - - - -
1942 - 400 - 509 - - - - -
1943 - 308 - 509 - - - - -
1944 - 225 - 336 - - - - -
1945 250 455 - 536 465 - - - -
1946 - 1042 972 893 - - 948 - -
1947 - 268 - 344 - - - 673 -
1948 - 263 - 337 - - - - -
1949 - 256 - 305 - 356 - - -
1950 160 289 - 287 211 - - 216 250
1951 - 426 - 180 333 - - - 350
1952 - 148 - - 273 - - - 234
Years Jaen Lleida Malaga Murcia Palencia Sevilla Soria Tarragona Toledo Zamora
1940 - - - 250 - - - - - -
1941 - - - - 139 395 - - - 400
1942 - - - - - - - - - -
1943 - - - - - - - - - -
1944 - - - - - - - - 273 -
1945 - - 238 229 - - - - 435 -
1946 625 700 - - 225 222 - - 1100 750
1947 221 - - - - - - - 357 483
1948 158 - - - - - - - 316 352
1949 158 - - - - - - - - 244
1950 144 - 305 260 - - 286 239 - 212
1951 269 - - - 345 300 - - - -
1952 - - - - - - - 176 - •
Sources: Table 1.5; Camara Oficial de Comercia e Industria de Gerona: Memoria Comercial (1946); Ceimara Oficial 
de
Comercio e Industria de Ja6n: Memoria Comercial y estudio sobre el desarrollo de los negocios en la Provincia de
Jadn________________________________________________________________________________________________
(1946-51); Ceimara Oficial de Comercia e Industria de Zamora: Zamora 1936-1941; Id.: Zamora 1946-1950; Ceimara 
Oficial de Comercio, Industria y Navegacion de La Corufia: La economia coruriesa en los ultimos arios (1947-1949)] 
Camara Oficial de Comercio, Industria y Navegacibn de Lleida: Memoria reglamentaria de trabajos y comercial de los 
arios 1946 y 1947\ Ceimara Oficial deComercio y Navegacion de Barcelona: Memoria Comercial (1940,1946,1948, 
1950); Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Reseria Estadistica de ... Alicante (1958), Badajoz (1954,1962), Cbceres 
(1957), Huelva (1960), Huesca (1955), Malaga (1956),Murcia (1962), Palencia (1964), Sevilla (1958), Soria (1958), 
Tarragona (1962), Toledo (1950).
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The first two points are analysed here while the last one will be treated in the 
following section. The development of the productive area is the least complicated 
point to analyse. Due to the approximately fifteen years it takes for a newly-planted 
olive tree to enter production, changes in the productive area will normally be limited. 
The Civil War did not cause widespread destruction of the stock of olive trees, so by 
1940 the productive area had increased by one percent compared to the 1932-36 
average. This growth continued through the 1940s, and in 1952 there was eight 
percent more productive area cultivated with olives than before 1936. Given the 
continuity between the data for the pre- and post-war years, we will accept the official 
figures for the productive area cultivated with olives for the rest of the analysis.
The official statistics for industrial yields display that 1.6 percent more olive oil 
was obtained per unit of fruit between 1940 and 1950 than between 1932 and 1936.231 
This relative stability with only a limited increase is expectable and plausible. First, 
the system of intervention operated with a single quality of olive oil, which would 
have been an incentive to value quantity over quality. However, the scope for 
increasing the industrial yields was small since the amount of oil in the olives was 
almost constant from year to year. Second, the technological level of most of the oil 
industry in Spain in the 1930s had already made it possible to extract the maximum 
amount of oil from the fruit.232 Given the constraints on changes in the industrial 
yields, changes in this factor will always be overpowered by the evolution of the 
agrarian yields. The following analysis, therefore, deals only with the combined 
agrarian and industrial yields measured as the amount of olive oil produced per unit of 
land.
4.2.2: The likely errors in the reporting of yields of olives between 1939 and 1952
Since the data on productive area and industrial yields appears to be reasonable 
trustworthy, an eventual underreporting of output is likely to appear in the agrarian 
yields. Yet, any analysis of this is complicated by the fact that these were very volatile 
even in normal circumstance. The range of plausible yields is quite wide, and the
231 Ministerio de Agricultural Anuario Estadistico de las producciones agricolas (1931-35, 1939-40, 
1943-49); Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico deEspana (1943).
232 Zambrana Pineda (1987), pp. 136-160.
233 The most extreme illustration of this can be seen in the size of the harvest in the years between 1928 
and 1931. With no significant change in the cultivated area the harvest of olives for olive oil was 
approximately 3,520,000 tons in 1928, 920,000 tons in 1929, 3,340,000 tons in 1930 and finally 
620,000 tons in 1931; Tio (1982), pp. 354-355.
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investigation has to be done in such a way that the influence of yearly fluctuations can 
be omitted. Thus, it is not possible to make an estimation of underreporting of olive 
oil output on a yearly basis but only for a longer period. Consequently, the calculation 
of the relative and absolute size of the black market can only be made as an average 
for the years were the necessary data are available, but not on a yearly basis.
The average yields of olive oil per hectare between 1940 and 1952 were 92 
percent of the 1932-36 average. Yet, this hides huge variations at the provincial level, 
going from a decline of 60 percent in Cuenca to 65 percent increase in Zamora 
(Table 4.3). In spite of the large variations, yields relatively close to the pre-war levels 
are found in the majority of the main producing areas, including the three provinces 
with the largest average.234 The large variations at the provincial level of the post-war 
yields looks suspicious in the light of that the data in Table 4.3 cover a 13 year period. 
In fact the expectation would be that post-war yields in general were close to the pre­
war level, for the following reasons: the total area cultivated with olives remained 
stable; the technological level used for the extraction of olive oil from the fruit did not 
change; the methods employed for collecting the fruit from the trees also remained the 
same; and finally as artificial fertilisers were not often used for olives before the war, 
the post-war decline in the availability of this input would not have had a large effect 
on yields.235 Hence, it is necessary to analyse the reasons for the development in the 
provinces where there was a sharp increase or a sharp decrease in the yields after 
1940.
The relative large expansion of yields in Barcelona, Salamanca, Teruel and 
Zamora is counter-intuitive in an environment with a thriving black market, where the 
farmers would have been inclined to report as small a harvest as possible to the 
authorities. Still, the aggregate output of the four provinces was just 1.8 percent of the 
average pre-war total, and almost 70 percent of this was produced in Teruel. We will 
thus only have a short look at the situation there.
234 Jaen, Cordoba and Sevilla produced approximately 50 percent of total average output between 1932 
and 1936.
235 Zambrana Pineda (1987), pp. 128-129. See Section 3.4.1 for the lack of artificial fertilisers in Spain 
between 1933 and 195 b.
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Table 4.3: Index o f average yields of olive oil, 1940-52 (1932-36 average = 100), provincial distribution of 1932-36 average 
olive oil output (percent), relative increase in productive area with olives, 1932-52.
Provinces Index of yields of olive oil 
production (1940-52)
Percent increase in 
productive
Percent of 1932-36 total 
average olive oil
Percent of 1940-52 total 
average olive oil
area between 1932-36 
average and 1952
production. production according to 
official statistics.
Cuenca 40 -5.8 1.3 0.5
Valencia 43 -4.3 2.3 1.0
Madrid 44 -10.4 0.8 0.3
Navarra 47 14.4 0.7 0.4
Ciudad Real 57 45.5 3.1 2.4
Toledo 61 13.4 1.6 1.2
Zaragoza 61 -8.3 4.1 2.5
Alava 61 46.2 0.0 0.0
Huesca 65 18.0 1.0 0.8
Baleares 66 -2.8 0.4 0.2
Logrono 69 45.0 4.5 4.1
Badajoz 69 16.3 0.8 0.6
Albacete 70 31.4 0.2 0.2
Avila 71 7.1 0.3 0.2
Guadalajara 72 3.3 1.0 0.7
Lleida 85 1.0 3.5 3.1
Gerona 86 -33.3 0.5 0.3
Murcia 88 -12.4 1.0 0.8
Granada 89 13.7 3.3 3.4
Cadiz 89 1.4 5.4 5.2
Malaga 90 35.2 1.1 1.2
Huelva 92 6.0 1.4 1.4
Caceres 93 2.8 2.0 2.0
Alicante 97 -10.3 1.7 1.6
Tarragona 99 9.4 4.0 4.4
Castellon 100 -6.5 1.4 1.4
Jaen 104 8.9 24.1 27.4
Sevilla 105 15.3 11.0 12.5
Cordoba 107 2.0 15.2 17.5
Almeria 110 5.8 0.4 0.4
Barcelona 127 4.5 0.4 0.5
Salamanca 130 -36.9 0.2 0.2
Teruel 139 -21.9 1.3 1.5
Zamora 165 -28.2 0.0 0.0
Spain 92 105.5 100.0 100.0
Sources: Ministerio de Agricultural Anuario Estadistico de las producciones agricolas (1931-35,1939-40,1943-53);
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de Espafia (1943).
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The development of olive oil production in Teruel appears to have been the result of a 
change in the strategy of production. Before the war, olive oil from Teruel was 
renown for its high quality, while the policy of one quality/one price in the 1940s was 
an incentive to increase quantity at the expense of quality. Consequently, it seems 
likely that at least a part of the unexpected increase in yields in the post-war years can 
be explained by an increase in the quantity at the cost of the quality of oil.
The significant decline in the official yields in a number of provinces after 1940 
does not necessarily indicate that massive underreporting took place there. Yet, it is 
difficult to find an alternative explanation. First, climatic variations do not appear to 
be a likely reason for the different developments in the yields, since systematic 
climatic differences between the provinces are not probable over a period of more 
than ten years. This is even more so since Map. 4.1 shows no clear geographic pattern 
among the provinces with a large decrease in the post-war yields. Second, nor does the 
development in the productive area appear to be an adequate explanation. The 
correlation coefficient between, on one side, the relative increase in the productive 
area between the pre-war average and 1952, and, on the other side, the relative change 
in the yields is -0.43.237 This could indicate that average yields declined in
some provinces, because marginal land was put into cultivation or the trees had a 
younger age profile. Yet, the correlation coefficient is mainly driven by the data for 
Salamanca, Teruel and Zamora, and this obscures the initial picture. Table 4.3 showed 
that these three provinces produced an insignificant part of total output. At the same 
time, they experienced atypical high increases in the yields in the 1940s. If these three 
provinces are omitted the said correlation coefficient declines to -0.14. The significant 
decline in official yields in some provinces in the 1940s does therefor not appear to be 
the outcome of different developments in the productive area at the provincial level. 
Consequently, it is difficult to find a common factor that explains the sharp decline in 
the post-war yields in the provinces in the upper part of Table 4.3. This means that it 
is possible that at least a part of the decline in the official yields in some of the 
provinces disguise black market activity.
236 Mangrane Escardo (1961), pp. 24-25. Between 1932 and 1936 the average yields in Teruel were 
only some 50 percent of the national average when calculated as the production of olive oil per hectare. 
It is likely that a part of this originated in the higher quality of oil obtained at the cost of small yields.
237 See Table 4.3 for the data.
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Map 4.1: Geographical distribution of olive producing provinces according to post-war 
development in yields
FRANCE
INDEX OF AVERAGE YIELDS OF OLIVE OIL, 1940-52 (1932-36 AVERAGE = 100)
INDEX: 41 - 6 0
INDEX: 6 1 - 8 0
INDEX: 8 1 -1 0 0
INDEX: 101 -  120
INDEX: 120 -
It has been argued that it is to be expected that the post-war yields of olive oil are 
close to the pre-war levels, and a correction of the official data for yields has to be 
based on this assumption. According to the official data in Table 4.3 a large 
proportion of post-war output was in fact produced in provinces where post-war yields 
were “close to the pre-war levels”. Consequently, corrections of the official data can 
be limited to the provinces where post-war yields were significantly different from the 
pre-war level. In Diagram 4.2, the data from Table 4.3 have been grouped in intervals 
according to the relative size of the post-war yields. The question is then how to 
define the limits within which it can be said that the post-war yields were close the 
pre-war levels. The basic assumption is that there were small variations in the yields, 
and Diagram 4.2 demonstrates that there are only three intervals of relative post-war 
yields that includes more than ten percent of the pre-war output. They are those going 
from 85 to 90 percent, from 100 to 105 percent and from 105 to 110 percent. If all 
these are to be included in the range of “normal relative post-war yields” a symmetric 
definition of this concept will go from 85 percent to 115 percent of the pre-war level. 
The provinces in this interval accounted for almost 76 percent of average pre-war 
output and this increased to almost 83 percent of post-war output according to the 
official data. “Normal relative post-war yields” can be defined more narrowly as 
going from 90 percent to 110 percent of the pre-war level. In this case, the provinces 
in this interval accounted for 62 percent of pre-war output, and almost 70 percent of 
post-war output according to the official statistics.239 The more narrow definition still 
encompasses the two largest observations. On the other hand, the range of the normal 
yields will have to be increased beyond the 75 to 125 percent interval to include more 
provinces. It therefore appears appropriate to define “normal relative post-war yields” 
as either going from 85 to 115 percent, or going from 90 to 110 percent of the pre-war 
levels. Thus, it is now possible to establish a likely magnitude of the error in the 
official post-war yields of the “under performing provinces”. With the data available 
this can be done in two ways: applying the post-war index of average yields in the 
provinces in the 90-110 percent interval to the average post-war cultivated area in the 
provinces in the 40-89 percent interval. Alternatively, it ca be done by applying the 
post-war index of average yields in the provinces in the 85-115 percent interval to the 
average post-war cultivated area in the provinces in the 40-84 percent interval. The 
result of these calculations can be seen in Table 4.4.
238 See Table 4.3.
239 See Table 4.3.
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Diagram 4.2: Distribution of post-war yields of olive oil, 1940-52
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Source: Table 4.3.
The results suggest that official output figures should be adjusted upwards by 
approximately 40,000,000 kilos. Since the original figure for total average olive oil 
output between 1940 and 1952 was 327,924,800 kilograms, the correction equals an 
increase o f 12 percent.
Table 4. 4: Revised data on olive oil output, 1940-52
Interval of indices Average index of 1940-52 average 1932-36 1940-52 revised
of post-war yields of post-war yields cultivated area average yields average yields
Within interval (kilos of olive oil (kilos of olive oil
(See Diagram 4.2) (hectares) per hectare) per hectare)
1 2 3 4 5
85-114.99 101
40-84.99 60 522476 158 160
90-109.99 105
40-89.99 71 775775 167 176
Interval of indices 1940-52 revised 1940-52 original Absolute increase Relative increase
of post-war yields Average output average output in 1940-52 in 1940-52
Average output average output
(See Diagram 4.2) (kilos of olive oil) (kilos of olive oil) (kilos) (percent)
6 :*SM a * j“ 7 8 > “C“- - V 9
85-114.99
40-84.99 83633500 49642200 33991300 68.5
90-109.99
40-89.99 136673900 91619500 45054400 49.2
Sources: Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario Estadistico de las producciones aghcolas (1931-35, 1939-40,
1943-52); Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de Espana (1943).
The decline in yields reported in the official statistics was deemed to be unlikely, but 
it cannot be rejected that more isolated decreases could have taken place. 
Consequently, the above estimate shall be considered as an upper limit. This point is 
further reinforced by the fact that the revision leads to a 50-70 percent increase in 
average yields in the affected provinces between 1940 and 1952, which is quite 
dramatic.240
The adequacy o f the correction can be checked indirectly, through a comparison 
o f  the consumption olive oil per capita before and after the war. The data in Columns 
5 and 6 in Table 4.5 demonstrate that even when using official data, post-war total 
availability per capita was only 4 percent below the pre-war level.241 This was the 
outcome o f changes in output, population growth, and a decrease in exports.242
240 Nevertheless, when the original figures for total cereal output between 1939 and 1948 were revised 
by the Ministry o f Agriculture, these included a 45 percent raise in the figure for barley and 35 percent 
augmentation in the case of wheat. See Appendix 1.
241 Total availability includes olive oil supply through the legal channels and through the black market.
242 With the exception of a few years, no data exists for the stock o f olive oil. The availability of olive 
oil per capita has therefore been calculated as a five year moving average, as well as an average for the 
1921-35 and 1940-52 sub-periods to neutralise the effect o f year to year oscillations in output.
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Table 4.5: Total and per verson availability of olive oil in Spain between 1920 and 1954.
Years Official data 
for olive oil
Revised data for 
olive oil output1’
Exports of olive oil Available olive oil Available olive oil 
per capita
Available olive oil per 
capita (kilos)
Available olive oil Available olive oil 
per capita
Available olive oil 
per capita (kilos)
output (Official output 
data)
(Official output 
data)
(Official output data) (Revised output 
data)
(Revised output 
data)
(Revised output 
data)
(100s of kilos) (100s of kilos) (100s of kilos) (100s of kilos) (kilos) (5 y. m. a.) (100s of kilos) (kilos) (5 y. m. a.)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1921 3169637 3169637 479763 2689874 12 - 2689874 12 -
1922 2760503 2760503 461152 2299351 11 - 2299351 11 -
1923 2891139 2891139 569096 2322043 11 12 2322043 11 12
1924 2988591 2988591 461284 2527307 11 11 2527307 11 11
1925 3351893 3351893 512521 2839372 13 10 2839372 13 10
1926 3275768 3275768 967006 2308762 10 13 2308762 10 13
1927 2301118 2301118 554529 1746589 8 12 1746589 8 12
1928 6656888 6656888 1193853 5463035 24 14 5463035 24 14
1929 1913187 1913187 513704 1399483 6 12 1399483 6 12
1930 6600885 6600885 1069027 5531858 23 13 5531858 23 13
1931 1149408 1149408 938586 210822 1 11 210822 1 11
1932 3511356 3511356 629616 2881740 12 12 2881740 12 12
1933 3488218 3488218 431532 3056686 13 9 3056686 13 9
1934 2916604 2916604 524029 2392575 10 - 2392575 10 -
1935 3130442 3130442 640653 2489789 10 - 2489789 10 -
1940 2086175 2336516 136641 1949534 7 - 2199875 8 -
1941 2846026 3187549 150738 2695288 10 - 3036811 12 -
1942 3826899 4286127 132618 3694281 14 11 4153509 16 12
1943 2372386 2657072 142046 2230340 8 11 2515026 9 13
1944 4135519 4631781 198757 3936762 15 11 4433024 16 12
1945 2752684 3083006 190806 2561878 9 10 2892200 11 12
1946 1885068 2111276 110646 1774422 6 13 2000630 7 14
1947 3882577 4348486 175464 3707113 13 11 4173022 15 12
1948 5709409 6394538 399887 5309522 19 11 5994651 22 13
1949 1489130 1667826 155307 1333823 5 11 1512519 5 12
1950 3878984 4344462 460211 3418773 12 12 3884251 14 14
1951 1715501 1921361 307121 1408380 5 10 1614240 6 11
1952 6049864 6775848 313051 5736813 20 11 6462797 23 12
1953 3051109 3051109 418261 2632848 9 - 2632848 9 -
1954 3480738 3480738 276061 3204677 11 - 3204677 11 -
1921-35 av. 3340376 3340376 663090 2677286 11.6 - 2677286 11.6 -
1940-52 av. 3279248 3672758 221023 3058225 11.1 - 3451735 12.6 -
1) Includes corrections for black market influence between 1940 and 1952 according to estimate in text.
Sources: Grupo de Estudios de Historia Rural (1991); Ministerio de Agriculture: Anuario Estadistico de las producciones Agrarias (1939-40,1943-54), Institute Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario 
Estadistico de Espana, (1943); Censo de la Poblacidn de Esparia (1920,1930,1940,1950,1960), Own elaboration._________________________________________________________________
In Columns 8 and 9, it can be seen that if  official output figures are increased by 12 
percent as suggested earlier, 1940-52 average availability of olive oil per capita 
becomes 8 percent higher than the average for 1921-35. It is difficult to evaluate 
whether an 8 percent increase in available supply, and thereby consumption is a likely 
event in the post-war years. At one side, pre-war consumption per capita was already 
twice as high as in Italy, and had been fairly stable for 15 years before the Civil 
War.243 Furthermore, a part of demand was satisfied in the black market where prices 
were substantially higher than in the official market. Anything else equal, this should 
lead to a decline in demand. On the other side, olive oil was a basic good with high 
calorific content, so it is possible that the income elasticity of demand was negative.
Based on the evidence at hand, it is not possible to determine whether the 12 
percent increase in official output figures between 1940 and 1952 is too high. 
However, given that method used for estimating the revision, it still appears safe to 
say that the 12 percent increase is likely to be the upper limit for a correction.
4.3: THE SIZE OF THE BLACK MARKET OF OLIVE OIL 1940-50
As mentioned in Section 1.3.3, two estimates by Tio and Gutierrez del Castillo exist 
on the size of the black market for olive oil in the post-war years. While Tio 
guestimated that on average the black market accounted for some 10-15 percent of 
output in the whole period, Gutierrez del Castillo calculated an average figure of 21.2 
percent for the 1940-44 years.244 Given that Tio reached his result in a rather 
impressionistic way, Gutierrez del Castillo’s figures are generally considered the best 
available and are normally referred to in the historical literature.245
The upper part of Table 4.6 contains the main data and the formula used by 
Gutierrez del Castillo. She defined the size of the black market as being what 
remained when total output of olive oil was deducted the amount of oil that was 
controlled, in one way or another, by the CGAT. Although Gutierrez del Castillo's 
methodology is adequate in principle, her calculations contain certain errors. After 
correcting for these faults, it is possible to re-estimate the size of the black market 
between 1940 and 1944, as well as to calculate the size of the black market for the 
1940-50 period as a whole. The errors in Gutierrez del Castillo’s data concern the 
figures in Column 2 (“Exports”) and in Column 6 (“Consumption of other vegetable
243 International Institute of Agriculture (1939), Vol. 1, p. 158.
244 Tio (1982), pp. 76-77 and Gutierrez del Castillo (1983), p. 161.
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oils”). The author did not possess data for exports for 1940 and 1944, and misplaced 
the data for the rest of the period by one year. The inclusion of the missing data 
increases aggregate exports of olive oil from 1940 to 1944 by approximately eighty- 
one percent, from 42,000 metric tons to 76,081 metric tons.246 In the case of human 
consumption of other vegetable oils, a misinterpretation of the markets of oils and fats 
led Gutierrez del Castillo to overestimate the amount of these that were distributed 
through the rationing system.
Table 4. 6: The relative and absolute size of the black m arket for olive oil in Spain, 1940-44.
Calculation from Gutierrez del Castillo (1983). (All amounts in metric tons).
1 2 3 4 5 6
Years Output Exports Change in National supply Amount of oils Consumption
Stocks of olive oil sold in legal of other
(1-2+3) markets vegetable oils.
1940 208610 0 0 208610 158732 18002
1941 284602 0 0 284602 181147 17787
1942 382689 15000 -19250 348439 255111 26930
1943 237238 13000 45083 269321 239068 21977
1944 413441 14000 -25833 373608 298005 13258
1940-44
accumulated 1526580 42000 0 1484580 1132063 97954
7 8 9 10 11 12
Years Olive oil sold Reserve Legal consump­ Black Market Black market as Black market
in legal markets to tion of olive oil percent of legal as percent of
(5-6) producers (7+8) (4-9) consumption output
1940 140730 0 140730 67880 48.2 32,5
1941 163360 34424 197784 86818 43.9 30,5
1942 228181 49559 277740 70699 25.5 18,5
1943 217091 26243 243334 25987 10.7 11,0
1944 284747 16962 301709 71899 23.8 17,4
1940-44
accumulated 1034109 127188 1131297 323283 27.8 21.2
Revised figures based on corrections in Guti6rrez del Castillo data for "Production", "Exports", and "Consumption of
other vegetable oils". (All amounts in metric tons).
1 2 3 4 5 6
Years Output Exports1' Change in National supply Amount of oils Consumption
Stocks of olive oil sold in legal of other
(1-2+3) markets Vegetable oils.1'
1940-44
accumulated 1709770 76081 0 1633689 1132063 307
7 8 9 10 11 12
Years Legal market Reserve Legal consump­ Black Market Black market as Black market
Of olive oil To tion of olive oil percent of legal as percent of
(5-6) Producers (7+8) (4-9) consumption output
1940-44
accumulated 1131756 127188 1258944 374745 29.8 21.9
1) See Appendix 2 for the revised yearly figures.
Source: Gutierrez del Castillo (1983): Tables 1,2, 3, 4, and Anexo Tables 2 and 3; Institute Nacional de Estadistica:
Comercio exterior de Espafia. Numeros indices (1901-1956)-, Own elaboration.
245 See for example Barciela (1986b), p. 394 and Zambrana Pineda (1999), p. 4.
246 The yearly data are 1940: 13,664 metric tons; 1941: 15,074 metric tons;
1942: 13,263 metric tons; 1943: 14,205 metric tons; 1944: 19,876 metric tons; Sindicato Vertical del 
Olivo (1950), p. 88.
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In fact, only 307 metric tons of non-olive oil were sold through the rationing system 
between 1940 and 1944, as opposed to the 97,954 metric tons asserted by Gutierrez 
del Castillo.247 Viewed in isolation, the effect of these corrections is that the relative 
size of the black market diminishes. A further problem to deal with is that Gutierrez 
del Castillo used the official contemporary statistics for her data on total output. Yet, 
in Section 4.2 it was found that these probably undervalue actual output by up to 12 
percent on average between 1940 and 1952. Since this revision was only a rough 
estimate, it was not possible to calculate yearly figures for the underreporting. The 
output data for 1940-44 have therefore, been adjusted upwards by 12 percent over the 
period as a whole. The effect of this is an increase in the relative size of the black 
market.
The combined effect of these corrections can be seen in the lower part of Table 
4.6. It is noteworthy that the new estimate of the relative size of the black market is 
close to that given by Gutierrez del Castillo. This happens irrespectively of whether it 
is calculated as a percent of output or as a percent of the legal consumption. 
Nevertheless, according to the new estimate, the absolute size of the black market is 
approximately sixteen percent larger than thought by Gutierrez del Castillo.
When extending the study of the size of the black market for the period after 
1944, the absence of data on changes in the stock of oil presents us with a problem. It 
can be assumed, though, that the accumulated change in stock between 1940 and 1950 
was zero.249 By doing this, it is possible to estimate the size of the black market for the
1940-50 period as a whole, as seen in Table 4.7. The main result is that the relative 
size of the black market was approximately twenty-f we percent of legal consumption, 
or 'Osteen percent of marketed output. These numbers are below those for the 1940- 
44 period shown in Table 4.6.
247 See Appendix 2 for further details.
248 Note that if a 12 percent increase of the figures for total output is too high, the relative amount sold 
in the black market declines.
249 It can be supposed that no significant stock was available in 1940 due to the introduction of 
rationing immediately after the Civil War. Furthermore, it seems likely that the available stock was 
close to zero at the end of 1950, after the harvests of 1949 had been very bad and the 1950 slightly 
above average. This last assumption is supported by the fact that after another small harvest in 1951, 
the prices in the black market increased sharply that summer. The accumulated change in stock can 
therefore be set to zero for the 1940-50 period. While it can be argued that the stock at the end of 1951 
also was zero, the analysis has to be restricted to the 1940-50 period, since no data are available on the 
rationing system for 1951. For monthly data on official and black market prices in Jaen between 1946 
and 1951, see Camara Oficial de Comercio e Industria: Memoria Comercial y  estudio sobre el 
desarrollo de los negocios en la provincia deJaen (1946-51).
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Table 4. 7: The relative and absolute size of the black market for olive oil in Spain, 1940-50.
(All amounts in metric tons).
1
Years Production Exports Change in National supply Amount of oils Consump-
Stocks of olive oil sold in legal tion of other
(1-2+3) markets Vegetable oils.
1940-50
Accumulated 35498763 2253064 33245699 26345623 614
10 11 12
Years Olive oil sold Reserve Legal consump- Black Market Black market as Black market
in legal markets to tion of olive oil Percent of legal as percent of
(5-6) producers (7+8) (4-9) consumption Output
1940-50
Accumulated 26345oc°i 24>»Vi 26S<*2l9>
Sources: Data for "rf^yKI'-are 112 percent of the official data according to estimate in Section 4.2; "Export1
data are from: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Comercio exterior de Espana. Numeros indices (1901-1956),
p. 77; "Change in stock" is set to zero according to argument in text; "Amounts of olive oil sold in legal market"
is composed of data for rationing to the civil industry, the military industry, to the colonies, to the civil population.
and to the military personnel and their families. The amount of olive oil going to the industry is given by Gutierrez
del Castillo for 1941-44, and is set to 5 percent of the production for the rest of the years according to
argument in Appendix 2. The rationing to the colonies is set to 5 percent of the amount going to the civil
population in mainland Spain, on the basis of data from Gutierrez del Castillo for 1940-44. This is in
concordance with information in S^nchez-Duarte (1947). The rationing to the civil population in mainland Spain
is given in Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de Espana (1943-51), except 1940 and 1941,
where data are from Gutierrez del Castillo. The rationing to the military personnel and their families is given by
Gutierrez del Castillo for the whole period. Human consumption of other vegetable oils are set to twice the
amount consumed in 1943, to account for this year and 1946, as explained in Appendix 2. The "Reserve to
producers" between 1945 and1950 is set to 20.000 metric tons/year according to Sanchez Duarte (1947) p.10.
For the 1940-44 period data are given by Gutierrez del Castillo.
Although the black market continued to be important in the olive oil sector throughout 
the 1940s, the relative size o f the black market for oil was clearly smaller than in the 
case for wheat.250
4.4: STATE INTERVENTION IN THE OLIVE SECTOR AND THE EFFECTS ON 
PRODUCTION AND OFFICIAL SUPPLY OF OLIVE OIL
The system o f intervention in the production, commercialisation and consumption o f 
olives and olive oil in the 1940s was extensive and affected producers, industrialists, 
merchants and consumers. Compared with the intervention in the wheat sector, there 
were both similarities and differences. The first were that the state, in theory, 
controlled consumption o f the produce as well as prices paid at all stages o f the 
production process. Likewise, rationing until 1952 regulated consumption. In the 
rationing system, consumers were given coupons that gave them the right to buy a
250 When referring to the article by Gutierrez del Castillo, Barciela had stated that the quantity of olive 
oil sold in the black market was close to the amount of oil sold in the legal market: Barciela (1986b), p. 
394. This appears to be incorrect since from Tables 4.7 it can be calculated that the legal market on 
average was four times as large as the black market between 1940 and 1950.
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fixed amount of oil per month. The main difference compared to the wheat sector was 
that the intervention mainly dealt with the process of elaborating the oil rather than 
directly with the farmers growing the crop.
The reasons for this can be attributed to the different characteristics of the crops 
and in the infrastructure involved in the processing of wheat grain and olive fruit. The 
fact that the olive fruit starts to putrefy quickly after being picked from the tree, with a
c i 9
subsequent loss in the quality of its oil was a well-known fact. At the same time, the 
alternative of leaving the fruit on the trees also had negative consequences for its 
quality in the form of a higher acidity and smaller yields for that harvest year and the 
subsequent one.252
For the individual farmer, this meant that he had to bring his fruit to the presses 
as quickly as possible after its collection. Collectively speaking, in any given region 
all of its olive farmers had to go through this process in a condensed period of time. 
Consequently, unlike wheat farmers, the olive growers could not choose to store their 
harvest while waiting for an increase in black market prices. This probably explains 
why production quotas, which were so problematic and conflictive in the case of 
wheat, were not enforced in the olive sector during most of the 1940s.
The focus for the intervention in the production of olives was therefore not the 
farmers but the presses. This was very convenient for the state for two reasons. First, 
because the number of presses was much less than the number of farmers. Second, 
because the pressing of the fruit took place within a period of a maximum of 40 to 60 
days, it was easier to control than cereal grinding, which could happen throughout the 
year.
However, the olive farmers were still subject to some regulation of their harvest. 
Before the harvest, they had to declare to the local Junta Agncola the expected size of 
the harvest and where the pressing was going to be made. After making this 
declaration, the farmer received a legal conduct to transport his fruit as well as the 
right to receive a higher than normal ration of olive oil for self-consumption. The 
price the farmer received for his produce was set by the Junta Local de Precios (The 
Local Price Committee) in each municipality. The Junta Local de Precios consisted of 
one farmer who pressed his own fruit, one representative from the buyers of the olives
251 In the late- 19th and early-20th century an important factor in the improvement of the quality of the 
olive oil was the increase in the pressing capacity, which made it possible to press the fruit much faster 
after it was collected. A contemporary author suggested that the fruit should not be stored for more than 
a week before pressing: Guillen-Garcia (1917), p. 95.
252 Guillen-Garcia (1917), pp. 83-85.
253 Tio (1982), p. 90.
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and one representative for the sellers o f the olives. The last two were both selected by 
the provincial delegate o f the Sindicato Nacional del Olivo. The Junta Local de 
Precios was presided by either the mayor or by the president o f  the local section o f  the 
HSGL, if  such a section existed.254
Concerning working conditions, regulations stipulated that the harvest had to be 
paid by piecework, unless it could be argued that this was not possible. This would be 
to the advantage o f  the farmer, given that the wages paid per amount o f fruit collected 
was lower when paid as piecework than when paid at a daily rate. The process of 
gleaning, which had often been a part of the worker’s salary, was made compulsory 
but was prohibited without a specific contract between the workers and the farmer.255
As regards olive oil, it was intervened in a way that resembles the case for 
wheat. This meant that the pressers needed permission to work and that the prices 
were set in all parts o f the commercialisation process. Moreover, trade and transport 
o f  the finished product were illegal without prior authorisation from the CGAT.256 The 
degree o f  intervention was similar for the main sub-product o f  the pressing, the orujos 
grasos.257 This was sold as fodder and to the extractor industry, where most o f the 
remaining oil was separated from the remains o f the fruit. The orujo oil that was 
produced in this way was mainly used for industrial purposes, but in years o f  scarcity,
 ^CO
a small part was also used for human consumption after being refined. The orujo 
oil, regardless o f  its purpose, was also regulated by a system o f intervention until the 
1950-51 harvest.
Yet, as analysed in Section 4.3 the extensive control system could not avoid the 
emergence o f a large black market for olive oil in the 1940s. This combination 
appears to be somewhat paradoxical taking into account that Table 4.5 demonstrated 
that the average supply o f olive oil per capita between 1940 and 1952 was very close 
to the pre-war levels. Nevertheless, it is also worth noting that the development o f the 
level o f output suggests that it might have been reasonable to introduce a rationing 
system immediately after the Civil War.259 In circumstances, where the stocks were 
probably exhausted, the transport system was in poor condition, and where the first
254 Tio (1982), p. 89.
255 Tio (1982), p. 91.
256 Tio (1982), pp. 92-93.
257 The orujos grasos is the residue left after the pressing o f the fruit. This mass still contained an 
amount o f oil that could not be extracted by mechanical pressure alone, but also required the use of 
chemicals.
258 Se for a description o f the use of orujo oil for industrial use and human consumption.
259 Out o f the first five harvests after the end of the Civil War, the first and the fourth were quite small, 
the second was fair, and the third and the fifth were better than average.
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post-war harvest was below average a strong case could be made for state 
intervention. Yet, from the 1942 harvest onwards, the supply of the domestic market 
per capita was similar to the pre-war situation. This normalisation of overall supply is 
supported by the evolution of relative black market prices for olive oil in provincial 
capitals demonstrated in Table 4.3. After an initial period of relatively high black 
market prices, with the exception of 1946 these decrease throughout the period. 
Moreover, Table 4.5 indicates that when the rationing system was abolished in 1952, 
it happened after a harvest that, although the best since 1940 was not very different 
from the 1948 harvest. Hence, the existence of the intervention system until 1952 
appears to have been unnecessary and was probably the result of the “culture of 
intervention” in the state bureaucracy described in Section 3.7. Hence, the system of 
intervention thereby became a factor in the maintenance of an inadequate supply of 
olive oil in the official market.
At the same time, the existence of a black market did not increase total output of 
olive oil as opposed to what was argued took place in the wheat sector. In Chapter 2, 
we described the necessary conditions for this to take place. It would be necessary that 
at least a part of the supply in the black market was not the outcome of diversion, but 
the outcome of farmers also reacting to black market prices. However, in the case of 
olives, farmers could not respond to black market price incentives in the short run 
because it takes years to put new plantations into production, and since the supply of 
fertilisers was restricted.
The state failure that we have found in the olive sector is clearly different from 
the social market failure in the wheat sector in Chapter 4. The existence of a black 
market for olive oil unnecessarily complicated the supply situation for consumers, 
especially in the many provinces with little or no production of olive oil where direct 
access to producers was limited.261 As explained in Chapter 1, trading in products 
subject to state intervention required authorisation from the authorities, and, except in 
special circumstances, permission was not given to individuals to transport their goods 
across provincial boundaries. These circumstances probably made non-authorised 
transports between provinces particularly costly due to the increased risk of being
260 Both the 1949 and the 1951 harvests were smaller than that of 1946. Yet, while no stocks were likely 
to be available in 1946, since the 1945 harvest was also below average, this was not the case in 1949 
and 1951, where the preceding harvests had been better than average. See Table 4.5.
261 Approximately fifty percent of average output of olive oil came from Jaen, Cordoba and Sevilla: 
Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario Estadistico de las producciones agricolas (1931-52).
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caught, or subsequently, to the payment of large bribes to the officials of the state’s 
control system.
At the same time, for the individual consumer the option of travelling to other 
provinces to buy in the black market was time consuming and costly. With the 
possible amount of goods that could be transported by an individual, the unit price 
would obviously go up in relation to the distance travelled.
4.5: CONCLUSIONS
The present chapter concluded that official statistics were likely to underreport 
average olive oil output between 1940 and 1952 by up to 12 percent. Yet, 
irrespectively of whether this correction was included, average post-war output turned 
out to be very close to the pre-war level. This is a result, which is significantly 
different from what we saw in the case of wheat. The main reason for the different 
output levels was not official prices, but the dependency of wheat cultivation on work 
animals and artificial fertilisers, which were in short supply in the 1940s.
It was also possible to estimate the relative and absolute size of the black market 
for olive oil between 1940 and 1950. This turned out to be approximately IS percent 
of total output, or 2S percent of legal consumption. Although the analysis 
demonstrated that the black market for olive oil was important, it was relatively far 
smaller than in the case of wheat.
The introduction of a rationing system in 1939-40 might have been sound due to 
lack of stocks and the destruction of a part of the infrastructure in Spain. Nevertheless, 
given the level of output and the subsequent availability of olive oil per capita in most 
of the 1940s, there seems to have been no economic or social reason for continuing 
with the intervention system after 1942. State intervention in the olive oil sector does 
therefore appear to be an example of state failure, which led to unnecessary market 
distortions and complicated the situation for producers and consumers alike. This is a 
conclusion that is very different from the case of wheat. Moreover, it points to the 
importance of distinguishing between different sectors when investigating the effect of 
the Franco regime’s agrarian policy on output and distribution. When compared to the 
existing historical literature, this is clearly a new and important result.
262 In the case of olives, farmers were only allowed to bring the fruit to mills in the same province for 
grinding, unless it would be far easier to carry out the milling through crossing to the neighbouring 
province.
119
Compared with Tio’s study on edible oils in Spain, the conclusions of this 
chapter clarify an aspect of his interpretation. On the one hand, Tio states that 
although the production between 1940 and 1945 was smaller than before the war, the 
difference was not so big that it should have led to a general shortage. On the other 
hand, he also maintains that the lack of fats in the post-war years, especially for 
industrial purposes, made it necessary for a system of rationing to be established.264 
We have now seen that the overall supply to the population in the 1940s was, in most 
years, comparable to the pre-war period. Thus, rationing could have been abandoned 
much earlier than it was. But while the intervention system created an unnecessary 
feeling of scarcity in the case of human consumption, there was a real scarcity of fats 
for industrial use. Still, this last phenomenon can hardly be attributed to the system of 
intervention as it was mainly the result of the international situation in the 1940s and 
early 1950s.265
263 Tio (1982), pp.79-80.
264 Tio (1982), p. 111. In a discussion of this question, Llopis Agelan forwarded the statement that since 
there was a system of rationing there must have been a scarcity of olive oil: Llopis Agelan (1994), p. 
49. This though appears to be a circular argument given that the official consumer price was below the 
equilibrium price.
26 As pointed out by Tio, other European countries -  such as Germany, Belgium France and Italy -  
also failed to recover pre-war levels of consumption of non-olive oil as late as 1955: Tio (1982), pp. 
110- 111.
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CHAPTER 5: THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE SOCIAL 
STRUCTURES OF THE AGRARIAN POPULATION IN CUENCA, 
JAEN, AND TOLEDO
5.1: INTRODUCTION
The three provinces selected for analysis at the local level are Cuenca, Jaen and 
Toledo. All three provinces are located in the part of Spain where dry-land farming of 
traditional Mediterranean crops, such as cereals, olives and vine, made up the 
dominant sector of agricultural produce. Their respective locations can be seen in Map 
5.1, with Cuenca and Toledo in the La Mancha region in Central Spain and Jaen 
located in Andalucia in the South.
As described in the Introduction, the combination of the most extended crops as 
well as the social structure of the relevant agrarian sub-sectors determined the choice 
of these specific places. This means that it would have been possible to analyse other 
provinces with similar characteristics, without changing the general outline of the 
thesis. These provincial studies are therefore not an analysis of each of the provinces 
for their own sake, but an examination of the respective agrarian sub-sectors 
exemplified by these regions. However, it is still necessary to describe some basic 
characteristics of these areas as a background for the more detailed analysis, which 
will follow in the Chapters 6, 7 and 8. Although we have to be aware that while wheat, 
olives and vine were, and still are, important crops in Cuenca, Jaen and Toledo, other 
products were also grown. Furthermore, although small-scale farmers were of some 
significance in both Jaen and Toledo, it was only in Cuenca that these constituted 
the most numerous group of farmers. For these two reasons, it is not possible without 
prior considerations to analyse the data on an aggregate level for each of the provinces 
when we work on the development of the respective sub-sectors. Therefore, this 
Chapter also serves to delimit the sub-sectors that will be at the core of the further 
analysis in the Chapters 6, 7 and 8.
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M ap 5.1: The geographical location of Cuenca, Jaen and Toledo
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This chapter consists of two main parts. The first is a introduction to some of the 
general characteristics of the agrarian population in three provinces within a national 
context. In the second part, we will take a closer look at each province individually, 
focusing on their physical traits and internal complexities.
5.2: THE GENERAL SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE AGRARIAN POPULATION
5.2.1: The development of the population
As we study the development and the characteristics of the population in the three 
provinces, a number of common features appears. The first of these concerns the total 
population that in all three cases climaxed in 1950 (Table 5.1)
Table 5.1: Population and emigration in Cuenca, Jaen and Toledo, 1900-80.
Years Population Emigration
Cuenca Jaen Toledo Cuenca Jaen Toledo
1900 249696 474490 376814 N/A N/A N/A
1910 269634 526718 413217 6813 -744 10495
1920 281628 592297 442933 11452 -21579 14621
1930 309526 674415 489396 14319 8088 19805
1940 333335 753308 480008 11911 -1263 45536
1950 335719 765697 527474 34489 75430 9923
1960 315433 736391 521637 57917 152267 67850
1970 247158 661146 468925 58344 183201 97426
1980 215875 627598 471806 21280 90688 27435
Sources: Censo de la poblacidn de Espafia (1900-80)
Due to high rates of emigration after 1950, we see a significant decline in total
population. While the loss of population in the 1950s and 1960s was considerable, a
266similar trend occurs in most of the agrarian provinces throughout mainland Spain. 
The emigration was partially the result of the strong seasonal character of the demand 
for labour in agriculture. Seasonal unemployment was a major problem for a large 
proportion of workers, who fled the countryside when emigration became a viable 
option after 1950.267
A further point of interest is the development of the population between 1930 
and 1940. In spite of the war, we see both in Cuenca and in Jaen that the census data 
for 1940 registered more inhabitants than in 1930, though this is not the case for
266 Molina Ibanez (1988), pp. 89-95.
267 The minor increase in population in Toledo after 1970 is undoubtedly due to its proximity to 
Madrid, which makes the northern part of the province a possible residential area for people working in 
the capital. Ministerio de Agricultural Mapa de Cultivos y  aprovechamientos de la Provincia de Toledo, 
p. 50.
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Toledo.268 The reason for this difference is likely to be found in the fact that the 
province of Toledo was divided in two parts by the battlefront throughout the Civil 
War. Therefore, we could expect that both the number of casualties and refugees were 
higher here than in Cuenca and Jaen. Yet, one must use the figures contained in the 
1940 census with caution. The reason is that people who were missing, still 
performing military service, and those who were imprisoned or in concentration 
camps were included in the totals.269 However, it is almost impossible to estimate the 
margin of error.
5.2.2: Land distribution and the agrarian population
In the period under consideration, agriculture was by far the most dominant sector in 
all three provincial economies. As late as 1970, close to 50 percent of the active 
population were employed in farming, which was significantly higher than the 
national average (Table 5.2).270
268 The effect of the Civil War on the availability of labour in the agrarian sector in each province will 
be discussed in the respective chapters.
269 Reher and Valero Lobo (1995), pp, 51-54.
270 The census data, with the exception of 1960, shows a very low female participation rate in the labour 
market, so the 1960 figures has been adjusted to make the data comparable. This has the result that the 
figures in Table 5.2 only show the male occupational structure, and this counts for all following 
statistics on employment based on official records. Note that in rural areas it was normal for females to 
take on seasonal wage employment.
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Table 5. 2: Percentage of activdpopulation in Cuenca, Jaen, Toledo and Spain employed in 
agriculture, 1920-70.
Provinces 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970
Cuenca 84 78 79 74 71 53
Ja6n 77 66 67 64 65 54
Toledo 79 71 82 65 70 46
Spain 59 46 51 48 40 29
Sources: Censo de la poblacibn de Espafia (1920-70).
Given that small-scale fanners are in the focus of this study, it is not only the portion 
of the active population employed in agriculture, which interests us, but also the 
composition of this group. Several variables are worth noting in relation to this:
1) The relative number of labourers to farmers.
2) The regional differences of these factors.
3) The different types of farms, including size, crop structure and need for 
hired labour.
4) Developmental trends over a period of time
Several primary and secondary sources are available to investigate these questions. 
Nevertheless, not all sources are available for all three provinces and the information
771from different sources do not always provide the same form of information.
Starting the analysis on a general level, Table 5.3 shows that the distribution of 
land varied between the three provinces with Cuenca clearly being the province where 
land was most equally allocated in 1930. However, the picture we get from Table 5.3 
is somewhat misleading because it does not take into account several factors. First, the 
sheer size of the area can obscure variances in soil quality and mix different socio­
economic situations in the same group. Second, due to the range of the categories in 
which the data are organised, as for example the case of owners with, respectively less 
than five hectares and owners with 50 hectares that are placed in the same group. 
While the first amount of property on dry land would be insufficient to sustain a 
family, this would not be the case with 50 hectares.
271 This is probably due to problems with methodology. One problem is distinguishing between farmers 
and labourers. Persons without any access to land can be easily categorised as labourers. However, 
there is a border definition problem regarding people cultivating an amount of land which does not 
require hired labour, yet what they produce is not (always) sufficient to sustain the needs o f a whole 
family. A distinction could be made by the main source of income, but this is difficult to establish and 
can vary from year to year. An alternative could be according to farm size, but aspects such as the 
fertility of land and the possibility of sharecropping or renting of land makes data on ownership of land
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Table 5.3: Distribution of property in Cuenca, Jaen and Toledo, 1930.
Cuenca Small property Medium and Very large Total
large property property
(0-50 Ha) (50-500 Ha) (> 500 Ha)
Owners 34439 1046 80 35565
Id. in percent 96,83 2,94 0,22 100
Land (Hectares) 308822 55411 11163 375396
Id. in percent 82,27 14,76 2,97 100
Jaen Small property Medium and Very large Total
large property property
(0-50 Ha) (50-500 Ha) (> 500 Ha)
Owners 96114 2729 418 99261
Id. in percent 96,83 2,75 0,42 100
Land (Hectares) 629477 298988 387892 1316357
Id. in percent 47,82 22,71 29,47 100
Toledo Small property Medium and Very large Total
large property property
(0-50 Ha) (50-500 Ha) (> 500 Ha)
Owners 104934 3724 524 109182
Id. in percent 96,11 3,41 0,48 100
Land (Hectares) 844639 249871 384009 1478519
Id. in percent 57,13 16,90 25,97 100
Source: Rodriguez Labandeira (1991), pp. 437-439.
A third factor is that the data does not cover the whole province in the case of 
Cuenca.272 Fourthly, when dealing within the aggregate the data does not take into 
account regional differences, or differences between different sub-sectors. In the fifth 
place, it would be better if the data dealt with the number of exploitation rather than 
the number of owners. As part of an owner’s property could be rented out, it would be 
more exact to base one’s figures on the exploitation of the land as it could account for 
such complexities.273 It is not until 1962 that nation-wide statistics on the agrarian 
sector was produced again, and it is not until then, that data are given for the number 
of exploitations.274
Although we can not escape the inherent difficulties in constructing an all- 
encompassing definition, the figures in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 indicate that an expectable 
concentration of land took place in all three provinces between 1930 and 1962.
problematic. Similar difficulties arise concerning the distinction between small-scale and large-scale 
farmers.
272 It was only approximately 20 percent of the land that was surveyed in Cuenca.
273 A similar problem occurs, when we use another often referred to source -  Carrion, where the data 
for 1930 concerns the number of plots. The problem in using this method is that in all three provinces 
the number of plots exceeds by far the number of people working in the agrarian sector, given that 
many exploitations consisted of more than one plot. The data from Carrion therefore underestimates the 
concentration of land. See Carrion (1975), Estado N2 1).
274 Although this information post-dates the period of this study, we can still use the information to get 
an idea of the changes that took place in the meantime.
275 In the case of Jaen, a comparison between Tables 5.3 and 5.4 shows that the number of, respectively, 
owners and exploitations with more than 50 hectares is nearly 2,800 in 1930 and around 3,100 in 1962. 
At the same time there is an increase in the total amount of land they posses from some 700,000 
hectares in 1930 to about 800,000 hectares in 1962. Meanwhile, in 1930 there were 96,114 owners with 
less than 50 hectares, while in 1962 we find 83,618 exploitations with less than 50 hectares. At the
126
However, as already pointed out, the figures only give a rough indication of the 
development given the different concepts of “owners” and “exploitations” in the two 
cases.
Table 5 .4 : Distribution of property in Cuenca, Jaen and Toledo, 1962.
Cuenca < 50 Ha. 50-500 Ha >500 Ha. Total
Exploitations 53369 1179 2686 57234
Id. in percent 93,25 2,06 4,69 100,00
Land (Hectares) 569128 238947 742402 1550477
Id. in percent 36,71 15,41 47,88 100,00
Jaen < 50 Ha. 50-500 Ha >500 Ha. Total
Exploitations 83618 1212 1632 86462
Id. in percent 96,71 1,40 1,89 100,00
Land (Hectares) 419314 243549 561802 1224665
Id. in percent 34,24 19,89 45,87 100,00
Toledo < 50 Ha. 50-500 Ha >500 Ha. Total
Exploitations 61355 1525 2477 65357
Id. in percent 93,88 2,33 3,79 100,00
Land (Hectares) 504170 313450 496274 1313894
Id. in percent 38,37 23,86 37,77 100,00
Source: Ministerio de Agricultural Censo agrario 1962.
In spite of these statistical problems, it appears clear that at least one-third of the total 
land belonged to farms with less then 50 hectares as late as in 1962.276 It must 
furthermore be supposed that this figure was higher at the beginning of the 1930s, as 
this was before the process of concentrating the land into fewer hands accelerated.
In sum, the available data on land only permits us to conclude at the moment 
that small-scale farming was relatively more important in Cuenca than in the two
a
other provinces. Moreover, there appears to beprocess of land concentration between 
1930 and 1962. We will therefore proceed to an analysis of the composition of the 
agrarian population.
The census data in Table 5.5 confirms the higher proportion of small-scale 
farming in Cuenca than in the two other provinces. Furthermore, there was a decline 
in the relative number of labourers to farmers in the post Civil War years, which is in
same time, these owners possessed 629,477 hectares in 1930, while the exploitations in 1962 covered 
only 419,314 hectares in 1962.
In the case of Toledo we see that the number of, respectively, owners and exploitations with more than 
50 hectares remains at a comparable level of close to 4,000 between 1930 and 1962. At the same time 
there is an increase in the amount of land they posses from 630,000 hectares in 1930 to 810,000 
hectares in 1962. Meanwhile, the data for the farms with less than 50 hectares indicates that these 
should have declined in numbers from slightly above 100,000 in 1930 to about 60,000 in 1962. At the 
same time, they experienced a decline in the land they cultivated from almost 850,000 hectares in 1930 
to only 500,000 hectares in 1962.
It is not possible to make a similar comparison in the case of Cuenca due to the incomplete data for 
1930. This point will be further examined in Section 5.3.1.
276 Note that the term ”belonged” is deliberately vague, so that it covers both land that was owned, 
rented or cultivated as well as sharecropping.
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agreement with the finding on increased emigration and concentration of land in the 
same period.277
Table 5. 5: Occupational structure in the agrarian sector in Cuenca, Jaen and Toledo, 1920-70.
(All figures in percent).
Cuenca 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970
Workers1' 73,7 N/A N/A 66,5 N/A 52,2
FarmersZ) 26,3 N/A N/A 33,5 N/A 47,8
Ja6n 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970
Workers1' 91,0 N/A N/A 88,2 N/A 85,1
FarmersZ) 9,0 N/A N/A 11,8 N/A 14,9
Toledo 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970
Workers1' 78,9 N/A N/A 81,9 N/A 65,8
FarmersZ) 21,1 N/A N/A 18,1 N/A 34,2
1) Includes non-wage workers.
2) Owners, tenants and sharecroppers.
Sources: Censo de la poblacion de Espafia (1920-70).
When compared to the national context in the 1930s, the 9:1 ratio of workers to 
farmers in Jaen was quite typical of the situation in Andalucia. Cuenca with a ratio of 
3: l 278 was in an intermediate position between that of Andalucia and those provinces 
in Central and Northern Spain,279 where the ratio was close to 1:1. Finally, in Toledo 
we find a **:1 ratio, which is between that of Andalucia and that of Cuenca.280
However, Table 5.5 also reveals the different pace of the relative decline in 
the number of workers to farmers in the three provinces. This was the result of the 
different crop structure in the three provinces. The highest ratio of workers throughout 
the period is found in Jaen, undoubtedly due to the difficulties in the mechanisation of 
the cultivation of olives compared to, for example, cereals. Similarly in the case of 
Toledo, the difficult transition to mechanising vine cultivation is the probable 
explanation for the slower decline in the ratio of workers to farmers here than in 
Cuenca.
We are now able to summarise shortly the general development of the agrarian 
sector in the Cuenca, Jaen and Toledo. Throughout our main period of study, the 
agrarian sector continued to employ the majority of the active population. In spite of 
the fact that all three provinces were already experiencing emigration before the Civil
277 Based on local sources Reher reached a result which, on one side shows a similar level of workers to 
farmers in Cuenca, and to a certain degree also confirms the development over time: Reher (1988), p. 
30.
278 This resembles the situation in provinces as for example Valladolid, Valencia, Alicante, Huesca and 
Zaragoza.
279 Such as for example Guadalajara, Burgos, Soria, Lleida, Leon, Zamora, Santander and Orense.
280 Rodriguez Labandeira (1991), pp. 440-441.
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War, the total population continued to grow until 1950. However, from approximately 
this year, emigration began to outstrip the natural population growth.
The decline in the relative number of workers to farmers, especially after 1950, 
together with a concentration of the land testifies to a general modernisation and 
mechanisation of the sector. Nonetheless, due to technical reasons, the process of 
mechanisation was much more pronounced in Cuenca than in Jaen and Toledo.
5.3: SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AGRARIAN SECTOR IN THE 
THREE PROVINCES
5.3.1: Cuenca
Normally the province is divided in three geographical regions - La Mancha, La 
Sierra, and La Alcarria - based on variations in natural environment.281 However, 
although there is agreement on the basic characteristics of each region, different 
authors delimit the regions in slightly different ways.
La Sierra, that is “The Mountains” is the most elevated area of the province, 
with altitudes from 1100 meters to 1800 meters. The landscape is ragged, making it 
only partially useful for agriculture, but it contains a notable extension of woods.282
La Alcarria in the north-western part of the province is less mountainous than La 
Sierra and is located approximately at 800 to 900 meters of altitude.283 Compared to
904
La Sierra there are relatively less forests and the earth suffers from some erosion.
La Mancha, which is approximately the southern half of the province, is a part of the 
great central plateau in Spain, and here the land is cultivated in a higher degree than in 
the other two areas. Both the physical landscape and the predominance of the 
cultivation of cereals, and especially wheat, makes this part of the province similar to 
other provinces in Central Spain, such as Albacete, Ciudad Real and Toledo. On the 
other hand, La Alcarria and La Sierra share similarities with areas in neighbouring 
provinces like Guadalajara and Teruel.
281 Reher (1988), pp. 23-24, for the division in the three regions and the basic characteristics o f each.
282 In the 1980s close to 70 percent of the exploited area was used for forestry, Gonzalez Cardenas 
(1988), p. 54.
283 “Alcarria” roughly translates into “high lying, open less fertile land”.
284 In the 1980s woods occupied close to 20 percent of the exploited area, Gonzalez Cardenas (1988), p. 
54.
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Map 5.1*. The province of Cuenca (Note that the exact territorial division is disputed. 
According to Gonzales Cardenas (1988), p. 59, La Alacarria is smaller than shown in this 
division, which is from Reher (1988), p. 18.
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When analysing the regional differences of the agrarian sector, the lack of uniform 
statistics becomes apparent again. Even so, some general conclusions can be made 
that can serve as guidelines for the rest of the analysis. One important point is that the 
relative number of large-scale farms was limited in all three regions, but, said that, 
they were more important in La Mancha than in La Alcarria and La Sierra, as shown 
in Table 5.6.
Table 5. 6: Relative number of farms in Cuenca, 1943-46
(All figures in percent)
La Sierra La Alcarria La Mancha
Large farms 1,0 0,3 3,2
Family farms 17,5 22,5 23,6
Small farms 81,5 77,2 73,1
Source: Organizaci6n Sindical: Datos estadisticos.
However, the figures in Table 5.4 indicate that in 1962 farms with less than 50 
hectares only possessed some 36 percent o f the total agricultural land. This appears to 
contradict with the data on the relative importance of the small-scale farmers in Tables 
5.5 and 5.6. The problem arises because the calculation in Table 5.4 do not distinguish
9R f\between cultivated and non-cultivated land, with the last heading including forestry. 
When this is taken into account, as in Table 5.7, it turns out that some 65 percent of 
the cultivated land in 1962 belonged to farms with less than 50 hectares.
Table 5. 7: Distribution of land use according to crops and farm sizes in Cuenca, 1962.
(All figures in Hectares)
Crops < 1 ha 1-10 ha 10-50 ha 50-100 ha >100 ha Total
Wheat 138 17185 97501 30288 54046 199158
Barley 174 8992 33862 8556 15060 66644
901 18871 35209 8896 14634 78511
Olives 691 11106 27879 6003 7332 53011
Leguminous 230 5928 26082 7938 12632 52810
Others 736 7105 45068 11666 13994 78569
Total cultivated 2870 69187 265601 73347 117698 528703
Fallow land 181 20471 124519 39611 64324 249106
Non-cultivated 404 15565 70330 39106 647263 772668
Total 3455 105223 460450 152064 829285 1550477
Relative distribution
0,58 13,09 50,24 13,87 22,26 100,00
of cultivated land
(Percent)
Source: Ministerio de Agricultura: Censo Agrario 1962.
286 The municipalities own a very important part of the large-scale exploitations of forestry. The 
consequence is a structure of the ownership of land where small- and medium-sized farms coexists with 
public owned large-scale exploitations. Hence, a large proportion of the high quality land is in the 
hands of the small and medium-scale farms. The structure found in Cuenca is different from that of the 
southern part of the La Mancha region, where large-scale farms are mainly in private hands, Mata Olmo 
(1988), pp. 171-173.
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The statistics in Table 5.8 about the employment structure in the agrarian sector in 
1953 basically gives the same picture as what was shown in Table 5.6. The main 
points are that the group of “family farmers” is important in all areas, as well as that 
there is an inverse relationship between the relative number of family farmers and the 
relative number of male workers. We also see that although there are a higher 
proportion of “Larger farmers” in La Alcarria than in La Mancha, the proportion of 
“Regular hands” and “Non-regular hands” is higher in La Mancha than in La Alcarria. 
This points to the fact that the larger farms were more labour intensive in La Mancha 
than in La Alcarria, which confirms that the land was more intensively cultivated in 
La Mancha than in the two other regions.
These structural differences between the regions appear to have been constant 
throughout the period of our study, which can be seen in the figures from Reher in 
Table 5.9.287 For the early to mid-1940s we have information that makes it possible to 
distinguish between a number of different types of farms according to size, crop and 
employment structure, as well as the physical environment in which they were 
located.288
Among the conclusions, which can be drawn from Table 5.10 is that the 
dividing line between “small farms” and “family farms” depends on the region where 
the farm is located.289 As a rule, land in La Mancha appears to generate more income 
than land in the other regions. This can be seen in the case of how much land is 
necessary to qualify for the heading “family farms” as opposed to “small farms”. This 
seems to be connected with differences in the crop structure in the three regions. 
While more land in La Alcarria and La Sierra was dedicated to pasture and woods, in 
La Mancha we see more land used for cultivation.290
287 Note that the figures are not without problems: 1) they are based on a relatively small sample, 2) it is 
unclear how to interpret the category “others”, and 3) there are relatively large time spans within each 
category. In spite of this, the general picture confirms what we saw in Tables 5.5, 5.6 and 5.8.
288 The criteria used for selecting “typical farms” are not explained in the source. The data that is 
reproduced in Table 5.10 appears to have been an answer to a questionnaire, which appears to have 
been sent out from the Organization Sindical, i.e. the official “trade-unions”. However, the purpose of 
the survey is not stated in the source. The local branch of the Organization Sindical compiled the data, 
which, in theory, was the representative of the respective sectors. It can therefore be supposed that the 
information was collected by persons with a good knowledge of the subject. Unfortunately, it has not 
been possible to find similar information for Jaen and Toledo.
289 Note that the relative size of the figures for the value of production might not reflect the exact 
relation of the net income of the farms, due to differences in cost structure.
290 It should be noted that there are also two examples from La Mancha of “large farms” with important 
areas dedicated to pasture side by side with the mainly cereal growing farms.
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Table 5. 8 Agrarian sector employment structure in the Province of Cuenca in 1953.
(All figures in percent)
Regions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Large Large Family Family Share­ Regular Non regular Non regular Total hired
farmers farmers farmers farmers croppers hands hands hands labour
(owners) (tenants) (owners) (tenants) (males) (males) (females) (6+7+8)
La Alcarria 7,5 4,8 35,1 13,5 3,3 14,6 15,8 5,4 35,8
La Sierra 2,0 2,0 58,1 7,6 3,0 5,2 17,6 4,4 27,2
La Mancha 7,0 2,5 25,0 8,6 1,8 14,7 29,5 10,8 55,1
City of Cuenca 15,6 9,5 11,1 25,4 0,0 24,0 14,3 0,0 38,3
Total 6,2 2,9 32,9 9,4 2,3 13,0 24,7 8,6 46,3
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Resena Estadistica, Cuenca, 1958.
Table 5 .9  Occupational structure of the active population employed in agriculture 
in the province of Cuenca - excluding the city of Cuenca, 1926-70._______________
(All figures in percent)
La Sierra La Alcarria La Mancha
1926-50 1951-70 1926-50 1951-70 1926-50 1951-70
Workers 19,0 28,0 18,8 8,1 47,5 40,1
Farmers ” 60,0 66,9 59,3 82,0 44,5 45,1
Others 21,0 5,2 21,9 10,0 7,9 14,8
Persons in
sample 663 172 691 271 818 474
1) Owners and tenants.
Source: Reher (1988), p. 31
Table 5.10: Normal farm types in Cuenca, 1943-46.
La Sierra Small farms Family farms Family farms Family farms Large
farms
Size (Ha.) 6 11 48 46 570
Cereals (%) 81 91 30 31 13
Leguminous (%) 12 1 3 1 0
Olives (%) 0 0 0 0 0
Wine (%) 0 0 0 0 0
Pasture (%) 0 0 67 66 87
Woods (%) 0 0 0 0 0
Others (%) 7 8 0 2 0
Work animals N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A
Other animals 0 0 100 sheep N/A 500 sheep
Hired labour 0 0 2 + 2 casuals 0 8
Estimated value
of 1946 prod, (pts.) 4500 8930 26000 25000 80000
Mountainous Small farms Family farms La Alcarria Small farms Family farms Large Large
part of La Ale. farms farms
Size (Ha.) 20 76 22 81 379 1726
Cereals (%) 43 34 64 35 28 5
Leguminous (%) 2 3 5 0 0 1
Olives (%) 5 12 23 2 2 1
Wine (%) 0 4 0 0 0 0
Pasture (%) 49 39 9 62 69 0
Woods (%) 0 0 0 0 0 93
Others (%) 2 8 0 0 1 1
Work animals N/A 3 mules N/A 3 mules N/A N/A
Hired labour 0 2 0 2 N/A 20
Estimated value
of 1946 prod, (pts.) 10000 30000 8000 32000 50000 196000
Table 5.10 (continued): Normal farm types in Cuenca, 1943-46.
La Mancha Small farms Family farms Family farms Large Large Large Large Large
farms farms farms farms farms
Size (Ha.) 6 20 57 96 268 530 762 2850
Cereals (%) 64 70 47 51 85 71 69 18
Leguminous (%) 5 0 11 11 0 18 18 1
Olives (%) 0 0 7 6 12 2 1 0
Wine (%) 32 30 35 0 3 5 10 3
Pasture (%) 0 0 0 31 0 0 0 66
Woods (%) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
Others (%) 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0
Work animals N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Other animals 0 0 0 0 0 400 sheep 1000 goats 0
and goats and sheep
Hired labour 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Estimated value
of 1946 prod, (pts.) 16000 30000 32700 74500 100000 650931 715328 20000
Source: Organization Sindical de Cuenca: Datos Estadisticos.
In conclusion, it is possible to generalise about the agrarian sector in Cuenca between 
1920 and 1970. Throughout the period, the agrarian sector was by far the most 
important regarding employment. It was not until 1970 that the part of the active 
population employed in agriculture declined to 50 percent. Together with the massive 
emigration after 1950, this makes Cuenca a rather typical province in Central Spain.
Although the data was somewhat conflicting, the ratio of workers to farmers was 
small throughout the period, with the highest level reaching approximately 3:1 in the 
pre-war period. The data on land distribution in general confirms the findings of the 
worker to farmer ratio, i.e. that small and family farms were the most widespread 
types both in numbers and covered area during the main period under investigation. 
The most equal land distribution was in La Sierra, followed by, respectively, La 
Alcarria and La Mancha, and this pattern did not change between the 1920s and the 
1960s. Physical environment determined some general patterns in crop structure in the 
three regions, although no perfect characterisations can be made. Regarding “Small 
farms” and “Family farms”, it was often the case in La Sierra and La Alcarria that an 
important part of the exploited area was dedicated to pasture and/or forestry. This was 
not so often the case in La Mancha, where the main crops were cereals along with 
leguminous, wine and olives. Regarding the “large farms” located in La Mancha there 
were both some, which only grew cereals, leguminous, olives or wine, but also others 
that had important parts of the land dedicated to pasture. On the other hand, in La 
Alcarria and La Sierra these types of farms used their land predominantly for pasture 
and wood.
In conclusion, it seems acceptable to regard the cereal-growing sector in the 
province as mainly made up of small-scale and family farms, although some larger 
farms also existed in La Mancha. It can be assumed that the cereal sector was 
sufficiently homogeneous within the province to carry out the rest of the analysis 
using aggregated data from the provincial level.
5.3.2: Jaen
The province of Jaen can be divided into a number of relatively well-defined areas, 
with characteristics that, at least partially, coincide with the varieties of agrarian
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development.291 In the periphery, there are three mountainous areas, respectively 
“Sierra Morena”, “Sierra de Segura and Sierra de Cazorla”, and “Sierra Magina”. 
Between these regions, the valleys of the Guadalquivir River, as well as other minor 
rivers, dominate the central part of the province.
Sierra Morena is in the northern and north-eastern part of the province bordering 
the great central plain of La Mancha. It is characterised by a warm climate with 
limited precipitation and poor soil, which makes forestry and grazing important in the 
area. However, the cultivation of olives are of some importance in the foothills 
towards the east.
The neighbouring mountains of Sierra de Segura and Sierra de Cazorla in the 
eastern part of the province have a colder and more humid climate than Sierra 
Morena. Forestry is important in the northern part, while olives are found towards the 
south of the region.
Sierra Magina in the southern part of the province facing the province of Granada is 
also characterised by a humid and cold climate, although less humid than in Sierra de 
Segura and Sierra de Cazorla. The mountainous parts of the province are mainly used 
for forestry, while the growing of olives becomes more common towards the 
Guadalquivir and Guadiana Menor valleys north and east of the mountains. Between 
the mountains, there are several minor valleys where the land is used for a number of 
different crops.
Finally, La Campina is the central part of the province stretching from la Loma 
de Ubeda and Sierra de Segura in the east to the border of Cordoba province in the 
west, and is dominated by the Guadalquivir valley. This area, with relatively fertile 
soil and some extension of irrigation, is heavily cultivated, with cereals and olives 
being the most important crops.292
In general, the climate and the soil in Jaen are suitable for the cultivation of
olives by Spanish standards. In the winters, the temperature seldom falls below the 
minimum required by the crop, and precipitation, although scarce for many other 
crops, is just about adequate for olives.
291 Obviously, the degree that physical environment determined agricultural development depends on 
the period under consideration, and the following refers to the largely non-mechanised situation in the 
province in the first half of the 20th century.
292 Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Resefia estadistica de la Provincia de Jaen, 1956, pp. 186-187.
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Consequently, the yields of olives were higher in Jaen than the national average for 
the period with which we are concerned. The favourable conditions for the cultivation 
of olives made Jaen the province with the largest amount of land used for the growth 
of the crop in Spain in the 1940s. This status has remained the same up to the present.
From Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 we remember that the distribution of the property 
was far from being as equal in Jaen as was the case in Cuenca. Because of this, Jaen 
was among the provinces included in the Agrarian Reform Bill of the Second 
Republic, which aimed to redistribute land to the landless labourers and long-time 
tenants.294 The cancellation of the redistributive reforms of the Second Republic after 
the Francoist victory and the difficulties of mechanisation of the cultivation of olives 
had the effect that the ratio of workers to farmers remained close to 8:1 in 1950. As 
late as 1970, it had only fallen to 6:l.295
In light of this, the information presented in Table 5.11, where the ratio of 
workers to farmers is less, points to the possibility that a number of the workers also 
cultivated a small plot of land. Still they probably earned their main income from 
wages.
Table 5.11: Occupational structure of the agrarian population in Jaen, 1953.
Number of persons As percentage of total As percentage of farmers
agrarian population
Large scale farmers (owners) 19271 10,20 22,13
Large scale farmers (tenants) 4748 2,51 5,45
Small scale farmers (owners) 42341 22,40 48,62
Small scale farmers (tenants) 7150 3,78 8,21
Sharecroppers 13575 7,18 15,59
Labourers in fixed employment 17603 9,31 N/A
Casual labourers (men) 84304 44,61 N/A
TOTAL 188992 100,00 100,00
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Jadn. Resefla Estadistica, 1953, p. 234.
The province can be divided further into three zones with different ratios of landless 
workers to small-scale farmers296 and an increasing proportion of small-scale farmers
9Q7 9QRamong the agrarian population as can be seen in Table 5.12. The three zones are:
293 But at the same time, land distribution was more equal in Jaen than in most other provinces in 
southern Spain.
294 See Malefakis (1976) for the classical description of the background for the Agrarian Reform of the 
Second Republic, as well as the political and social tensions that the reform created in the 1930s.
295 See Table 5.3 above.
296 This includes owners either paying less than 50 pesetas in land tax for land exploited directly by 
them or paying less than 25 pesetas in land tax for land ceded to tenants. It also includes tenants and 
sharecroppers cultivating less than 10 hectares of dry land or less than 1 hectare irrigated land: Garrido 
Gonzalez (1990), Vol. 2, p. 473.
297 Please note that the figures for small-scale farmers in Table 5.12 are a combination of physical 
extension of the farms cultivated by the farmers and the value of the land. The consequence of this is
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a) Sierra Morena
b) La Campina and areas in Sierra de Cazorla and Sierra de Segura bordering with 
La Campina
c) Sierra de Cazorla and Sierra de S e g u r a ^ ^  S\ec«c.
These regional differences in the size of property were also found among the olive- 
growing farmers. On one side, the largest number o f farms with under 10 hectares 
were found in Sierra de Segura and Sierra Magina. On the other side, it was in La 
Campina that most olive growing farms with more than 150 hectares were located.299
Table 5.12: Absolute and relative number of landless labourers to small-scale farmers in Jaen, 
1933-34.
Zone
1 2 3
Small-scale Landless "27" r
farmers labourers
1) Sierra Morena 2922 10066 3,44
2) Sierra de Cazorla
and Sierra de Segura 3544 4772 1,35
3) Sierra Magina 5720 9384 1,64
4) La Campina 10443 23981 2,30
5) Municipalities with land in
both zone 2 and 4 1172 2668 2,28
6) Id. in both zone 3 and 4 3428 8336 2,43
Provincial total 27229 59207 2,17
Source: Censo campesino 1933 and 1934, reproduced in Garrido
Gonzalez (1990): Vol. 2, pp. 473-477.
Considering that the large-scale farms were much more important in Jaen than in 
Cuenca, it is important to establish that olives were an important crop among the small 
farmers. Unfortunately, I have not been able to localise data similar to those for 
Cuenca regarding "typical farms", so it is necessary to look for other sources. It this 
respect it is helpful that it is time-consuming to bring new olives into cultivation. 
Going back to the 19th century and the beginning o f  the 20th century, the expansion of 
the olive plantations in Jaen was a process in which both small and large-scale farmers 
participated. While the initial extension o f olives was mainly the result o f the 
expansion o f smallholdings, its continued growth in the late 19th century and the 
beginning o f  the 2 0 th century led to large landholdings increasingly planting olives.300
that the sheer size o f the exploitation is not the single factor determining their classification, and this 
therefore is different from the categorisation we have seen for example in Tables 5.3 and 5.4.
298 Note that the figures in Table 5.12 only cover approximately 60 percent o f the male population 
employed in the agrarian sector.
299 Ministerio de Agricultural Inventario agrondmico del olivar, Vol. II: Provincia de Jaen, pp. 39-40. 
The data refers to 1962, but there is no indication that this pattern should have changed since the 1940s.
300 Jimenez Blanco (1986b), pp. 472-478.
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tViAlthough, there is a relatively long time gap between the start of the 20 century 
and the beginning of the 1960s, the existence of olives on both small and large farms 
appears to have been a shared phenomena. The information from the 1962 agrarian 
census given in Table 5.13 shows that a large proportion of the land on small farms 
was used for olives and that the relative importance of olives declined with the size of 
the farm.
Table 5.13: Distribution of land use according to crops and farm sizes in Jaen, 1962.
(All figures in Hectares)
Crops < 1 ha 1-10 ha 10-50 ha 50-100 ha >100 ha Total
Olives 6780 98075 118233 41286 74454 338828
Wheat 1429 25189 32442 12754 31991 103805
Barley 610 12163 15768 6019 15893 50453
Leguminous 791 12678 13958 5027 10389 42843
Others 1635 7207 5675 1793 7517 23827
Total cultivated 11245 155312 186076 66879 140244 559756
Fallow land 361 13342 28468 12356 39109 93636
Non-cultivated 145 5909 18456 14988 531775 571273
Total 11751 174563 233000 94223 711128 1224665
Olives as %
of Total 57,70 56,18 50,74 43,82 10,47 27,67
Source: Ministerio de Agriculture: CensoAgrario 1962.
On this basis, it appears that a large number of the small farmers produced olives and 
the main destination of their produce must have been the market rather than self­
consumption for all but the smallest farmers.301
Even though it is located in Andalucia where large-scale landowners in general 
possessed relatively much more land than in, for example, Central Spain, in Jaen the 
small-scale and medium-scale farmers were also a significant group of the agrarian 
sector. We have also seen that the relative importance of the cultivation of olives was 
higher the smaller the farm size, which makes the province a proper subject for this 
thesis. However, it is necessary to be aware of that in absolute terms most olives were 
found on large-scale farms. In the further analysis it can not automatically be 
supposed that data, for example on the development of cultivated area with olives on 
the provincial level also applies specifically to the situation for small-scale farmers. 
The solutions to this problem will depend on the question asked, so various strategies 
will be used to deal with this problem in Chapter 7.
301 In Jaen between 1932 and 1936, the average production of olive oil was some 262 litres per hectare, 
while the estimated average consumption for the total Spanish population in the same years was some 
12-14 litres per year. It would be possible for a family of 5-6 persons to cover its consumption needs in 
olive oil with less than half a hectare planted with olives. This holds even if the olive growing farmers 
had a significantly higher consumption than the average population.
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5.3.3: Toledo
The province o f  Toledo can be divided in five regions according to differences in the 
natural environment, as shown in Map 5.4. Talavera, in the north-western part o f  the 
province, has a relatively poor soil and an important part o f the land is used for 
pasture. Cultivated land is mainly used for cereals with a low productivity.
The soil in Torrijos, to the east o f  Talavera, is somewhat more complex, 
depending on whether you are on the left or right o f  the Alberche River. On the left 
bank cereal and vine are the dominant crops, while the land on the right bank is poor 
and mainly used for cereals and pasture.
The Tajo River Valley divides Sagra-Toledo, east o f Torrijos. On the right bank 
is La Sagra, which is the northern extension o f  La Mancha rising slowly towards the
<3=>
province o f  Madrid. This is primarily planted with cereals, but we also find vin . On 
the left bank o f the Tajo the land is less fertile and is partly used for pasture and 
forestry.
The region o f  La Mancha is the easternmost part o f the province. It goes from 
La Mesa de Ocana in the north to the border with the province o f  Ciudad Real in 
the south and is a part o f the great central plain in Spain. The whole o f  La Mancha, 
which includes parts o f Toledo, Cuenca, Ciudad Real, and Albacete, is now the largest 
grape cultivating area in the world. However, cereals and olives are also important 
crops.303
Finally, the areas o f La Jara, Montes de Navahermosa and Montes de Yebenes 
in the south and south-eastern part o f the province are a mountainous region that 
continues into the neighbouring provinces o f Caceres, Ciudad Real and Badajoz. 
Between the hills and mountains the land is planted with cereals, grapes, olives, 
vegetables and fruits, but given the semi-mountainous nature o f  the region, there is a 
large cattle population in the areas where cultivation is difficult.
302 La Mesa de Ocana is the extension of the La Alcarria region in the province o f Cuenca, and as such 
shares some o f the natural characteristics with this region. See Section 5.3.1, p. 129 for a short 
description o f La Alcarria.
303 The current limits o f the district where it is possible to qualify wine for the “Denominacion de 
Origen de La Mancha” does not follow the geographical limits o f La Mancha as shown on the map. The 
“Denominacion” includes a part of the region of Montes de Los Yebenes. Ministerio de Agricultural
Mapa de cultivos y  aprovechamientos de la Pronvincia de Toledo, p. 64.
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Map 5.4: The province of Toledo
The growing of grapes in Toledo is mainly found in La Mancha plus a minor area on 
the left bank of river Alberche in the region of Torrijos. This can be seen from the 
figures given in Table 5.14, where the province is divided in the seven regions just 
described.304
Table 5.14: Distribution of cultivated land with grapes in Toledo, 1946.
Region Grapes (Ha.) Grapes in association Non-productive
with olives (Ha.) vine stocks (Ha.)
Talavera de la Reina 2223 654 179
Torrijos 11532 828 1456
Sagra-Toledo 3000 783 274
La Mancha 64911 4936 3477
La Jara 439 250 5
Montes de Navahermosa 255 75 0
Montes de Y6benes 2759 391 293
Total 85119 7917 5684
Source: Comisaria General de Abastecimiento y Transporter Mapas de Abastecimiento
(Provincia de Toledo) -1946.
From this data the predominant position of the La Mancha and Torrijos regions are 
very clear. In the rest of the regions, it is furthermore often the case that a large part of 
the cultivated area with grapes is concentrated in only a few municipalities.
The province of Toledo was, like Jaen, among the provinces that were included 
in the agrarian reform of the Second Republic, which implies an uneven distribution 
of the land in the area. However, in Table 5.3 we saw that in 1930 owners with less 
than 50 hectares possessed 57 percent of the land. On one hand, this was some 10 
percent more than in Jaen, but, on the other hand, it was well below the figure for 
Cuenca where this group accounted for 82 percent of the land. Together with the fact 
that in Toledo the amount of land concentrated in plots of less than 10 hectares was 
larger than in any other of the provinces included in the Agrarian Reform of the 
Second Republic, this implies a situation with a coexistence of small-scale and large- 
scale farms.306
This is not to say that the situation was uniform throughout the province. 
Smallholdings were found in the northern part of the districts of Escalona, Illescas and
304 The total cultivated area with grapes in Table 5.14 fits relatively well with the data from the Anuario 
Estadistico de las Producciones Agricolas from the Ministry of Agriculture. In the latter 84,992 
hectares of productive vines and 7,866 hectares of non-productive vines were reported for 1946.
305 In Sagra-Toledo one-third o f the productive area was in Valmojado; in Talavera half of the 
productive area was divided between Cebolla and Montearagon; in La Jara two-thirds of the productive 
area was in Los Navalmorales; in Montes de Navahermosa all the vine cultivated un-associated with 
other crops was in Menasalvas, while all the vine cultivated in association with olives was in 
Navahermosa; and finally in Montes de Yebenes two-thirds of the productive area was in Orgaz. 
Comisaria General de Abastecimiento y Transporter Mapas de Abastecimiento (Provincia de Toledo) 
1946.
306 Carrion (1972), p. 113.
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Torrijos, and on the other side in La Mancha in the districts of Ocana, Lillo, Quintana 
and Madridejos.307 Significantly, an important characteristic of these areas in 
particular was widespread cultivation of grapes.
Unfortunately, we do not possess information on the number of small-scale 
farmers on the regional level, nor data for the number of small-scale farmers that were 
cultivating grapes on a provincial or regional level from the 1930 or 1940s. This sort 
of knowledge only becomes available in 1962, and at that moment 55 percent of the 
total cultivated area with grapes was found on farms smaller than 10 hectares. At the 
same time the relative amount of land dedicated to grapes rose in inverse proportion to 
the size of the farm, as can be seen in Table 5.15.
On this background, we can conclude that the agrarian sector in Toledo was 
characterised by a dualism between small-scale and large-scale farms. The small-scale 
farms were to a certain degree concentrated in specific areas, where, at the same time, 
grape cultivation was most widespread.
Table 5.15: Distribution of land use according to crops and farm sizes in Toledo, 1962.
(All figures in hectares)
Crops < 1 ha 1-10 ha 10-50 ha 50-100 ha >100 ha Total
Grapes 1592 33258 56878 14782 22717 129227
Olives 1484 22202 37900 13402 28665 103653
Wheat 255 16134 73315 30602 90403 210709
Barley 490 16022 42087 13823 33966 106388
Leguminous 364 9705 31697 10287 19155 71208
Others 701 9220 13636 6016 25191 54764
Total cultivated 4886 106541 255513 88912 220097 675949
Fallow land 386 20821 91379 42263 149835 304684
Non-cultivated 164 5222 19258 14720 293897 333261
Total 5436 132584 366150 145895 663829 1313894
Grapes as %
of Total 29,29 25,08 15,53 10,13 3,42 9,84
Source: Ministerio de Agricultura: Censo Agrario 1962.
Unfortunately, we do not have quantitative evidence for the 1940s, but the qualitative 
evidence from the 1930s, together with quantitative evidence from 1962, shows that 
the coincidence of small-scale farms and grape cultivation in the same areas was not 
accidental. Rather, it was, to a quite large degree, farmers with less than 50 hectares 
who were growing grapes in Toledo.
A minor proportion of the vine was found on larger farms. Yet, sufficient grapes 
were grown by small-scale farmers to make it acceptable to use aggregate data on the 
provincial, in the analysis of the situation for the small-scale winegrowers.
307 A district is a smaller unit than a region. Illescas is located in the region of Sagra-Toledo, while 
Escalona and Torrijos are in the region of Toriijos.
308 Carrion also noted this coincidence: Carrion (1972), pp. 113-114.
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CHAPTER 6: THE WHEAT PRODUCTION CRISIS IN POST-WAR 
SPAIN: THE CASE OF CUENCA
6.1: INTRODUCTION
In the five years preceding the outbreak of the Civil War, the province of Cuenca had 
the largest annual average production of wheat of all Spanish provinces. Although the 
area hardly experienced any direct warfare, the general level of agrarian production 
was significantly smaller after 1939 than before the war. As can be seen in Table 6.1, 
this was especially the case for cereals including wheat, where average output of the 
latter between 1939 and 1949 was only 45 percent of the pre-war average. These 
conditions make Cuenca useful for the analysis of the connection between post-war 
agrarian policy and wheat output in provinces where small-scale farmers dominated 
the agrarian sector.309
Table 6.1: Cereal output in Cuenca, 1931-49.
Crops Output (100s of kilos)
1931-35 1939-49 1939-49 average as percent
average average of 1931-35 average.
Wheat 2250575 1005282 45
Barley 1005904 518082 52
Rye 119507 102536 86
Oats 370700 193345 52
Sources: Ministerio de Agricultural Anuario Estadistico de las
producciones agricolas (1931-35,1939-40,1943-49, 1951); Instituto
Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de Espana (1943).
In Chapter 3, which dealt with wheat production at the national level, it was concluded 
that the supply curve of wheat shifted to the left, and that there was a simultaneous 
twist of the curve, making it steeper after 1939. These conclusions are confirmed by 
the analysis of the agrarian sector in Cuenca, which also experienced a lack of work 
animals and fertilisers in the 1940s.
Furthermore, the evidence in this chapter shows that the price policy in the 1940s 
cannot be considered the main cause for the low post-war level of wheat output. The 
post-war decline in real official prices paid to the farmers show up in the official 
statistics on the value of production. However, when estimated black market earnings 
are included in the analysis, the average value of production per unit of cultivated land 
in the 1940s remained similar to the pre-war level. In general, these conclusions are at
309 For the relative importance of small-scale farmers in Cuenca, see Sections 5.2.1, and 5.3.1.
146
odds with Barciela’s commonly accepted interpretation that stresses agrarian price
310policy as the main reason for the depressed level of wheat production in the 1940s.
Since the relative crop composition remained stable, the post-war level of wheat 
production was mainly the result of an involuntary and unavoidable retraction of land 
from production and a simultaneous decline in the yields of the crops. For the small- 
scale farmers this meant that the economic outcome of the agrarian policy in the 1940s 
depended on the ability to obtain earnings from the black market, and the capital stock 
at the end of the Civil War. From the mid-1950s fertilisers became available again, 
and wheat output grew due to higher yields. In the case of large-scale farmers, this 
went hand in hand with increased mechanisation of the farms from the late 1950s. On 
the other hand, farmers with less than 50 hectares were only to a very small degree 
participating in this process before 1960.
6.2: THE AGRARIAN SECTOR BEFORE THE WAR: THE PREDOMINANCE OF 
CEREALS AND A LIMITED MODERNISATION
Before the Civil War, traditional Mediterranean dry-land crops dominated the agrarian 
sector in Cuenca. Wheat was by far the most widespread single crop, and as can be 
seen in Table 6.2, on average almost half of the value of agrarian production 
originated from this cereal.
Both the relative land distribution and the amount of tilled land were relatively 
stable between 1931 and 1935, with the exception of a notable decline in the land 
occupied by grapes as a result of the spread of phylloxera.
Table 6. 2: Average land use and relative value of output in Cuenca, 1931-35.
Crops Average land use Average land use Average relative value
(Ha.) (%) of output (% )1}
Wheat 272783 44,8 47,3
Other cereals 181916 29,9 21,2
Leguminous plants 19903 3,3 2,6
Vine 68801 11,3 5,8
Olives 38177 6,3 3,9
Others*' 26919 4,4 19,1
Total 608500 100,0 100,0
1) Value in current prices were changed to constant 1958 pesetas by deflator for "agriculture forestry
and fishing" from Prados de la Escosura (1995). Average value calculated on basis of constant
1958 pesetas.
2) The "Total" includes cultivated land only.
Source: Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario Estadistico de las Producciones Agricolas (1931-35).
310 See Section 1.3.2, p. 31 ff.
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The relative importance of wheat shows in the fact that the provincial harvest on
• 11 ,average amounted to slightly more than 5 percent of the domestic production. This 
was the largest figure for any province, and production reached almost 500 percent of 
the internal consumption plus seeds.312 The large relative volume of production in 
Cuenca was mainly due to the extension of cultivated area rather than exceptional 
natural conditions or widespread modernisation. Most work was still done by hand 
and/or animals,313 and although the use of fertilisers had increased since the beginning 
of the century, it was still not widespread.314 In Table 6.3 we see that the amount of 
fertilisers used in the province during the early 1930s was sufficient to cover the needs 
of approximately 140,000 hectares of cereals according to contemporary 
recommendations. However, with the average area cultivated with wheat, barley, 
rye, and oats being some 435,000 hectares between 1931 and 1935,316 a substantial 
part of the land was either not fertilised, or fertilised less than recommended.
Table 6.3: Average yearly consumption of fertilisers in Cuenca, 1931-35.
Fertiliser Active ingre­ Main use on Maximum
dients (tons) covered area (Ha.)
Superphosphate 4051 (P20 5) Wheat, barley 90020
Ammonium sulphate 382 (N) Cereals 21746
Sodium nitrate 37 (N) Cereals 1904
Potassium sulphate 23 1 (K20 ) ? 9280
Potassium chloride 70 (K20) ? 2800
Compound fertilisers 873 (P20 5) Wheat, barley, 14896
90 (N), 65 (K20) market gardens
Total 140646
Sources: Ministerio de Fomento: Materias fertilizantes empleadas en la
Agricultura, pp. 65-67, and "Appendix D"; Ministerio de Agricultura:
Anuario Estadistico de las producciones agricolas (1931-35); Gallego
Martinez (1986), p. 224 - for amount of active ingredients in fertilisers.
Still, the increase in the use of fertiliser after 1900 had made it possible to bring 
marginal land in Central Spain into cultivation. The negative aspect of this 
development was that one sixth of the area cultivated with wheat in Central Spain in 
1936 was totally dependent on the use of fertilisers.317 It is likely that this was also the
311 Ministerio de Agricultural Anuario Estadistico de las Producciones Agricolas (1931-35).
3,2 Montojo Sureda (1945), p. 192. The specialisation in wheat contradicts Reher’s affirmation that the 
production was mainly for consumption within the province; Reher (1988), p. 41.
13 In the beginning of the 1930s, there were only 88 tractors, one traction engine, 118 stationary 
engines, 754 reapers and three harvesters in the province; Ministerio de Agricultural Anuario 
Estadistico de las Producciones Agricolas (1932); Ministerio de Agricultural “Tres estudios 
economicos”, pp. 71-77.
314 Ministerio de Fomento: Materias fertilizantes empleadas en la Agricultura, pp. 70-71.
315 The calculation of the “maximum covered area” in Table 6.3 rests on information from Ministerio de 
Fomento: Materias fertilizantes empleadas en la Agricultura, "Appendix C".
316 Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario Estadistico de las Producciones Agricolas (1931-35).
317 Simpson (1995), pp. 120-124.
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case in Cuenca. Here the Consejo Economico Sindical (the Economic Council of the 
Trade Unions) in the 1940s stressed that marginal land recently brought into use 
needed fertilisers to render any substantial yields.318 The consequence of the limited 
mechanisation and the sub-optimal use of fertilisers was that the yields for the 
majority of the most widespread crops - including wheat, rye, oats,<yai*s and olives - 
were below the national average.319
6.3: LITTLE PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION IN THE AGRARIAN SECTOR 
DURING THE CIVIL WAR
To analyse the post-war development of wheat production, it is necessary first to have 
a short look at the influence of the Civil War on the agrarian sector as such. During 
the Civil War, Cuenca was located in the republican rearguard, and as such hardly 
experienced any direct warfare. However, one side effect of the war, namely a decline 
in the number of work animals turned out to be a powerful constraint on the level of 
agrarian output in the 1940s. Consequently, the overall development in Cuenca was in 
line with the national trend that we found in Chapter 3. With the exception of the 
reduction in the number of work animals, the results confirm the general accepted 
interpretation in the historical literature, which states that the Civil War had led to 
limited damages in the agrarian sector.320
Sources show that a relatively optimistic outlook dominated the contemporary 
evaluation of the situation in the agrarian sector. For example, when the Diputacion 
Provincial (the Provincial Council) made a report in 1940 on war damages, they listed 
them as only:
(...) some 200 buildings in the village of Tarancon are destroyed, as well as 
approximately 100 in Salvacanete, Canete and Huelamo. Some are destroyed in 
Tragacete. Furthermore, almost all the churches in the province have been 
plundered and destroyed.321
318 See for example: Consejo Economico Sindical de Cuenca: Informe, dated 8th March 1946, p. 1, and 
Consejo Economico Sindical de Cuenca: Situacion actual de la agricultura, p. 2.
319 Barley was the only important crop where the yields were higher in Cuenca than the national 
average.
320 Barciela (1986b), pp. 384-385; M.-J. Gonzalez (1980), p. 90. For a detailed description of the 
arguments, see Section 1.3.1.
321 Diputacion Provincial de Cuenca: Ficha conteniendo los datos relativos a la situacion de la 
corporacion en el periodo de tiempo comprendido entre el 18 de julio de 1.936 y el 31 de diciembre de 
1.939, que se remite en cumplimiento de lo ordenado en la circular del Iltm2 senor Director General de 
Administracon Local de fecha 11 de marzo de 1.940, s.p. COu^
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This can hardly have constituted a major setback for the agrarian sector, and in 1940, 
the Civil Governor expressed the same opinion when he wrote:
During the war production suffered a considerable decrease, and its influence 
was still felt last year, although the harvest of potatoes, barley, oats, rye, carobs, 
vetch, lentils, and other articles, increased. Intensive campaigns (...), however, 
have given to sowing fields with such a high intensity (...) that, with just a small 
help from natural factors, the next harvest will be not only as good as in the 
years before 1936, but in quantities will more than double the normal pre-war 
harvest. This will especially be the case for chickpeas, potatoes, and green 
beans.322
Nevertheless, the Civil War had led to a major reduction of output for almost all 
crops, and recovering pre-war agrarian output levels turned out to be a very lengthy 
process.323 Starting with a short look at the main war related factors -  such as lack of 
care taking, wartime collectivisation in the agrarian sector, the demographic 
development, and the decline in the number of work animals - the analysis shows that 
of these only the decline in the number of work animals had lasting negative impact 
on agrarian output.
A thirty-five percent decline in the area cultivated with the main crops between 
1935 and 1940 was an important factor in determining the level of output immediately 
after the war, as can be seen in Table 6.4.324
Table 6. 4: Development of the area cultivated with the main crops in Cuenca, 1931-40.
(All figures in hectares)
Crops 1931-35 average 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940
cultivated area cultiv. area cultiv. area cultiv. area cultiv. area cultiv. area
Wheat 272017 265000 229755 N/A 165300 161530
Barley 67050 76000 65457 N/A 47200 35675
Rye 23620 24000 21017 N/A 18650 16845
Oats 71637 65000 19620 N/A 42800 47100
Olives v 33178 32793 32727 N/A 29087 31156
Grapes 55483 51555 51825 N/A 33697 33697
Leguminous^ 11521 12110 10041 N/A 5125 13893
Total 534506 526458 430442 N/A 341859 339896
1) The 1935 cultivated area. Grapes for wine production, and olives for oil production.
2) Includes lentils, vetch, chickpeas, beans, peas, and green beans.
Sources: Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario Estadistico de las Producciones Agricolas (1931-35,1939-40);
Ministerio de Agricultura: Estadistica de Cereales y Leguminosas (1936,1937); Ministerio de Agricultura: Estadistica
de la Produccidn Olivera (1936,1937); Ministerio de Agricultura: Estadistica de la Produccion Vitivinlcola (1936,1937).
322 Gobiemo Civil de Cuenca: Informe, pp. 4-5. COum- ‘VfO.u.sbAou^
323 The post-war development of output will be analysed in detail later in the chapter.
324 As discussed in Chapter 1 and Appendix 1, the official statistics are not totally reliable for these 
years. Although the largest problems relate to output data, the figures in Table 6.4 might still 
overestimate the post-war decline in cultivated area.
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Comparing the stability of the area cultivated with olives and the decline in the 
extension of grapes demonstrates that not all crops faired equally bad. Vines in 
Cuenca had already suffered from a phylloxera attack before the Civil War, but this 
was aggravated during the war due to lack of care taking.325 The result was such that 
in 1940 the Civil Governor estimated that it would take another 3-4 years to replace 
the affected vines.326
Nevertheless, although the lack of care taking was important in the case of 
grapes, this was a particular circumstance determined by the perennial nature of the 
crop. It can hardly have had a long-term effect on the yearly crops, where the 
production cycles are much shorter. However, the war produced other consequences 
that were detrimental for the recovery of the agrarian sector. One such factor that 
might have been important in the short run was collectivisation in agriculture. Its 
negative effect on agrarian output could originate both from post-war politically- 
motivated repression against former members of the collectives as well as insecurity 
about ownership of land and capital during and after the war.
Although the information is incomplete, the existence of approximately 100 
agrarian collectives in Cuenca at some time or another during the war seems to be a 
reasonable estimate.327 Although the collectivisation was less widespread in Cuenca 
than in some other provinces, it was still important with government-recognised 
collectives controlling 435,467 hectares, equalling 26 percent of the total exploited 
land between 1931 and 193 5.328 Yet, with most collectivised land located in La 
Alcarria and La Mancha, where relatively more land was cultivated than in La Sierra, 
the collectivisation probably affected a larger part of the cultivated area than this 
figure suggests. Still, the negative effects of collectivisation and de-collectivisation 
were short-term, lasting only until property rights to land and capital were restored 
after the war.
To deal specifically with this aspect, the insurrectionists created in 1938 the 
Servicio de Recuperation Agraria (the nAgrarian Recovery Service,' SRA). The 
purpose of the SRA was to solve problems in conquered territory related to doubts 
about ownership of land and capital, as well as to cultivate land temporarily where the
325 Delegation Sindical Provincial: Untitled report dated 23 September 1939. Note that in 1931, vines 
occupied more than 72,000 hectares in the province.
326 Gobiemo Civil de Cuenca: Informe, p. 5.
327 Based on local sources Rodrigo Gonzalez reached a figure of 107 collectives with the majority 
located in La Alcarria and La Mancha, while Carrion states that the Republican government legally 
recognised 102 collectives. See Rodrigo Gonzalez (1985), pp 94-97 and 106, and Carrion (1973), p. 
136.
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owner was absent.329 In Cuenca, the SRA was active in 111 of the 292 
municipalities,330 equalling more or less the number of collectives during the war. 
This figure fits with the fact that it was often the case that there was only one all- 
encompassing collective in each rural municipality. The dissolution of the SRA by the 
end of 1940 indicates that the insecurity about property rights was largely resolved 
shortly after the war’s conclusion.
Another factor that could have negatively affected agrarian output, but which is 
not reflected in contemporary reports, was the lack of labour due to deaths, exiles or 
imprisonment as a result of the Civil War and post-war repression. Nonetheless, 
census figures and the data on birth and death rates in fact indicate that there were 
only limited demographic changes in relation to the war in Cuenca.
According to the census, the provincial population increased by some 20,000 
persons between 1930 and 1940, though this figure is probably inflated. Moreover, 
while the Civil War led to changes in the relative number of deaths and births, both 
rates quickly returned to pre-war levels, as can be seen in Table 6.5. Taken together 
this signifies a very limited change in the number of males employed in agriculture, 
which went from 81,437 in 1930 to 80,186 in 1940.334 It is possible that the latter 
figure is too high, but it does not seem likely that there was a general lack of labour in 
the sector during the post-war period.
Table 6. 5: Births and deaths in the Province of Cuenca, 1930-42.
Years Births Deaths Births per
Total Per 1000 Total Per 1000 100 deaths
capitas capitas
1930 10500 34,80 5560 18,42 188,85
1931 10105 32,65 6310 20,38 160,14
1932 9759 31,25 5503 17,62 229,30
1933 10824 34,35 5329 16,91 196,98
1934 10038 31,57 5988 18,83 167,64
1935 9941 30,80 5648 17,50 176,01
1936 10181 31,38 5922 18,50 171,92
1937 10892 33,57 7075 21,80 153,95
1938 8661 26,69 7751 23,89 111,74
1939 5531 17,04 6585 20,29 83,00
1940 11705 34,57 5806 17,15 201,60
1941 7529 22,24 5878 17,36 128,10
1942 7471 24,41 4705 14,11 158,79
Source: Ministerio de Trabajo: Cuenca. Resefia estadistica 1943, p. 156.
328 Carrion (1973), p. 136.
329 Servicio de Recuperacion Agricola (1941).
330 Servicio de Recuperacion Agricola (1941), p. 51.
331 See Section 1.3.1, p. 31.
332 See Section 5.2.1, p. 123.
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Finally, and this turned out to be very important for agrarian production in the 1940s, 
the war caused a decline in the number of work animals. Mules and donkeys were the 
most affected species, with the growth in the number of cattle only being able to 
counteract this partially, as we see in Table 6.6.
Table 6. 6: Work animals in Cuenca, 1933-55.
Years Mules older Mules older Donkeys Horses Cattle
than 1 year than 3 year
1933 47991 45156 33511 3495 1509
1940 42396 41789 21303 1920 2092
1942 42688 41593 22897 2107 3417
1948 42297 N/A 21478 3610 5058
1950 41492 N/A 20118 3913 5200
1955 44748 N/A 23871 3865 1853
Sources: Ministerio de Agricultura: "Tres estudios econdmicos", pp. 71-78; Instituto
Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de Espana (1943,1944-45,1950,1958).
Substitution of cattle for mules was often difficult.335 This seems also to have been the 
case in Cuenca, where the number of cattle used as work animals was still only 
between 1,700 and 1,800 in the late 1940s, in spite of the lack of mules.336
Contemporary reports for 1939-40 from the local administration acknowledged 
the lack of work animals, fertilisers and land prepared for sowing. Nevertheless, the 
impression was not of a catastrophic situation, nor was it foreseen that it would be 
very difficult to regain pre-war levels of production. In 1940 the Diputacion 
Provincial wrote:
The long war-period that the province of Cuenca suffered under the control of 
the reds has produced important changes, disorder, and a decline in the 
production. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that it will not take long before 
Cuenca recovers its equilibrium as a livestock and agricultural province. As a 
result production will surpass the statistical data that are given here,338 which 
can be considered as the average between the abnormal decrease of these 
moments and the logical increase of the following years.
The Civil Governor echoed this optimistic note, when he wrote:
333 See Footnote 270 for the necessity to restrict the analysis to male employment.
334 Censo de la poblacion de Espana (1930, 1940).
335 See Section 3.3 for the constraints to substituting cattle for mules.
336 Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de Espana (1954).
337 Gobiemo Civil de Cuenca: Informe, p. 6.
338 I.e. in the report by the Deputacion Provincial, not those in Table 6.3.
339 P. 10 in untitled report enclosed: Diputacion Provincial de Cuenca: Ficha conteniendo los datos 
relativos a la situacion de la corporacion en el periodo de tiempo comprendido entre el 18 de julio de 
1.936 y el 31 de diciembre de 1.939, que se remite en cumplimiento de lo ordenado en la circular del 
Iltm2 seiior Director General de Administracon Local de fecha 11 de marzo de 1.940.
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(...) at the time of the liberation it was necessary to confront serious problems. 
These should be apparent for those who try to get an idea about the situation in 
which Cuenca was left by the reds, and the following development in the 
province.
The problems originated in the decrease of all classes of livestock during the 
Marxist period, as well as in the unfortunate sanitary conditions of the animals. 
Parallel to this340, the increase of livestock has been encouraged and in general, 
the villages have responded with enthusiasm to the calls that have been made for 
this purpose. The result is that in many places people abstain from eating meat 
to avoid sacrificing animals, so it is hoped that the losses suffered during the war 
will be more than compensated for in relatively short time.341
Summarising it can be said that the observations in the contemporary reports, which 
stressed the interruption of the production process rather than physical destruction, are 
largely confirmed by the data. It was therefore expected by the local authorities that 
the recovery of the pre-war output levels would be a short process. Yet, lack of work 
animals and artificial fertilisers was to hinder the process until the early 1950s.
6.4: THE DELAY IN THE POST-WAR RECOVERY OF AGRARIAN 
PRODUCTION
In the first ten years after the end of the Civil War, the production of the majority of 
crops was significantly below pre-war levels. Often this was the result of the 
simultaneous decline in the cultivated area and yields, as recorded in Table 6.7.342 
This means that while there was a partial process of substitution among the yearly 
crops, it was far from sufficient to explain on its own the development of the 
production of wheat. This issue is the main topic under consideration in this 
Chapter.343
Although the conditions for cereal cultivation improved somewhat both in 
Cuenca and at the national level after 1950, the recovery process was very lengthy in 
both cases (Table 6.8). In none of the four main cereals was there a stable restoration 
of the pre-war level of production, even as late as 25 years after 1939. This was the 
result of a much slower revival of the cultivated area than yields.
340 I.e. a campaign for the vaccination of livestock.
341 Gobiemo Civil de Cuenca: Informe, p. 4.
342 All data between 1939 and 1948 on the cultivated area, yields and production for wheat, barley rye 
and oats have been corrected for the influence of the black market; See Appendix 3, Sections 3.2 and 
3.3.
343 See Chapter 3 for the discussion of the process of substitution as a possible explanatory factor for 
the decline in wheat production at the national level.
154
Table 6.7: Output, yields, and area cultivated with the main crops in Cuenca, 1931-49.
Crops Output (100s of kilos) Cultivated area (Ha.)
1931-35 193949 Index of 193949 
average
1931-35 193949 Index of 193949 
average
average average (1931-35 average 
= 100.)
average average (1931-35 average 
= 100.)
Cereals
Wheat1' 2250575 1005282 45 272783 176045 65
Barley1' 1005904 518082 52 67653 39012 58
Rye 119507 102536 86 23620 26750 113
Oats 370700 193345 52 71637 34554 48
Subtotal N/A N/A N/A 435693 276361 63
Leguminous plants
Carob beans 7491 5097 68 1593 1107 70
Lentils 1739 22633 1302 346 5056 1460
Grass peas'1' 23114 18563 80 4144 5050 122
Vetch 41332 27714 67 7441 6102 82
Chickpeas 8682 20136 232 1802 6124 340
Beans'1' 1420 1005 71 328 271 83
Id. (irrigated land)*' 11165 6576 59 1314 1064 81
Subtotal N/A N/A N/A 16968 24773 146
Roots
Potatoes 352032 129219 37 6380 3632 57
Id. (irrigated land) 517421 147103 28 4497 2466 55
Subtotal 869453 276322 32 10877 6098 56
Perennial crops
Olives for oil
237445 86541 36 33877 27623 82productionJ'
Grapes for wine
876573 482962 55 63291 34742 55production4'
Subtotal N/A N/A N/A 97168 62365 64
Total N/A N/A N/A 560706 369598 66
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Table 6.7 (Cont.): Output, yields, and area cultivated with the main crops
in Cuenca, 1931-49.
Crops Yields (100s of kilos per hectare)
1931-35 1939-49 Index of 1939-49 average
average average (1931-35 average = 100.)
Cereals
Wheat1' 8.25 5.71 69
Barley1' 14.87 13.28 89
Rye 5.06 3.83 76
Oats 5.17 5.60 108
Subtotal N/A N/A N/A
Leguminous plants
Carob beans 4.70 4.60 98
Lentils 5.02 4.48 89
Grass peas*' 5.58 3.68 66
Vetch 5.55 4.54 82
Chickpeas 4.82 3.29 68
Beans*' 4.33 3.71 86
Id. (irrigated land)*' 8.50 6.18 73
Subtotal N/A N/A N/A
Roots
Potatoes 55.18 35.58 64
Id. (irrigated land) 115.05 59.65 52
Subtotal 79.94 45.31 57
Perennial crops
Olives for oil
7.01 3.13 45productionJ'
Grapes for wine
13.85 13.90 100production4'
Subtotal N/A N/A N/A
Total N/A N/A N/A
1) Includes an Insignificant amount of irrigated land in the data for the cultivated area.
2) Does not include data for 1941 and 1942.
3) Does not include data for 1943.
4) Does not include data for 1942.
Sources: Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario Estadistico de las producciones agricolas
(1931-35,1939-40,1943-49,1951); Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico
de Espaiia (1943).
Table 6.8: Year for the post-war recovery of the 1931-35 average of output, yields, and area cultivated with the
four main cereals inCuenca and Spain.
For output and yields the recovery is calculated as a the recovery of the 5-year moving average. In these cases the years in the table 
indicate the central year in such an average. The data are corrected for black market distortions between 1939 and 1949, according to
procedure described in Appendix 3.
Crops Output. Yields. Cultivated area.
Recovery of 1931/35 before 1962? Recovery of 1931/35 before 1962? Recovery of 1931/35 before 1964?
Cuenca Spain Cuenca Spain Cuenca Spain
Wheat1' No 1956-1957 only From 1961 From 1955 No No
Barley1' No No From 1952 From 1960 No No
Rye 1948-1956 only No From 1947 No 1948-1955 only 1941-1956 only
Oats No No From 1948 From 1959 No No
Total N/A N/A N/A N/A No No
1) Includes an insignificant amount of irrigated land.
Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de Espana (1943); Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario Estadistico de 
las Producciones Agricolas (1931-35,1939-40,1943-63); Ministerio de Agricultura: Resumen estadistico de las producciones 
agricolas (1950-51). ______________________
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Furthermore, it is significant that the recovery of the cultivated was slower in Cuenca 
than in Spain as a whole. In Cuenca, the total area cultivated with the four main 
cereals between 1953 and 1961 was around 72 percent of the pre-war average. For the 
whole of the country, the similar figure was 90 percent of the pre-war level from 1951 
onwards.344 In Chapter 3, we argued that the national post-war level of wheat 
production was the outcome of a shift of the supply curve to the left. The following 
analysis of the process of crop substitution, the stock of capital goods, the availability 
of fertilisers, and the weather conditions in Cuenca lends support to this interpretation.
6.4.1: The Area Cultivatred with Wheat and Changes in Total Land Use
In the historical literature, it has been argued that one reason for the decline in wheat 
output in the 1940s was that changes in relative prices made it more profitable to use 
land for other purposes than wheat cultivation.345 However, this interpretation was 
criticised in Chapter 3 on the ground that most land taken out of cultivation was left 
fallow rather than used for other crops or animal husbandry.346 The same pattern 
appears in Cuenca, where only a minor part of the land that was taken out of 
cultivation in 1940s went to sheep grazing, while the rest was mostly left unused.
Among the four main cereals in Cuenca, rye was the only crop that at any time 
occupied more land between 1939 and 1964 than from 1931 to 1935. Since this was 
not even a permanent phenomenon, but only happened between 1948 and 1956, the 
main reason for the decline in wheat output in the 1940s can neither be found here or 
in any other large-scale crop substitution. The upper part of Table 6.9 shows an 
increase in the relative importance of the perennial crops and leguminous plants. 
However, the lower part of the table shows that it was not before the beginning of the 
1950s that this increase was mirrored in an absolute increase in the cultivated area. 
This was so because the belated recovery of the cultivated area after 1939, more than 
counteracted the relative changes in land use.
344 Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de Espana (1943), Ministerio de Agricultura: 
Anuario Estadistico de las Producciones Agricolas (1931-35, 1939-40, 1943-63), Ministerio de 
Agricultura: Resumen estadistico de las producciones agricolas (1950-1951).
34 See Section 1.3.2, p. 33.
346 See Section 3.2.
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Table 6.9: Changes in land use in Cuenca, 1931-62.
Panel A: Distribution of land use in Cuenca (1931-62). All figures are percent of total cultivated land in each 5-year period (Column 8).
Years
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Wheat Other cereals Leguminous Graces Olives1) Others Non cereal Cultivated total Meadows, pastures Fallow land
plants Total
(3+4+5+6)
(1+2+3+4+5+6) scrubland and wood
1931-1935 46 31 3 9*' 6 5 23 100 123 57
1939 42 30 2 10 10 7 28 100 229 52
1943-1947 40 27 7 11 9 5 32 100 23 2a’ 51
1948-1952 43 26 5 13 9 4 30 100 228 46
1953-1957 44 25 4 14 10 4 31 100 180 N/A
1958-1962 42 22 5 16 10 5 36 100 157 N/A
Panel B: Distribution of land use in Cuenca (1931-62). All figures are percent of average total cultivated land 1931-35. (Row 1, Column 8)
Years
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Wheat Other cereals Leguminous 6<upes11 Olives1’ Others Non cereal Cultivated total Meadows, pastures Fallow land
plants total (3+4+5+6) (1+2+3+4+5+6) scrubland and wood
1931-1935 46 31 3 9*’ 6 5 23 100 123 57
1939 29 21 2 7 7 5 20 70 159 36
1943-1947 29 19 5 8 7 3 23 71 165 36
1948-1952 33 20 4 10 7 3 23 76 175 35
1953-1957 36 20 3 11 8 3 25 81 146 N/A
1958-1962 36 19 4 14 8 5 31 86 135 N/A
1) Including non-productive land. 2) Data for 1935 only.
3) Does not include data for 1944, which are inconsistent with the rest of the series. The figure for 1944 is substantially lower than the rest of the years, without being
counterbalanced by an increase in land used for any other purpose.
Sources: Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario Estadistico de las producciones agricolas (1931-35,1939,1943-62). Ministerio de Agricultura: Resumen estadistico
de las producciones agricolas (1954-55).
Consequently, in the 1940s land previously used for cereals was taken out of 
cultivation altogether and classified instead as “meadows, pastures, scrubland and 
wood”, and, within this category, mostly as “non-permanently uncultivated land” or 
“permanently uncultivated land”.347 The only other significant change in land use in 
the 1940s, which fell under the general heading of “meadows, pastures, scrubland and 
wood”, was a 55,000 hectares expansion of “scrubland with pasture”. This was 
reflected in a 23 percent growth in the number of adult sheep between 1933 and 1955, 
which followed the national trend of an increase in the number of sheep.348 Given that 
the cultivated area declined by more than 100,000 hectares after the war, the 
expansion of sheep breeding is insufficient to explain this decrease.
The smaller extension of cultivated land in post-war Cuenca could either be the 
result of voluntary decisions by farmers due to a deterioration of the profitability of 
farming, or the outcome of external constraints on production. While the first is the 
standard interpretation in the historical literature,349 the evidence in Chapter 3 pointed 
towards the second explanation at the national level.
6.4.2: The Shortage of Capital Goods
The analysis of the relationship between changes in land use and changes in the 
capital stock of the agrarian sector between 1939 and 1962 can be limited to a few 
factors.350 Mechanisation was practically non-existent before the Civil War and this 
continued well into the 1950s.351 Work animals were therefore a very important 
element of capital in the sector. It is therefore hardly surprising that the lack of work 
animals turned out to be an important constraint on the post-war production of wheat.
In Cuenca, mules were the most widely used animals in the agrarian sector, 
followed by donkeys. Neither cattle nor horses were employed with great
347 “Meadows, pastures, scrubland and wood” occupied on average 724,898 hectares in 1931-35. After 
the war the average figure grew to 967,928 hectares in 1943-47 and 1,026,610 hectares in 1948-52, 
before it declined again to 856,798 hectares in 1953-57 and 792,897 hectares in 1958-62; Ministerio de 
Agricultura: Anuario Estadistico de las Producciones Agricolas (1931-35, 1939-40, 1943-62).
348 The number of sheep in Cuenca went from 455,797 to 561,944 between these two years. Ministerio 
de Agricultura: Anuario Estadistico de las Producciones Agricolas (1931-35, 1939-40, 1943-62); 
Ministerio de Agricultura: “Tres estudios economicos”; Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario 
Estadistico de Espana (1958).
349 See Section 1.3.2, p. 33.
350 We have extended the analysis until 1962 because this was the year of the first agrarian census, 
which facilitates much more detailed information on capital stock than the annual statistics.
351 See Footnote 313, p. 148 for the pre-war figures. The number of tractors in the province was 163 in 
1950, 615 in 1956 and 2,595 in 1962. Consejo Economico Sindical de la Provincia de Cuenca: 
Perspectivas de desarrollo economico de la provincia de Cuenca (en los proximos cinco anos), pp. 27- 
28. Ministerio de Agricultura: Censo Agrario 1962, p. 19.
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frequency.352 The largest absolute decline among the work animals in the province 
was found among donkeys, but the authorities gave less attention to this problem than 
to the decline of mules. This was connected with the much smaller workload that 
could be carried out by donkeys, as well as the fact that donkeys were used for 
transport rather than fieldwork.
The analysis in Section 3.3 has shown that at the national level it was difficult to 
recover the pre-war number of mules due to a combination of the international 
situation and the characteristics of the Spanish stock of breeding animals. The 
consistently low number of work animals in Cuenca in the 1940s suggests that these 
factors were also external constraints for the individual farmer in Cuenca.354 Various 
sources confirm this interpretation.
In 1946, the Consejo Economico Sindical in Cuenca reported that black market 
prices for medium-quality mules were around twice the price in the official market for 
the best quality animals.355 This phenomenon was apparently not restricted to Cuenca, 
since in the neighbouring province of Ciudad Real, the price for one mule went up to 
20,000.356 The situation remained the same during the following year, when the 
Consejo Economico Sindical in Cuenca said that prices were 50 to 150 percent higher
yen
than the legal maximum price for the best quality animals.
For the farmers, the price of mules relative to what they received for their 
production was probably significant for the decision about whether to invest in more 
animals. The pre-war price of a mule was roughly the same as £ metric tons of
k o
wheat, and by 1946 this amount of grain was worth 9,050 pesetas at official prices. 
Although this was fairly close to the official maximum price of 10,000 pesetas per 
animal between 1942 and 1947, it was well below the prices in the black market. 
However, it is also necessary to take black market earnings from sales of wheat into 
account. Barciela and Garcia Gonzalez estimated that the average black market price
352 Out of the almost 30,000 pairs of work animals registered in the province in 1948, 932 were cattle, 
868 horses, 19,697 mules and 8,194 donkeys; Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de 
Espana (1950).
353 The work force of a donkey was approximately 60 percent of that of a mule; Estebanez Alvarez 
(1974), p. 274.
354 See Table 6.6.
355 Consejo Economico Sindical de Cuenca: Informe, dated 22nd May, 1946, s.p..
356 Naranjo (1946), p. 1498. The official price was 10,000 pesetas.
357 Consejo Economico Sindical de Cuenca: Situacion actual de la agricultura, September 23rd 1947, 
s.p.. This is also comparable to the price of 60,000 pesetas for a couple of mules, which was reported in 
a meeting of the Junta Superior de Precios; Junta Superior de Precios: Acta de la reunion celebrada el 
dia 7-5-47.
358 Naranjo (1946), p. 1498.
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for wheat was about 250 percent of the official price in the 1940s.359 In the mid 1940s, 
the farmers would have to sell approximately 70 percent of his marketable production 
in the black market to maintain the same relative price of mules to wheat as in the 
1930s.
Selling 70 percent of the marketable part of production might not be 
impossible, but it was more than the national average, which oscillated around 50 
percent in the 1940s. However, black market activity involved the risk of extra costs 
in the form of fines, confiscation and bribes. Therefore it does not seem likely that all 
farmers could buy mules at the same relative price to wheat as before the war. The 
size of the relative price increase would vary according to yearly price oscillations in 
the black market price for the two commodities.
In any case, the buying of a mule would be an important investment. In the mid- 
1940s, the official mule price of 10,000 pesetas would equal the gross value of 
production of a small farm or some two-thirds of that of a family farm.360 In a place 
like Cuenca, where minor farms were widespread, the uncertainty of the rentability of 
such an investment due to the distortions in the market for agrarian production made 
the farmers economically vulnerable.
The influence of the decline in work animals on the cultivated area is difficult to 
quantify exactly due to heterogeneous statistical information from the pre-war and 
post-war years. The main problem is the absence of information from the 1930s on the 
number of donkeys for fieldwork. The data in Table 6.10 show that in the 1940s each 
“mule equivalent” tilled approximately 8.5 - 9 hectares. This fits very well with pre- 
war information that states that two mules were required to exploit a farm of 30 
hectares cultivated according to the traditional system of ano y  vez.
359 Barciela and Garcia Gonzalez (1983), p. 94.
360 Organization Sindical de Cuenca: Datos Estadisticos. Data are in Table 5.10. In the source the 
division between “small farms” and family farms” is based on average value of production. The 
distinction is that a “family farm” generates sufficient income to sustain a family, while this is not the 
case for a “small farm”.
361 In Table 6.10 a standardised team of work animals has been set to two mules.
362 Ministerio de Agricultura: “Tres estudios economicos”, p. 57. Cultivating A no y  vez is using half of 
the land for cereals, a minor part for leguminous plants, and letting the rest lying fallow. Table 6.10 
shows an relatively strong increase in the number of mule equivalents between 1940 and 1942, which 
was not reflected in a similar increase in the total number of work animals in Table 6.6. There appears 
to be two possible reasons for this paradox. The first is that relatively more animals were used for 
transport in 1940 than in the following years, due to destruction of capital in the transport sector during 
the Civil War. The second possible reason is that the statistics on mule equivalents employed in 
agriculture is deficient for 1940. It is not possible to decide which of the two reasons are correct. Yet, 
this is a minor problem given the homogeneity of the data for the rest of the years, as well as the 
consistency of the 1942-50 figures with pre-war information on a normal workload for a mule.
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Table 6.10: Number of "mule equivalents" employed in the agrarian sector in Cuenca and their 
work load per year in hectares, 1940-50.
Years Teams of mules Teams of donkeys Teams of horses Teams of cattle
1940 16750 5370 120 124
1942 ^ 20048 8350 303 267
1948 19697 8194 932 868
1950 18930 7764 1023 846
Years Total number of mule Total cultivated area Hectares per mule
equivalents v (hectares) equivalent
1940 40345 413693 10,3
1942 4 51069 429367 8,4
1948 52219 421614 8,1
1950 50323 464098 9,2
1) A "mule equivalent" is a mule or a horse. Donkeys and cattle are supposed to be able to
carry out, respectively, 40% and 35% less work.
2) The cultivated area is for 1943 given insufficient data on the productive area with vine and
olives for 1942.
Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de Espafia (1943-45,1950,1952);
Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario Estadistico de las producciones agricolas (1940,1948,1950).
The question now is whether the workload per mule equivalent was higher or lower 
after the war than before. The analysis shows that there does not appear to have been a 
widespread under-exploitation of the work animals in the 1940s.
Since the percentage of the total cultivated area occupied by yearly crops was 
relatively stable before and after the war, it can be assumed that the need for mule 
equivalents per hectare was also stable.363 If the same amount of land had been tilled 
by each mule equivalent in 1933 as the 1942-50 average, then the 609,505 hectares 
under cultivation in 1933 would have been tilled by the equivalent of approximately 
71,000 mules. The figures on the number of animals in the province in 1933 in Table 
6.6 suggest that such a number was not available. When calculated on the basis of the 
adult animals, there were only some 69,738 mule equivalents in the province in 
1933.364 Out of those, some of the cattle, donkeys and horses were probably used for 
transport rather than as work animals. In other words, the larger the amount of horses, 
cattle and donkeys that were used for non-tilling purposes in 1933, the larger the 
decline in the amount of land worked per mule equivalent after the Civil War.
It is not possible to determine the number of horses, cattle, and donkeys that 
were not used for tilling the land in 1933. However, the data for the 1940s show that it 
does not appear to have been more than 20 percent of horses and donkeys, but some 
65 percent of the cattle. If the same was the case in 1933, each mule equivalent
363 This can be calculated from Table 6.9. The yearly crops occupied 82 percent of the cultivated area 
between 1931 and 1935, 80 percent between 1940 and 1947 and 78 percent between 1948 and 1952.
364 I.e. the number of mules older than three years and the total number of other animals from Table 6.6.
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worked some 10 percent more land than the average between 1942 and 1950. Given 
that the average age of the work animals was higher in the 1940s than before the 
war,365 which would reduce the average work potential per animal, a minor increase in 
the mule equivalents per hectare was expectable.
Based on the available evidence it cannot be denied that up to 10 percent more 
land was potentially cultivable with the available stock of animals between 1940 and 
1950. However, beyond this potential 10 percent expansion, the number of work 
animals set a limit on the amount of land, which could be cultivated in the 1940s. 
Even if the land could be exploited to its full potential, it would have been totally 
insufficient to restore the pre-war situation since the total cultivated area was 
approximately 30 percent smaller in the 1940s than between 1931 and 1935.
After 1950, there was an increase in the amount of land under cultivation, the
'7(L(L
number of work animals and - finally in the late 1960s - the number of tractors. The 
importance of the number of tractors on the amount of cultivable land is further 
increased by the fact that these were mainly found on the larger farms, as can be seen 
in Table 6.11.367 This means that at the beginning of the 1960s the larger farmers had 
begun the process of substituting tractors for work animals, but most farmers with less 
than 50 hectares still depended on work animals. It would be interesting to know 
whether it was small-scale or large-scale farmers who were able to expand the 
cultivated area after 1950, but unfortunately the necessary data do not exist before 
1962.
Table 6.11: Distribution of exploitations, cultivated area, mule equivalents and tractors in 
Cuenca, 1962.
Size of exploitation Exploitations Cultivated area Mule equivalents Tractors
(%) (%) (%) (%)
<1 ha. 14,28 0,55 2,60 0,12
1 -<10 ha. 42,46 13,47 22,45 1,43
1 -<50 ha. 36,51 50,30 58,28 20,39
50-<100 ha. 4,01 13,72 9,31 25,28
100 -> ha. 2,74 21,95 7,36 52,79
Source: Ministerio de Agricultura: CensoAgrario 1962.
In Table 6.9 we saw that during the 1950s there was a downward trend in the relative 
importance of the land dedicated to yearly crops and a simultaneous upward trend in
365 Consejo Economico Sindical: Informe, dated 8th March 1946, p. 1.
366 See Tables 6.5 and 6.8.
367 This distribution of the tractors corresponds rather neatly to a contemporary estimation that some 75- 
100 hectares, used for a combination of cultivation and livestock, were necessary to make the 
investment in a tractor profitable. Consejo Econonomico Sindical de la Provincia de Cuenca:
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the land reserved for olives and grapes.368 Furthermore, back in Table 5.7, we saw that 
small-scale farmers used a relatively larger part of their land for perennial crops than 
large-scale farmers, who, on the other hand dedicated a relatively larger part of this 
land to cereals.
In general, the cultivation of cereals lends itself much easier to mechanisation 
than olives and grapes. Although the introduction of tractors was a phenomenon that 
only appeared at the end of the 1950s, other types of mechanisation had been possible 
before that. By 1962, this had mainly taken place on farms larger than 50 hectares, 
especially in the cases of machinery, which substituted traditional labour intensive
1 /T Q
works connected with the harvesting of grains.
In other words, large-scale farmers used their comparative advantage to 
mechanise cereal cultivation and, consequently, used a larger part of their land for 
these crops. On the other hand, the small-scale farmers had an advantage regarding the 
access to non-paid family labour and, subsequently, were more prone to use their land 
for the cultivation of grapes and olives. This process was reflected in the decline of the 
relative number of farm workers to farmers because of post-war emigration. It 
therefore seems likely that a large part of the expansion of the cultivated area in the 
1950s took place on the larger farms, because they had the financial ability to carry 
out a mechanisation process.
6.4.3: The Post-war Decline in the Availability o f Fertilisers and its Effect on Wheat 
Production
Chapter 3 described that the availability of chemical fertilisers, especially nitrogenous 
ones, decreased significantly in Spain after the Civil War. This was due to the 
interruption of international trade, the lack of sufficient domestic production capacity, 
and the absence of essential raw materials. Furthermore, the analysis showed that at 
the national level this was a very important factor in the decline in wheat output in the
Perspectivas de desarrollo economico de la provincia de Cuenca (en los proximos cinco anos), pp. 24- 
25.
368 Vines and olives occupied 18 percent of the total cultivated area in 1931-35, 20 percent in 1940-47, 
22 percent in 1948-52, 23 percent in 1953-57, and 26 percent in 1958-62 (Table 6.9).
369 In Cuenca in 1962, farms with more than 50 hectares constituted 6,75 percent of the total farms and 
cultivated 38,71 percent of the area cultivated with wheat. However, they possessed 73 percent of the 
animal drawn reapers, 94 percent of the tractor drawn or self-moving reapers, 64 percent o f the 
threshing machines and 66 percent of the bailing machines -  Ministerio de Agricultura: Censo Agrario 
1962.
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post-war years. This pattern was also true in Cuenca: the steep fall in the availability 
of fertilisers had a strong negative influence on wheat production.
The only systematic data for the use of fertilisers in Cuenca in the decade 
following the Civil War cover the years from 1939 to 1942 (Table 6.12).
Table 6.12: Consumption of fertilisers measured in P2OS, N and K20  per area cultivated with 
cereals in Cuenca in 1931-35 and 1939-42.
Active
Ingredients
Consumption of active Consumption per hectare
ingredients (Tons) cereals (kilos)
1931-35 1939-42 1931-35 1939-421'
P2O5 4924 165 10,8 0,6
N 509 15 1,1 0,1
K20 366 28 0,8 0,1
1) 1939-49 average area cultivated with cereals.
Sources: Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario Estadistico de las
Producciones Agricolas (1939-40): Insituto Nacional de Estadistica:
Anuario Estadistico de Espafia (1943-44); Tables 6.3 and 6.7.
Even after taking into account the simultaneous decrease in the area cultivated with 
cereals, which was where fertilisers were mainly used, the post-war situation can only 
be described as a fall into the abyss. In fact, even allowing for the general decline in 
the availability of fertilisers, the conditions in Cuenca between 1939 and 1942 were 
far worse than the national average.
It is not possible to say whether this situation continued throughout the 1940s, 
but there are some indications that this was the case. Firstly, between November 1944 
and August 1952 the CGAT distributed fertilisers, which, compared to the pre-war
'xn 1situation, favoured regions producing citrus fruits. Second, local data from the 
Organization Sindical (the official trade union) on the 1945 harvest noted the 
persistence of the problem. In fact, although the distribution of fertilisers was 
liberalised in 1952, the pre-war level of fertilising was not reached in Cuenca before
370 The situation in Cuenca was shared with that of some other provinces in Central Spain. For example, 
in Guadalajara, the consumption of superphosphate in 1940-41 was close to 10 percent o f the pre-war 
level, in Toledo it was 3 percent and in Almeria it was approximately 18 percent. On the other hand, the 
consumption of superphosphate was 104 percent of the pre-war level in Alicante, while Caceres it was 
129 percent in 1940 and 184 percent in 1941. The national average was 59 percent in both years; 
Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario Estadistico de las producciones Agricolas (1931-35, 1940); 
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de Espana (1943).
371 Alimentacion Nacional, vol. 38, November 1944, pp. 14 and 28, and vol. 221, August 1952, p. 23. 
The prices continued to be regulated until the late 1950s.
372 Apparently only 110 tons of superphosphate - equalling some 20 tons of P20 5 - were made available 
for the 1945 harvest; Consejo Economico Sindical de Cuenca: Informe, dated 1st May 1946. The 
contrast with the Government estimation from 1948 that 50,000 tons superphosphate - equalling some 
9,000 tons of P20 5 -  were needed, can hardly be bigger; Presidencia del Gobiemo, Secretaria General 
para la Ordenacion Economico-Social: Programa de necesidades de la Provincia de Cuenca, pp. 12-13.
166
the mid-1950s. The consequence was that a significantly smaller area could be 
fertilised after the war than before in both absolute and in relative terms. The 
disproportionate decrease in the use of fertilisers in Cuenca and various other 
provinces in Central Spain throughout the 1940s was clearly at odds with that the 
officially pronounced aim of the Government was to maximise wheat output.
According to a report from the Ministry of Agriculture in 1921, the introduction 
of non-organic fertilisers on previously non-fertilised dry land used for cereals in 
Cuenca would result in an increase in yields of roughly 45 percent.374 The exact 
increase would depend on the combination of fertilisers and manure, but it is possible 
to calculate an estimate of the decline in yields because of the post-war lack of 
fertilisers. According to Table 6.3, a total of 140,646 hectares could be fertilised 
before the war if  only one type of fertiliser was used at a time, while this was reduced 
to 5,716 hectares after the war. Before 1936 fertilisers were used mainly for wheat 
and barley, and the 140,646 hectares of land that could fertilised equalled 41.3 percent 
of the pre-war cultivated area with those two crops. In contrast to this, the 5,716 
hectares of land that could be fertilised after the war equalled just 2.7 percent of the 
cultivated area with wheat and barley between 1939 and 1942.
Setting the average yields of non-fertilised land to 1.0 and the yields on 
fertilised land to 1.45, ceteris paribus the average pre-war yields were then:
0.59*1 +0.41*1.45 = 1.19 
and the correspondent post-war yields:
0.97*1 +0.03*1.45 = 1.01
equalling a decrease of 15 percent.
This goes some way to explain the counter-intuitive coincidence that we saw in 
Table 6.8 of the post-war decline in the cultivated area and the yields for wheat and
373 Estebanez Alvarez: (1974), p. 264. This was slower than for the whole of Spain, where, as shown in 
Chapter 4, the use of nitrogenous and phosphoric fertilisers reached pre-war levels in 1950/51.
374 Ministerio de Agricultura: Materias fertilizantes empleads en la Agricultura, pp. 71-72.
375 Since nitrogenous and phosphate fertilisers are complimentary, the use of more than fertiliser at the 
same land would increase the effect on yields, but the total fertilisable area would be smaller. However, 
given the predominance of the use of superphosphate, complimentary use of different fertilisers could 
only affect a minor part of the land, and we can safely ignore this in the calculation of average yields.
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barley in the 1940s and for wheat in the 1950s.376 However, it still leaves an 
unexplained decrease in the yields of a roughly similar magnitude.
Concerning the use of fertilisers according to farm size, no data are available 
before 1962, but some useful insights can still be gained.377 Although the information 
in Table 6.13 shows that not all cultivated land was fertilised378 and that the amount of
*570
fertiliser used was still below the optimum level, at least it exceeded pre-war levels. 
Furthermore, there was a positive correlation between farm size and the intensity of 
fertiliser use. The difference in the relative use of fertilisers might have been the 
outcome of small-scale farmers having less access to credit, and difficulties in being 
supplied when the only boughfsmall amount of fertilisers at a time.
Table 6.13: Relative distribution of fertilised land according to farm  size in Cuenca, 1962.
Farm size Fertilised land Fertilised land as
(Ha.) percent of total
cultivated land.
<1 ha. 1028 35,0
1 - <10 ha. 27522 38,4
10 -<50  ha. 119599 44,7
50 -<100 ha. 38340 52,5
100 -> ha. 77342 66,2
Total 263831 49,6
Source: Ministerio de Agricultura: Censo Agrario 1962.
Together with the increase in the use of chemical fertilisers in the late 1950s, there had 
been a change in the composition of the fertilisers that were used. While the relative 
use of phosphoric fertilisers had declined, there had been a relative as well as absolute 
increase in the use of nitrogenous, potasio and compound fertilisers. This was a 
qualitative improvement compared to the 1930s, when phosphoric fertilisers 
dominated.380
376 In a situation where the farmers diminished the cultivated area, we would expect that it was the least 
fertile land that first was taken out of cultivation, with the result that yields per hectare should have 
increased.
377 As was the case with machinery, no statistics exist on a provincial level for the use of chemical 
fertilisers between the early 1940s and 1962. However, at the national level, a big leap forward in the 
use of nitrogenous fertilisers did not take place until the late 1950s. Then the use of N increased by 112 
percent between 1956 and 1962. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de Espana 
(1963).
378 Note that these data include land fertilised with both chemical and organic fertilisers. Due to double 
counting, the sum of the amount of land fertilised with each of the different types of fertilisers exceeds 
the total fertilised land by 43 percent. Consequently, the data on the fertilised area are not easy to 
compare with the pre-war figures in Table 6.3, where manure was not taken into consideration.
379 In 1962, 25 kilos of P20 5, 17 kilos of N and 11 kilos of K20 were used on each fertilised hectare of 
land. This is below the optimum level, and at the same time still leaves a part of the cultivated land 
unfertilised. However, this is of less interest to us as our main concern is the comparison with the 
situation in the 1930s and 1940s.
380 See Table 6.3.
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Since the yields of wheat took much longer to reach pre-war level than those of 
barley, the decline and later recovery of the use of artificial fertilisers appears to have 
affected mainly wheat. Furthermore, the effect was on a magnitude that was more than 
sufficient to counteract the expected increase in average yields that would result from 
taking marginal land out of production. The approximately 210,000 hectares of wheat 
cultivated around 1960 was some 77 percent of the 1931-35 average. In spite of this, 
the first time yields of wheat in Cuenca exceeded the pre-war average was in 1957, 
with the second time being in 1960. This performance was below the national average, 
given that the national yields reached pre-war levels by the mid-1950s.381
It appears likely that the slow recovery of the yields of wheat was related to the 
fact that small-scale farmers used less artificial fertilisers then the large-scale farmers 
did and that the former constituted the predominant group in the province.
6.4.4: The Normality of the Weather Conditions
A final point to consider is the weather conditions in the 1940s. It was an argument 
favoured by the Franco regime that the frequent draughts during these years had been 
especially unfavourable to agrarian production. This explanation has been generally 
rejected in the historical literature.382 In the specific case of Cuenca, it is difficult to 
argue that there was much difference between the weather conditions of the 1940s and 
the 1950s. Still, it appears that wheat was more dependent on optimal weather 
conditions than barley, rye and oats.
In 1946, an internal report by the Organizacion Sindical in Cuenca argued that 
the lack of precipitation was a general problem for the agrarian sector.383 However, 
the data do not suggest that the 1940s were a decade of particular shortages of rainfall 
in the province. The average yearly precipitation of 522 mm between 1941 and 1949 
was exactly the same as the 1901-30 average and just some six percent less than the 
1950-60 average.384 However, average figures and even yearly figures are both rather 
rough indicators. The average figures are problematic because the yearly variations
381 Calculated as a 5 years moving average the pre-war average yields of wheat were only exceeded in 
1961 in Cuenca, while this happened already in 1955 for the national aggregate.
382 See Section 1.3.1, p. 30 ff.
383 Consejo Economico Sindical de Cuenca: Informe, dated 1st May 1946, p. 1.
384 Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de Espana (1943-50). There is no data for 
1939 and 1940.
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were quite important.385 The difficulty with the yearly figures is that they are also too 
general, as an example from the neighbouring provinces of Albacete and Ciudad Real 
shows. Fernandez Garcia calculated the co-variation between annual precipitation and 
yields of wheat as 0.1 for Albacete, and as -0.1 for Ciudad Real. This lack of a relation 
between precipitation and yields does not appear to be a robust result.
Seasonal rainfall, with the crop year divided in four parts - sowing (September 
to November), hibernation (December to February), growing (March-May), and 
ripening (June-August) - turns out to be a more accurate indicator. The lower part of 
Table 6.14 shows a positive correlation between the percentage of yearly precipitation 
falling between March and May and the yields of wheat in the 1950-60 period. At the 
same time, there is a negative but weaker correlation between yields and the 
percentage of yearly precipitation in the three other periods.387
Table 6.14: Seasonal distribution of rainfall in Cuenca, 1901-60, and correlation between 
seasonal rainfall and yields of wheat in Cuenca, 1943-60.
Distribution of rainfall
Part of yearly 
precipitation
Part of yearly 
precipitation
Part of yearly 
precipitation
Part of yearly 
precipitation
(Sept.-Nov.) (Dec.-Feb.) (March-May) (June-Aug.)
(Percent) (Percent) (Percent) (Percent)
1901-30 average 28 25 33 15
1943-49 average1' 23 24 37 16
1950-60 average 25 26 31 19
194V49 standard 
deviation
b q \x> 9
1950-60 standard 
deviation
12 10 10 6
Correlation 
coefficient between
Part of yearly 
precipitation
Part of yearly 
precipitation
Part of yearly 
precipitation
Part of yearly 
precipitation
yields of wheat and 
seasonal
(Sept.-Nov.) (Dec.-Feb.) (March-May) (June-Aug.)
precipitation 1950-60 -0,03 -0,25 0,42 -0,17
1) Does not include 1944 and 1945 for lack of data.
Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de Espafla (1943-60); Ministerio de Agricultura: 
Anuario Estadistico de las Producciones Agricolas (1943-53).
This more refined measure makes it relevant to compare the percentage of the yearly 
precipitation in each season between 1901 and 1930, with the averages for 1943-49 
and 1950-60. However, the conclusions that can be drawn are somewhat hampered by
385 The minimum precipitation was 356.5 mm in 1944 and the maximum 890.1 mm in 1947. There is no 
yearly data for 1901-30.
86 Fernandez Garcia (1988), pp. 76-77. The problem can also be illustrated with an example from 
Cuenca. The total precipitation for 1946 and 1948 was respectively 514.5 mm and 521.5 mm, which is 
very close to the average for the decade of 522 mm. In spite of this, the yields of wheat were 994 
kilos/hectare in 1946 but only 457 kilos/hectare in 1948. The crucial difference was that in 1946, 57 
percent of the precipitation fell between March and May, while in 1948, only 29 percent of the 
precipitation fell in the same months.
170
the fact that the data for 1944 and 1945 are incomplete, so few observations can be 
made for the 1940s as a whole. Furthermore, the exceptional dry 1945 harvest cannot 
be included, which might affect the figures on average distribution o f precipitation 
between 1943 and 1949. It is therefore at best illustrative that the precipitation levels 
in the 1940s during the important March-May period seem to have been more 
favourable for the crops than in the 1950s (Top part o f  Table 6.14.)
Taking into account that the average figures might hide greater variations in the 
1940s than in other periods, the standard deviation for the percentage o f the yearly 
rainfall that falls in each season has been included. Again, the figures for the 1940s 
are problematic for the absence o f data for 1944 and 1945, but again the results do not 
show a large difference between the different periods. Consequently, the weather 
conditions do not appear to have been detrimental to the level o f  wheat production in 
Cuenca in the 1940s.
6.5: THE DEFICIENCIES OF THE SYSTEM OF INTERVENTION, AND THE 
RISKS INVOLVED IN BLACK MARKET ACTIVITY
The effects o f the price policy and the simultaneous development o f  factors such as 
the availability o f  work animalsv'iertilisers cannot be analysed adequately, without 
taking into consideration the day to day working o f the intervention system. This is 
because a large number o f farmers, consumers and administrators inside the system 
tried with some success to circumvent the control system for their own economic 
benefit. The following analysis shows that the variety o f as well as scope for illegal 
activities in this field was substantial. This is an important argument against the 
interpretation which says that the official price policy was the main reason behind the 
t<v4of production o f  wheat. The conclusions on the effects o f  the price policy 
will have to include the range o f possibilities that were open to the different actors to 
avoid various parts o f the intervention system.
6.5.1: Flaws in the System o f Intervention
As explained in Chapter 1, intervention rested on a system o f production quotas. 
These were centrally assigned to each province, and within those, the farmers were
387 Fernandez Garcia also looked for a relationship between absolute precipitation between December 
and March and yields of wheat, and found a correlation coefficient o f 0.5 in Albacete, but it was 0.0 in
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then given their individual quotas.388 In some years the provincial office of the SNT 
assigned the quotas directly to the larger farmers, while for the small-scale farmers the 
quota went through an intermediate level, with the assignation of a production quota 
to each village. It was then the Junta Agricola in each municipality that took the 
decision about the distribution among the farmers.
The quotas were the minimum requirements that the farmers had to sell to the 
SNT, and the farmers were normally fined if they did not reach the determined goal. If 
the production was greater than the quota, it was also compulsory to sell the overflow 
to the SNT - with the exception of what could legally be sold in the parallel market 
after 1948.390 A small production quota made it easier and cheaper to divert a part of 
the production to the black market, so the size of the quota was important for the 
average price received by the farmer for his produce. This made it crucial to gain 
access to the local decision making body - the local Junta Agrlcola.
In the small rural communities i i  was very likely that all members of the Junta 
Agrlcola would be farmers themselves, leading to the possibility of a conflict of 
interests when determining the quotas. How widespread the abuse of power by 
farmers in the Juntas Agricolas was is difficult to say, but it is relatively easy to find 
instances of it in the reports from the Provincial Inspectors of the SNT. For example, 
in 1950 one Junta Agrlcola assigned excessive compulsory quotas to farmers who
'1Q1
were living in other villages than where they cultivated their land. Another practice 
was for the members of the Junta Agrlcola to allocate small quotas to themselves.392 
In some cases, these types of abuses led to the staff of the SNT having to recalculate 
the compulsory quotas. Perhaps it was an attempt to curb the social power of the 
large-scale farmers, which in some years led to the SNT calculating the production
Ciudad Real! Table 6.14 indicates that he analysed the “wrong” season.
388 Unfortunately, it has not been possible to find a description of how the provincial quotas were 
calculated, and it has only been possible to locate the provincial production quotas for the 1950 harvest, 
and even these are incomplete (Table 3.6). Hence, it is impossible to say anything about the criteria 
used for allocating the quotas at the provincial and local level.
389 The Junta Agricola consisted of the mayor, a minor number of farmers, and the local head of the 
Hermandad Sindical de Ganaderos y  Labradores (the Sindical Brotherhood of Farmers and 
Stockbreeders, HSGL) which was the official “trade union” for the agrarian sector.
390 See Chapter 3 ,
391 Servicio Nacional de Trigo: Informe quincena/ -  2nd half of November 1950, from the Inspector 
Provincial assigned to the Provincial Headquarters in Cuenca.
392 Servicio Nacional de Trigo: Informe quincenal -  1st half of October 1950, from the Jefe Comarcal in 
zone 1.
393 Servicio Nacional de Trigo: Informe quincenal -  1st half of December 1950, from an Inspector 
Provincial of an unnamed zone.
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quotas directly for farmers who cultivated more than a certain amount of land.394 A 
more malicious interpretation would be that staff of the SNT would be better able to 
receive bribes and/or favour individuals for personal, political or other reasons. The 
possibilities of evading the system of intervention did not stop there. In 1950, a 
member of the SNT staff reported that some farmers bought wheat from other farmers 
and then sold it to the SNT at the price for the production exceeding the compulsory 
quota.395
Since the individual quotas were partly a function of the village quota - which 
was set by the SNT - disputes inevitably also rose over these as well. It was common 
that the local Junta Agricola wrote to the SNT explaining that for some reason it 
would be impossible to fulfil the village quota without leaving the local farmers and 
their famil^starving in the following year.396 The conflicts over this also led to the 
Junta Agricola refusing to assign quotas in some villages.397
The efforts to reduce the quotas did not stop at the village level. We find that in 
1948 the Provincial Delegation of the HSGL tried to obtain a reduction in the wheat 
quota for the whole province. During the process a local section of the HSGL sent a 
letter to the other sections urging that in each village a “realistic” quota was agreed 
upon by the farmers. However, as the SNT Provincial Inspector who reported the 
incident wrote:
With this letter known by the farmers, there is no doubt that none of them will 
say that they can hand in more than the assigned quota. With a few exceptions, 
they will not even hand in the assigned quota (...)39
394 In Cuenca, the limit from which the SNT staff allocated the quota directly was 20 hectares of 
cultivated land in 1948,14 hectares in 1950, and 10 hectares in 1951. No information on the limits have 
been found for other years, nor for other provinces.
395 Servicio Nacional de Trigo: Informe quincenal -  2nd half of September 1950, from an Inspector 
Provincial of an unnamed zone.
396 Excuses used by the local Juntas Agricolas in their attempt to get a smaller village quota were 
plentiful. They included a heat wave (Casasimarro); drought, and night frosts late in the year (Areas); 
drought, and lack of work animals and fertilisers (Belmonte); that a part of the land in the village 
belonged to farmers from other villages (Quintanar del Rey); that a part of the land was only cultivated 
due to explicit instructions from the SNT, and the subsequent harvest could not give a profit for the 
farmer (Iniesta). See Consejo Economico Sindical de Cuenca: Constitution de Juntas de Cupo Forzoso.
397 See for example: Servicio Nacional de Trigo: Informe quincenal - from: 1st half of February 1948 
from the Jefe Comarcal of Zone 2; 2nd half of August 1948 - unknown area; 2nd half of September 1948 
from the Jefe Comarcal in Cuenca; 1st half of October 1948 from the Inspector Provincial in Zone 2; 1st 
half of October 1948 from the Inspector Provincial in Zone 3; 1st half of October 1948 from the Jefe 
Comarcal in Cuenca.
398 Servicio Nacional de Trigo: Informe quincenal -  2nd half of October 1948 from the Inspector 
Provincial, working at the Provincial Headquarters in Cuenca. %\«vV;o A
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The possibility of breaking the regulation of the cereal production for their own 
benefit also appealed to SNT staff Aware of this, the central office of SNT in Madrid 
had National Inspectors who controlled the behaviour of the local staff.
One important function of the provincial and local SNT staff was to control the 
entrance and exit of goods in the SNT warehouses, where the produce was stored 
before it was sent to the industry for further elaboration. Several reports state that in 
spite of the importance of the task, this control was unsatisfactory.399 National 
Inspectors reported instances of wheat stored in the SNT warehouses without being 
officially registered - i.e. bought illegally by the SNT employee in charge of the 
warehouse.400 Another example of possible fraud by the SNT staff was the reporting 
of the imprisonment in 1946 of the head of the SNT warehouse in the village Villar de 
Domingo Garcia 401 Situations like this could be the result of SNT staff cheating the 
farmers, and/or they - together with the farmers - were cheating on the system of 
intervention.
All in all a picture arises where the relevant organisations and individuals tried 
to pass on the problems of the compulsory quotas to others and/or exploit the 
possibilities of illegal economic activity that emerged within the system of 
intervention. Even if it was possible to make a “fair” distribution of the quotas, and 
this is an assumption that is far from easy to make, the system put a high moral 
responsibility on those working in the bureaucracy. They had the power to determine 
the size of the quotas, and thereby to a certain degree their own earnings and those of 
the other farmers, in a situation where the gain of one would be the loss of another. As 
we have seen, and this can hardly be a surprise, many people did not live up to the 
“moral obligation” which accompanied the discretionary power to distribute income 
more or less at will.
In Chapter 3 it was argued that on the national level the existence of a black 
market could be a stimulus for increasing the level of production. The above analysis 
shows that while the laxity, corruptness and lack of homogeneity of the control system 
at the local level might have been a serious constraint on the income level of some 
farmers, others gained from the same conditions. This last group of farmers would
399 See for example Servicio Nacional de Trigo: Informe, from the Inspector Nacional of the SNT in the 
Centre Zone, covering September, October and November 1946, as well as the corresponding report 
covering March, April and May 1948.
400 See for example Servicio Nacional de Trigo: Informe, from the Inspector Nacional of the SNT in the 
Centre Zone, covering March, April and May 1946, and the similar reports covering June, July and 
August 1946, and December 1946 together with January and February 1947.
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have had an incentive to increase output through illegal channels. Taken into 
consideration that close to 50 percent of the marketable surplus of wheat was sold on 
the black market in the 1940s, the group that benefited from that black market was 
probably quite numerous. So while a less flawed control system might have been 
desirable from a juridical point of view, it could have retarded growth in production 
levels.402
6.5.2: The Risk of Punishment in Relation to Black Market Activities
In the 1940s, farmers faced the dilemma of whether to deal in the black market or to 
comply with the system of intervention. The first option could lead to substantial 
economic gains, but it also included the risk of being caught and punished. The second 
route did not offer the same potential economic benefits nor the threat of punishment. 
The choice taken by the individual farmer would be dependent on his perception of 
the potential gains in the black market versus the risk involved.
It is difficult to say much about exactly how a farmer would arrive at his 
decision of whether to engage in black market dealings or not. However, some 
evidence exists on the outcome of the considerations, i.e. the amount of black market 
activity and the type of risk that was involved when a person chose to enter the black 
market. Here, the available evidence from Cuenca indicates that although it was not 
risk-free to enter the black market, the deterrent effect was limited both from a moral 
and economic point of view. Consequently, the participation rate in the black market 
among farmers appears to have been very high.
The archive of Fiscalia Provincial de Tasas, the special court that dealt with 
black market cases, would have been the most important source of information 
concerning the black market in Cuenca. Unfortunately, the archive has been lost due 
to a flooding.403 However, a similar archive in the neighbouring province of Teruel 
exists and some examples of cases found there can shed some light on the functioning 
of the institution 404
401 Servicio Nacional de Trigo: Informe, from the Inspector Nacional of the SNT in the Centre Zone, 
covering March, April and May 1946.
402 See Chapter 3 for the discussion about the possibility of introducing a less rigid system of
intervention earlier than 1950, as well as the benefits that could have been the result of this.
403 Letter from the Civil Governor of Cuenca to the author.
404 As pointed out in Section 3.2, the archive contains some 10,000 cases for the 1941-53 period. It is
lamentable that it has been beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse this rich source material in detail.
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At the beginning of the 1940s, the smallest penalty that was imposed on people 
caught in possession of goods from or destined for the black market was a fine of 
1000 pesetas.405 This was a substantial amount considering that in the early 1940s the 
farmer received less than 100 pesetas for 100 kilos of wheat. In the same period, the 
average day wage for a worker in the agrarian sector oscillated around 10 pesetas, thus 
from the point of view of the consumer 1000 pesetas would have been a relatively 
large amount of money. In the archive of Fiscalia Provincial de Tasas in Teruel one 
can find examples of people being fined 1000 pesetas for the possession of 10 kilos of 
flour. Entering the black market involved therefore the risk of severe punishment for 
even minor offences, and this could have serious economic consequences for the 
offender.
In the first half of 1944, the provincial administration announced in the Boletin 
Oficial de Cuenca a number of auctions of property belonging to people who had 
fallen into debt to the state. In nine cases it was explicitly stated that the penalty was 
related to black market dealings,406 and here unpaid 1000 peseta fines were covered 
through forced selling of the following objects:407
1) One residential house
2) One donkey (two cases)
3) Seven urban buildings
4) One work cart and one sewing machine
5) Eight plots of land used for cereal growing
6) One round table, one caldron, three chairs, two frying pans, two pots, one 
cultivated plot of land, and six plots of waste land
7) One plot of irrigated land, and three plots of non-irrigated land.
Finally, the auctioning of a 320m2 plot covered one 10,000 peseta fine.408
Although the occupation of the persons whose goods were being sold was not 
stated, it is obvious that several of them were farmers when one considers that land 
and work animals were among the items up for auction. Although we do not know the 
economic situation of the people involved, the selling of land, work animals and even
405 Fiscalia Provincial de Tasas de Teruel: Fichas de los sancionados por la Fiscalia Provincial de Tasas 
y multas que se les han impuesto (1941-55).
406 A further 24 auctions are listed during 1944 in the Boletin Oficial de Cuenca, but without stating the 
reason for the unpaid debt to the public.
407 Each case represents one fine of 1,000 pesetas.
408 All information from Boletin Oficial de Cuenca, various dates, 1944.
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household equipment suggests that the auction would leave the person concerned on 
the brink of ruin. Such an outcome could hardly have been compensated for with 
whatever eventual earnings could have been gained on the black market.
The archive of the Fiscalia Provincial de Tasas in Teruel also shows that the 
non-payment of a fine could result in imprisonment in a work camp. In this case, three 
months was apparently the normal sentence for a fine of 1000 pesetas.409 For the 
persons involved this obviously equalled the loss of income in these three months and 
could affect the physical well being of the family of the offender.
When the farmer was assessing the risk of entering the black market the level of 
punishment would also have to be weighted against the risk of being caught. As 
explained in Chapter 3, the archive from Fiscalia Provincial de Tasas in Teruel 
clearly suggests that the risk of being punished was very limited. The direct control of 
the farmers included checking whether they fulfilled the compulsory production 
quotas. Although the non-completion of the production quota is not a proof of black 
market trade, the following example strongly suggests that there was a high 
correlation between the two phenomena. In March 1951, the central office of the SNT 
sent a list to the SNT office in Cuenca, naming 2,322 farmers that were to be fined for 
not fulfilling the compulsory production quota for wheat. These farmers all owed 
more than 1000 kilos of their quota and their aggregated debt was 5,449,889 kilos. 
Twenty-nine owed more than 10,000 kilos each, and the largest debt was for the 
considerable amount of 35,831 kilos out of a production quota of 49,966 kilos.410 
Nevertheless, these 2,322 farmers were only a fraction of the farmers that had not 
fulfilled their production quota. In fact, 19,023 farmers, - which is more than half of 
the wheat farmers in the province411 - altogether owed 9,908,180 kilos of their 
quotas.412 Although non-fulfilment of the production quota was not the same as black
409 Fiscalia Provincial de Tasas de Teruel: Fichas de los sancionados por la Fiscalia Provincial de Tasas 
y multas que se les han impuesto (1941-55).
410 Delegacion Nacional del Servicio Nacional de Trigo: Resumen de agricultures deudores de cupos 
forzosos de trigo para la campana 1950/51 - Cuenca.
411 In 1955, the SNT registered 46,526 wheat-growing farmers in the province - Servicio Nacional de 
Trigo: Veinte anos de actuation, pp. 40-41. However, this number seems inflated by double counting. 
If not, the ratio of farmers to workers was close to 1.5 to 1 in the mid 1950s, and this seems to be to 
high when compared to other sources, as described in Section 5.3.1, p. 131 ff.
412 Unfortunately, the source does not mention the size of the production quota, but official wheat
tfstwas 110,231,300 kilos. Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario Estadistico de las Producciones 
Agricolas (1951). As mentioned in Chapter 3 it was not the practice to fine all farmers with a quota debt 
of less than 1,000 kilos. In July 1951, the central office of SNT endorsed a list of 712 farmers, 
elaborated at the discretionary will of the local SNT office, who were to be fined. These 712 farmers 
had an average production quota of 907 kilos of wheat, of which they on average owed 759 kilos - 
almost 84 percent. See Delegacion Nacional del Servicio Nacional de Trigo: Resumen de agricultores 
deudores de cupos forzosos de trigo para la campana 1950/51, Cuenca.
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market trading, the cases of non-completion suggests that this was often the case. At 
the same time, the fulfilment of the production quota could also coincide with black 
market trading, especially if the farmer had managed to obtain a small quota. The non- 
fulfilment of the production quota by approximately 10,000,000 kilos is difficult to 
explain by other factors than a widespread and persistent black market activity on 
behalf of the farmers, and an insufficient and inefficient control system.
In sum, it can be said that being caught trading in the black market could have 
disastrous economic consequences for the farmers, who could have their homes, land 
and work animals sold at auctions. At the same time, the large black market is also 
likely to have produced significant economic gains for some of them.
6.6: MAINTENANCE OF THE VALUE OF AGRARIAN OUTPUT PER UNIT OF 
CULTIVATED LAND BUT DECLINE IN THE TOTAL VALUE OF AGRARIAN 
OUTPUT
The post-war value of agrarian output is an important element in the analysis of the 
effects of the agrarian policy on wheat production in the 1940s. This is so because it 
relates directly to the question of how to describe the conditions for wheat production 
in the 1940s. Was the level of output the result of a shift of the supply curve to the left 
due to changes in the conditions that governed production? Or was there as a shift 
along the supply curve due to changes in prices received by the farmers? So far, the 
evidence given in this Chapter has demonstrated the existence of important external 
constraints on wheat output in Cuenca in the 1940s. These caused a shift of the supply 
curve of wheat to the left and made it steeper than it had been before the Civil War. 
These conclusions support the argument presented in Chapter 3 on the wheat sector at 
the national level. The analysis of the value of agrarian output in Cuenca then makes it 
possible to analyse whether the shift of the supply curve was accompanied by a shift 
along the supply curve of wheat after the Civil War. Here the data clearly suggest that 
this was not the case. When estimated black market earnings are taken into 
consideration, the value of agrarian production per unit of land in the 1940s remained 
close to that of the 1930s.
This parity is not immediately clear from the official statistics. The official data 
in Table 6.15 show that the post-war value of agrarian output in Cuenca was 
significantly less than the pre-war level when calculated in real terms. This also 
happened elsewhere in Spain, but the development was far worse in Cuenca than for
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the country overall. Furthermore, the inclusion of black market earnings from wheat 
does not drastically alter the picture, although it obviously had the effect of bringing 
the post-war level closer to the pre-war situation.413
Table 6.15: Index of value of agrarian production in Cuenca and Spain in constant 1958 Pesetas 
between 1939 and 1958 (1931-35 average value = 100).
Years Cuenca Spain Cuenca Spain
(Original data) (Original data) (Corrected for black market of wheat)
1939 56 85 62 93
1940 51 84 58 90
1941 53 93 59 99
1942 N/A N/A N/A N/A
1943 46 76 59 86
1944 48 76 65 89
1945 38 68 46 76
1946 59 81 76 91
1947 45 74 55 85
1948 39 68 48 82
1949 44 69 52 80
1950 59 86 59 91
1951 72 107 72 112
1952 68 104 68 113
1953 58 97 58 100
1954 96 109 96 109
1955 79 97 79 97
1956 69 105 69 105
1957 93 107 93 107
1958 88 108 88 108
Current prices deflated by deflator for "agriculture, fishing and forestry" from Prados de la
Escosura (1995). See Section 3.2.1 for the use of constant Pesetas and the choice of deflator.
Sources: Ministerio de Agricultural Anuario Estadlstico de las producciones agricolas
(1931-35, 1939-40, 1943-58).
To get a more complete picture of the total value of the agrarian production in Cuenca 
it is necessary to include earnings from black market sales of other crops than wheat. 
Yet, this is no easy task as it is difficult to know which products were sold in the black 
market, in which quantities this happened, and at what prices. In general it seems that 
most products that were included in the rationing system also found an outlet in the 
black market. Unfortunately it has only been possible to locate evidence of this for the 
province of Cuenca for the months immediately after the Civil War. Between July and 
December 1939, the Provincial Delegation in Cuenca of the CGAT discovered some 
750 cases of black market trade in potatoes, olive oil, straw, wine, sugar, livestock, 
wheat and bread.414
However, information does exist for some other parts of Spain covering almost 
all of the 1940s. In Andalucia, for example, Naredo found that there was a black
413 See Appendix 3, Section 3.4 for the revision of the value of wheat output in between 1939 and 1953.
414 Comisaria General de Abastecimiento y Transportes: Cuentas y jutificaciones de la Delegacion 
Provincial de Cuenca, July 1939 to January 1942.
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market for wheat, barley, rye, oats, maize, rice, chickpeas, and various types of beans 
and olive oil.415 Further information can be gathered from publications by a number of 
provincial Chambers of Commerce. These would include details about the black 
market and, along with the products found by Naredo, it was reported that potatoes, 
sugar, and lentils were also frequently sold in the black market.416 Finally, in the 
neighbouring province of Teruel, where the crop structure was relatively similar to 
that of Cuenca, the Fiscalia Provincial de Tasas judged some 10,000 cases of black 
marketing dealing with almost every imaginable commodity between 1941 and 
1952.417
The complex nature of the black market trade means that any estimate of the 
amount of earnings from it will suffer from a large degree of uncertainty. In face of 
this uncertainty, the following estimate is only a rough indication of the total value of 
agrarian production. Furthermore, taking into consideration the dominant position of 
cereals within the crop structure in Cuenca, the following estimates only deal with the 
consequences of the black market for wheat, barley, rye and oats on the value of total 
agrarian output. Consequently, the estimates probably err on the lower side, which, 
however, only strengthens the conclusion that emerges at the end of the analysis.
While the SNT compiled an assessment of the relative size of the black market 
for wheat in the 1940s, no similar calculation exists for barley, rye and oats. However, 
at the beginning of the 1950s the Ministry of Agriculture published revised production 
figures for these three crops between 1939 and 1949. This was done because the 
original figures did not take into account the part of the production that was sold in the 
black market. In the calculation behind Table 6.16 it has therefore been assumed that 
the black market amounted to the difference between the original and the revised
A \ Q
production figures for barley, rye and oats.
415 Naredo (1981), pp. 91-92.
416 See for example: Camera Oficial de Comercio, Industria y Navegacion de Bilbao: Memoria 
Comercial (1943-51); Camera Oficial de Comercio, Industria y Navegacion de La Coruna: La 
economia corunesa en los ultimos anos. Memoria Comercia de la Camara Oficial de Comercio, 
Industria y  Navegacion de La Coruna de los anos 1945 y  1946, p. 20; Camara Oficial de Comercio e 
Industria de Jaen: Memoria Comercial y  estudio sobre el desarrollo de los negocios en la provincia de 
Jaen (1948-51); Camara Oficial de Comercio e Industria de Zamora: Zamora 1946-1950. Memoria 
comprensiva de los aspectos mas interesantes de la provincia referido a dicho periodo, pp. 261-262.
417 Fiscalia Provincial de Tasas de Teruel: Fichas de los sancionados por la Fiscalia Provincial de Tasas 
y multas que se les han impuesto (1941-55).
418 In the case of wheat, the official figures for the black market exceeds the correction on output 
statistics. It is therefore possible that the size of the black market also exceeded the size of the 
corrections in the cases of barley, rye and oats. Yet, if this was the case, the definition of the size of the 
black market as the difference between the original and the revised figures introduces a bias in the 
calculation that goes against the argument in the present thesis.
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Unfortunately, it has not been possible to find local evidence on relative black 
market prices for these three cereals. Yet, Naredo found that in La Campina del 
Guadalquivir in Southern Spain, normal black market prices paid to the farmers for 
barley and oats in the 1940s were approximately 4-5 times the official prices.419 On 
the basis of the information, each column in Table 6.16 represents a distinct scenario, 
where different relative black market prices are attached to the same relative size of 
the black market. In the first column, the production sold in the black market carries 
no premium; in the second the premium is 100 percent premium; in the third, the 
premium is 200 percent; and in the last column, the premium is 300 percent.420
Table 6.16 demonstrates that the original statistics probably underestimate the 
value of total agrarian production by at least 25 percent between 1939 and 1949. 
Between 1950 and 1953, the error in the statistics was likely to be somewhat smaller 
as the importance of the black market declined during these years. In spite of this, it is 
hardly plausible that the total value of the agrarian production in real terms could have 
reached the pre-war level in the 1940s. This was the case even if  the figures in Table 
6.16 probably are on the low side, since only the black market for cereals has been 
included in the estimation of total value of agrarian production.
However, it was not changes in relative and absolute prices that alone caused the 
post-war decline in the value of total agrarian production. A significant part of this 
development was the consequence of the decline in the total cultivated area, which 
between 1939 and 1949 was only some 70 percent of the 1931-35 average.421 
Accordingly, the value of production per cultivated hectare when calculated in real 
terms was almost as high in the 1940s as it was in the pre-war years. In Chapter 3 it 
was argued that the average price for wheat received by the farmers when black 
market earnings were included was not very different from the pre-war level. It has 
been shown that the total value of agrarian output per unit of cultivated land remained 
almost stable from the 1930s throughout to the 1950s.
4,9 Naredo (1981), pp. 91-92. Naredo did not provide information on the black market price o f rye.
420 The relative black market prices have on purpose been s,e V below those given by Naredo. If relative 
black market prices in Cuenca were comparable to those given by Naredo, the bias in the calculations in
To.V>y tXwill go against the hypothesis of the present thesis. Given that the corrections for the production 
of barley, rye and oats only covers the 1939-49 period, it has not been possible to estimate the size of 
the black market for these three cereals after 1949. However, it can be supposed that the post-1949 
black market was of limited importance since the system of intervention was abolished gradually in the 
following years.
421 Respectively 608,465 hectares between 1931 and 1935 and 424,554 hectares between 1939 and 
1949 when corrections for the black market are taken into account.
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Table 6.16: Index of value of agrarian production in Cuenca 1931-49 calculated in constant 1958 Pesetas. Original data, 
and data including the value of wheat sold in the black market, as well as various estimates of the value of barley, rye and 
oats sold in the black market.
Years Original data. Wheat as in Table 6.15 Wheat as in Table 6.15 Wheat as in Table 6.15 Wheat as in Table 6.15
No kind of black No black market premium 100% black market pre­ 200% black market pre­ 300% black market pre­
market included. for revised harvest of mium for revised harvest mium for revised harvest mium for revised harvest
barley, rye and oats. of barley, rye and oats. of barley, rye and oats. of barley, rye and oats.
Index Index Index Index Index
(1931-35 = 100) (1931-35 = 100) (1931-35= 100) (1931-35 = 100) (1931-35 = 100)
1931 74 74 74 74 74
1932 106 106 106 106 106
1933 96 96 96 96 96
1934 108 108 108 108 108
1935 117 117 117 117 117
1939 56 62 62 63 63
1940 51 58 58 58 58
1941 53 60 60 60 60
1942 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1943 46 62 64 66 69
1944 48 67 69 71 73
1945 38 47 50 52 54
1946 59 79 82 84 87
1947 45 57 57 59 60
1948 39 50 51 53 54
1949 44 53 54 56 57
1939/49 48 59 61 63 65
Current prices deflated by deflator for "agriculture, fishing and forestry" from Prados de la Escosura (1995). See Section 3.2.1 for the use of
constant Pesetas and the choice of deflator.
Sources: Table 6.15; Institute Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de Espafia (1943); Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario
estadistico de las producciones agricolas (1939-40,1943-49,1951).
In fact, it is even possible that - because of black market earnings - the value of 
agrarian production per cultivated hectare was at its highest level in the 1940s.422 
These conclusions clearly suggest that the low level of production of wheat in the 
1940s was not the result of movements along the supply curve.
The post 1953 recovery still did not seem to be sufficient to recover the pre-war 
output level. Although the cultivated area increased, the total value of agrarian 
production between 1953 and 1958 was in real terms still only 80 percent of the 1931- 
35 average.423 This means that the recovery of the agrarian sector in Cuenca was still 
not complete 20 years after the end of the Civil War. This conclusion is also 
significant in relation to the discussion of whether the crisis in wheat production in the 
1940s was the result of the system of intervention. The situation after 1953 did not 
lead to a quick restoration of pre-war levels of production, although there was a 
gradual increase in output. This occurred through an increase in the cultivated area, 
which was possible when work animals and, later, tractors became available, and in 
the yields as farmers gained better access to artificial fertilisers. Work animals, 
tractors and artificial fertilisers were all in short supply in the 1940s. This 
demonstrates once again that in these years the output of wheat was more dependent 
on shifts in the supply curve rather than a shift along the supply curve.
6.7: CONCLUSIONS
The evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates that in Cuenca in the 1940s the 
supply curve for wheat became steeper and shifted to the left at the same time. This 
was due to lack of work animals and artificial fertilisers, while two other potential 
factors - changes in the labour market and in the weather conditions - had little effect 
on output. Although cereals occupied a smaller relative part of the total cultivated area 
after 1939, this was not because of an increase in the extension of other yearly or 
perennial crops. On the contrary, the post-war decline in the area cultivated with
422 The absence of black market earnings from other crops, as well as the low estimate of the relative 
size of the black market for barley, rye, and oats, as witnessed in Table 6.16 further strengthen the 
argument.
423 The average total value of agrarian production in the province was 2,913 million pesetas between 
1931 and 1935, and 2,343 million pesetas between 1953 and 1958. The maximum in this last period 
was 2,716 million pesetas in 1957. All prices in constant 1958 pesetas, obtained by deflating current 
pesetas by producer price index for “agriculture, forestry and fishing” from Prados de la Escosura 
(1995). All data from Ministerio de Agricultural Anuario Estadistico de las Producciones Agricolas 
from the respective years.
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wheat and other cereals was primarily the consequence of the abandoning of the 
cultivation of land altogether.
In light of the developments in the value of production per unit of land, 
voluntarily abandonment of land does not appear to be an economically rational 
decision. Total value of agrarian production calculated in real terms was significantly 
smaller in the 1940s than before the war. This even holds when black market earnings 
were included. However, this was principally the result of the decline in the cultivated 
area, and the post-war value of agrarian output per unit of land was similar in the 
1940s to that of the 1930s. Hitherto, the analysis of black market earnings has showed 
that large-scale farms were able to increase profits substantially in the 1940s.424 Yet, 
the evidence here proves that in an area of small-scale farms like Cuenca, black 
market earnings were also important.
In addition to this, the value of agrarian output per unit of land in the 1950s also 
stayed at a level close to that of the 1940s. Nevertheless, wheat output increased 
because of a larger cultivated area and higher yields. Consequently, higher official 
prices were not sufficient on their own to increase output in the 1940s, nor were they 
necessary for increasing output in the 1950s. Yet, a raise in the prices paid to farmers 
would have eased the economic condition for the small-scale farmer.
The best solution to the production crisis would have been an increase in either 
the availability of work animals or fertilisers. However, this was not only beyond the 
control of the farmers but also to a large degree beyond the capabilities of the 
government. The result was that the average small-scale farmer was worse off in the 
1940s than before the war. Hence, farmers were forced either to enter the black market 
and/or to accept a deterioration of their living standards.
Finally, the analysis showed that for the individual farmer the economic 
situation in the 1940s then depended to a large degree on luck. First, the fortunes of an 
individual farmer were heavily dependent on the continued good health of his work 
animals. Second, by dealing in the black market, a farmer risked being fined and/or 
suffering the confiscation of a part of his production. In the cases where the farmers 
lacked the necessary luck regarding work animals and black market earnings, they 
faced the risk of acute proletarianization.
For the individual farmer, the shift from a system of intervention in the 1940s to 
a more liberalised market in the 1950s could lead to both an improvement and a 
worsening of his economic conditions. The outcome would depend on how he had
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managed to adapt or persevere through the peculiar situation in the 1940s and the 
early 1950s. Again, after 1950, the access to work animals would be the crucial factor 
in the process of improving his economic condition.425
The increase in the availability of work animals and fertilisers after 1950 
resulted in small-scale farmers returning to a way of cultivation that was close to the 
pre-war practice. The end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s also witnessed 
a further increase in the use of fertilisers and machinery. However, this latter 
development was strongly linked to farm size with a near-absolute minimum of close 
to 50 hectares. This means that while the small-scale farmers after the mid 1950s 
found themselves in a situation that resembled their pre-Civil War status, the large- 
scale farmers were already moving on to the next stage of economic modernisation.
424 See for example Naredo (1981).
425 For the small-scale farmers, an increase in the cultivable area would be the most obvious way to 
improve their economic situation, given that both machinery and chemical fertilisers were still mainly 
used by large-scale farmers.
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CHAPTER 7: THE STABILITY OF THE OUTPUT OF OLIVE OIL 
BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER THE CIVIL WAR: THE CASE OF 
JAEN
7.1: INTRODUCTION
The production of olive oil in the 1940s was much closer to the pre-war level than was 
the case for wheat. This happened in spite of the similarities of the systems of 
intervention that were in force for the two crops during the period. The province of 
Jaen in Andalucia has been selected as a case study to examine why the olive sector 
experience differed. Throughout the 20th century, Jaen was the province with the 
largest average production of olive oil in Spain. Furthermore, in the post-war years 
output remained fairly close to the pre-war level. These conditions, together with the 
fact that both small-scale and large-scale farmers grew olives, make the province a 
suitable object for the analysis of the relationship between agrarian policy and olive 
(oil) production in the 1940s.426
It was an important feature of the market for olive oil in the 1940s that the state 
set a price below the equilibrium. This led to excess demand and the subsequent 
creation of a black market for olive oil, which the state was not able -  or willing -  to 
suppress. The purpose of the present chapter is to analyse how the farmers reacted to 
this situation and what was the economic outcome of their behaviour.
The following evidence creates a picture that is significantly different from the 
depressed situation that we saw in the case of wheat farmers in Cuenca. The 
difference is due to several factors, with the first being that in the 1940s the 
possibilities for olive oil production in Jaen were much better than those for wheat in 
Cuenca. This was mainly the result of the fact that the stock of olive trees survived the 
Civil War relatively unhurt in Jaen. The production capacity was therefore not 
restricted in the same way as in the wheat sector in Cuenca was, which suffered from 
severe handicaps caused by the decline in work animals in connection with the war.427 
Another factor that favoured the maintenance of pre-war levels of olive oil production 
was the limited use of artificial fertilisers in the sector. The decline in the availability 
of this commodity in the 1940s had therefore a very limited influence on output.
426 See Sections 5.2.2 and 5.3.2 for the social composition of the agrarian population in Jaen.
427 See Section 3.3 for the availability of work animals at the national level and Section 6.4.2 for the 
work animal situation in Cuenca.
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Consequently, the shift of the supply curve to the left, which was responsible for 
the post-war decline of wheat production in Cuenca, did not take place in the case of 
olive oil in Jaen. On the contrary, the sector experienced a period of stability in 
production throughout the 1940s and in the early the 1950s.
Although there was no shift of the supply curve to the left, the relative stability 
of production was not a foregone conclusion as the state set the price paid to the 
farmers below the equilibrium. There were three factors that counter-balanced the 
negative effect that this could have had on production. The first was that the prices in 
the black market were higher than those in the official market. The second was that 
not only did the official prices decrease in real terms, but wages in the agrarian sector 
did as well. This factor was quite important as wages accounted for 40 to 50 percent 
of the costs of producing olives. Moreover, wages were a larger part of total costs in 
olive production than in wheat production. Finally, the fact that the price elasticity of 
supply of olive oil in the 1940s was very small in the short- and medium-term further 
restricted the effects of the official price policy on production.
Generally, the positive economic outcome of black market earnings and 
declining real wages increased with the size of the farm. This occurred because, 
firstly, the larger farms often had more effective ways of controlling the 
commercialisation of their produce, and secondly, because the larger the farm, the 
larger the relative importance of wages in the cost structure. Consequently, it appears 
that the 1940s were a period where income levels of the olive farmers were at least 
comparable to the immediate pre-war years. For the large-scale farmers the 1940s 
might actually have been an economic golden age, in spite of state intervention. This 
is confirmed by the expansion of the productive area in the 1950s, which was the 
result of decisions taken by the farmers in the 1940s. The stability of the productive 
area in the 1940s does not reflect the economic situation of the farmers in the decade, 
as the size of the productive area was the outcome of the economic conditions before 
the Civil War.
These results support some of the findings from Chapter 4. Most important is 
that, with the exception of the first few years after the end of the war, the intervention 
in the olive sector was unnecessary and harmful for the normal working of the market. 
Although an abolition of the system of intervention would not have increased the 
production in the short run, it would have improved the transparency of market 
conditions. It therefore would have been easier for the farmer to foresee whether 
expanding production would be profitable. The consumers would also have benefited
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from less market distortions since the hassle of the black market could have been 
avoided. The short-term influence of the system of intervention on the level of output 
was therefore limited, but its distribution was negatively influenced. It is not possible 
to say whether the system of intervention was detrimental for the long-term expansion 
of production as well, since this involves the answering of two difficult questions. 
First, when black market earnings, paying of bribes, fines, and so on are included, 
would net earnings have been higher in the absence of state intervention? Second, if 
there were no intervention, would farmers have anticipated higher returns to the 
investment in new olive trees? The answer to the second question is only partially 
dependent on the response to the first as the answer would also have to take into 
account the farmers’ risk willingness in relation to black market trade.
Nevertheless, the olive sector in Spain in the 1940s was an example of state 
failure, contrary to the case of the wheat sector which was an example of a social 
market failure. This fact is significant for the interpretation of the consequences of the 
post-war agrarian policy. The main point is that the understanding of the conditions in 
the agrarian sector becomes divided in sub-sectors according to crops and social 
structure. It is of special importance that the conditions in the agrarian sector in the 
1940s are not only seen as the outcome of the trans-sectoral price policy. It is also 
necessary to analyse the specific conditions in each sector, including technical 
development, the dependency on off-farm inputs and capital goods and so on.
7.2: THE PREDOMINANCE OF OLIVES IN THE CROP STRUCTURE IN JAEN 
BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR
In the last five years before the Civil War, the cultivation of three crops -  olives, 
wheat, and barley - totally dominated the agrarian sector in the province (Table 7.1). 
The 330,000 hectares cultivated with olives in Jaen equalled close to 16 percent of the 
Spanish total, and thereby Jaen was the province with the largest extension of the crop 
before, during, and after the Civil War.428
428 Ministerio de Agricultural Anuario Estadistico de las Producciones Agricolas (1931-35). Note that 
the expansion has continued practically ever since, given that in 1961, some 378,000 hectares were 
grown with olives, and that figure had further grown to some 463,000 hectares in 1995. In this last year, 
the crop covered 65 percent of the cultivated area in the province: Ruiz et al. (1995), p. 10.
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Table 7 .1 :  Average land use and relative value of production in Jaen, 1931-35.
Crops Average land use Average land use Average relative value
(Ha.) (%) of production (% )11
Olives 330000 56,9 48,2
Wheat 106760 18,4 21,2
Barley 92186 15,9 13,2
Other cereals 10529 1,8 1.3
Leguminous plants 26347 4,5 3,2
Others 14032 2,4 13,0
Total21 579853 100,0 100,0
1) Value in current prices changed to constant 1958 pesetas by deflator for "agriculture forestry
and fishing" from Prados de la Escosura (1995). Average value calculated on basis of constant
1958 pesetas. See Section 3.2,1 for the use of prices and the choice of deflator.
2) The total includes cultivated land only.
Source: Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario Estadistico de las Producciones Agricolas (1931-35).
In general, the expansion or contraction o f the cultivated area is expected to be a slow- 
moving process. This is due to the nature o f  the olive tree, which requires 15 years 
before it starts producing and a further 35 years to reach its full potential. It is then not 
surprising that the amount of land dedicated to olives remained stable between 1931 
and 1935.
Within a somewhat longer perspective, the province had experienced a notable 
expansion in the cultivation o f  olives since the beginning o f  the 20th century. This 
development was not restricted to Jaen as the sector had expanded substantially in 
other parts o f Spain as well after passing through a period o f  crisis in the late 19th 
century.429 The extension o f olive farming in Jaen was partly the result o f this general 
trend, but was also due to the comparative advantage o f the province in climatic 
conditions.430 This advantage meant that the province o f  Jaen contained 16 percent o f 
all land dedicated to olive farming but produced 24 percent o f  total oil output between 
1931 and 1935.431
The expansion in the first third o f the 20th century was accompanied by a 
simultaneous but limited modernisation o f the production process. This included the 
introduction o f more effective ploughs and, although only on a very limited basis, 
artificial fertilisers 432 At the time it was believed that only nitrogenous fertilisers 
could have any positive impact on yields,433 but even as late as 1956 these were still
429 This general expansion was due to a combination of protectionism, the disappearance of imports of 
copra from the Philippines after the loss of the colonies in 1898, and the boost o f exports in relation to 
the First World War. The relatively late introduction o f the technology o f refining in Spain, which did 
not happen until 1920, further restricted the competition from other sorts o f vegetable oils: Tio (1982), 
p. 49.
430 See Section 5.3.2, p. 138.
431 Ministerio de Agricultural Anuario Estadistico de las Producciones Agricolas (1931-35).
432 Hernandez Armenteros (1998), pp. 212, 214; Zambrana Pineda (1987), pp. 128-129.
433 Ruiz et al. (1995), pp. 57-65.
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not commonly used in Jaen. In this year the Sindicato Nacional del Olivo - the branch 
of the official “vertical trade unions” that organised the olive sector -  reported that 
fertilisers were mainly employed with olives grown on irrigated land. Furthermore, 
dung was still the principal fertiliser.434 The mechanisation of production had to await 
the introduction of tractors in the 1950s and the invention of "tree-shakers" for the 
collection of the fruit in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Beside the improvements in cultivation as such, the growth in output before 
1936 also coincided with a betterment in the elaboration of oil. This was especially the 
case with the diffusion of the hydraulic press, which increased in numbers from 232 in 
1915 to 1,060 in 1930.435 The advantage of the hydraulic press was that it increased 
pressing capacity, whereby both the quality of oil and the industrial yields 
improved.436
7.3: THE LIMITED INFLUENCE OF THE CIVIL WAR ON OLIVE 
PRODUCTION
Throughout the Civil War almost the whole of the province of Ja6n was located in the 
Republican rearguard and therefore spared battlefield destruction.437 The war-time 
experience does not appear to have been a disaster for the agrarian sector in Jaen. The 
Diputacion Provincial wrote a report in 1939 saying:
The damages caused by Marxist domination exist. With respect to private 
property, which had to support the abuses, lack of cultivation and attention, 
incompetence and the hateful and useless management of the red hordes, losses 
of great consideration were caused. Nevertheless, if  we analyse the damages 
from the point of view of the national economy, these losses are only of a 
relative importance.438
Damages caused directly by the war were found in only 13 towns and villages, with 
the value of destroyed assets being around 19 million pesetas excluding damages to 
churches, monasteries and so forth.439
434 Sindicato Nacional del Olivo (1956), p. 35.
435 Hernandez Armenteros (1998), p. 217.
436 The industrial yields are the amount of oil obtained per unit of fruit.
437 Diputacion Provincial de Jaen and Colegio Universitaria de Jaen (1982), p. 512. The exceptions 
from the general Republican control were the areas around Alcala la Real and Porcuna in the western 
part of the province.
438 Diputacion Provincial de Jaen: Memoria de la Diputacion Provincial de 1939, pp. 36-37.
439 Diputacion Provincial de Jaen: Ficha conteniendo los datos relativos a la situation de la corporation 
en el periodo de tiempo comprendido entre el 18 de julio de 1.936 y el 31 de diciembre de 1.939, que se 
remite en cumplimiento de lo ordenado en la circular del Iltm2 Senor Director General de
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Apart from direct warfare, the Civil War also triggered a collectivisation process 
in the province that affected over 850,000 hectares,440 equalling close to 66 percent of 
the exploited land between 1931 and 1935.441 This was relatively much more than in 
Cuenca, where only about 26 percent of the exploited area was affected. In spite of 
this, Tables 6.4 and 7.2 show that the relative decline in the cultivated area with the 
main crops in relation to the Civil War was almost 40 percent in Cuenca but only 11 
percent in Jaen.442 This was caused by differences in the crop structures. In both 
provinces, the area cultivated with olives remained stable, and at the same time, the 
relative decline in area cultivated with yearly crops was at the same level.443 
Consequently, the difference originated in the relative importance of olives within the 
crop structure. This match the prevailing national trend that lands devoted to yearly 
crops were affected more by the Civil War than those planted with perennial crops.444
Table 7. 2: Civil War influence on the area cultivated with the main crops in Ja6n, 1931-40.
Crops
(All figures in 
hectares)
1931-35 average 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940
cultivated area cultiv. area cultiv. area cultiv. area cultiv. area cultiv. area
Wheat 106760 105800 87400 N/A 72281 76888
Barley 92186 89400 57600 N/A 38519 55536
Olives1} 330000 330000 321396 N/A 336200 336200
LeguminousZ) 25666 25495 21010 N/A 25250 39301
Total 528946 525200 466396 N/A 447000 468624
1) Both productive and non-productive land.
2) Include lentils, vetch, chickpeas, broad beans, peas, and green beans.
Sources: Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario Estadistico de las Producciones Agricolas (1931-35,1939-40):
Ministerio de Agricultura: Estadistica de Cereales y Leguminosas (1936,1937); Ministerio de Agricultura:
Estadistica de la Produccidn Olivarera (1936-37,1937-38).
All in all, the olive sector appears to have escaped the war years relatively unhurt. Not 
only did the cultivated area remain stable, but output was greater in 1937, 1938, 1941 
and 1942 than the average for the years 1932-36. Given the strong need for labour in 
the olive harvest, it is also important that deaths, exiles, or imprisonment did not lead
Administracion Local de fecha 11 de marzo de 1.940, and Diputacion Provincial de Jaen: Memoria de 
la Diputacion Provincial de 1939, p. 38. The locations that suffered damages were Alcala la Real, 
Andujar, Aijona, Aijonilla, Castillo de Locubin, Frailes, Higuera de Calatrava, Jaen, Lopera, 
Marmolejo, Martos, Porcuna and Santiago Calatrava.
440 Garrido Gonzalez concluded that the collectivisation affected 852,499 hectares while according to 
the Instituto de Reforma Agraria the figure was 855,655 hectares: Garrido Gonzalez (1979), pp. 41-56, 
and Carrion (1973), p. 135.
441 See Section 6.3, p. 151 for the potential negative effects of the collectivisation and de­
collectivisation process. See Cobo Romero (1993) for the political and social situation in Jaen during 
the Civil War.
442 The data in Table 7.2 does not include corrections for the black market influence on the official data 
for the cultivated area. The figures are therefore only indicative for the post-Civil War years, but this is 
of limited importance for the general picture.
443 The decline in the land dedicated to cereals was only partially compensated by an increase in the 
cultivation of leguminous plants especially chickpeas.
444 See Chapters 3 for the development for the main yearly crops and Chapter 4 for that of olives at the 
national level.
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to a shortage of workers in the agrarian sector. As pointed out earlier, the official data 
on total population show an increase of some 80,000 persons between 1930 and 
1940.445 However, the figure for 1940 is probably too high, and this is also likely the 
case for the official eight percent increase in the number of males employed in the 
agrarian sector between 1930 and 1940.446 The seasonal character of the need for 
labour in the olive sector meant that a scarcity of workers would be visible in the size 
of the harvest. The better-than-average harvests in 1937, 1938, 1941, and 1942 would 
indicate that sufficient labour was available.447
7.4: THE LEVEL OF OLIVE OIL PRODUCTION IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD
It follows from the above description that the post-war years were not a "recovery 
period" in the case of olives, but rather an example of continuity. In fact, the average 
production of olives used for oil between 1940 and 1951 was 89.3 percent of the 
1932-36 average.448 This decline was due to the fact that the yields between 1940 and 
1951 were ic, percent lower than the 1932-36 average.449 It is important to notice that 
this was to a large degree the result of a slightly unusual situation in 1949-51, when 
there were three relatively bad harvests in a row (Diagram 7.1).
The cultivated area continued to increase in spite of the Civil War 450 This was 
possible because the dependency on work animals was much less in the olive sector 
than in the wheat sector. The only major change after the Civil War occurred between 
1951 and 1952 when the official statistics report an unusually large increase.
445 See Section 5.2.1, p. 123.
446 From around 149,000 in 1930 to about 160,000 in 1940: Censo de la Poblacion (1930, 1940). See 
Section 5.2.1, p. 124 for the general problem of the reliability of the 1940 census. The figures for Jaen 
were probably also inflated by the influx of refugees from other parts of Andalucia.
447 The olive harvest takes place between late December and March, which means that it does not 
coincide with the harvest of the cereals. Due to the dominant position of olives, a labour shortage would 
be most acutely felt for this crop.
448 It is important to remember that the analysis in Chapter 4 showed that in a number of provinces the 
statistics on production and cultivated area with olives appeared very reliable. These were subsequently 
used to estimate a correction of the data for a number of provinces where there seemed to be a serious 
problem of underreporting. Given that Jaen was in the first group, the original statistics on production 
have been accepted. Obviously, this is not the same as saying that there was no black market for olive 
oil in Jaen, but rather that the authorities made at least probable estimates of the size of die production.
449 The agrarian and industrial yields had grown since the beginning of the 20th century because of a 
general improvement in the cultivation of olives and the elaboration of oil (Section 7.2). Yet, there were 
technical limits to the growth that could be obtained with the available resources, and when these were 
reached in the early 1930s, the yields remained stagnated in the remaining decades.
450 The exception from the continuity in the productive area that we see between 1918 and 1919 appears 
to be the result of defective statistics before this last year.
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Diagram 7.1: The developm ent of the production of olives, the total area covered by olives, and the
productive area with olives, 1904-54.
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This points to the possibility that there could have been an underestimation of the land 
under cultivation in the 1940s.451 However, even if  this was the case, the overall 
picture would not be seriously affected. According to the official figures, the 
expansion in productive land between 1951 and 1952 was only some 10,000 hectares, 
equalling an increase of three percent.
The point of departure is therefore radically different from what we saw earlier 
in the case of cereal production in Cuenca. This is not only the result of dealing with 
two different crops, but also because the development was different for wheat in 
Cuenca and Jaen. In the case of wheat cultivation in Cuenca, we saw that the post-war 
decline in production was the result of a shift of the supply curve to the left and a 
simultaneous twist of the curve, so it became steeper. This was due to the interruption 
of the availability of fertilisers and a reduced number of work animals.452 Contrary to 
this, the olive sector in Jaen almost kept up the pre-war production levels. At the same 
time, the wheat sector in Jaen also performed much better than in Cuenca. According 
to contemporary official statistics - without the necessary alterations for the black 
market -  the average wheat production between 1939 and 1952 was close to 80 
percent of the pre-war average.453 In fact, it is possible that if the statistics are 
corrected to account for black market influence, the average wheat production in Jaen 
in the 1940s was very close to that of the pre-war years. This further indicates that the 
price policy of the 1940s in itself did not necessarily lead to a very large reduction in 
wheat output.
7.4.1: The maintenance of the stock o f work animals
Given the perennial nature of olive trees, changes in the number of work animals 
would be of a lesser importance for production than it would be for yearly crops. Still, 
the lack of work animals might have a minor negative effect on the yields if less 
ploughing between the trees led to insufficient irrigation.
451 A possible argument for this interpretation is that the figures given by the Ministry of Agriculture for 
1952 are very close to the figures for 1945 in a data set collected by the CGAT. Comisaria General de 
Abastecimiento y Transporte: Mapas de abstecimiento (Provincia de Jaen, 1945). CGAT's figures were 
based on local information, which were normally gathered by the municipal secretary, while the official 
figures used in Diagram 7.1 were gathered by the state bureaucracy. It is therefore not easy to say 
whether the 1951-52 increase in the area cultivated with olives found in the official data reflects a 
greater accuracy or an actual increase.
452 See Chapter 6.
453 This was the result of that after 1941 the cultivated area was always at least 86 percent of the 1931- 
35 average, and that between 1939 and 1952 the average yields reached some 90 percent of the pre-war
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Although Table 7.3 shows that the statistics on the number of mules between 
1933 and 1952 are conflicting,454 we are left with the impression that the Civil War 
had a very limited influence on the number of animals.455
Table 7 .3 : Number of mules in Ja6n, 1933-50.
Years Animals older Animals older All animals
than 1 year than 3 years
1933 N/A 31800 38100
1940 46362 40544 47933
1942 34990 30761 36507
1948 39132 N/A N/A
1950 41340 N/A N/A
Sources: Ministerio de Agricultura: 'Tres estudios econdmicos";
Institute Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de
Espana (1943-45, 1950, 1953-54).
The small decrease in the number of mules makes it plausible to conclude that the 
effect on post-Civil War yields -  at least in this respect - was very small. This, 
together with the stability of the area cultivated with olives, show that important parts 
of the capital stock in the olive sub-sector in Jaen suffered significantly less than the 
cereal-sector in Cuenca. Furthermore, the difference between the number of mules in 
Jaen and Cuenca coincides with the above-mentioned difference in the cereal- 
cultivated areas in the two provinces 456 This supports the conclusion from Chapter 6 
that the number of work animals was an external constraint on the recovery of the 
cultivated area in Cuenca after the Civil War.
7.4.2: The limited influence of fertilisers and weather conditions on post-war yields
In Chapter 6, we discovered that the lack of artificial fertilisers in the post-war period 
had a negative affect on the yields of wheat in Cuenca. This factor does not seem to 
have had any significant influence on the yields of olives in Jaen in the 1940s, for the 
simple reason that artificial fertilisers were not often used for olives in the pre-war
figure. Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario Estadistico de las Producciones Agricolas (1931-35, 1939- 
40, 1943-52)
454 The problem is that the data for 1940 look suspicious, as they report an increase of close to 25 
percent compared to 1933 for both "All animals" and "Animals older than 3 years". This hardly seems 
likely due to the general lack of work animals in Spain. Note that mules were the preferred animals for 
olive cultivation since they moved easier and faster between the trees: Jimenez Blanco (1986b), p. 301.
455 For the discussion of the total number of mules in Spain and the possibilities of increasing this 
number, see Section 3.3.
456 There is no easy explanation for the different development of the number o f work animals in Cuenca 
and Jaen, since both provinces were located in the Republican rearguard throughout the war. One 
would suspect that the “drafting” of animals would be similar, but this might not have been the case.
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years.457 When they were used, it was mainly on large-scale farms. On the rest of the 
farms, the principal fertiliser was manure, or eventually, the planting and ploughing 
down of leguminous plants between the trees. However, even these more traditional 
methods were not generally employed on small-scale farms.458 As no other significant 
inputs were used in the olive sector in the pre-war period, a lack of inputs would not 
have caused a significant decline in the post-war yields.
On the other hand, it is possible to establish a relationship between the weather 
conditions and the olive harvests. This is the case both when precipitation is computed 
between October and April and when it is computed between October and September 
(Table 7.4).
Table 7.4: Correlation coefficient between precipitation and yields of olives in Jaen, 1944-66
Years October - April October - September
1944-55 0,71 0,75
1944-60 0,75 0,79
1944-66 0,69 0,74
Source: de Andr6s Cantero (s.a), pp. 7,13-35; Own elaboration.
This is of some importance since yearly precipitation in the mid 1940s and around 
1950 was less than the 1901-30 average (Diagram 7.2). Consequently, the difference 
between the yields in the pre- and post-war periods seems to be explainable through 
the level of precipitation.
When taken as a whole, the results are very different what we saw for wheat- 
growers in Chapter 6. On one side, weather conditions appear to have been the main 
cause for a small decline in the yields of olives in Jaen after the Civil War. On the 
other side, it was lack of work animals and fertilisers that was the reason for the 
relatively much larger decline in wheat output in Cuenca.
457 See Section 7.2, p. 189.
458 Garcia Romero (ed.)(1948), p. 58.
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Diagram  7.2: Index of yearly precipitation in Jaen, 1942-65 (1900-30 average precipitation = 100)
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7.5: THE INCOME NEUTRALITY FOR THE FARMERS OF THE COMBINED 
DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTION, OFFICIAL PRICES, BLACK MARKET 
PRICES, AND WAGES
This section deals with the question of whether there was a movement along the 
supply curve of olive oil due to changing prices. While the official prices paid to 
farmers suggest that this indeed was the case, three other factors worked towards the 
opposite effect. The first was the influence of earnings from the black market, where 
prices were higher than in the official market. The second factor was that, when 
compared to the pre-war situation, wages rose significantly less fast than the official 
price of olives and olive oil. Finally, more workers were paid on a piecework basis 
after the Civil War, and this lowered the costs per unit of harvested fruit. Everything 
else being equal, the last two elements should cause a shift of the supply curve to the 
right. The expansion of the productive area in the 1950s supports this interpretation.
7.5.1: The level o f the official prices paid to the farmers in the 1940s
As a result of state intervention official oil prices in the 1940s were on average 17 
percent below the pre-war level when calculated in real terms.459 Although the farmers 
reacted by extracting more oil from the fruit, this was not sufficient to maintain the 
gross value of production in real terms. Here the official statistics show that in the 
1940s the average gross value of production was around 20 percent lower than before 
the war. The worst situation was reached in the mid 1940s with a 30 percent decline a 
result of the development of prices rather than a decline in the average production.
We have seen that the CGAT set prices only for olive-based products, and it 
appears that the official price received by the farmers depended directly on the official 
market prices for oil 460 Unfortunately, the data for the price of olives are incomplete, 
so any conclusions based on them must be treated with some caution. Diagram 7.3 
shows three different official prices in real terms. The first is the price for the standard 
oil type Andaluz corriente (Normal Andalusian oil) in Barcelona before the war.461
459 See Section 4.4 for details on the post-war system of intervention in the olive sector. See Section 
3.2.1 for the use of rea l prices and the choice of deflator.
460 See Section 4.4.
461 Barcelona was Spain’s major trading centre before the Civil War, and the practice was to quote the 
price of olive oil using the Barcelona figure.
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The second is the price received by farmers for olives in the 1940s, and the last is the 
official price for olive oil in Jaen.
In the years immediately before the Civil War, we find that the price for olive
011 in Jaen and the price for the Andaluz corriente variety in Barcelona followed each 
other closely, and this is as expected.462 Zambrana Pineda showed that the price for 
olive oil in Spain was a product of prices in the international markets, and in those the 
price of olive oil depended on the level of prices of other vegetable oils.463 This 
changed after the Civil War when the economy went from a situation where the sector 
followed the international market conditions to one where the state set prices.
Looking at the development of real olive oil prices in Jaen, it is clear that in 
most of the 1940s it was at a lower level than before the war 464 Consequently, for the 
whole of the 1940-51 period, the average real official price paid to the farmers in Jaen 
was 17 percent lower than the 1932-36 average. This has to be viewed in light of the 
fact that between 1931 and 1935, the price of olive oil had already fallen by some 10-
12 percent in real terms when compared to the previous decade.465 With declining real 
prices of olive oil, producers reacted by extracting about 10 percent more oil from 
their olives in the 1940s than in the last 15 years before the war.466 This was 
detrimental to the quality of the oil, but a logical consequence of a price policy that 
operated on a one-quality/one-price system.
Diagram 7.4 shows the gross value of both the olives and the olive oil produced 
in Jaen. As can be seen, this fluctuated much more violently than the unit price, 
because of the volatility of the yields of the crop. When calculated as a 5-year moving 
average, the gross value of the olive oil production reached its lowest level in 1944- 
45. Although this decline is slightly less than what happened in the unit price of 
olives, it is still a decrease of about 30 percent when compared to the 1932-36 
average.
462 Apparently, there is an error in the price for olive oil in Jaen in 1930. There are no available local 
price data before 1930.
463 Zambrana Pineda (1987), pp. 298-307
464 See Section 3.2.1 for the reason for the use of constant pesetas, as well as for the choice of using the 
deflator for the “agriculture, forestry and fishing” from Prados de la Escosura (1995), for the 
calculation of prices.
465 That is when calculated from the price of Andaluz corriente in Barcelona.
466 Calculation based on data from: Ministerio de Agricultural Anuario Estadistico de las Producciones 
Agricolas (1939-40, 1943-50); Ministerio de Agriculture: Informes 5R (1941-42); Zambrana Pineda 
(1987), p. 424.
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Diagram 7.3: Official prices in real terms of olive oil (Andaluz corriente) in Barcelona, and of olive oil
and olives in Jaen, 1922-60.
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The close connection between the gross value of olives and that of olive oil is of great 
help for those years where there are no price data for the formers. In this situation, it is 
possible to use the development in the gross value of olive oil as a proxy for the gross 
value of olives. The conclusion is that state intervention led to a close to 17 percent 
decline in real terms in official prices received by olive farmers. Furthermore, the 
average gross value of olive and olive oil production in Jaen was 20 percent lower 
than in the 1932-36 period.
7.5.2: The effect of black market prices on farm income
The decline in the official price for olive oil was at least partly compensated for by 
earnings from the black market. Consequently, the gross value of production of olive 
oil in Jaen in the 1940s remained on a level similar to the pre-war situation. It is more 
difficult to say whether the same held true for the output of olives. However, the 
parallel development of the prices for olives and olive oil in the legal markets before 
and after the war indicates that this was the case.
Concerning the level of black market prices for olive oil in Jaen, we do not 
possess data at the level of producers. Yet, at the level of the consumer monthly data 
exist for the last 6 years before the abolishment of the rationing system, and these are 
shown in Diagram 7.5. Although the data do not cover the whole period under 
consideration, some conclusions can be drawn from it.
It is clear that the black market price was relatively close to the official price in 
four of the six years. In fact, it was only in 1946 and 1951 that the black market price 
was more than 200 percent of the official price. The small difference between official 
and black market prices was a distinctive feature of the province of Jaen (Table 4.3). It 
is likely that this was the result of Jaen being the province with the largest production. 
The relatively low level of prices in the black market in Jaen points to the negative 
effect the high levels of production had on the economic gains that could be made by 
the farmers in the black market. Other indicators support this interpretation.
For the case of Alicante, Moreno Fonseret has described that the process of 
selling a part of the production in the black market consisted of two main elements. 
The first was that the controls over the size of production by the individual farmers 
could be eased through bribing the local officials.467
467 Moreno Fonseret (1994), p. 171.
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Diagram 7.5: Official price received by farmers, official retail price and black market retail price for
olive oil in Jaen, 1946-51.
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The second, and according to Moreno Fonseret, the most important one, was found in 
the processing of the olives into oil. Here it was possible to press non-registered olives 
as well as falsify the industrial yields of the registered olives. If a farmer possessed his 
own press, it was possible for him to control both the cultivation and the pressing of 
the olives. This was especially important in the 1940s, since it made it much easier to 
evade the control of the bureaucracy and increase the amount of oil sold in the black 
market. However, this was not within the capabilities of every farmer. In the late 
1940s, there were 1,289 presses in the province, while in 1955 there were 1,286, of 
which 927 were employed in that harvest.
Evidence from other parts of Spain confirm the importance of possessing a press 
for the possibility of selling a part of one’s produce in the black market. Based on 
accounts from olive farms in Andalucia, Naredo reached the conclusion that olive oil 
was a more important commodity in the black market than olives.469 Similarly, Llopis 
Agelan used the same reasoning to explain the increase and modernisation of the olive 
presses in Extremadura in the 1940s.470
A parallel argument can also found in a pamphlet published in Jaen in 1947, 
which quite bluntly stated that:
You should never forget that the olive grower cannot sell his olives in the 
black market, but only at the official price. This is set in each village in 
concordance with the yields of the fruit and the official price of olive oil. 
Distant and unknown persons determine and receive the black market price for 
olive oil, and it is those who make a profit without having intervened in the 
production of the olives. The olive grower cannot profit from selling his fruits, 
the olives, given that these cannot be hidden nor pressed illegally. The farmers 
are forced to hand them over to the oil factories the same day they are 
harvested. When they ask permission to harvest, they even have to declare the 
harvest they will obtain and the route they will use for transportation to the 
factory.471
The possibility of evading state control in the industrial part of the sector was further 
increased with the multiplicity of products and sub-products that can be made from
468 Presidencia de Gobiemo - Secretaria General para la Ordenacion Economico-Social: Programa de 
necesidades de la provincia de Jaen (1948), pp. 34-35; Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Resena 
estadistica de la Provincia de Jaen (1956), p. 284.
469 Naredo (1983), p. 202.
470 Some of the new presses which were opened in Extremadura by medium- and small-scale farmers in 
the 1940s were forced to close again in the 1950s when the profitability declined again: Llopis Agelan 
(1994), pp. 53 and 57.
471 Gomez Medina (1947), p. 6. Note that the author presents himself as a farmer growing olives, which 
means that he has an interest in presenting the situation as bad as possible for the agrarian part of the 
olive oil sector K W . ,
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olives. This could even include declaring that oil suited for human consumption was 
for industrial use, or vice versa.472 Finally, the success of the commercialisation of the 
part of the production that went to the black market depended on the evasion of the 
transport control, in the same way as it happened in the case of wheat.
These conditions and the restrictions on inter-provincial trade point strongly to 
the fact that those farmers who owned presses earned the lion’s share of the gains to 
be made in the black market.473 This meant that the small-scale farmers were at a 
comparative disadvantage in their attempts to profit from the black market of olive oil. 
Nevertheless, olive oil sold illegally still had to be obtained from swindle with the 
quality of the produce, from the elaboration of unregistered olives, or by paying of 
bribes to the inspectors of the CGAT. The relative bargaining position in this process, 
and thereby the distribution of the black market gains, between the small-scale 
farmers and the press owners is difficult to estimate.
Nevertheless, it appears that the outcome for the small-scale farmers of these 
conditions was that the gross value of the olive production was close to the pre-war 
level in real terms. As mentioned above, the average unit price of olive oil in real 
terms between 1940 and 1951 was some 17 percent below that of 1932-36. If the 
relative amount of olive oil sold in the black market in Jaen was similar to the national 
average,474 then black market price had to be approximately 230 percent of the official 
price to maintain the gross value of the olive oil at the pre-war level.475
Returning to the price information in Diagram 7.5, the simple average of the 
monthly black market prices between 1946 and 1951 was 200 percent of the official 
price. This is fairly close to the required relative black market price that was necessary 
to uphold the gross value of olive oil at the level of 1932-36. Furthermore, Table 4.3 
showed that in Badajoz the relative black market price in the first half of the 1940s 
was at least comparable with those of the second half of the decade.476 Since we also 
concluded in Chapter 4 that in general the supply of oil improved over the years, it is 
at least plausible that the relative black market price in Jaen followed the same trend 
as in Badajoz. Consequently, after including the black market, it seems difficult to
472 Moreno Fonseret (1994), p. 172. Although the iirs*possibility is counter-intuitive, it could make 
sense in some years, because of the price structure of different types of oil: Sindicato Nacional de Olivo 
(1956), pp. 154-155.
473 This point was also made in Naredo (1981), pp. 108-109.
474 Remember that in Chapter 4 it was calculated that, on average, 25" percent of output went to the 
black market, 0
475 This calculation takes into account the combined effect of the decrease in the agrarian yields and the 
increase in the industrial yields.
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argue that the gross value of the total amount of olive oil produced in Jaen between 
1940 and 1951 fell significantly below the pre-war level in real prices. However, this 
conclusion is subject to the insecurity derived from the assumption that the relative 
size of the black market in Jaen was similar to that in the rest of Spain. Whether this 
also holds for the gross value of olives is more difficult to say, but the parallel 
development of olive and olive oil prices in the legal market both before and after the 
war indicates close market integration.
7.5.3: The reduction in costs in the olive sector due to the development of the wages
The development of prices in the official and the black market was not the only factor 
that determined the level of earnings for farmers in the 1940s. The relative price of 
olive oil to wages was also of great importance in the cultivation of a crop where up to 
50 percent of the costs were labour-related.477 On this point, the situation was very 
favourable for the farmers. The cultivation of one hectare of olives required 
approximately 20 man-days outside the harvest season and 30 man-days for a normal 
harvest.478 Given the seasonal character of the work, the fluctuations in the relative 
price of olive oil to labour would be felt on even relatively small farms, but obviously, 
the larger the farm, the more important it would be.
Table 7.5 shows that between 1934 and 1945 the relative price of olive oil to 
labour costs rose by approximately 30 percent, and by 1950 the increase was even 
larger.479 This result is obtained although the prices used for the calculation are the 
official ones. The inclusion of black market earnings would have further improved the 
farmer’s profit margin.
476 Badajoz is the only productive province with a continued series o f black market prices for the whole 
decade.
477 Sindicato Vertical del Olivo (1945), p. 140; Hernandez Armenteros (1998), p. 189.
478 Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Agrarias: Indice humanistico de mecanizacion de los trabajos 
agricolas en la provincia de Jaen, pp. 10-11.
479 The sources behind Table 7.5 are from four different accounts of the costs of cultivating olives, with 
each account representing ’’typical farms” in each of the four years. Although the type of tasks that 
were carried out on each farm were the same, there were minor differences in the number of man-days 
that were employed in each case. To make the accounts comparable, the number of man-days involved 
in each task on the farm in the source for 1945 has been applied to all four farms. Thereby, the figures 
reflect the economic development on this ’’farm” under the changing relation between wages and 
prices. The reason for using this farm as the base is that the source explicitly says that it is a typical 
farm in Jaen. Using the man-days involved in each task from one of the other ’’farms” only leads to 
minor changes in the development of the relative price of oil to wages with the general trend remaining 
the same.
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Table 7. 5: Accounts for the costs of the cultivation of one hectare of olives in Jaen, 1934-56.
Wages costs in current pesetas. 1934 1945 1950 1956
Ploughing 60,00 140,00 200,00 500,00
First harrowing 90,00 210,00 300,00 750,00
Second harrowing 15,00 35,00 50,00 125,00
First hoeing 31,89 52,75 69,60 125,00
Second hoeing 15,00 31,65 41,76 75,00
Pruning 29,59 36,20 55,68 100,00
Spraying against larvae ^ 3,83 25,50 N/A N/A
Sulphuring 1J 3,83 25,50 N/A 60,00
Harvesting 104,65 153,00 306,00 382,50
Carting of fruit to the press 21,88 61,20 45,90 153,00
Guarding v 3,00 5,09 N/A N/A
Total wage costs 378,67 775,89 1068,94 2270,50
Other costs
Interest on land N/A 425,00 127,50 N/A
Insurance, interest on wage outlay etceteras 25,47 52,96 161,20 522,22
Taxes N/A 48,33 45,90 440,00
Total costs excluding taxes
404,14 828,85 1230,14 2792,72and interest on land
144,00 390,00 793,00 1156,00Official price of 100 kilos of olive oil
100 205 282 600Index of total wage costs (1934 = 100)
Index of total costs excluding taxes and
100 205 304 691interest on land
Index of price of olive oil (1934 = 100) 100 271 551 803
1) No data are given for "Spraying against larvae", "Sulphuring" and "Guarding" for 1950, and "Spraying against
larvae" in 1956. However, in 1934 and 1945 these tasks only accounted for three to seven percent of total wages,
so it is hardly significant for the development of relative wage costs to the price of olive oil.
Sources: Garrido Gonzalez (1990), vol. 2, pp. 247-276;; Patacde Traviesas (1950), pp. 33-37; Sindicato
Nacional del Olivo (1956), Vol. 1, p. 11; Sindicato Vertical del Olivo (1945), pp. 69, 71.
Moreover, this development has to be seen in the perspective of Cobo Romero’s find, 
which proved that the wages in the province in 1934 were already lower than had been 
the case in the earlier years.480 Specifically in the case of wages in the olive sector in 
Jaen in the 1940s, the minimum wage for the collection of the fruit was continuously 
around 10 pts/100 kilos between the 1941 harvest and the 1948 harvest. It is notable
A O  1
that this was comparable to the absolute level paid in the 1934-35 harvest. The 
trend in the relation between prices and wages clearly favoured the economic position
A Q 'y
of the farmer, and the advantage improved with the size of the farm.
In Diagram 7.1 we saw that between 1951 and 1952 there was an increase in 
both the productive and the non-productive land with olives. This point was earlier 
discussed but it was not possible to conclude whether this increase took place in this 
year or just was a reflection of defective statistics in the post war years. Whatever was 
the case, the figures for the development of the cultivated area with olives between
480 Cobo Romero (1992), pp. 160-172.
481 Cobo Romero (1993), pp. 487-489.
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1940 and 1951-52 shows a very moderate increase when compared to the situation 
after 1952.
When comparing data from the CGAT at the local level for 1945 and 1954- 
55,483 it can be seen that the stable situation at the provincial level covered some 
minor differences at the local level.484 In Table 7.6, these changes are compared with 
the data on the relative number of landless labourers to small-scale farmers in the 
different regions. The comparison indicates that there seems to be a positive 
relationship between the relative number of landless labourers to small-scale farmers 
and the relative increase of productive land with olives between 1945 and 1954-5 5.485
Table 7. 6: The distribution and development of land occupied by productive and non productive 
olives in Jaen, 1945-55.
Region Area with Area with Change in % Number of landless
productive olives productive olives between 1945 labourers to small-scale
in 1945 (Ha.) in 19554/55 (Ha.) and 1954/55. farmers in 1933/34
1) Sierra Morena 59553 59040 -0.9 3.4
2) Sierra de Cazorla 
and Sierra de Segura 25264 24516 -3.0 1.3
3) Sierra Magina 44162 41326 -6.4 1.6
4) La Campina 146570 145776 -0.5 2.3
5) Municipalities with land 
in both zone 2 and 4 25763 28553 10.8 2.3
6) Id. Both zone 3 and 4 51231 52449 2.4 2.4
TOTAL 352542 351660 -0.3 2.2
Sources: Comisaria General de Abastecimiento y Transporter Mapas de Abastecimiento, (1945)
(Provincia de Ja6n); Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Resefla Estadistica de Jadn (1956); Table 5.12.
Admittedly the evidence is not to strong in itself, and there is an exception in the case 
of Sierra Morena. Yet, the result fits with our conclusion that large-scale farmers 
benefited the most from the development of the relative price of olive oil to labour.
All in all, the evidence strongly suggest that the small-scale farmers cultivating 
olives in Jaen in the 1940s lived through a period, which economically was at least 
comparable with the immediate pre-war period. The small-scale farmers cultivated 
roughly the same amount of land and the yields produced were nearly as they were 
before the Civil War. At the same time, farmers benefited from a decline in the costs
482 In a somewhat overlooked article, Naredo reached a similar conclusion and called the last part of the 
1940s and the beginning of the 1950s for “A golden age” of olive cultivation; Naredo (1983), pp. 192- 
193.
483 For the differences between these data made by the CGAT and the yearly data publicised by the 
Ministry of Agriculture, see Footnote 451.
484 The notable increase in Region 5 is almost entirely due to an increase in Villacarillo of 3463 
hectares, equalling some 40% of the 1945 productive area in the municipality. This looks suspiciously 
like an error in the data in one of the years, and if the increase in Villacarillo is taken out of the 
equation, the total increase for Region 5 falls to 1,1%.
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of labour relative to the official price paid by the state for their produce. Furthermore, 
it is likely that the farmers also received a part of the black market premium from the 
illegal market of olive oil, which also increased profits. Finally, the post 1950 
expansion of the area cultivated with olives that we saw in Diagram 7.1 reflected 
decisions from the 1940s on increasing output. This supports the interpretation that the 
economic conditions in the decade were favourable for the olive farmers.
However, despite these relatively favourable circumstances, the situation was 
not yet so that a widespread mechanisation of the production of olives was possible, a 
state of affairs that persisted until late in the 1950s.486 In 1961, the Consejo 
Economico Sindical Provincial concluded that although the prices received by the 
farmers in the 1950s had kept up with inflation, they did still not constitute a basis for
Aon
building sufficient reserves to make a mechanisation possible.
7.6: CONCLUSIONS
The evidence in this chapter showed that the influence of state intervention on the 
level of olive oil production in Jaen was limited. This was due to a combination of 
several factors. A reduction in output was expected when considering the development 
of official prices in real terms. On the other hand, earnings from the black market and 
the development of the relative price of olive oil to wages clearly favoured an 
expansion of output. These conflicting tendencies appear to have more or less 
cancelled each other out, or it might have been that the advantages outweighed the 
disadvantages. But even if this had not been the case, the price elasticity of supply of 
olive oil was severely limited in the short run.
In this context, it is important to remember that the stagnation in the area 
cultivated with olives in the 1940s was the result of decisions taken before the Civil 
War. Similarly, the expansion in the cultivated area in the 1950s was the outcome of 
choices made by the farmers in the 1940s. This indicates that farmers were willing to 
expand their holdings planted with olives in the 1940s in spite of the state.
485 In most municipalities no data are given for the non-productive area with olives, and the provincial 
total is far smaller than the total given in the statistics from the Ministry of Agriculture for the same 
years.
486 In 1953, there were only 581 tractors in the province: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Reseda 
estadistica de la Provincia deJaen (1956), p. 223.
487 Consejo Economico Sindical Pronvincial -  Jaen: Estructura economica de la provincia de Jaen, vol. 
Ill: Agricultura, p. 80.
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The situation in the olive sector in Jaen was therefore significantly different 
from the wheat sector in Cuenca. At the outset, it could be expected that the olive 
sector would be in a more precarious situation than the latter due to the more rigid 
crop structure. However, this did not turn out to be the case. The main difference was 
that there was not the shift of the supply curve to the left in Jaen that was so important 
for post-war level of wheat output in Cuenca.
All in all, olive farmers in Jaen fared on average far better than the wheat 
growers in Cuenca. This happened in spite of the fact that in a market with falling 
official prices, olive growers were in a less favourable position than the wheat farmers 
were. This second group could choose to increase their self-consumption and be less 
dependent on the market for their provisions. Yet, this expedient was only possible to 
a very limited extent for the olive farmers, due to the nature of their crop. This meant 
that the relative success experienced by the olive growers in Jaen happened in spite of 
their greater dependency on the market.
Within the olive sector, the data has showed that the economic advantages 
connected with the black market and declining real wages increased with farm size. It 
might therefore be that small-scale farmers experienced something less extravagant 
than the “golden age”, which Naredo found for the large-scale olive farmers. Still, 
neither was it an economic depression similar to what the average small-scale wheat 
farmer experienced in Cuenca.
The comparison between the situation for olive and wheat growers reveals an 
important fact about the effects of the system of intervention on output and farm 
income. It demonstrates that their circumstances were not solely the result of 
intervention itself. The development in the stock of capital was also very important 
and cannot be ignored. It is therefore not possible to transfer in toto the conclusions 
about the wheat sector to the olive sector, or vice versa for that matter. Nor can we 
talk about the agrarian sector as a single unit. This is a new interpretation compared to 
the existing literature, which tends to look at the agrarian sector that was subject to 
state intervention as a whole.
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CHAPTER 8: SHIFT IN DEMAND AND RISING PRICES IN THE 
WINE SECTOR AFTER THE CIVIL WAR: THE CASE OF TOLEDO
8.1: INTRODUCTION
This third and last provincial study deals with the economic consequences of the 
agrarian policy for small-scale winegrowers in the province of Toledo. This particular 
province has been selected for two reasons: most of its winegrowers only possessed 
small plots of land, and its production was mainly low quality wine destined for daily 
consumption and/or distillation to industrial alcohol in surplus years. The quality of 
toledano wine is representative of the traditional part of this agrarian sub-sector, while 
the average size of its farms makes it comparable with the other provincial studies.
Until now, the case of wine has received almost no attention in the historical 
debate on the agrarian policy of early Francoism. This is probably because the 
situation for the winegrowers was somewhat distinct from that of the olive and wheat 
farmers. The main difference was that the production of grapes, as well as the 
elaboration, commercialisation and consumption of wine, was not subject to the same 
intervention as the wheat and olive sectors in most of the post-war years. This meant 
that the wine sector did not face production quotas, rationing systems, and that, 
subsequently, there was no black market for its produce.
The purpose of this chapter is therefore twofold. First, it will widen the analysis 
to an important part of small-scale farming in the agrarian sector. This will fill a gap 
in the knowledge about agriculture in the 1940s, since the wine sector has hardly 
received any attention within the context of the economic policy of the Franco regime. 
Second, the different political environment of this sub-sector will be examined 
contrasting it to the cases of wheat and olives. It will thereby be possible to analyse to 
which degree the differences in the developments in the three sectors were caused by 
different policy approaches or by other factors.
The main conclusions to be drawn are that the development of the wine sector in 
Toledo in the 1940s has to be seen in the long-run perspective of changes that had 
been occurring since the beginning of the 20th century. In the post-war years, the 
production of wine was larger than in the 1930s, in spite of the Civil War leading to an 
important decline in the area cultivated with grapes. Furthermore, the prices received 
by the farmers were, in real terms, also significantly higher than before 1936. For the
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individual winegrower, the 1940s were therefore a much more prosperous period than 
the 1930s as long as his vines had not been destroyed during the war.
Although this coincided with a significantly smaller area cultivated with yearly 
crops throughout the province, the relation between this and the situation in the wine 
sector does not seem to be one of direct cause and effect. This holds because 
conditions in the wine sector in Toledo in the 1940s favoured expansion, almost 
regardless of the conditions for the cultivation of cereals. This is important as it, 
together with the results found in earlier chapters of this thesis, indicates that 
developments in significant agrarian sub-sectors were relatively independent. 
Conclusions drawn from one agrarian sub-sector on the economic consequences of the 
Franco regime’s policies can therefore not be generalised for the whole of the sector.
8.2: EXPANSION OF PRODUCTION AND SHIFTS IN OUTPUT COMPOSITION 
IN THE WINE SECTOR IN TOLEDO, 1900-60.
The analysis of the wine sector in Toledo in the post-war years is characterised by an 
apparent paradox. When the Civil War ended, the wine sector in Toledo was left in 
shambles. The cultivated area in 1941 had declined by almost 37 percent compared to 
the 1935 level, and the 1940s did not clearly favour the replanting of vines that had 
been destroyed. The consumption of wine declined in the early 1940s because of the 
economic crisis, and exports of wine decreased after the outbreak of World War II. 
Finally, the precarious supply of edible crops might have led some farmers to consider 
substituting the cultivation of grapes for that of basic staples such as wheat.
In spite of these problems, the statistics show that the trend for production was 
clearly increasing after the war (Diagram 8.1). Furthermore, in real terms farmers 
received higher prices for their must in the 1940s than before the war and the late 
1950s (Diagram 8.2).488 To analyse this development, it is necessary to start with a 
short outline of the pre-war conditions in the wine sector in Toledo.
488 Must is the unfermented juice extracted from grapes.
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8.2.1: Wine production in Toledo before the Civil War: Expansion, Crisis, and 
Political Intervention
Vines in Toledo for the years 1934-35 occupied 18.5 percent of the total cultivated 
area, amounting to almost 9 percent of the national total. However, since the yields 
were lower than the national average, provincial production of must only accounted 
for some 6.4 percent of national production.489 As can be seen in Table 8.1, this took 
place within the context of an agrarian sector that was dominated by grapes and other 
traditional dry land crops like cereals and olives.
The wine sector in Toledo had increased since the beginning of the 20th century, 
in spite of the pre-war period was often characterised by overproduction and calls for 
government protection of the producers at the national level. These claims led to the 
introduction of some protective measures in the last ten years before the war, and they 
remained as the guidelines for the regulation of the sector until the early 1950s. In two 
ways the situation in the wine sector in the 1940s was different from that of the wheat 
and olive sectors. First, there was continuity in policy before and after the war. 
Second, the price policy for wine aimed at obtaining high producer prices rather than 
low consumer prices.
Table 8.1: Average land use in Toledo, 1931-35, and relative value of output, 1934-35.490
Crops Average land use Average land use Relative value of
(Ha.) (%) production in 1934-35 (%)
Cereals 406350 53 59
Grapes ” 142357 18 12
Olives 98369 13 8
Leguminous plants 76136 10 10
Others 49480 6 12
Total 772692 100 100
1) Data for 1935 only. See explanation later in the text.
2) Includes cultivated land only.
Source: Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario Estadistico de las Producciones Agricolas (1931-35).
Within the province of Toledo, the vineyards were mainly located in the section of the 
province that forms part of the La Mancha region. The post-1900 expansion was 
shared with the other provinces that were partly or totally located in La Mancha, 
which became the largest wine-producing region in Spain before the Civil War.491 In 
1934-35, the total area cultivated with grapes in Albacete, Cuenca, Ciudad Real and
489 Ministerio de Agricultural Anuario Estadistico de las Producciones Agricolas (1931-35).
490 The figures for the cultivated area and value of production in the wine sector in Toledo only refer to 
1934-35. This is due to inconsistency in earlier data, as will be explained in Footnote 501.
491 The other provinces in La Mancha are Albacete, Ciudad Real, and Cuenca.
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Toledo exceeded 25 percent of the national total and the production of must was 
roughly 25 percent of the Spanish total.492
The expansion of vines in La Mancha started in the late 19th century with 
impetus provided by the crisis in French wine production after the phylloxera attack in 
the 1880s. This incident led to a golden age for the Spanish wine sector until French 
production recovered and the very same phylloxera spread to Spain. After this change 
in circumstances in the early 1890s, the Spanish wine-sector in general suffered from 
a combination of lower prices and smaller production 493 Yet, vines continued to 
expand in La Mancha up to the Civil War. This was possible because the diffusion of 
the disease was much slower here than, for example, in Cataluna 494 The difference 
gave the La Mancha region a comparative advantage over the Catalan wine sector, 
which had to endure the high costs connected with the replanting of new phylloxera 
resistant American rootstocks.495
World War I led to an increase in prices, but this was a short-lived phenomenon 
that only lasted until the French wine production got back to normal. Problems 
increased with the post-1929 international crisis, which led to declining exports, as 
well as a decrease in sales for human consumption within Spain 496 The expansion of 
wine production in La Mancha before 1936 therefore happened against the 
background of troublesome economic conditions in the sector elsewhere in Spain.
In the mid-1940s the Sindicato Nacional de la Vid, Cervezas y  Bebidas (the 
National Trade Union for Wine, Beer and Beverages - SNVCB), pointed out the main 
reasons for the pre-war crisis. These were a mixture of structural problems, inadequate 
government intervention, and international conditions. The main structural problems 
were that the sector was poorly organised at the producer level, with most 
winegrowers being small-scale farmers and few participating in co-operatives. This 
was especially the case in the interior of the country, where the contacts with 
international markets were limited. The quality of the final produce was jeopardised
492 Immediately before the war, more than 400,000 hectares were covered with vines in the four 
provinces. The second largest wine producing region was Cataluna with close to 18 percent of the 
cultivated area and 22 percent of the national production immediately before the war; Ministerio de 
Agriculture: Anuario Estadistico de las Producciones Agricolas (1934-35).
493 Jimenez Blanco (1986a), pp. 61-64.
494 Fernandez Martinez (1963), p. 30 and Rodriguez Tato (1988), p. 358. The slower diffusion was due 
to different climatic conditions in the two regions, with the determinant factor being the higher 
maximum temperature in La Mancha. For the development of the wine sector in Cataluna between 
1892 and 1935 see: Pujol Andreu (1986).
495 Simpson (1992), pp. 118-128.
496 Between 1922 and 1931, the average export of wine was some 3,729,000 hectolitres, but this fell to 
some 1,554,000 hectolitres in 1934 and 1,354,700 hectolitres in 1935; Sindicato Nacional de la Vid, 
Cervezas y Bebidas (1947), pp. 424.
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by the practice of watering down the wine, which nominally increased production but 
also led to declining prices. Furthermore, the transport system was deficient, which 
hindered market integration. Finally, the SNVCB stipulated that it was middlemen, 
rather than the producers, which received the main part of the profits in the trade of 
high quality wine. The principal complaint against the action taken by the government 
was that the regulation of the markets for alcohol was inadequate to maintain high 
prices in the wine sector. On top of that, governmental, provincial and local taxes 
were described as unequal but generally too high. Finally, the declining exports in the 
1930s due to the world crisis further aggravated the internal problems.497
While the last point obviously was difficult to overcome, the different political 
regimes in Spain tried from the mid-1920s to solve some of the other problems that 
were later identified by the SNVCB. After the end of the relatively prosperous years 
during World War I, demands emerged for government action to recuperate the 
profitability for the winegrowers. The main goals for the farmers were that distilled 
wine should be the only legal base for the production of industrial alcohol, that local 
taxes were reduced, and that the control of the quality of wine should be improved 498
This campaign was successful as it led in the last ten years before the Civil War 
to the introduction of various measures along the lines proposed. From September 
1924, the price and size of wine production determined whether other raw materials 
than grapes could be used for the elaboration of certain types of alcohol.499 From 
1926, preferential status was given to distilled wine for the making of industrial 
alcohol and alcohol for human consumption. Furthermore, the compulsory mixing of 
fuel with industrial alcohol was introduced gradually in the late 1920s and the early 
1930s.500 Also in 1926 it was legally defined what could be sold as “wine”, and it 
became prohibited to mix wine with industrial alcohol or other liquids that were not 
derived from grapes. The regulation was transformed into El estatuto de vino (the 
wine statue) in 1932, and finally made into law the following year.501 This legislation
497 Sindicato Nacional de la Vid, Cervezas y Bebidas (1947), p. 21. Almost 20 years later, similar 
arguments for the crisis were forwarded by the Consejo Economico Provincial (the Provincial 
Economic Council) in Toledo: Consejo Economico Provincial (Toledo) (1961), p. 164.
498 Carrion, Santacana, Tarin (1974), pp. 295-332. The text is a reprint of an article from 1925, 
containing the political demands of the winegrowers.
499 Sindicato Nacional de la Vid, Cervezas y Bebidas (1947), p. 804.
500 Carrion (1974), pp. 350-351.
501 In Footnote 490 it was pointed to that the figures for the area cultivated with grapes in Toledo in 
Table 8.1 only covered 1934-35, rather than for example the 1931-35 average. This is due to the 
difficulty in accepting official statistics, which show a remarkable 65 percent increase in the cultivated 
area -  including young non-productive vines - from 85,856 hectares in 1931 to 142,357 hectares in 
1935. In the same years according to the official statistics, the cultivated area with productive vines 
went from 78,850 hectares to 130,987. Although the protective measures introduced after 1926
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continued to govern the market for wine and alcohol until the end of the 1940s, and
502was the base for subsequent laws that remained in force until the early 1950s.
The situation in Toledo reflected the problems of the sector at the national level, 
and some of the protective measures that were introduced were important for the 
winegrowers in the province. The SNVCB described the lack o f internal organisation 
in the sector as a general structural weakness, and this also applied to Toledo. Co­
operatives were virtually non-existent in the province until the late 1940s, and the 
local capacity for the elaboration of grapes into wine was very limited. This meant 
that only a minor part of the value added in the production of wine ended up in the 
hands of the farmers. The structural problems were not eased by the fact that it was 
small-scale farmers that produced most of the grapes before and after the Civil War.503 
The difficulty in mechanising the cultivation of grapes imposed a limit on the 
possibilities of improving the farming techniques. At the same time, the investments 
that were required for improving the elaboration process also meant that the individual 
farmer only had a limited scope for changing the technical conditions in the industrial 
part of production. Consequently, major shifts in the production of wine had to await 
the introduction of co-operatives, which did not happen on a larger scale until the 
early 1950s.
The production in Toledo in the 1930s and 1940s was therefore characterised by 
a large number of small-scale farmers who produced low quality wine (Table 8.2). 
Hence, the regulation of the production of industrial alcohol in favour of the use of 
distilled wine was important for the majority of the winegrowers in Toledo, as it 
raised the prices for low quality wine. Table 8.2 also shows that the predominant 
position of low quality wine in Toledo was quite typical for the Spanish wine sector as 
a whole, with different sorts of bulk wine being the main produce.
benefited the farmers, the 1930s also were characterised by declining exports and a retraction in 
national consumption. It therefore appears likely that expansion in the cultivated area did not happen at 
such a rapid speed between 1931 and 1935 but rather was a longer process, which, however, was not 
registered before the early 1930s. At that time there was an increase in the incentive for the farmers to 
report correct production figures, since this was necessary to obtain benefits from the state intervention. 
A similar problem affects the official statistics of the neighbouring province of Ciudad Real, where 
some 140,000 hectares of vinecwere reported in the last five years before the Civil War as well as in 
1939. However, in 1940 this jumps to slightly over 200,000 hectares, where it remains until another 
leap upwards of 40,000 hectares is reported in 1946: Ministerio de Agricultural Anuario estadistico de 
las producciones Agrarias (1931-35, 1939-40, 1943-46).
502 See Sindicato Nacional de la Vid, Cervezas y Bebidas (1947), pp. 807-820 for the law of 1933. The 
legislation also included technicalities such as the compulsory declaration of production, the definition 
of the concept of Denominacion de Origen and the compulsory labelling of the bottles.
503 See Section 5.2.3.
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Table 8. 2: Destination of must produced in Toledo and Spain, 1934-35.
Type of wine Toledo Toledo Spain Spain
(Hectolitres) (% of total) (Hectolitres) (% of total)
Ordinary red wine 1429476 58,8 16403330 42,3
Ordinary white wine 766022 31,5 12302557 31,7
Ordinary ros6 wine 32445 1.3 7561217 19,5
Fine red wine 93658 3,9 346368 0,9
Fine white wine 81700 3,4 317521 0,8
Fine ros6 wine 20175 0,8 165295 0,4
Others 12342 0,5 1659750 4,3
Total 2432094 100 38756038 100
Source: Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario Estadistico de las producciones
agricolas (1934-35).
8.2.2: The Conditions in the Wine Sector during the Civil War: Phylloxera, Warfare, 
and Collectivisation
The Civil War had a profound negative influence on the wine sector in Toledo and the 
cultivated area in 1941 was almost 37 percent smaller than in 1935. Such 
developments were found in other parts of the agrarian sector as well, so even in 1941 
the total cultivated area was still some 25 percent below the pre-war level (Table 8.3). 
According to the official statistics, most of the decline in the area cultivated with 
grapes happened between 1940 and 1941. However, according to a letter from March 
26, 1941 written by the Jefatura Agricola in Toledo to the Ministry of Agriculture, the 
decline preceded these years:
Answering your letter of the seventh of the current month, I can say that the 
data on the area cultivated with vines, which are shown in the lOR-form,504 is 
the result of the latest received data. Last year we could not get updated 
information, which is why we instead reported data from earlier years.5 5
Although a 37 percent decrease in the area cultivated with vines is remarkable, it was 
not an isolated phenomenon. In the neighbouring province of Cuenca the decline was 
some 35 percent, and here the reduction was attributed to a further spread of 
phylloxera during the war.506
Similarly, the decline in the area cultivated with grapes appears to be the 
outcome of various factors related to the Civil War. First phylloxera also appears to 
have been a factor in Toledo, but it is difficult to determine the exact importance of
504 I.e. the form used by the provincial office of the Ministry of Agriculture to report the statistics on 
wine to Madrid.
505 Ministerio de Agricultura: Informes 10R, Toledo, 1941. The 1941 figure might be too high, since in 
1942 the cultivated area was given as 84,325 hectares. \rcxw>\«*Aov^ ')
506 See Section 6.3.
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the disease. Yet, it was reported in some of the CGAT “Supply maps” in the late 
1940s,507 and replanting with American rootstocks took place in the mid-1940s.508
Table 8.3: Civil War influence on the area cultivated area with the main crops in Toledo, 1931- 
40.
Crops 1931-35 average 1936
N-COo> 1938 1939 1940 1941
cultivated area cultiv. area cultiv. area cultiv. area cultiv. area cultiv. area cultiv. area
(Hectares) (Hectares) (Hectares) (Hectares) (Hectares) (Hectares) (Hectares)
Wheat 226144 N/A 145070 N/A 140425 140000 175000
Barley 106658 N/A 51470 N/A 58880 80010 85000
Rye 13658 N/A 6250 N/A 8750 12750 15200
Oats 57397 N/A 27230 N/A 21400 29975 27700
Olives ^ 98369 N/A 60896 N/A 87269 87267 850004'
Grapes 142357 N/A 98581 N/A 112589 112489 89833
Leguminous 69736 N/A 31010 N/A 37976 56232 57890
Total 714319 N/A 420507 N/A 467289 518723 535623
1) The statistics cover the area controlled by the Republican Government.
2) The 1935 cultivated a r e a w i n e m a k i n g ,  and olive for oil production.__________________________________
3) Include carob beans, vetch, chickpeas, beans, peas, and green beans._____________________________________
4) Estimated figure based on the data for 1940 and 1943. There is no data for area cultivated with olives for olive oil 
production for 1941 and 1942.
Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de Espafla (1943); Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario 
Estadistico de las Producciones Agricolas (1931-35,1939-40); Ministerio de Agricultura: Estadistica de Cereales y 
Leguminosas (1937); Ministerio de Agricultura: Estadistica de la Produccion Olivera (1937); Ministerio de Agricultura: 
Estadistica de la Produccion Vitivinicola (1937). Ministerio de Agricultura: Informes 10R, Toledo, 1941.
Second, destruction of the vines caused by combat is also a likely cause for the decline 
in the cultivated area. During most of the Civil War, Toledo was divided between an 
area controlled by the Government and another by the insurrectionists. However, after 
the initial months of combat, the frontline did not change much, and the Government 
maintained control over roughly two-thirds of the province.509 On the other side, after 
the early conquest of Toledo and Talavera de la Reina, the rebels occupied the 
remaining third of the territory.510
The effects of the war are described in a report from the administration of the 
insurrectionists. The report is probably written in 1938, and it declares that war-related 
damages, which included more than just churches and monasteries, in 17 villages. In 
addition, the report stated that means of production were destroyed before the arrival 
of the Francoist army. The main obstacle for the recovery of agrarian production was 
the lack of work animals, and although no figures were given for these, the number of
507 Comisaria General de Abastecimiento y Transporte: Mapas de abstecimiento (Provincia de Toledo, 
1949), Muncipalities of Almonacid de Toledo and Yepes.
508 Sindicato Nacional de la Vid, Cervezas y Bebidas (1947), pp. 22-23. Given the higher costs that this 
involved compared to using European vines, it is likely that replanting with American rootstocks was 
the result of a further spread of the disease. Nevertheless, European vines were still used for new 
plantations as late as the early 1960s, which indicates that the spread of the disease was under control at 
that moment. Fernandez Martinez (1963), p. 32.
509 These were located in a belt along the borders of Cuenca to the east, Ciudad Real to the south and 
the southern part of Caceres to the west.
5,0 This was found in the north-west comer of the province, next to the northern part of Caceres, and the 
southern parts of Avila and Madrid.
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other animals had declined by two thirds when compared to 1936.511 It is likely that a 
part of the reduction in the area cultivated with grapes was the result of the prolonged 
division of the province by the frontline. On the other hand, the decline in the number 
of work animals was not likely to be detrimental to the maintenance of the existing 
vines, due to the perennial nature of the crop. Yet, lack of work animals could be a 
hindrance for the plantation of new vines, since this requires a thorough preparation of 
the soil. Moreover, the yields obtained from existing vines could be perjured if  lack of 
work animals led to less or no ploughing so that less water would reach the roots.
Another factor to consider is the collectivisation process that took place in the 
part of the province controlled by the Government during the war.512 Up to August 
1938, the Instituto de Reforma Agraria recognised 100 collectives with a total of 
289,362 hectares.513 This equals some 37 percent of the total cultivated area, but only 
some 20 percent of the total exploited area. This was relatively less than in Cuenca 
and, especially, Jaen. Yet, it has to be taken into consideration that the province of 
Toledo was divided in two parts during most of the war, and that no collectivisation 
took place in the part controlled by the insurrectionist. It is possible that uncertainty 
about property rights connected with collectivisation and post-war de-collectivisation 
could result in sub-optimal care taking of vines, and thereby spreading phylloxera 
further.
One element that apparently did not affect the situation of the wine sector after 
1939 was the availability of labour. The official figures on male employment in 
agriculture514 indicate a slight increase from some 115,000 persons in 1930 to some 
118,000 persons in 1940, but at the same time, there was a minor fall in the total 
provincial population.515 However, as the 1940 census data were generally inflated,516 
it is likely that the decrease in the population was larger than reported, and that the 
agrarian sector employed less than 118,000 persons in 1940. Yet, since yields were 
higher in the 1940s than before the war lack o f labour was probably not a problem in 
the wine sector in the 1940s.
5,1 Diputacion Provincial de Toledo: Unnamed and undated report, pp. 7-13.
512 See Section 6.3 for the argument that collectivisation and de-collectivisation could be detrimental for 
agrarian production.
5.3 Carrion (1973), pp. 135-136. A similar number of collectives, but without data on the size of the 
affected area, is found in Rodrigo Gonzalez (1985), pp. 94-97.
5.4 See Footnote 270 for the necessity to restrict the discussion of employment to the male population.
515 See Table 5.1.
516 See Section 5.1.1.
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8.2.3: The post-war demand induced changes in production
The post-war years for the wine sector in Toledo were characterised by higher real 
prices than before the war, in spite of the fact that the demand for wine for human 
consumption declined. Yet, this was more than counteracted by an increase in the 
demand for alcohol for industrial use and human consumption. The winegrowers 
reacted to the demand shift by increasing output of high alcohol white wine, which 
was suited for distillation. Still, the reaction of the farmers does not appear to have 
been detrimental to cereal output since land was plentiful. The market conditions 
changed again in the beginning of the 1950s when prices declined sharply. However, 
at this point the government stepped in and introduced a system of intervention that 
kept producer prices up, making it possible for the farmers to continue the expansion 
of their production. This relatively positive development for the winegrowers was not 
a foregone conclusion. One of the main findings from the previous section was that 
between 1935 and 1939 the area cultivated area with grapes declined by almost 40 
percent. Furthermore, in spite of the fact that wine production had expanded before 
the war in the La Mancha region, including Toledo, the 1940s does not at first sight 
appear to be a period that favoured the replanting of vines.
There are several reasons for this. First, the economic crisis in Spain led to a 25
c  i n t
percent decline in consumption of wine in the first half of the 1940s. This was 
because the working class, especially in the countryside, consumed a large part of the 
ordinary wine in Spain, and that consumption was positively correlated to the 
employment rate.518 The second problem affecting the wine sector was a further drop 
in exports after the outbreak of World War II. We noted earlier that when compared to 
the 1922-31 period, exports were already down by approximately 60 percent 
immediately before the war. Nevertheless, the situation became even worse with the 
average exports between 1940 and 1945 standing at only 13 percent of the 1921-31 
average.519 The third factor to take into consideration was the precarious supply of 
edible crops, which might have led some farmers to consider substituting the 
cultivation of grapes for that of basic staples.520 Yet, the possibility of growing crops 
such as wheat was complicated by the fact that these were integrated in the system of
517 While the consumption per capita decline by roughly 30 percent, total consumption was roughly 25 
percent below the pre-war level.
18 Sindicato Nacional de la Vid, Cervezas y Bebidas (1947), pp. 21, 421 and 427. No data exists after 
1945.
519 Between 1940 and 1945 average exports were 507,400 hectolitres, while the 1921-31 average was 
some 3,729,000 hectolitres: Sindicato Nacional de la Vid, Cervezas y Bebidas (1947), pp. 424.
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intervention. As described in Chapters 3, 4, 6 and 7, this would on one side have the 
inconvenience of state fixed-prices, production quotas and so on, but on the other also 
opened up the possibility of black market earnings. Whether this would have been 
attractive for the individual farmer would depend on a combination of circumstances 
such as farm size and access to the black market. In all cases, the state tried to avoid a 
shift in the opposite direction, i.e. from the cultivation of intervened crops to grapes, 
and legal restrictions on the expansion of vines were in force throughout the 1940s.
Still, a higher level of demand for low quality wine, which was subsequently 
distilled into alcohol, counteracted these negative factors. This was due to a lack of 
imports of alcohol and fuels, and it partly compensated for the decline in exports and 
domestic consumption of wine.521 This situation led to the somewhat unexpected 
development in the prices received by farmers for must between 1931 and 1958. 
Given the general level of inflation, it is hardly surprising that in current pesetas the 
price level in the 1940s was higher than in the 1930s. Yet, Diagram 8.2 showed that 
prices received by the farmers in real terms were also significantly higher in the 1940s 
than in both the 1930s and the 1950s.522 The elaboration of must therefore changed 
towards a final produce of inferior quality, i.e. wine suitable for distillation, which 
somewhat paradoxically coincided with an increase in producer prices. Table 8.2 
demonstrated the destination of must before the Civil War, and here we saw that six to 
eight percent of must was used for high quality wine. This figure declined slightly in 
the 1940s, and during some years, no high quality wine was produced at all in Toledo. 
Another shift in production that took place was the use of between two and six percent 
of the production for sulphured musts from 1944 onwards.523 However, given the 
relatively small production, the importance of these changes was limited. The most 
significant movement that took place was a major shift from the production of 
“ordinary red wine” to “ordinary white wine”.524 Behind this was a widespread 
expansion of the white Airen grape, which today is the most widespread type in La 
Mancha.525 Still, as indicated earlier, the shift in grape type was not a shift towards a
520 Piqueras Habas (1993), p. 86.
521 Carrion (1974), p. 351.
522 See Section 3.2.1 for the reason for the use of constant pesetas, as well as for the choice of using the 
deflator for the “agriculture, forestry and fishing” from Prados de la Escosura (1995), for the 
calculation of re«.i prices.
523 Ministerio de Agricultural Anuario Estadistico de las producciones agricolas (1933-35, 1939-40, 
1943-62).
524 Before the Civil War some 60-70 percent of the must was used for ’’ordinary red wine”, with 
roughly 30 percent going to ’’ordinary white wine”. After 1939, this gradually changed to the opposite 
distribution.
525 Duijker (1992), p. 152.
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higher quality of wine, but towards a higher amount of alcohol originating from the 
Airen grape. The reason for this shift was that prices were positively correlated with 
the amount of alcohol in the produce when the wine was used for distillation.
It is therefore hardly a surprise that the quality of the white wine of La Mancha 
in the 1950s, which was normally sold in Madrid, has been described as:
The white wine produced at the time had not much to recommend it. The grapes 
were usually picked too late in the season and then fermented at a temperature 
which was to high to be able to preserve the wine’s fruit and freshness. 
Moreover, the alcohol content was usually around 13 to 14 percent, which made 
the wine very soporific.526
The practice of a late harvest was one way to increase the percentage of alcohol, but, 
as the above author states, this happened at the cost of quality.527 Unfortunately, there 
are no provincial data describing the amount of must that was distilled. At the national 
level some 600,000 hectolitres of wine were on average distilled between 1926 and 
the beginning of the 1930s. This increased sharply in the last three years before the 
war, reaching 1.8 million hectolitres in 1935.528 After a minor decline to 1.5 million 
hectolitres in 1940 and 1941, the upward trend continued and reached approximately 
2.5 million hectolitres in 1944.529
In the 1940s, there were two reasons for the increased use of wine for
C T A
distillation. The first was an increase in the exports of brandies and liquors. 
Although most of the grapes were produced in La Mancha, the elaboration of the must 
into brandy mainly took place in Jerez de la Frontera in Andalucia.531 The business 
link between the Airen-producing farmers in La Mancha and the brandy production in 
Jerez increased especially after the opening of a railway connection in 1945.
526 Duijker (1992), p. 153.
527 Even in the early 1980s, many bodegas were still working in the tradition of favouring alcohol 
percentage over quality, which at that time had become an obstacle for the modernisation of the sector. 
See Junta de Comunidades de Castilla-La Mancha (1982), pp. 223-225.
528 This was the result of that the state fuel monopoly CAMPSA by the law of June 5th 1935 that 
regulated the market for alcohol, was ordered to buy alcohol made from molasses for blending with 
fuel. This lead to an increase in the demand for alcohol made from vine in other parts of the economy. 
See Sindicato Nacional de la Vid, Cervezas y Bebidas (1947), p. 820-822, for the text.
529 Sindicato Nacional de la Vid, Cervezas y Bebidas (1947), pp. 421-422.
530 The average exports of brandy were 7,558 hectolitres in 1931-35, 38,367 hectolitres in 1941-45 and 
55,373 hectolitres in 1946-50. Comercio exterior de Espana. Numeros indices (1901-1956), p. 78.
531 This is still the case in the beginning of the 21st century. Local grapes in Jerez are too expensive to 
use for brandy, since they are the only ones that legally can be used for the production of sherry. The 
advantage of making brandy in Jerez originates in that it is old sherry casks that are used for its 
production.
332 Robinson (ed.) (1994), pp. 148-150.
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Parallel to the increase in brandy production, a new regulation of the market 
for alcohol appeared after the war. In 1941 and again in 1947, further restrictions were 
placed on the production and use of alcohol that was made from products other than 
wine. From 1947, the control of the market was carried out by the Comision 
Interministerial del Alcohol (the Interministerial Commission for Alcohol) which had
* 533 »the authority to set the prices for a number of non-wine alcohol products. In this 
way the producers used the distillation of wine as a safety valve in years of 
overproduction in relation to the domestic demand and export possibilities.534
However, the favourable development of prices did not persist beyond 1952-53 
when an important decline set in after two years with better than average harvests. 
This led the government to extend its intervention in the sector to secure minimum 
prices for the farmers. New regulations were launched, first as temporary solutions in 
1952, but already from 1953 as a lasting measure. The main point was the creation of 
the state agency, the Comision de Compra de Excedentes de Vino (CCEV, the 
Commission for the Buying of Surplus Wine) which was to regulate the market prices 
for wine. The CCEV offered loans to co-operatives against security in wine, as well as 
purchasing grapes and wine from farmers, co-operatives and wine-producers when the 
price fell below a predetermined level. The state agency would then sell the produce 
as either wine or alcohol when prices were higher.535 Another function of the CCEV 
was to encourage the establishment of co-operatives and facilitate credits so that these 
could store production until prices raised. In the case of Toledo, the organisation of 
producers in co-operatives increased from 11 in 1943 to 143 in 1963, with 26,767 
members in the latter year.536
At the national level, the activities of the CCEV quickly reached huge 
proportions. In 1953, which saw the largest harvest of the decade, the CCEV bought 
more than 12 percent of the wine produced. The following year, when the harvest was 
also better than average, CCEV was authorised to buy up to 400 million kilos of 
grapes from La Mancha and other specific areas where such action was estimated to 
be necessary.537 After the introduction of minimum prices in 1952-53, the official
533 Carrion (1974), pp. 352-354.
534 The importance of alcohol for the price of wine was already well accepted in the 1920s. In this 
period, the winegrowers argued that an important protection for wine could be gained through the 
prohibition of making alcohol from other products than grapes, unless the harvest was below normal. 
Carrion, Santacana, Tarin (1974), pp. 316-317. As described in Section 8.2.1, this was partially 
conceded by the Government from the mid-1920s.
535 Carrion (1974), pp. 337-345 and 364-365.
536 Movimiento Nacional: Toledo. Espana en paz, p. 97.
537 Carrion (1974), pp. 335-340.
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statistics show a prolonged increase in the productive area in the La Mancha region 
that lasted until the early 1980s.538 This knowledge about the wine market is necessary 
for the interpretation of the post-war statistics on production, cultivated area, and 
yields in Toledo.
Diagram 8.1 demonstrated that post-war output increased steadily after the Civil 
War. This happened despite that the cultivated area remained almost constant until 
1960. Subsequently, the official data in Diagram 8.3 show that the yields were 70 
percent higher in the 1940s and early 1950s than in the 1930s,539 before they started to 
decline again in the late 1950s.540 The level of the yields in the early 1950s according 
to the official statistics is comparable to the level of 20-22 hectolitres per hectare 
found in the 1990s. This was mainly due to the bumper harvest of 1953, and can not 
be considered a normal situation. With legal restrictions on the expansion of vines in a 
situation with high prices paid to the farmers, it appears plausible that an increase of 
the cultivated area was camouflaged as an increase in the yields. It might be an 
exaggeration to explain all of the increase in the yields in the 1940s to a possible 
underestimation of the cultivated area, but few alternative explanations are likely.541
The availability of fertilisers was significantly smaller in the 1940s than before 
the war, mechanisation did not begin on any major scale before the 1960s, and the 
number of co-operatives was still very limited in the 1940s. It is therefore conceivable 
that the process in reality was smoother than what the official data show. Moreover, 
the figures state a doubtful increase of the cultivated area of some 25,000 hectares of 
vines between 1958 and 1960.
Piqueras Habas (1993), pp. 89-91.
539 The picture is the same when calculated on the bases o f grapes and when the calculation is based on 
must.
540 Note that the data behind Diagram 8.3 suffer from a problem of incoherence before 1934, as 
discussed in Footnote 501. This, however, does not seem to affect the data on the yields, which are 
coherent in the pre-war period. This might indicate that the Ministry of Agriculture got the yields 
roughly right, but seriously underestimated the cultivated area and, thereby, the total production. If it 
was the other way around, i.e. that the estimate of the total production was correct, so it was the data on 
the cultivated area that were to low. The consequence would be then much lower yields in the pre-war 
period. In the light of the post-war data, this seems unlikely.
41 In the last years before the Civil War, the national trend was one of declining yields after the sector 
entered a crisis as a result of raising wages and declining exports. In this situation farmers seem to have 
reacted by reducing labour input, which led to declining yields: Simpson (1985), p. 240-242; Pujol 
Andreu (1986), p. 329.
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A more gradual development also fits with the reporting from the mid-1940s of that 
re-plantation was happening at a quite fast rate in Toledo due to the high prises at that 
time.542 In sum, it appears that from the end of the Civil War until the early 1950s the 
strategy of the winegrowers was to increase the industrial yields at the expense of 
quality.543 At the same time, the extension of the cultivated area was probably 
disguised as higher yields. Although the expansion of the crop appears to have been a 
viable solution in the 1940s and 1950s, Table 8.4 indicates that this was probably not 
detrimental to the cultivation of cereals.
The situation in Toledo resembles what we saw in Cuenca in Chapter 6, i.e. that 
the recovery of the pre-war total cultivated area was still not accomplished 25 years 
after the end of the Civil War. This was the result of that a large amount of land that 
had been cultivated before the war was left fallow, and that expansion of almost all 
crops that took place after 1943 was very slow. We observed earlier that the 
administration of the rebels claimed that an important decline in the number of work 
animals occurred because of the Civil War. In Chapter 6, we argued that one of the 
main reasons for the slow recovery of the pre-war level of production in the 1940s 
was exactly due to this factor. It is therefore plausible that this element was also at 
work in Toledo, but the statistics in Table 8.5 on the number of mules are 
inconclusive, as a result of inconsistencies in the pre-war data.
The data for 1933 looks problematic in comparison with the 1929 figures and 
the post-war development. It does not appear logic that the increase in the number of 
animals between 1940 and 1950 should not be reflected in the area under cultivation. 
However, this remained relatively stable in the period at a level some 15 percent 
below the 1931-35 average.544 When this is taken into account, it becomes clear that 
vines and cereals did not compete for the same land in the 1940s and early 1950s in 
Toledo. Consequently, it is erroneous to ascribe the post-war decline in the cultivated 
area with cereals to this factor. On the contrary, the expansion of cereals and vines 
occurs simultaneously. Note that these conclusions are similar to those in Cuenca, 
where the development was analysed from the “point of view” of the cereal
545growers.
542 Sindicato Nacional de la Vid, Cervezas y Bebidas (1947), pp. 22-23. It was here estimated that the 
pre-1936 cultivated area was re-established by 1946. This, though, seems exaggerated in the light of 
that the amount of land under cultivation did not reach its pre-war figure until as late as 1960.
543 Apart from lowering the quality, watering down the produce or mixing with other substances were 
other ways of increasing the yields.
544 See Table 8.9 above.
545 See Chapter 6.
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Table 8.4: Index of composition of land use in Toledo, 1931-62 (1931-35 total cultivated area = 100}
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Years Cereals Grapes1’ Olives1’ Leguminous Others2’ Cultivated total Meadows, pastures Fallow land
scrubland and wood
1931-35 52,6 18,4d’ 12,7 9,9 6,4 100,0 50,9 39,9
1939 29,7 12,44’ 11,3 5,3 5,2 63,2 55,2 35,3
1943-47 42,2 12,0 11,6 12,2 5,2 83,2 38,9 44,7
1948-52 43,1 12,3 11,5 12,2 5,4 84,4 35,9 38,4
1953-57 44,3 12,8 11,6 11,8 6,0 86,3 32,8 N/A
1958-62 43,4 13,2 11,8 12,3 3,9 84,7 s’ 38,3 N/A
1) Includes non-productive land.
2) Includes esparto grass until 1958 only, which accounts for the decline in the last period.
3) Data for 1935 only due to incoherence in pre-war data, as explained in Section 8.2.1.
4) Data as given in 1941 due to inaccurate original data for 1939, as explained in Section 8.2.2.
5) See note 2.
Sources: Ministerio de Agricultural Anuario Estadistico de las producciones agricolas (1931-35,1939, 1943-62); Ministeriode
Agricultural Resumen estadistico de las producciones agricolas (1954-55).
Table 8.5: Number of mules in Toledo, 1933-50.
Years Animals older Animals older All animals
than 1 year than 3 years
1929 N/A 56516 60503
1933 N/A 45030 48967
1940 45939 41764 47355
1942 46442 43310 48017
1948 54143 N/A N/A
1950 55509 N/A N/A
Sources: Ministerio de Agricultural “Tres estudios econdmicos”;
Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsidn: Anuario Estadistico de Espana
(1929); Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de
Espana (1943-45,1950,1953-54).
8.3: POST-WAR WINE PRODUCTION IN TOLEDO IN FACE OF CHANGES IN 
THE RISK ENVIRONMENT
Three factors are crucial when considering the economic consequences of the post­
war agrarian policy for the wine sector in Toledo. First, there was no black market for 
grapes or wine, which makes it easier to accept the post-war official statistics on the 
value of production. Second, small-scale farmers dominated the sector, which limited 
the scope for adjusting the patterns of production at least until the early 1950s when 
co-operatives became more widespread.546 Finally, some of the relevant statistics are 
problematic. The pre-1934 figures underestimate the cultivated area, output and the 
aggregate value of production in the wine sector by an unknown factor. Moreover, the 
post-1940 figures on cultivated area and yields are likely to be incorrect.547 Thus, it is 
necessary to be careful with the official data on the development of the value of the 
production.
Nevertheless, it appears clear that winegrowers in Toledo in the 1940s 
experienced a situation which, although far from simple, was still economically more 
favourable than in the 1930s. The negative aspects were the decline in exports and in 
domestic demand for wine for human consumption. However, domestic production 
was smaller than in the 1930s. This and the increase in the use of alcohol based on 
grapes more than compensated for these factors and led to higher prices. Farmers 
benefited further from the development of wages in the agrarian sector.548
Diagram 8.4 shows the official figures for the value of production of the wine 
sector converted into constant 1958 pesetas, and according to these, the average value 
of production reached its climax in the late 1940s.549
546 See Sections 5.1.2 and 5.2.3.
547 See Sections 8.1.2 and 8.2.3.
548 See Chapter 7, where this factor was discussed at some length in relation to the olive sector.
549 prices were obtained using the deflator for “agriculture, forestry and fishing” from Prados
de la Escosura (1995). See Section 3.2.1 for the use of r  ~ prices instead of nominal prices, as well 
for the choice of deflator. The total value of production includes the value of must, grapes sold for 
direct consumption and wood from the vines. Approximately 90 percent of the value of the production 
of products and sub-products came from the value of the must: Ministerio de Agricultural Anuario 
estadistico de las producciones agricolas (1931-35, 1939-40, 1943-60).
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Diagram 8.4: Real value of total production - including subproducts - and value per cultivated hectare in
the wine sector in Toledo, 1930-58.
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Still, according to the official statistics, this pattern also counts for the value of 
production per cultivated unit of land, where the 1941-58 average in real terms was 
274 percent of the 1930-36 average.550 Yet, it was earlier pointed out that the 70 
percent increase in the 1940s’ yields reported in the official statistics looked 
suspicious. It is thus conceivable that the official figures on the value of production 
per unit of land are too high for the 1940s, but hardly sufficient to cancel out the effect 
of the increase in prices.
Simultaneously, wages in real terms were lower than in the 1930s, making the 
amount of cultivated land the main variable that determined the economic outcome for 
the individual farmer. The significant decline in the amount of land under cultivation 
in connection to the Civil War was the result of two largely exogenous incidents: war 
related destruction and the limits to the spread of phylloxera. Thereby, the timing of 
the recovery process becomes crucial for the evaluation of the situation faced by the 
winegrowers after 1940. This is especially so in the light of the several factors that 
changed in the early 1950s and that were important for the profitability of the 
cultivation of grapes. The most significant changes were probably the introduction of 
guaranteed minimum prices in years with a large production, and the incentives to 
establish co-operatives with financial help from the CCEV.
Still, it is a problem that the official statistics on production indicates a 
development in the sector, which is different from what that suggested by the statistics 
on the cultivated area. The timing of the post-war expansion of production can 
therefore be interpreted in two different ways. On one side, the production statistics 
indicate a continued growth of production from the mid-1940s to at least the late 
1950s. On the other side, the statistics on the cultivated area indicates that the main 
post-war increase took place in the second half of the 1950s.551
In the first case, the policy changes in 1952-53 stabilised an ongoing expansion 
at a time when prices began to decline. The expansion in the 1940s was the result of 
that the farmers reacting to the post-war conditions with a combination of an increase 
of production and a shift in the structure of output. This took place by substituting red 
wine-producing grapes for the Arien variety, which, producing high alcohol white 
wines, was a suitable response to the growth in demand in the 1940s for alcohol based
550 The peak was in 1947, where the value of production per hectare was 627 percent of the 1930-35 
average. The lowest point was found in 1940 when the value of production per hectare was only 67 
percent of the pre-war average.
51 In both cases, see Diagram 8.1.
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on grapes. In the longer perspective, the 1940s were an integrated part o f  the secular 
expansion o f the cultivation o f grapes that started in the early 2 0 th century.
In the second scenario, the 1952-53 policy shift was a necessary condition for 
the increase o f the crop. Within this interpretation, the intervention in the wine sector 
before 1952-53 was insufficient to trigger a widespread growth in the sector. This 
happened although the farmers obviously faced a situation that, due to the absence o f 
a black market, was less complicated than in the cereal and olive sectors. Seen in 
perspective the 1940s constituted a break in the secular expansion o f  vines in Toledo 
that started in the early 20 th century and continued into the early 1980s.
The difference between the two interpretations can be boiled down to the 
question o f  whether the sector was able to exploit the market conditions in the 1940s 
and continue the growth in production. A comparison between the development o f 
production in La Mancha and in Cataluna, which was the second largest wine 
producing region in Spain, indicates an answer to this question. Diagram 8.5 strongly 
suggests that while production could be augmented in La Mancha in the 1940s, this 
was only the case in Cataluna after the introduction o f  further legislation in 1952-53.
is
The same impression^When comparing the development o f  the value o f output in the 
wine sector in the two regions (Diagram 8 .6 ).
In the 1940s the problem o f the Catalan wine sector to adjust to the new market 
conditions, were likely to be the result o f the relative successful changes that had 
taken place before the Civil War. The plantation o f American vines after the 
phylloxera attack had required large investments, and the consequence was that grape 
production was concentrated in the areas most suited for the crop. In the first 30 years 
o f the 20th Century, this had been accompanied by technical improvements in the 
cultivation o f grapes and the elaboration o f wine, as well as an increase in the number 
o f co-operatives.552 A return in the 1940s to the production o f  low quality wines for 
distillation was therefore not feasible since it would equal render useless the large 
investments in vines and infrastructure that had taken place over the last 30-40 years.
The gradual increase of production Toledo from the early 1940s appears to have 
been a two step process, with the division line running around 1952-53. The relatively 
high prices in real terms in the 1940s obscure the fact that this happened against the 
background o f a crisis in the human consumption o f wine.
552 Pujol Andreu (1986), pp. 331-337.
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Diagram 8.5: Production of must in La Mancha and Cataluna, 1939-62.
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The high prices that the farmers could get for their must were the result o f an 
extraordinary demand for alcohol, and the farmers reacted to this incentive by 
spreading the Airen grape, which produced high alcohol white wines. However, this 
strategy was bound to run into trouble with the growth o f  the Spanish economy from 
the beginning o f the 1950s.
Although the demand for wine would increase given its position as a superior 
good, in the longer run the request would be for higher quality wines. This would 
happen at the expense o f the low quality wines produced in Toledo and La Mancha. 
The continued growth in production after 1952-53 is therefore likely to have been the 
outcome o f the system of guaranteed minimum prices, which justified the investment 
involved in planting new vines. Nevertheless, production was still mainly oriented 
towards low quality wine.553 For the individual farmer, a change in production 
towards higher quality output would require investments in new vines and a more 
careful cultivation o f the grapes. However, to obtain higher prices it would also be 
necessary to improve the elaboration o f the must into wine. This was probably beyond 
the economic possibilities o f the average farmer, and had to await the establishment o f 
co-operatives. A large-scale improvement o f  the quality o f  output in La Mancha was 
therefore bound to be a complex and long-term process.
It is difficult to reject that for the winegrowers in Toledo the post-war years 
were economically more favourable than the immediate pre-wear period. At the same 
time, the 1940s were also a continuation of the secular trend, which stretched back to 
the early 20th century. For the small-scale farmers in Toledo, the most obvious 
alternative to grape cultivation would be cereals, but with low official prices, this was 
hardly an attractive option in the 1940s. Neither would the fact that the soil in La 
Mancha is relatively poor for dry-land cereal cultivation »v*ce.A‘v«.
In a place like Toledo, the post-1950 development in wages would further 
encourage this course. Non-mechanised grape cultivation was significantly more 
labour intensive than non-mechanised cereal cultivation.554 Moreover, it was much 
easier to mechanise the cultivation o f cereals than that o f  grapes. For large-scale 
farmers, the potential economies o f scale in cereal cultivation would favour a shift 
towards these types o f crops,555 while the small-scale farmers would have a
553 As late as in 1975, the Diputacion Provincial de Toledo complained in a report o f the lack o f further 
elaboration o f the produce beyond bulk vine: Diputacion Provincial de Toledo (1975), Fase II, Vol. 1, 
p. 78.
54 One unit of land required approximately twice as much labour input if  cultivated with vine instead of 
cereals: Rodriguez Tato (1988), p. 361.
555 See Section 6.4.2 for this discussion.
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comparative advantage if they cultivated grapes. They were in a much more difficult 
position to mechanise due to the lower limit of farm size that would make such an 
investment profitable.556 At the same time, a relatively large part of the work in the 
cultivation of grapes would be made by non-wage labour in the form of the farmer and 
his family.557 The data in Table 5.15 from the Agrarian Census of 1962 confirms the 
comparative advantages of the small- and large-scale farmers.
Although the legal situation and economic conditions favoured the expansion of 
grapes rather than cereals, it is not possible to blame this factor for the poor 
performance in the cultivation of cereals in Toledo in the 1940s. Compared to the pre­
war situation, the total amount of land under cultivation in Toledo was so much 
smaller that neither the scarcity of land nor labour was a problem. It has not been the 
purpose of this chapter to explore the reasons for the decline in the amount of land 
with cereals. Yet, the conclusions from Chapter 6 on the neighbouring province of 
Cuenca showed that this was mainly the result of the lack of work animals and 
fertilisers after the end of the Civil War. The above description and the figures in 
Table 8.4 suggest that a similar process took place in Toledo.
8.4 CONCLUSIONS
The main conclusion from this analysis of the wine sector in Toledo after the Civil 
War is that the farmers experienced an economic situation that was more favourable 
than in the 1930s. This was the result of a growth in the demand for wine suitable for 
distillation, and the farmers reacted to this by increasing output of low quality, high 
alcohol white wine. Consequently, total output increased gradually after 1939. This 
does not appear to have been detrimental to the production of cereals, since less land 
in total was cultivated in the 1940s than before the war. After 1952-53, this expansion 
continued within the context of state intervention that further protected the sector 
through the introduction of floor prices.
The analysis of the wine sector in Toledo, together with the conclusions from 
Chapters 6 and 7, suggest that the development of the different agrarian sub-sectors 
followed relatively independent paths. The main cereals, olives and grapes often could 
be cultivated on the same type of land. Nevertheless, substitutions appear to have been
556 Ibid. and Chapter 5 on typical farm size for winegrowers in Toledo.
557 In the neighbouring province of Ciudad Real, relatively more vine was found on large-scale farms 
than in Toledo. However, here the wine was generally of a higher quality, thereby obtaining higher 
prices, making it economically more viable for large-scale farmers to cope with the rising level of 
wages.
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secular rather than short time in nature. This corresponds to the conclusion from 
Chapter 3, where it was stated that crop substitution mainly took place between annual 
crops. In the short run this is not surprising considering the investments and de­
investments involved when taking vines and olives in and out of production. However, 
the results from Chapters 7 and 8 indicate that this was also the case in the long run.
The analysis has shown that similar kinds of intervention led to quite different 
result in terms of production, as was demonstrated in the cases of wheat and olives. 
On the other hand, different types of intervention led to similar results in production 
for olives and vines. The implications of this for our understanding of the period under 
investigation will be explored in the following conclusion of this thesis.
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
The present thesis provides a new understanding of the economic consequences of 
Francoist agrarian policy in the 1940s and early 1950s. The principal argument is that 
it was external constraints, and not the official prices paid to farmers, that primarily 
determined the post-war level of output of yearly crops. The analysis also 
demonstrates that similar forms of state intervention in the olive and wheat sectors 
produced quite different results at the level of output. Thereby it has been shown that 
the economic consequences of the agrarian policy were heterogeneous and depended 
on the particular circumstances in each sub-sector. This result is further supported by a 
comparison between the olive and wine sectors, which experienced relatively similar 
developments in output in spite of being subject to different regimes of state 
intervention. Finally, the comparison between the situation in Spain and in other 
countries improves the understanding of the policy choices taken be the Franco 
go yemment. The main point is that the agrarian policy in Spain in the 1940s had 
similarities with those carried out in other countries. Hence, the Spanish system of 
intervention was not unique but included advantages and disadvantages akin to those 
found elsewhere.
A significant part of the thesis focuses on the economic conditions for small- 
scale farmers. The evidence presented in Chapters 3, 6, and 7 shows that although the 
large-scale farmers undoubtedly benefited more from the black market than their 
small-scale counterparts, black market earnings were important for the latter as well. 
Nevertheless, the analysis revealed that the economic situation for small-scale farmers 
was complex and contained a variety of outcomes. On the one side, when black 
market earnings are included, the average value of production per unit of cultivated
f C O
land did not appear to have declined in real terms compared to the 1930s. On the 
other side, it was not possible to maintain the pre-war cultivated area with yearly 
crops. The economic outcome for the farmers was therefore a consequence of a 
number of factors such as the size of the exploitation, the cultivated crops and the 
farmers’ access to work animals and chemical fertilisers.
558 The illegal nature of the black market made it necessary to rely on estimates of the black market 
prices received by farmers. Black market earnings were therefore calculated in such a way that they 
were likely to under-estimate farmers’ economic gains. This procedure secured that the bias of the 
results mns contrary to the main argument in the thesis.
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From the early 1970s, the main trend in the historical literature has been to stress 
the economic policy as the main reason for the post-war decline in agrarian output.559 
In the early 1980s, this line of interpretation was further strengthened by the works of 
Barciela.560 Hence, in the last 15-20 years these have been the main reference points 
for the analysis of the relation between Francoist economic policy and agriculture.561 
Nevertheless, Simpson relatively recently suggested that lack of work animals and 
artificial fertilisers could have been important for the post-war decline in output. 
The conclusions from the present thesis are at odds with the interpretation represented 
by Barciela, but in line with the argument suggested by Simpson.
Barciela and Garcia Gonzalez maintained that the depressed official prices led 
small-scale farmers to withdraw from the market.563 Nevertheless, given that we found 
that the real value of production per unit of land kept up with the pre-war level, 
leaving the market does not appear to be a likely response. With most work being 
done by the family, non-cultivation of land would only result in a limited reduction in 
variable costs, while fixed costs would remain unchanged. Moreover, to the extent 
wage labour was used, official prices increased relative to wages and a withdrawing 
from the market would therefore reduce profits. The analysis of the economic 
conditions for small-scale farmers forms a contrast to several existing studies, which 
have centred on large-scale farms.564 In these works it has generally been argued that 
notwithstanding that the 1940s were a period of depressed official prices in real terms, 
farmers were compensated through black market earnings and declining real wages. 
So, while the importance of black market earnings for the large-scale farmers has been 
recognised in the historical literature, is has hitherto been unclear as to what the 
situation was for the smaller farms. The present thesis demonstrates that if small-scale 
farmers sold less in the market, it was mainly due to a smaller marketable surplus and 
not because of declining prices as stipulated by Barciela and Garcia Gonzalez.
A possible counter-argument to the interpretation forwarded in this thesis might 
be that black market earnings were too insecure or volatile to be useful as guidelines
559 The viewpoint can be found in Clavera et al. (1973), which was a seminal work on the Spanish post­
war economic history.
560 Barciela (1981a), Barciela (1981b), Barciela (1983a), Barciela (1986b), and Barciela and Garcia 
Gonzalez (1983).
561 The works of Barciela are often referred to in more general articles and books on Spain’s economic 
history, including Harrison (1985), Harrison (1990), Lieberman (1995), Prados de la Escosura and Sanz 
(1996), and Richards (1999).
562 Simpson (1995).
563 Barciela and Garcia Gonzalez (1983), pp. 84-86.
564 For example Naredo (1981), Naredo (1983), and Naredo, Ruiz-Maya and Sumpsi (1977). In the last 
article, the focus is on the relation between sharecroppers and large-scale landowners.
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for future earnings. Farmers could therefore be supposed to plan the following harvest 
based on official prices. Yet, the longevity and the relatively large size of the black 
market along with the price elasticity of supply for wheat work against such an 
argument. Furthermore, in Chapter 3 it was intended to establish a relation between 
official prices and planned output, but this was not possible. This can indicate either 
that there was no such relation, or that the quality of the statistics is deficient. Yet, 
Astorquiza and Albiso computed the price elasticity of supply for wheat for the 1959- 
85 period and determined that it was positive but low.565 The economics literature 
indicates that the price elasticity of supply in the agrarian sector in general is 
positively correlated with technical development.566 Thus, it is difficult to argue that 
the price elasticity of supply should have been significantly higher in Spain in the 
1940s than in the 1959-85 period. This is important in relation to the argument that 
black market earnings did not affect farmers’ decision on how much wheat to sow. 
The case is, that the price elasticity of supply calculated by Astorquiza and Albiso is 
far too low to support the conclusion that official prices alone explain the post-war 
decline in wheat output.
As indicated earlier, it turns out that lack of work animals and artificial 
fertilisers were the main reasons for the post-war decline in output. The Civil War 
resulted in a 10 percent decline in the number of mules. In normal circumstances, it 
would not have been a major problem to replace the missing animals by imports. Yet, 
World War II interrupted this trade, and at the same led to an increase in the demand 
for animals for military purposes in other countries. Consequently, the decrease in the 
number of work animals during the Civil War had a disproportionate effect on the 
agrarian sector due to the outbreak of World War II. However, at least in the medium 
term, the regime could have done more to alleviate this problem. The introduction of a 
price ceiling on mules, as well as the absence of a large-scale breeding scheme, 
delayed the recovery of the pre-war stock of animals. Nevertheless, a change in policy 
would hardly have been sufficient to solve the problem of supply of mules in the 
1940s, due to the lack of adequate breeding animals in Spain.
World War II also significantly reduced the international trade for nitrogenous 
fertilisers, due to the use of nitrogen in the production of explosives. After 1945 this 
was followed by a situation where the United Nations regulated the international 
commerce with nitrogenous fertilisers until 1949, allocating less fertiliser to Spain
565 Astorquiza and Albiso (1985).
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than desired by the government. At the same time, Spanish industry was incapable to 
compensate for the shortfall in imports. Before the war, Spanish production of 
nitrogenous fertilisers was very limited. This was a result of a lack of competitiveness 
and an international market that was characterised by over capacity and low prices. 
The dictatorship tried to solve the problem of supply with the help of the INI. Yet, the 
programme suffered from technical problems, and the jealousy of the institution vis-a- 
vis the private sector was also an obstacle for increasing output. Anyhow, to obtain 
self-sufficiency in this field was hardly a short-term project. Furthermore, it can be 
questioned whether it would be economically sound to reach this goal as the 
experience from the 1914-39 period was that a shortage in war years could quickly be 
replaced by over capacity in peace time.
The importance of fertilisers and work animals for the agricultural supply 
situation in Spain in the 1940s is underlined by the way the wheat supply crisis was 
solved around 1950. At this time, output increased but mainly through a greater use of 
fertilisers rather than an expansion of the amount of cultivated land. This development 
suggests that there was not a large amount of idle capital in the 1940s in the form of 
work animals and/or machinery, which could have been put into use if  the economic 
incentives had been there. The lack of fertilisers during World War II as well as the 
post-1945 regulation of international trade has hitherto not been stressed in the 
historical literature. Such an omission is important in the light of contemporary 
estimates which show that the fertilisation of normal Castilian dry land would lead to 
a 40 percent increase in the yields of cereals.
The constraints on output of yearly crops have the consequence that the 
desirability of the system of intervention has to be re-evaluated. It is argued in the 
present thesis that to solve the supply problem the answer was neither to increase 
official prices nor to liberalise the market completely. With external restrictions on 
output, higher official prices would have increased returns to land and capital without 
substantially increasing production. This process would principally had benefited the 
large-scale farmers. Although the richest consumers would pay the largest part of the 
price increase in absolute terms, the poorest consumers would face the risk of an even 
more precarious living standard. Liberalising the market would also have left the 
poorest consumers worse off in the short run by denying them the security of 
receiving a minimum amount of their foodstuffs through the rationing system.
566 See Askari and Cummings (1976), Chhibber (1989), Griliches (1960), Peterson (1979), and Schiff 
and Montenegro (1997).
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Moreover, the low price elasticity of supply in the agrarian sector in Spain in the 
1940s make it doubtful whether output would have increased substantially in the 
medium term. The result of increasing consumer prices and maintaining the rationing 
system, or liberalising prices and consumption, would be a socially regressive 
redistribution of income.
On the other side, the introduction of a parallel market in 1950, which worked as 
a self-regulated dual-price policy, helped to solve the problem c4 the supply of basic 
foodstuffs. However, this measure was applied late in the period, and could have been 
introduced earlier if it had been politically acceptable to the Franco regime. Another 
way out of the deadlock could have been the introduction of an across-the-board 
consumer subsidy. While both of these solutions had their own faults, they would 
have increased the legally-consumed part of the production without a negative effect 
on the size of output. The late introduction of such measures places a heavy legacy on 
the Francoist regime. This less than perfect handling of the situation was not only 
found in Spain. Yet, the degree of success turned out to be positively correlated with 
structural traits in the agrarian sector as well as the rest of the economy. A comparison 
with the policies employed in other countries during World War II shows that 
rationing and price controls were often introduced on an ad hoc basis. Governments 
and administrators were often unable to foresee all the consequences of state 
intervention, and the type of sub-optimal policy carried out by the Franco regime can 
also be found in other countries in later periods of history. Yet, when compared to 
more industrialised countries like Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States, Spain was in a disadvantageous situation to change production patterns and 
improve the productivity of its land.
In the inquiry into the olive sector, it was estimated that the official statistics of 
output of olive oil probably should be increased by up to ^  percent for the 1940-52 
period due to underreporting caused by the black market. With the exception of wheat, 
barley, rye and oats - where the Ministry of Agriculture revised the statistics -  olive is 
the first crop where such a correction has been made. Based on the new estimate of 
olive oil output, it was argued that rationing was unnecessary to secure a sufficient 
supply of olive oil to the population in most of the post-war years. This result clarifies 
an ambiguity that appears in Tio’s interpretation of the supply situation in the
cf: n # t
1940s. The question he did not answer was whether there was scarcity of olive oil 
for human consumption in Spain in the 1940s or not. The conclusion from Chapter 4
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clearly suggests that there probably was a situation of insufficient supply in the early 
post-war years, but that this was not the case later in the decade. Nevertheless, there 
was a lack of oils and fats for industrial use, but this was mainly the effect of the 
international situation in the post-war years rather than a consequence of state 
intervention in Spain.
The largely unnecessary state intervention in the markets for olive oil for human 
consumption created market distortions, including a black market, which, though, was 
significantly smaller than the black market for wheat. At the same time, it was argued 
that the existence of a black market did not increase olive oil output, while it did for 
wheat. Chapter 4 demonstrated that the relative size of the black market for olive oil 
equalled up to 2 percent of the legal market between 1940 and 1950, or 1 percent of 
average output. These figures are not that different from the calculation made by 
Gutierrez del Castillo in an article that until now has been the point of reference for
c z o
this topic. Still, the new computation covers a longer period, includes a revision of 
the figures for total output and corrects various minor errors made by Gutierrez del 
Castillo.
The different developments in the relative size of the black market and output of 
olive oil and wheat happened in spite of the fact that the decline in official prices was 
almost similar in the two cases. The differences were rooted in the sectors’ 
dependence on fertilisers and work animals. As the olive farmers relied to a lesser 
degree on these two inputs they were not hit by a simultaneous fall in prices and 
output, as was the case with the average wheat grower. The economic situation for the 
olive farmers also improved because rural wages did not keep up with agrarian prices. 
In a much overlooked article, Naredo used the development of the price-wage relation 
to argue that large-scale olive farmers experienced a “golden age” in the late 1940s.569 
In Chapter 7, it was concluded that although this might be too optimistic a description 
to be applied to small-scale olive farmers, the picture was far from catastrophic. 
Nevertheless, while state intervention had only a limited immediate effect on olive oil 
output, it cannot be denied that it might have delayed the expansion of the cultivated 
area. The time-gap between plantation and the first harvest meant that this would only 
be felt on the supply side in the medium term.
The examination of the wheat and olive sectors reveals that it is difficult to talk 
about the consequences of state intervention for the agrarian sector as a whole, or to
567 Tio (1982).
568 Gutierrez del Castillo (1983).
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transfer results from one sub-sector to another. This point was emphasised by the 
analysis of the wine sector in Toledo in Chapter 8. There are no obvious points of 
comparisons in the historiography with the following conclusions, as the wine sector 
has not been examined before in the light of the agrarian policy of the period.
In contrast to wheat and olives, the markets for grapes and wine were 
characterised by a protective intervention in the 1940s. This does not mean that the 
situation was uncomplicated, since market conditions were somewhat different from 
the pre-war years. On the one hand, demand for wine for human consumption was 
depressed, but on the other, there was increased demand for wine-based alcohol. 
These two factors, together with protective measures, led to an increase in the unit 
price of must, and, in the case of winegrowers in Toledo, a partial shift in production 
from red wine to white wine.
The analysis has demonstrated that the official statistics for Toledo in the 1940s 
underestimate the cultivated area with grapes. Still, the error appears to be small, and 
after the Civil War retraction, the pre-war extension of the crop was not reached again 
until the early 1960s. Taking into account that prices in real terms declined in the 
1950s, it is a peculiar phenomenon that the re-plantation of rootstocks accelerated in 
this decade rather than in the 1940s. Yet, the developments in Toledo followed a 
national trend. This emphasises the importance of the change in policy in 1952-53, 
which extended the existing system of price guarantees. At the same time, the 
improvement of the general economic conditions in Spain increased demand for wine. 
Thus, the farmers probably perceived the 1950s as economically more favourable than 
the 1940s. Nevertheless, the situation in Toledo cannot be seen as solely the 
consequence of a shift in the agrarian policy, but was also related to the secular
thdevelopment of land use in La Mancha. Since the beginning of the 20 century, the 
unsuitability of the soil for dry-land cereal cultivation in the region had worked as an 
incentive to increase the cultivation of grapes.
To summarise, the analysis in Chapters 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8 suggests that the 
developments in different agrarian sub-sectors to some degree followed independent 
paths. Similar patterns of intervention in the cases of wheat and olives led to quite 
unlike results in levels of output. At the same time, quite different sorts of intervention 
led to similar outcomes in the cases of olives and grapes. This happened despite the 
fact that cereals, olives and grapes could often be cultivated on the same land, but 
substitutions between yearly and perennial crops appear to have been restricted. This
569 Naredo (1983).
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is not surprising in the short run, when one considers the investments and de­
investments involved when taking vines and olive trees in and out of production. 
However, the conclusions from Chapters 7 and 8 indicate that substitution was also 
limited in the longer run. The discussion of the economic consequences of the agrarian 
policy for the farmers in the 1940s and early 1950s has therefore to discriminate 
between agrarian sub-sectors. Hitherto, this is seldom found in the historical literature, 
where focus often has been on a single crop.570
Within the broader context of the economic policy of the early Franco regime, it 
is normally stressed that autarky and state intervention was a deliberate choice 
influenced by the German and Italian pre-war experiences. According to Francoist 
ideology, widespread state intervention was seen as necessary to prepare the country 
for war and making it militarily and economically independent. As pointed out in 
Chapter 1, this strategy materialised in Spain through the creation of the state-holding 
INI, whose activities in the 1940s were focused on military-related industries. The 
dominant status of industry relegated the agrarian sector to a secondary place, where 
its main purpose was to provide cheap foodstuffs for the industrial labour force. This 
thesis does not change the perception of the subordinated nature of the agrarian sector 
with regards to industry. Nevertheless, it introduces a shift in the understanding of the 
conditions governing the agrarian sector: Since there were external constraints on 
agrarian output in the 1940s, intervention by the government was a reasonable 
measure to secure distribution of basic foodstuffs. Although this was not the reason 
behind the intervention, it was a likely policy in the circumstances of World War II.
The intervention that took place was not always the best possible, and this 
especially concerns the distribution of the produce to the population. A number of 
confluent factors, of which the following are the most likely, can help explain the 
deficient working of the rationing system. First, the relevant persons in the 
administrations thought that the planning of the economy in all cases was the correct 
way of pursuing the political goals of the regime. Second, insufficient statistical 
information, especially the lack of knowledge of the size of the black market, had the 
consequence that the administrators and politicians believed that the supply situation 
was worse than in reality. Third, the lack of knowledge about how to handle an
570 Most of the work by Barciela had been on the wheat sector, while Tio and Gutierrez del Castillo 
analysed the olive oil sector. Contrary to this, Clavera et al. mainly referred to the agrarian sector as a 
whole without distinguishing between sub-sectors.
571 See for example Barciela (1986b), Catalan (1992), Catalan (1995), Clavera et al (1973), Gamir (ed.) 
(1980), M.-J. Gonzalez (1980), Preston (1995), Tusell (1993), Velasco Murviedro (1981) and Vinas 
(1984).
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intervention system made it deficient. Fourth, personal economic interests of 
administrators and politicians were involved in the black market, either through direct 
participation or through the acceptance of bribes. It has been pointed out that all four 
elements were probably at play simultaneously throughout the 1940s and early 1950s.
Finally, the opposition of the Ministry of Agriculture to the plans of the CGAT 
about the “harmonisation” of prices in 1946 showed important disagreements in the 
government about the course of its economic policy. This finding is parallel to the 
conclusions of a recent book by San Roman on the INI. She maintained that although 
the interventionist line in the government was strong in the 1940s, it was also resisted 
by members of the cabinet and industrial circles.572 The closed nature of the regime, 
including the strict censorship of the press, tends to emphasise shifts in government as 
breaking points for changes in policy. Within this line of reasoning, Barciela has 
stressed the shift in government in 1951 for the liberalisation of the agrarian sector in 
the following years. Yet, such an interpretation can be misleading, as demonstrated 
in this thesis. The steps taken by Rein Segura in the late 1940s clearly anticipated the 
actions of Cavestany, who took office as Minister of Agriculture in 1951.
572 San Roman (1999).
573 Barciela (1986).
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APPENDIX 1: THE LIMITS TO THE RELIABILITY OF THE 
OFFICIAL STATISTICS
1.1: INTRODUCTION
It is well known that the statistics covering the agrarian sector during the Franco years 
are less trustworthy than could be desired, especially taking into consideration that we 
are dealing with a relative recent historical period.574 Concerning the topics that are 
dealt with in the present thesis, two main problems arise with the use of official 
statistics on the agrarian sector in the 1940s. The first problem is the result of that the 
Franco regime was a dictatorship, and it is necessary to consider whether the agrarian 
statistics were deliberately manipulated for political purposes. The second problem 
relates to the existence of a large black market for foodstuffs in the 1940s, which had 
the consequence that the original statistics underestimated output as well as the 
cultivated area. It is the purpose of this appendix to discuss the nature of these 
problems, as well as to show which solutions have been chosen to make it possible to 
work with the available data in spite of the existing problems.
1.2: THE QUESTION OF THE POSSIBLE DELIBERATE MANIPULATION BY 
THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE OF THE AGRAIAN STATISTICS 
COVERING THE 1940S
The question of whether the agrarian statistics of the 1940s were deliberately 
manipulated, has its origin in a note sentence from the 1950 edition of the statistics 
published by the Ministry of Agriculture. In the Anuario Estadistico de las 
Producciones Agricolas it was stated that until that year the statistics had been 
elaborated in the following way:
The estimations of the harvest of all the crops, and therefore also those for the 
autumn cereals, used to be based exclusively on data from the Provincial 
Agronomic Offices which were later corrected by the DG of Agriculture. The 
data coming from the Provincial Offices had been sent to them by the local 
organisations, and had passed an initial correction by the Provincial Offices 
(..•).575
574 Barciela (1986a), pp. 161-164.
575 Ministerio de Agricultural Anuario Estadistico de las Producciones Agricolas (1950), pp. 1-2. 
(Underlining by the author,
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It is the use of the words “corrected” in a context where statistics where employed for
• * • 576political aims, which raises the first question about the reliability of the data. 
However, an inspection of some of the original data sent from the Provincial Offices 
indicates that the Ministry Agriculture did not systematically falsify the figures it 
received. The corrections are easily recognisable in the originals, but there are very 
few and in the majority of the cases concerns errors of calculation of the value of the 
production.577 This means that the published statistics reflects the information 
facilitated by the local bureaucracy to the Ministry of Agriculture, which is an 
argument against that the statistics were systematically falsified by the Ministry in 
Madrid.
1.3: THE OFFICIAL AGRARIAN STATISTICS AND THE BLACK MARKET FOR 
FOODSTUFFS
Although the Ministry of Agriculture does not appear to have made a systematic 
falsification of the agrarian statistics in the 1940s and early 1950s, this does not mean 
that they necessarily are correct. This is due to that the existence of a large black 
market for foodstuffs had the consequence that not all output was officially registered. 
However, this insight is not new, since the Ministry of Agriculture as early as in 1950 
started to revise output statistics for wheat, barley, rye, and oats for the 1939-48 
period. According to the Ministry, it was noted in 1950 that there was an important 
difference between the pre-harvest data on expected output facilitated by the local 
authorities, and the amount of grain that was later purchased by the SNT. Using this 
difference as a benchmark, the statistics for national output of the four cereals between 
1939 and 1948 were then changed.579 However, the procedure appears to have been
576 Political use of statistics is found in Ministerio de Agricultural Anuario Estadistico de las 
Producciones Agricolas (1939), where it is “shown” that the rebels were better organisers of the 
agrarian production than the Republic during the Civil War. Another example is that pre-1936 agrarian 
statistics were “corrected” in 1955 to “demonstrate” that the pre-war “Republican” agrarian production 
was smaller than the post-war “Francoist” production. This corrected pre-war data are generally 
rejected in the historiography and has therefore not been used in this thesis. Barciela (1986a), pp. 161- 
164. See Ministerio de Agricultural Resumen Estadistico de las Principales Producciones Agricolas 
1954-55, pp. IX-X, and 24-25 for the “corrected” pre-war figures.
577 Se for example Ministerio de Agricultural Informes 5R (olives); Id.: Informes 7R (cereals and 
leguminous); Id.: Informes 1 OR (wine).
578 The difference between the pre-harvest expectation and the post-harvest data was probably the 
outcome of a gradual liberalisation of the control system and the introduction of a parallel market, 
which occurred in 1950. See Section 3.7 for a detailed description.
579 Ministerio de Agriculture: Resumen estadistico de las producciones agricolas (1950), pp.3-4 and 13. 
It is not explained how the information about the 1950 harvest was extrapolated to the earlier years, and
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somewhat ad hoc since in six of the 10 years between 1939 and 1948,580 the upward 
corrections in output were in relative terms the same. Here the smallest relative 
increase was in the case of rye with approximately 20 percent, while the largest was a 
45 percent in the case of barley.581 In the remaining four years, the corrections were 
somewhat smaller.582
The following year, the Ministry continued the work and produced revised 
provincial data for the four cereals covering the yearly average cultivated area and 
average yearly output between 1939 and 1948.583 It is notable that the percentage 
increase in the data for the average cultivated area between 1939 and 1948 is generally 
less than five percent and practically of the same size for all provinces.584 However, 
the corrections of the average cereal output are more heterogeneous, as can be seen in 
Table A.I.
Table A. 1: Official corrections of average cereal output, 1939-48.
Wheat Barley Rye Oats
Original figures for average total
yearly output, 1939-48 (metric tons) 2577788 1431613 382114 466709
Official revised figures for average total
yearly output, 1939-48 (metric tons) 3205970 1856410 438070 563653
Increase in average yearly output,
1939-48 (Percent) 24 30 15 21
Smallest increase at provincial level
in average yearly output, 1939-48 (percent) 20 24 10 14
Largest increase at provincial level
in average yearly output, 1939-48 (percent) 26 34 17 26
Sources: Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario Estadistico de las Producciones Agricolas (1939-40,
1943-48 and 1951); Institute Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de Espana (1943).
When analysed closer it appears that there is a geographic pattern in the statistical 
corrections of total cereal output, i.e. the aggregate output of wheat, barley, rye, and 
oats. In A.2 , it can be seen that most of the smallest relative corrections
it has not been possible to localise the manuscript behind the revised published data to solve this 
question.
580 That is in 1942-45, 1947-48.
581 The figure for wheat is a 35 percent increase and for oats a 33 percent increase.
582 In 1939-41 output of barley and oats were not corrected. While the increase for rye was four percent 
in these three years, the adjustment of wheat output was 11 percent in 1939 and 1940, and nine percent 
in 1941. Concerning 1946, the figures were wheat: 14 percent; barley: 36 percent; rye: 12 percent; oats: 
24 percent. Ministerio de Agricultural Resumen estadistico de las producciones agricolas', Ministerio 
de Agricultural Anuario Estadistico de las Producciones Agricolas (1939, 1940, 1943-49); Institute 
Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de Espana (1943).
583 Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario Estadistico de las Producciones Agricolas (1951).
584 The increase in the area cultivated with wheat was between 3.21 percent and 3.74 percent, with the 
exception of Valladolid where the data remained unchanged. In the case of barley the increase in the 
cultivated area was between 3.10 percent and 3.95 percent, with the exception of Orense where the 
increase was 5.11 percent. The increase in the area cultivated with oats was between 3.69 percent and 
5.58 percent. The data for the area cultivated with rye were not changed. Ministerio de Agricultura: 
Anuario Estadistico de las Producciones Agricolas (1939-40, 1943-48, 1951); Institute Nacional de 
Estadistica; Anuario Estadistico de Espana (1943).
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correspond to the North-eastern part of the peninsula. At the same time, some of the 
largest corrections correspond to the South,586 as well as some provinces - such as 
Alicante, Barcelona, and Madrid - where local output was to small to meet demand. 
This could reflect that the corrections were made with a view to that black market 
trade was most widespread where wheat was important in the crop structure, when 
local supply was insufficient, as well as in provinces where land was concentrated in 
few hands.
Table A. 2: Relative corrections at provincial level of aggregate output of wheat, barley, rye, and 
oats, 1939-48.
Increase in % Provinces Increase in % Provinces
15,0 Pontevedra 24,8 SPAIN
15,3 Orense 24,9 Burgos
16,6 Lugo 25,2 Malaga
19,8 La Coruna 25,2 Teruel
21,3 Le6n 25,2 Cuenca
21,3 Oviedo 25,6 Cordoba
22,2 Valladolid 25,6 Avila
22,4 Santander 25,7 Tarragona
23,0 Zamora 25,7 Granada
23,0 Las Palmas 25,7 C£diz
23,1 Logrono 25,7 Valencia
23,2 Navarra 25,9 Lleida
23,6 Guadalajara 26,1 Castellbn
23,7 Soria 26,1 Sevilla
23,7 Alava 26,4 Ja6n
23,8 Palencia 26,4 Aibacete
23,8 St. Crus de T. 26,5 Segovia
23,9 Vizcaya 26,6 Toledo
24,0 Huesca 26,7 Badajoz
24,1 Cdceres 27,4 Murcia
24,1 Guipuzcoa 27,5 Madrid
24,1 Salamanca 28,1 Barcelona
24,2 Huelva 28,3 Almeria
24,4 Zaragoza 28,3 Ciudad Real
24,5 Baleares 28,5 Alicante
24,7 Gerona
24,8 SPAIN
Own elaboration based on Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario Estadistico
de la Producciones Agricolas (1939-40,1943-48,1951); Instituto
Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Etadistico de Espana (1943).
Since no other data were corrected, the reliability of the available data for agrarian 
output and cultivated area can be questioned on several grounds. The first problem is 
that even the corrected data often were constructed applying a similar relative increase 
to the original data in different years and in different provinces. This would either 
suggest that the relative size of underreporting was stable from year to year, or that the 
Ministry of Agriculture only had a general idea of the amount of underreporting that 
took place. The second problem is that although there was a black market for almost
585 I.e. Galicia, Asturias, Santander, and part of Castilla la Vieja.
586 I.e. parts o f Castilla-La Mancha and Andalucia, as well as Murcia.
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every agrarian produce, the statistics were only revised for the four main cereals, but 
not for example for leguminous plants or olive oil. A special problems relates to the 
value of output, where the underreporting of output introduces an error, but where this 
is magnified by the fact that black market prices received by the farmers were higher 
than official prices. Consequently, the raw data are still problematic, and it has been 
necessary to take this into account at various points in this thesis.
The approach to the issue has been pragmatic focusing on the problems, which 
had the largest importance for a given topic under discussion. Generally speaking, 
data supplied in the main text shall therefore not be considered as perfect. They shall 
rather be seen as the best available, where every caution has been taken to correct 
possible errors and/or discuss the likely magnitude and bias of those errors.
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APPENDIX 2: HUMAN CONSUMPTION OF NON-OLIVE OIL 
BETWEEN 1940 AND 1944
Gutierrez del Castillo maintained that between 1940 and 1944, 97,954 metric tons of 
non-olive oil was distributed through the rationing system for human consumption. 
However, this is not correct, and the real figure was only 307 metric tons for the five 
years. The error has its origin in a misinterpretation of the distribution and 
consumption of edible oils.
The part of the production of olive oil that was controlled by the state through 
the rationing system had several outlets: The civil population, the military personnel 
and their families, the civilian industry, the military industry, the Spanish possessions 
in Morocco, exports, and stocks. In Table 4.6 these outlets, with the exception of 
exports and stocks, have been pooled in Column 5 “Amounts of oil sold in legal 
markets”. The official information on the amount of oil sold through the rationing 
system for human consumption only refers to “oil”.587 Erroneously, Gutierrez del 
Castillo therefore supposed that this heading referred to olive oil as well as other sorts 
of edible oils. She therefore deducted the consumption of other oil types from the total 
legal consumption of oil, to reach the figure of the total legal consumption of olive oil, 
but this is incorrect.588
Olive oil is produced in several different qualities that can easily be separated 
and sold to different markets. The quality of the oil depends on factors such as the 
quality of the fruit, the time gap from harvest to grinding, the pressing method, and 
whether the oil comes from the first or later pressings. Approximately five percent of 
the oil would normally have an acidity of more than 15°, which made it unsuitable for 
human consumption even after being refined.589 Gutierrez del Castillo only had data 
for 1943 and 1944 for the relative amount of oil that went to the civil and military 
industry, and this was 5.54 percent and 5.07 percent of the official production of olive 
oil.590 This means that the data she is using for the consumption of oil in the civil and 
military industry, only refers to the consumption of olive oil in the industry and not all 
types of oils used in the industry.591 The consequence is that the author implicitly
587 See Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de Espana (1943-52).
588 See Table 4.6.
589 Anonymous (1944), s.p. Immediately before the Civil War, olive oil was used in the pharmaceutical 
industry as well as in the making of margarine, pomades, cosmetics and soap; Soroa Pineda (1936), p. 
23.
590 The data for the other years are estimates made by Gutierrez del Castillo.
591 See Gutierrez del Castillo (1983), Table 1, p.158, for her use of the data.
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supposes that vegetable oils with other origins than olives were normally a part o f the 
oil that was distributed for human consumption through the rationing system. 
Although this was the case in years with an acute scarcity o f olive oil, such as 1943 
and 1946, it was generally not allowed.592
In 1943 there was scarcity o f  olive oil, and non-olive oil was then used for 
human consumption in the form o f refined orujo oil with an acidity o f  less than 150.593 
However, this only took place in four provinces594 and only to military personnel and 
their families. In total it amounted to some 307.5 metric tons, which is totally 
insignificant compared to the data given by Gutierrez del Castillo in column 6 in
upV' t
Table 4.6. It was not/l946, where the harvest was the worst o f  the decade, that the 
use o f  non-olive oil for human consumption was permitted again. The types o f  non­
olive oil that was used for human consumption included orujo oil with an acidity of 
less than 15°, and oil obtained from almonds, hazelnuts, peanuts, and cotton.596 
Consequently, only 307 metric tons o f orujo oil shall be deducted from the total 
consumption o f oil in Table 4.6 and only so in 1943.
Since no data are available for the amount o f non-olive oil that was sold through 
the rationing system in 1946, it has been supposed in Table 4 .^  that it was equal to the 
amount in 1943. Seen in the light o f the total amount o f olive oil sold through the 
rationing system between 1940 and 1950, it is o f limited importance whether this 
guestimate is totally correct.
592 Tio (1982), pp. 96-98. Non olive oils were almost exclusively used for industrial purposes, in spite 
o f the rationing o f the olive oil for human consumption, due to a mayor deficit of industrial oils and fats 
in the post-war years. The deficit was caused by a sharp decrease in the imports of these products after 
1939; Zambrana Pineda (2000), pp. 4-6. The imports that took place to alleviate this deficit were 
mainly in the form of animal fats, copra, palm oil, castor beans and linseeds; Tio (1982), p. 429. 
Although the fats and oils that were obtained from these products could be used for human 
consumption - with the exception of castor oil - they were almost exclusively designated for the 
industry.
593 After the repeated application of mechanical pressure, the rests o f the olive fruits still contain oil, but 
can only be extracted through chemical dissolution. Oil obtained in this way is the orujo oil - ”aceite de 
orujo’'' -  and a part o f this can be used for human consumption after being refined. Although orujo oil 
comes from olive fruits, it is illegal to call it ’’olive oil”, since this requires that it is obtained through 
mechanical pressure of the fruit.
594 Almeria, Orense, Pontevedra, and Vizcaya.
595 Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes: Memoria del aciete, pp. 43, 45.
596 Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes: ’’Circular 568”, Boletin Oficial del Estado, 
May 6, 1946. This order modified ’’Circular 548” that originally regulated the intervention o f olive oil 
in 1945/46, and which did not permit the use of non olive oil for human consumption.
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APPENDIX 3: DETAILS ON BLACK MARKET RELATED 
CORRECTIONS OF DATA ON WHEAT, BARLEY, RYE, AND OATS 
IN CUENCA BETWEEN 1939 AND 1949
3.1: INTRODUCTION
For the analysis of the cereal sector in Cuenca in the 1940s, it has been necessary with 
a careful modification of the data on output, cultivated area, and yields for wheat, 
barley, rye, and oats. As explained in Appendix 1, the Ministry of Agriculture 
corrected in the early 1950s the statistics on wheat, barley rye, and oats for the 1939- 
48 period. However, revised yearly figures only appeared for the national aggregate, 
while at the provincial level new figures only appeared as an average for the 1939-48 
period. Nevertheless, it is possible to make a rough revision of the yearly statistics for 
the four main cereals at the provincial level in Cuenca. Even though the correction 
suffer from some insecurity, the revised figures are still preferable to the original 
statistics, since these seriously underestimated output and the amount of land under 
cultivation.
3.2: REVISION OF YEARLY OUTPUT FIGURES IN CUENCA BASED ON THE 
OFFICIAL REVISION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL
As mentioned above, officially revised yearly output figures exists at the national 
level, but at the provincial level they only exist for the 1939-48 as a whole. However, 
Table A.3 shows that the Ministry of Agriculture estimated that the supposed 
underreporting of output in Cuenca between 1939 and 1948, was similar to the 
perceived underreporting at the national level.
Table A. 3: Official relative revisions in cereal output in Cuenca and Spain, 1939-48 average.
Crops Original average 1939-48 Revised average 1939-48 Relative increase in 
average
Relative increase in 
average
output figures (Cuenca) output figures (Cuenca) output figures (Cuenca) output figures (Spain)
(100s of kilos) (100s of kilos) (Percent) (Percent)
Wheat 785764 975185 24,11 24,37
Barley 393743 518975 31,81 29,67
Rye 83900 96699 15,26 14,64
Oats 160984 192769 19,74 20,77
Own elaboration based on Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario Estadistico de la Producciones Agricolas (1939-40, 
1943-48,1951); Institute) Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de Espafia (1943).
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Given the parallel situation in Cuenca and Spain, the yearly data on cereal output in 
Cuenca has been increased in Table A.4 by the same relative amount as the official 
revision of the data for the national total.
As pointed out in Appendix 1, the Ministry increased total national output by the 
same relative amount in six of the 10 years between 1939 and 1948. The revised data 
in Table A.4 shall therefore only be considered as an estimate of the likely size of 
cereal output in Cuenca in the 1940s, and not as an exact measure of output in each 
and every year.
Table A. 4: Own revision of official yearly data on cereal output in Cuenca, 1939-48.
(All figures in 100s of kilos).
Years Original output Revised output Original output Revised output
data for wheat data for wheat11 data for barley data for barleyZ)
1939 664210 735945 430550 430550
1940 700004 775604 292150 292150
1941 796502 872010 338131 338131
1942 869793 1171176 498860 723347
1943 642575 865291 552813 801579
1944 829083 1116360 442118 641071
1945 470855 634006 201150 291668
1946 1530276 1747269 495788 676751
1947 766705 1032368 320745 465080
1948 587641 791259 365123 529428
Years Original output Revised output Original output Revised output
data for rye data for ryeJ> data for oats data for oats
1939 65275 67938 149800 149800
1940 58958 61363 211950 211950
1941 84328 87769 226952 226952
1942 101777 122957 208092 276055
1943 70785 85515 164047 217625
1944 82389 99534 147010 195023
1945 47816 57767 91553 121454
1946 131838 147606 184107 228569
1947 90805 109702 126344 167608
1948 105026 126882 101098 134117
1) Original data were increased by 10,80 percent in 1939-40, by 9,48 percent in
1941,
by 34,65 percent in 1942-45 and 1947-48, and by 14,18 percent in 1946.
2) Original data were increased by 45,00 percent in 1942-45 and 1947-48, and by
36,50 percent in 1946.
3) Original data were increased by 4,08 percent in 1939-41, by 20,81 percent in
1942-45 and 1947-48, and by 11,94 percent in 1946.
4) Original data were increased by 32,66 percent in 1942-45 and 1947-48, and by
24,15 percent in 1946.
Own elaboration based on Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario Estadistico de la
Producciones Agricolas (1939-40,1943-48 and 1951); Instituto Nacional de
Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de Espafta (1943).
However, the analysis in Chapter 6 shows that even when the revised data are used, 
cereal output in Cuenca in the 1940s was significantly lower than before the Civil 
War. Although the revised data suffers from some insecurity, the post-war decline in 
cereal output in Cuenca cannot be disputed, given the magnitude of the difference 
between pre- and post-war output levels.
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3.3: REVISION OF YEARLY DATA FOR THE AREA CULTIVATED WITH 
CEREALS IN CUENCA BASED ON THE OFFICIAL REVISION AT THE 
NATIONAL LEVEL
In the case of the officially revised figures for the area cultivated with cereals, the 
problem is the same as it was for the output data, i. e. that there are only yearly 
estimates at the national level. However, the official corrections made for the 1939-48 
average cultivated area in Cuenca are once again similar to the corrections for the 
same period at the national level, as can be seen in Table A.5.
Table A. 5: Official relative revision of cultivated area with cereals in Cuenca and Spain, 1939-48 
average.
Crops Original average 1939-48 
output figures
Revised average 1939-48 
average figures
Relative increase in 
average output figures
Relative increase in 
average output figures
(Cuenca) (Cuenca) (Cuenca) (Spain)
(Hectares) (Hectares) (Percent) (Percent)
Wheat 164727 170305 3,39 3,27
Barley 40806 42273 3,59 3,66
Rye 21300 21300 0,00 0,00
Oats 42299 44285 4,69 4,88
Own elaboration based on Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario Estadistico de la Producciones Agricolas (1939-40, 
1943-48,1951); Institute) Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de Espafia (1943).
Given the proximity of the corrections for Cuenca and for Spain, and in the absence of 
any alternative estimation, the year to year corrections for Spain have also been 
applied to Cuenca.597 The revisions that are shown in Table A.6 increase the total 
cultivated area in Cuenca by approximately 12,000 hectares, which is roughly 3% of 
the provincial total. As was pointed out in relation to the revised output data in Table 
A.4, the revised data on cultivated area in Table A.6 shall only be considered an 
estimate but not an exact measure for each year.
The increase in the area cultivated with cereals obviously has to be deducted 
from some other heading in Table 6. , which deals with total land use in the province. 
Since the underreporting of land under cultivation was due to the existence of a 
widespread black market, it would not be logic if  land use for cereals was reported as 
being used for other crops.
597 In contrast to the revision of output data in Table A.4, the figures were only corrected for the 1941- 
48 period for barley and oats, as well as for 1942-48 in the case of wheat. This procedure follows the 
method used by the Ministry of Agriculture when the official revisions o f the yearly data were carried 
out at the national level.
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Table A. 6: Own revision of official yearly data on cereal output in Cuenca, 1939-48.
(All figures in hectares).
Years Original data for area Revised data for area Original data for area Revised data for area
cultivated with wheat cultivated with wheat ” Cultivated with barley cultivated with barley
1939 165730 165730 47775 47775
1940 162305 162305 36425 36425
1941 176853 176853 48033 50219
1942 157991 165701 49710 51972
1943 147321 154510 42048 43961
1944 150442 157784 39844 41657
1945 179299 188049 36300 37952
1946 170000 178296 36625 38291
1947 170044 178342 35575 37194
1948 167283 175446 35729 37355
Years Original data for area Revised data for area
cultivated with oats cultivated with oats
1939 42800 42800
1940 47100 47100
1941 56738 60171
1942 52023 55170
1943 48249 51168
1944 41215 43709
1945 36621 38837
1946 35068 37190
1947 31586 33497
1948 31593 33504
1) Original data were increased by 4.88 percent between 1942 and 1948.
2) Original data were increased by 4.55 percent between 1941 and 1948.
3) Original data were increased by 6.05 percent between 1941 and 1948.
Own elaboration based on Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario Estadistico de la Producciones Agricolas
(1939-40, 1943-48, 1951); Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: Anuario Estadistico de Espafia (1943).
It can therefore be supposed that a part of land used for cereals was reported as being 
’’Fallow land” or being used for ’’Meadows, pastures and scrubland”. Since the 
amount of land described at ’’Meadows pastures and scrubland” is significantly higher 
after the war than before 1936, the deducting has been made from this heading. 
However, choosing one or the other does not change the overall picture of the Table 
given the total amount of land under both of these alternative headings.
3.4: THE ESTIMATION OF THE RELATIVE BLACK MARKET PRICE FOR 
WHEAT IN CUENCA BETWEEN 1939 AND 1952
To estimate the average wheat price received by the farmers in Cuenca, it is necessary 
to know the relative size of the black market as well as the relative black market price. 
Unfortunately, this information is not available at the provincial level. However, we 
have just seen that the corrections of the cultivated area and production of wheat in 
Cuenca are close to those for the whole of Spain. Since the raison d’etre for the 
corrections was the existence of the black market, it has been assumed that the same
258
relative share of production went to the black market in Cuenca as in the whole of 
Spain.598
Concerning the relative black market price for wheat, it has not been possible to 
find much information from Cuenca. In a report written in February 1948 by an SNT- 
inspector, it was stated that the Principal of the SNT-warehouse in the village 
Quintana del Rey had sold 9,000 kilos of wheat, with a gain of some 30,000 
pesetas.599 This equals 3.33 pesetas/kilo and given the official price was 2.52 
pesetas/kilo, the gain represents 132% of the official price. This is relatively close to 
the estimate by Barciela and Garcia Gonzalez that the average price paid for wheat in 
the 1940s was 250% of the official price.600 Furthermore, according to the Chambers 
of Commerce in Bilbao and Zamora, the black market price for bread seems to be a bit 
low in 1947/48 compared to the normal level in the 1940s.601
The relative black market price varied from province to province and was 
influenced by whether a province was a net importer of wheat, what the distance was 
to large urban centres, the quality of the infrastructure, and the type of land 
ownership.602 All these factors were unfavourable to the farmers in Cuenca. This is so 
because the province had a considerable net export of wheat, a very small part of the 
population lived in urban centres, the distance to Madrid and Valencia were at least 70 
kilometres from the border of the province, and the neighbouring provinces Albacete, 
Ciudad Real, Guadalajara, Teruel and Toledo were also net exporters of wheat. 
Furthermore, the road system was deficient, and the majority of the farmers were 
family farmers, making their bargaining position weak when selling in the black 
market.
It does therefore not seem likely that the farmers in general were able to obtain 
relative black market prices that were substantially higher than the national average. 
Consequently, it has been assumed that the relative black market price for wheat in
598 These data are found in: Servicio Nacional de Trigo: Cosechas, comercio y  consumo de trigo desde 
la fundacion del servicio nacional hasta la cosecha de 1962.
599 Servicio Nacional de Trigo: Informe quincenal de la primera quincena de febrero de 1948, from an 
Inspector Provincial of the SNT in Temel temporarily working for the SNT in Cuenca.
600 See Section 3.2.
601 In Bilbao the black market price for bread in December 1948 was 4.57 times the official price. The 
average relative black market price between 1941-49 was 7.14 times the official price; Camera Oficial 
de Comercio, Industria y Navegacion de Bilbao: Memoria Comercial (1943-44, 1946, 1948-51); 
Gonzalez Portilla and Garmendia (1988), p. 33.
In Zamora, the relative black market price was 2.32 times the official price in 1947 and 2.12 times the 
official price in 1948. The average relative black market price in the 1946-50 period was 2.43 times the 
official price; Camara Oficial de Comercio e Industria de Zamora: Zamora 1946-1950. Memoria 
comprensiva de los aspectos mas interesantes de la provincia referido a dicho periodo, p. 262.
602 Barciela and Garcia Gonzalez (1983), pp. 78-79.
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Cuenca on average was 250% of the official price. This is similar to the estimate by 
Barciela and Garcia Gonzalez of the national average relative black market price. 
With this information, the revised value of wheat output in Cuenca between 1939 and 
1953 has been calculated in Table A.7. The new estimate in Column 8 of the value of 
wheat output is significantly higher in most of the 1940s than the original figures. The 
importance of this result for the analysis of the incentive structure for wheat farmers in 
Cuenca is discussed in detail in Section 6.6 in the main text.
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Table A.7: Original and revised figures for value of wheat output in Cuenca between 1939 and 1953.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Years Original wheat Official wheat price Original value of Revised wheat Share of output sold Black market Revised value of Revised value of wheat output
output data wheat output output in the black market wheat price wheat output as percent of original value of
(100s of kilos) (Pts per 100s of kilos) (Pesetas) (100s of kilos) (Percent) ( Pesetas) ( Pesetas) wheat output
1939 664210 70,50 46826805 735945 27,93 176,25 73620944 157
1940 700004 85,50 59850342 775604 30,88 213,75 97030907 162
1941 796502 86,00 68499172 872010 27,96 215,00 106444913 155
1942 869793 98,00 85239714 1171176 38,26 245,00 180644805 212
1943 642575 147,84 94998288 865291 34,12 369,60 193396553 204
1944 829083 182,07 150951142 1116360 34,27 455,18 307739311 204
1945 470855 161,97 76264384 634006 28,95 404,93 147283123 193
1946 1530276 194,10 297026572 1747269 31,02 485,25 496949080 167
1947 766705 139,57 107009017 1032368 35,58 348,93 220987215 207
1948 587641 178,79 105064334 791259 37,04 446,98 220069373 209
1949 970084 250,00 242521000 970084 32,75 625,00 361659441 149
1950 1102313 250,00 275578250 1102313 20,58 625,00 360649256 131
1951 1388270 293,00 406763110 1388270 18,10 732,50 517199294 127
1952 1261073 376,00 474163448 1261073 23,89 940,00 644079920 136
1953 762463 396,00 301935348 762463 8,65 990,00 341111459 113
Sources: Columns 1, 2 and 3: Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario Estadistico de las producciones agricolas (1939-40,1943-53); Instituto Nacional de Estadistica:
Anuario Estadistico de Esparia (1943). Column 4: Own estimation according to Appendix 3. Column 5: Own estimation applying share of national wheat output sold in
the black market to the situation in Cuenca. Data for share of national wheat output sold in black market are from: Sevicion Nacional de Trigo (1963): Table C.-10-1.
Column 6: Own estimation as explained in text and based estimate of relative black market wheat price from Barciela and Garcia GonzSlez (1983).
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